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Abstract 
This thesis offers a historical account of the emergence and evolution of new Islamic 
educational institutions in Saudi Arabia in the twentieth century which came to sit at 
the heart of migratory circuits of students and scholars from across the globe. It pays 
special attention to the Islamic University of Medina (IUM), which was launched by the 
Saudi state in 1961 to offer fully-funded religious instruction to mostly non-Saudi 
students. Exploring the history of this missionary project provides a point of departure 
for interrogating the commonplace claim that Saudi actors have taken advantage of 
wealth derived from oil rents in recent decades to fund the export of Wahhabism. In 
order to understand the far-reaching cultural, social and political dynamics that have 
emerged from this nexus between migration, education, material investment and 
religious mission, this study develops a historiography grounded in a novel conception 
of transnational religious economies. These are understood to consist in flows – both 
within and across national borders – of material capital, spiritual capital, religious 
migrants and social technologies. While Saudi state spending has been crucial for the 
operation of institutions like the IUM, its missionary project has also drawn on a far 
wider range of resources within the terms of these economies, including migrant 
labour, sources of symbolic legitimation and modes of pedagogy appropriated from 
beyond the Peninsula. The IUM’s syllabuses, whilst firmly rooted in core Wahhabi 
concerns, have also been shaped by processes of hegemonic engagement with migrant 
students. Finally, students bearing spiritual capital accumulated on its campus have 
themselves made divergent uses of these resources in locations around the world. The 
notion of transnational religious economies developed here shines light on the 
multiple resources, border crossings, historical contingencies, interests and forms of 
agency bound up in the articulation of a power-laden, state-led project of “religious 
expansion”. 
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Note on Transliteration and Referencing 
Throughout this thesis, I have relied on the International Journal of Middle East Studies 
transliteration system when rendering Arabic words in the Latin alphabet. 
With regard to referencing, where a particular primary source or piece of secondary 
literature is identifiable by the name of the author and the date of its publication, I 
have included this information in the body of the text. Where more complex 
referencing is required, or where there is a need for further discussion of a particular 
source or secondary work, I have used footnotes. Dates are given according to the 
Gregorian calendar, with Hijri dates also supplied where this may be helpful to the 
reader. Where the publication date for a given resource is available only as a year 
according to the Hijri calendar (e.g. 1419 H., with no further details regarding the day 
or the month), I have converted this into the equivalent range of years according to 
the Gregorian calendar (e.g. 1998/9) when referencing in the body of the thesis and 
have given both sets of details in the bibliography. 
Referencing of articles from the journal of the Islamic University of Medina is 
somewhat complex. For the first 44 issues of this journal from its inauguration in 1968, 
each issue is identified by a volume number (reflecting the number of years that the 
journal had been in publication) followed by an issue number (reflecting the order of 
the quarterly issues published in any given year); e.g. 4(3) for the third quarterly issue 
published in the fourth year of the journal’s existence. Subsequent issues are identified 
by an issue number only; i.e. 45, 46, 47, and so on. In my own referencing, I have stuck 
to this original system (e.g. 11(4) for the final quarterly issue published in the eleventh 
year of the journal’s existence, but 45 for the subsequent issue). Online records of the 
IUM journal, which I relied upon heavily in my research, do not always include details 
of the year and month in which any given issue was published. Where that is the case, I 
have sought to indicate an approximate timeframe (e.g. mid-1970s) in the body of the 
thesis text on the basis of the available information. 
Where information is drawn from interviews, I have given details of the interviews in 
question in footnotes. In most cases, I refer to interviewees using a single-letter 
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pseudonym, in order to protect their identities. This issue is discussed further in the 
introduction to the thesis. 
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Glossary 
ʿAqīda: creed 
Bidʿa (pl. bidaʿ): innovation, usually in this context with the connotation of heresy 
Dāʿiya (pl. duʿāt): one who calls or invites; in this context, Islamic missionary 
Daʿwa: call, summons, invitation; in this context, religious mission 
Fiqh: jurisprudence 
Ḥalaqa (pl. ḥalaqāt): study circle 
Ḥaram: sanctuary; the dual plural Haramayn is used to refer jointly to the Masjid 
Haram and the Masjid Nabawi in Mecca and Medina; also denotes the areas around 
these sites which non-Muslims are not permitted to enter 
Ijāza (pl. ijāzāt): certificate traditionally issued by a scholar to affirm a student’s 
mastery of a particular subject or text, or several of each 
Ijtihād: derivation of legal rulings by independent interpretation, on the basis of direct 
access to the source texts 
Kuttāb (pl. katātīb): traditional Qurʾan school 
Madhhab (pl. madhāhib): used primarily here to refer to one of the established schools 
of Islamic law; may also refer to a school of thought more generally 
al-Masjid al-Haram: the Grand Mosque, in Mecca 
al-Masjid al-Nabawi: the Prophet’s Mosque, in Medina 
Mawlid: commemorations of the Prophet’s birthday 
Qadi (pl. quḍāt): shariʿa judge 
Tafsīr: Qurʾanic exegesis 
Taʿlīm: education, with an emphasis on the transmission of knowledge 
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Taqlīd: practice of imitating the legal rulings of a particular madhhab 
Tarbiya: education, with an emphasis on the moulding of character 
Ṭarīqa (pl. ṭuruq): Sufi order 
Tawḥīd: the unicity of God 
ʿUlamaʾ (sing. ʿālim): (religious) scholars 
ʿUmra: the lesser pilgrimage to Mecca, performed outside the hajj season 
Uṣūl al-fiqh: legal methodology 
Uṣūl al-ḥadīth: the principles of hadith studies 
Vilayet: (Ottoman) province 
Waqf (pl. awqāf): religious endowment 
Zāwiya (pl. zawāyā): Sufi lodge 
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Introduction 
In an article published in September 2012 under the headline “How Saudi Petrodollars 
Fuel Rise of Salafism”, France24 cited Antoine Basbous, head of the Paris-based 
Observatory of Arab Countries, as explaining that 
“the Salafism we hear about in Mali and North Africa is in fact the export version of 
Wahhabism,” a conservative branch of Sunni Islam actively promoted and practised by 
Saudi Arabia’s ruling family. Since the 1970s oil crises provided the ruling House of Saud 
with a seemingly endless supply of cash, “the Saudis have been financing [Wahhabism] 
around the world to the tune of several million euros” (Daou 2012) 
Particularly in the wake of the Arab Spring and the dramatic emergence of Salafi 
currents onto the political stage in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria and elsewhere in the 
Middle East, the suggestion that such groups – and the modes of religiosity which they 
espouse – are in some sense a Saudi export has become common currency in public 
discourse.1 However, claims of this kind tend to raise more questions than they answer. 
What is the supposed “export version of Wahhabism” at stake here, and what is its 
relationship with the diverse strands of Salafi religiosity that have proliferated in 
locations around the world – not only in North Africa and the Middle East but also in 
Europe, North America, the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, and beyond – in 
recent decades? Through what channels and frameworks has this process of “export” 
occurred? Who are “the Saudis” involved in these dynamics? What are their 
motivations? How have their target audiences responded to these initiatives? 
For a historian of the modern Middle East, claims about the supposed export of 
Wahhabism also raise important questions of a more theoretical nature. What exactly 
does it mean to speak of “exporting” a particular religious or cultural framework? 
What circumstances facilitate the movement of persons, ideas, practices and 
institutions across borders? To what extent might these things undergo 
transformations as they are translated into new geographical, social, cultural and 
political contexts? What factors contribute to shaping the outcome of these 
transformations? How does the availability of material capital - the oft-noted 
“petrodollars” – feed into processes of cultural change? If it is indeed true that there is 
                                                        
1 For comparable examples, see Schwartz 2001; Winsor 2007; Vallely 2007; Pabst 2009; Mir 
2012; Lavizzari 2013. 
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a relationship between flows of material capital and processes of cultural change, then 
how does human agency figure in this picture? And what power relations are 
established which might variously constrain or facilitate such agency? 
A scholar looking to make headway with the moot question of Saudi or Wahhabi 
“religious expansion”2 might choose between any number of empirical angles. She or 
he might focus on the history of Saudi-sponsored missionary organisations like the 
Muslim World League (est. 1962) or the World Association of Muslim Youth.3 Another 
option would be to explore influence exerted by Saudi actors in the sphere of religious 
publishing, which may or may not have played a significant role in ensuring that Salafi-
oriented literature is readily available on the internet and through institutions such as 
mosques and Islamic bookshops worldwide.4 Alternatively, one might focus on the role 
of Saudi actors in funding mosque-building and offering financial support to a range of 
religious institutions and movements the world over; although one would need to 
allow for the fact that such money has ended up with a range of constituencies both 
within and outside circles that would commonly be labelled Salafi.5 
Though many of these issues will be touched upon in the course of this thesis, the 
thrust of my own approach is to develop a historical account of the emergence of new 
Islamic educational institutions in Saudi Arabia in the twentieth century which have 
come to sit at the heart of cross-border circuits of students and scholars from all over 
the world. Migrants have for centuries travelled long distances in order to perform the 
hajj and to teach and undertake religious studies in the holy cities of the Hijaz, in what 
is now western Saudi Arabia. I explore the ways in which the operation of these cross-
                                                        
2 The phrase “religious expansion” is borrowed from Al-Rasheed 2008a. 
3 Though brief treatments of such institutions are found in the English-language literature (e.g. 
Schulze 1995), such sustained studies as exist are available only in their original German and 
Russian (Sharipova 1986; Schulze 1990). 
4 In the most focused work of this kind to date, Eleanor Doumato (2008) concludes that “no 
case can be made” that Saudi religious publications have led to Wahhabi influence penetrating 
the Muslim community in the United States. The issue is also discussed in Haykel 2004 and 
touched upon in Birt 2005; Abou El Fadl 2007. 
5 Yoginder Sikand (2007) has explored how Saudi funding has intersected with pre-existing 
sectarian divisions in India. Such funding is also discussed in Birt 2004; Al‐Rasheed 2004c; Abou 
El Fadl 2007. For a report by a graduate of the Islamic University of Medina on Saudi 
sponsorship of a wide range of Salafi and non-Salafi institutions in the United Kingdom, see S. 
Hasan n.d. 
 15 
border circuits, and the cultural, social and political influence that they have long 
exerted in locations far beyond the Arabian Peninsula, were impacted by the rise of 
the modern Saudi state, the access of Saudi state actors to material resources made 
available in part from oil rents, and their investment of these resources in educational 
projects geared towards daʿwa – which may be loosely translated in this context as 
missionary work – with global reach. 
While non-Saudi students and scholars have taught and undertaken religious studies in 
an array of settings in Saudi Arabia in the period covered by this study, I focus on the 
history of one especially important institution. This is the explicitly missionary Islamic 
University of Medina (IUM), which was launched by the Saudi state in 1961. The IUM 
has been distinguished from the kingdom’s other Islamic universities by its primary 
goal of offering fully-funded religious instruction to young, non-Saudi men, who from 
the start made up over 80 per cent of its student body. The expectation was that, after 
graduation, these students would return to their communities of origin or travel on 
elsewhere as duʿāt (sing. dāʿiya), or missionaries. Although they were certainly 
expected to preach to non-Muslims, the focus was on offering guidance to Muslim 
communities which were seen as having deviated from orthodox religious belief and 
practice. Over the half a century that has elapsed since the founding of the IUM, many 
thousands of young men from all across the globe have passed through its system of 
instruction. For the first decades of the university’s existence, a very large proportion 
of its staff were also recruited from beyond Saudi Arabia. 
Scholars writing on related subjects have singled out these cross-border religious 
educational circuits as an especially important framework through which Saudi actors 
have sought to extend their religious influence beyond the kingdom’s borders, with 
Yahya Birt describing the IUM as being “at the centre of the global Wahhabi mission” 
(2005, 170–71).6 Studies of Salafi currents around the world have also in passing 
revealed key roles played in the emergence and consolidation of those currents by 
                                                        
6 See also Samer Traboulsi’s (2008) passing remark on this subject in the context of a review of 
David Commins’s The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. 
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graduates of the IUM.7 Yet these references in the context of serious academic studies 
to the role played by the IUM in the spread of Salafism worldwide have been more or 
less oblique and limited in scope. Moreover, discussion of this issue in journalistic 
reporting and even in some of what has passed for semi-academic literature has 
frequently involved basic inaccuracies and a sometimes staggering degree of 
obfuscation. To give just one example, Dore Gold’s polemic work Hatred’s Kingdom 
uncritically quotes the “Chechen government’s special envoy to Europe, Hajj Salih 
Brandt” as asserting that: 
The whole political agenda of Wahhabi Fundamentalism (what the West now calls 
Islamism)… [is] a deviation of Islam taught in Madinah University in Saudi Arabia, 
sponsored by the Saudi government and exported from there… Out of it have come 
Hamas, the Taliban, Osama bin Laden, the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front], Sudan, and now 
the gangs roaming Chechyna and Daghestan (quoted in Gold 2003, 4–5) 
It is left to the reader to puzzle over the sense in which “Wahhabi fundamentalism” 
might usefully be considered as equivalent to “Islamism”, or how any of these 
individuals and movements – let alone Sudan – are products of Wahhabism as taught 
at the IUM. 
By focusing this project on one particular aspect of the far broader set of issues that 
fall under the rubric of Wahhabi “religious expansion” – the intersection between 
migration, education and religious mission – the hope is that it will be possible to move 
past generalisations. By pulling on this single thread – a narrow set of cross-border 
dynamics which have crystallised since the early 1960s around one key institution – 
vague abstractions like “Salafisation” and “Wahhabisation” can be made to give way to 
concrete frameworks, and the biographies and memories of identifiable students and 
scholars. Moreover, it becomes possible to achieve a richer understanding of recent 
dynamics of Wahhabi religious expansion by bringing a historical perspective to bear, 
situating them in relation to long-standing processes of migration, religious 
transformation, and state- and nation-building. 
                                                        
7 For example, in his study of Salafism in the Bale region of Ethiopia, Terje Østebø (2012, 148, 
204) emphasises the role played by the Salafiyya Madrasa in Robe. This school emerged as a 
key hub of Salafi proselytising with the arrival of two IUM graduates in 1976, and it has since 
employed at least 15 other IUM alumni. 
 17 
I am particularly concerned with exploring the extent to which proselytising within the 
framework of cross-border religious educational circuits centred on Saudi Arabia in the 
twentieth century may have contributed to the construction, perpetuation and 
subversion of power relations both within and across borders, and the ways in which 
material resources available to Saudi state actors may have figured in such dynamics. 
Research grounded in the themes of power and resistance can go some way towards 
explaining what motivates people to engage in revivalist daʿwa within this framework, 
how the impact of these processes has played out in diverse locations, and why the 
Saudi state, ʿulamaʾ and other actors have invested so heavily in this sphere. It also 
offers a basis for interrogating the commonplace intuition that this religious expansion 
has amounted in some sense to an extension of Saudi “hegemony”, “influence” or 
“soft power”.8 
The task of exploring such questions is made easier by a growing body of academic 
research on religion and politics in Saudi Arabia.9 This literature has served to highlight 
diversity and conflicts within the Saudi national sphere and has opened up debate 
regarding the extent to which religious actors, institutions and trends inside Saudi 
Arabia have themselves been influenced by persons, movements, ideas and practices 
arriving from outside the kingdom. Stéphane Lacroix has proposed a “Copernican 
revolution”, whereby Saudi Arabia is no longer seen “solely as a power that exports 
Islam” but also comes to be understood as “the recipient of influences emanating from 
most currents of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Islamic revivalism” (2011, 1). 
According to this thinking, such influences have given rise to divisions and debates in 
Saudi Arabia within and between groupings including: traditional Wahhabi circles; 
politically activist strands influenced by inter alia immigrant Muslim Brothers from 
Egypt, the Levant and elsewhere, and the Syrian former Muslim Brother Muhammad 
Surur Zayn al-ʿAbidin; exclusivist quietists influenced by the Albania-born Muhammad 
                                                        
8 See, for example, Madawi Al-Rasheed’s remark that, “From the very beginning, Saudi Arabia 
pursued an expansionist religious policy, the main purpose of which was to protect the Saudi 
realm and promote its interests, in both adjacent and far-flung territories. Islam became an 
important means for the Saudi state to enhance its legitimacy with a hesitant Muslim 
population worldwide” (2008b, 2). 
9 Important recent examples include Commins 2005; Al-Rasheed 2007; Hegghammer 2010; 
Lacroix 2011. 
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Nasir al-Din al-Albani, amongst others; and militants inspired in part by the Afghan 
conflict of the 1980s. In contrast, Madawi Al-Rasheed (2007) has tended to emphasise 
the role played by indigenous grievances and influences in catalysing the emergence of 
the wave of politically-engaged Islamist activism known as the Sahwa, which peaked in 
Saudi Arabia in the first half of the 1990s, as well as a later surge of more militant 
currents. Without denying the relevance of transnational connections, she has noted 
the need to be alert to the ways in which the narrative of the Saudi Islamist scene 
having been shaped primarily by external influences has been mobilised as “an excuse 
propagated by official Saudi figures in order to absolve their own indigenous Islamists 
from any wrongdoing after 9/11” (Al-Rasheed 2013). Whatever role might be 
attributed to foreigners, it is clear that many of these dynamics of fracture and 
contestation have played out within and around the IUM, as well as the kingdom’s 
other Islamic universities. 
This project also benefits from a growing body of academic research on contemporary 
Salafism in other locations around the world.10 This literature has sometimes touched 
upon the trajectories of non-Saudi staff members and graduates of Saudi Islamic 
universities. More broadly, it has provided scope for contextualising the history of 
Salafi educational institutions like the IUM by highlighting the diversity, local 
specificities, and cross-border connections and debates, which characterise Salafism 
today. While Salafi currents around the world are frequently influenced in part by 
Saudi actors, they have histories of their own which often pre-date institutions like the 
IUM. Moreover, the social, cultural and political projects pursued by Salafis have taken 
on contrasting valences within different local and national contexts, and have also 
given rise to and been shaped by long-distance connections which bypass the kingdom 
altogether. 
When pieced together, the insights offered in these two bodies of literature begin to 
indicate ways in which institutions like the IUM have both been influenced by and have 
exerted influence within a lattice of cross-border processes and connections. 
                                                        
10 In addition to the works on Saudi Arabia listed in the previous footnote, important examples 
include Wiktorowicz 2006; Lauzière 2008; Meijer 2009; Lauzière 2010; Bonnefoy 2011; Østebø 
2012; Wagemakers 2012a; Gauvain 2013; Pall 2013. 
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In building on this earlier work, the key contributions of this thesis are twofold. Firstly, 
I develop an empirical account of cross-border circuits of scholars and students – and 
corresponding cross-border flows of religious ideas, practices and resources – centred 
on the Arabian Peninsula in the modern period. I consider how such dynamics played 
out prior to and immediately after the founding of the current Saudi state but focus in 
particular on the ways in which they came to crystallise around the IUM from the early 
1960s onwards. The sustained treatment of these issues offered in this thesis goes 
considerably beyond the fragmentary insights that are to be found in the existing 
secondary literature. 
Secondly, I seek to develop a sociology of the ways in which – in the context of the 
particular dynamics at stake here – material capital possessed by certain Saudi actors 
has provided for the exercise of power and influence in the religious sphere abroad. 
This involves an effort to understand how material resources may have contributed to 
granting these actors privileged status within what are no doubt far more extensive, 
multivalent cross-border processes involving a diversity of persons and institutions, 
and an array of local and national contexts. A sociology of this kind is absent from the 
existing literature. Instead, in studies which have otherwise offered rich insights into 
the ways in which Salafi currents have developed and evolved in particular locations 
around the world, any role played by Saudi actors has commonly been glossed in 
passing in terms of the unsatisfactory “export” metaphor, which leaves many of the 
questions identified at the beginning of this thesis unanswered.11 Alternatively, to the 
extent that scholars have sought to address the cross-border processes in question in 
transnational perspective, this approach has sometimes tended to shine the spotlight 
away from sustained consideration of the power and influence exerted by the Saudi 
political and religious establishments.12 In an effort to address these issues, I argue for 
the utility of a novel conception of transnational religious economies, consisting in 
                                                        
11 For example, Østebø offers valuable insights into the “localisation” of Salafi actors, ideas and 
practices in the Bale region of Ethiopia but has recourse to the “export” metaphor when it 
comes to explaining how Salafi ideas first arrived in part from Saudi Arabia (2012, xxi, 131). 
12  For a discussion of this issue, see my critical engagement with Laurent Bonnefoy’s 
impressive study of Salafism in Yemen, in Farquhar 2013. 
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flows – both within and across borders – of religious migrants, social technologies, and 
material and symbolic forms of capital. 
In what follows, I begin with a brief discussion of Islam, Salafism and Wahhabism, the 
latter two labels in particular being unavoidable in a study of this nature and yet so 
ambiguous and contested as to require some dedicated consideration and definition. I 
subsequently turn to setting out the historiographical framework that guides this study, 
explaining the bodies of literature on which it draws and developing a theoretical 
toolbox suited to tackling the questions at hand. I then offer a brief overview of my 
research methods and sources. Finally, I outline the chapters that make up this thesis 
and sketch in a little more detail the arguments that tie them together. 
Islamic, Salafi and Wahhabi Traditions 
As a basis for making sense of the terms Islam, Salafism and Wahhabism – and the 
relationships which exist between them – I draw on Talal Asad’s (1986) conception of 
Islam as a “discursive tradition”. According to this understanding, the notion of 
tradition does not denote an ossified set of beliefs and practices, endlessly reproduced 
across space and time. Rather, as usefully paraphrased by Samira Haj, it consists in 
“historically evolving discourses embodied in the practices and institutions of 
communities”, or “a framework of inquiry within which Muslims have attempted to 
amend and redirect Islamic discourses to meet new challenges and conflicts as they 
materialised in different historical eras”. For all its internal heterogeneity and 
transformation over time, the Islamic tradition is held together by Muslims’ “pursuit of 
an ongoing coherence by making reference to a set of texts, procedures, arguments 
and practices” (Haj 2009, 4–5). 
Building on this approach, Salafism may be thought of as a “tradition within a 
tradition”. If the Islamic tradition as a whole is lent coherence by such broad elements 
as belief in the oneness of God and the mobilisation of arguments legitimated with 
reference to the Qurʾan, then the Salaﬁ tradiƟon as understood for the purposes of 
this thesis is further distinguished by a more specific overlapping set of methodological 
principles, texts and practices. The origins, history and shifting meanings of the term 
“Salafism” are a matter of considerable debate (Lauzière 2010). However, I draw on 
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work by Bernard Haykel (2009, 38–39) in defining the Salafi tradition as being primarily 
characterised by six interconnected theological features. The first feature, as outlined 
by Haykel, is an emphasis on the authentic purity of the beliefs and praxis of the Salaf 
al-Salih (the “pious ancestors”), often understood to denote members of the Muslim 
community who lived in the period from the time of the revelation of the Qurʾan unƟl 
the death of the jurist Ahmad ibn Hanbal in 855. The second is a distinctive 
understanding of the concept of tawḥīd (the unicity of God), which in turn tends to 
give rise to a strong emphasis on the importance of correct worship of God alone and 
the view that many traditional Islamic practices constitute shirk (polytheism). The 
details of this conception of tawḥīd will be discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis. The 
third relevant feature of the Salafi tradition is a stress on combating perceived unbelief, 
particularly any attitudes or practices understood as amounting to shirk. The fourth is 
insistence that the Qurʾan, the sunna and “the consensus of the Prophet’s 
companions” are the only legitimate bases of religious authority. The fifth is an 
emphasis on purging illegitimate innovations (bidaʿ, sing. bidʿa) understood to have 
corrupted Islamic belief and praxis over the centuries since the time of the Salaf al-
Salih. The final feature identified by Haykel is a commitment to the view that the 
Qurʾan and the sunna are clear in meaning and that they are “sufficient to guide 
Muslims for all time and through all contingencies”. 
Salafism as defined here is an exclusively Sunni phenomenon; the sunna which is so 
central to the Salafi tradition being “equated with the canonical Sunni hadith 
collections” (Haykel 2009, 39). It is also worth noting that Salafism thus defined does 
not encompass late nineteenth-century reformists like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani or 
Muhammad ʿAbduh. While al-Afghani and ʿAbduh have often been depicted as 
representatives of a particular brand of modernist Salafism, their theology differed 
from that outlined here. Moreover, their ecumenical vision contrasted with the 
exclusivist attitudes towards non-Salafi Muslims which many contemporary Salafis 
derive from this theology (Haykel 2009, 45–47). 
As with the broader Islamic tradition of which it is a part, the Salafi tradition is again by 
no means either homogeneous or fixed across time and space. Rather, Salafis draw on 
this tradition as a basis for engaging with whatever issues present themselves in the 
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particular social and historical contexts in which they live their lives. The conclusions 
that they reach about appropriate ways of responding to any given matter can and 
frequently do strongly conflict. Contemporary Salafis dispute one another fiercely over 
such issues as the legitimacy of political activism and the permissibility of violent action 
as a means for effecting political change under current conditions.13 Yet their sharply 
divergent views and the heated debates in which they engage are a matter of 
disputation within a common “framework of inquiry”, the key features of which were 
delineated above. 
While the term Salafi may have positive connotations, evoking the historical and 
religious authenticity of the Salaf al-Salih, the label Wahhabi is an exonym generally 
considered derogatory by those to whom it is applied. I opt to use it in the context of 
this thesis for lack of a better alternative and because of the importance of 
distinguishing the Wahhabi tradition from the broader Salafi tradition of which it, in 
turn, is part. While Wahhabism displays all of the features of Salafism outlined above, 
it has certain further characteristics which justify treating it as a distinguishable sub-
tradition within the broader Salafi tradition. These features include the central place 
given within it to works authored by the eighteenth-century Najdi reformer 
Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab and certain of his descendants. Another feature of 
the Wahhabi tradition is a distinctive approach to jurisprudence. In principle, 
Wahhabism shares with many other modes of Salafism a commitment to rejecting 
blind emulation of the rulings of any of the four – Hanbali, Hanafi, Maliki and Shafiʿi – 
mainstream Sunni schools of law. The view within the Salafi tradition that the meaning 
of the Qurʾan and the sunna is quite transparent and that these, along with the 
consensus of the companions of the Prophet, are unrivalled as sources of religious 
authority often gives rise to an emphasis on deriving legal rulings directly from these 
                                                        
13 Quintan Wiktorowicz has used these fault lines as the basis for a tripartite categorisation of 
contemporary Salafis into purists (who “emphasize a focus on nonviolent methods of 
propagation, purification, and education” and “view politics as a diversion that encourages 
deviancy”), politicos (who “emphasize application of the Salafi creed to the political arena”) 
and jihadis (who “argue that the current context calls for violence and revolution”) (2006, 208). 
While I employ these labels at points in this thesis for the sake of convenience, I generally 
favour the historical specificity allowed by consideration of particular individuals, movements 
and institutions rather than ideal types. Any given individual may – both over time and at any 
given point in time – subscribe to views which span these three categories.  
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sources rather than relying on secondary works authored by the jurists associated with 
these schools of law. However, in practice Wahhabism has historically had a very 
strong – albeit complex – relationship with the Hanbali jurisprudential tradition. While 
these issues will be unpacked further in Chapter 6 of this thesis, they are mentioned 
here in order to illustrate the importance of identifying the Wahhabi tradition as a 
distinctive thread within the broader Salafi tradition. Once again, it is worth 
emphasising that Wahhabism has been and is marked by variation between its 
adherents both over time and also at any given point in time. The views expressed by 
Wahhabis have varied on a whole range of issues; including, for example, the question 
of how to manage relations with non-Muslims and non-Salafi Muslims (Al-Fahad 2004; 
Wagemakers 2012b). As with any other discursive tradition, the texts, principles, 
practices and other elements which make up the Wahhabi “framework of inquiry” are 
amenable to diverse interpretations and applications. 
Transnational Religious Economies 
The body of literature that has grown up around Asad’s notion of Islam as a discursive 
tradition has contributed valuable insights to the study of the beliefs, practices and 
politics of Muslims, both past and present (e.g. Mahmood 2005; Deeb 2006; Hirschkind 
2006; Haj 2009). Conceiving of Islam as a discursive tradition has provided for nuanced 
understanding of the coexistence of heterogeneity, transformation and coherence in 
the religious sphere, has problematised longstanding assumptions about the nature of 
orthodoxy, and has challenged persistent dichotomies such as that posited between 
the modern and the traditional.14 Moreover, by conceptualising Islam in terms of a 
notion of discourse encompassing such elements as moral affect, modes of normative 
reasoning, knowledge, ethics and embodied practice, scholars working in this vein 
have developed rich insights into the ways in which Muslims engage with their religion. 
As part of her work on women’s mosque study circles in Cairo, for example, Saba 
Mahmood has explored how those involved in such groups train themselves in 
distinctive modes of moral reasoning which include an emphasis on religious 
                                                        
14 Samira Haj, for example, has drawn on Asad’s work in order to reject depictions of the late 
nineteenth-century Egyptian reformist Muhammad ʿAbduh as either a tradiƟonalist or a 
Westerniser. Instead, she has explored his struggle to “reconfigure orthodoxy by drawing from 
within the parameters of the Islamic discursive tradition” (Haj 2009, 107 emphasis added). 
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knowledge and engagement with historical Islamic sources, in constant dialogue with 
contemporary concerns (Mahmood 2005, 78–116). With regard to the disciplining of 
moral affect, Charles Hirschkind has considered the ways in which consumers of 
sermon cassettes in Egypt engage with them not only in terms of the meaning of the 
words being uttered by the preacher but also as part of an ethical process of moulding 
“visceral” aspects of their own subjectivities; for example, actively seeking to cultivate 
a fear of damnation and desire for rewards in the afterlife (Hirschkind 2006). As Samuli 
Schielke notes, such studies have generated productive ways of thinking about 
religious phenomena without treating them as merely epiphenomenal of political or 
economic dynamics, and they have illustrated that “Muslims’ engagement with their 
religion is neither the outcome of blind adherence, nor the result of coercion, but an 
active and dynamic process of engagement with ideals of good life and personhood” 
(Schielke 2010, 1, 5). 
However, while the present study builds on insights that have emerged from this line 
of inquiry, it will at the same time be necessary to move past them. From the 
perspective of this project, this literature has two primary limitations. The first is that, 
with its understanding of the beliefs and practices of Muslims in terms of discourse in 
the sense outlined in the preceding paragraph, it often has little to say about the role 
of material economies in relation to religious life. It thus offers few tools for 
understanding how material wealth possessed by Saudi state actors might have 
contributed to dynamics of religious transformation beyond Saudi Arabia’s borders. To 
make this point is not to call for a revival of modes of analysis which reduce religious 
phenomena to economic phenomena. Rather, what is required is consideration of how 
the two spheres may intersect. 
The second key limitation of this line of inquiry in relation to the present study 
concerns the ways in which questions of power are conceptualised in much of this 
literature. Power and resistance have an important place in Asad’s notion of Islam as a 
discursive tradition. For him, argument and conflict are central to the ways in which 
such traditions operate and evolve. This conflict plays out as struggles to define 
orthodoxy, which is itself characterised by Asad precisely as “a relationship of power”: 
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Wherever Muslims have the power to regulate, uphold, require, or adjust correct 
practices, and to condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace incorrect ones, there is the 
domain of orthodoxy. The way these powers are exercised, the conditions that make 
them possible (social, political, economic, etc.), and the resistances they encounter 
(from Muslims and non-Muslims) are equally the concern of an anthropology of Islam, 
regardless of whether its direct object of research is in the city or in the countryside, in 
the present or in the past. Argument and conflict over the form and significance of 
practices are therefore a natural part of any Islamic tradition (Asad 1986, 15–16) 
Yet the conceptions of power prevalent in much of the literature that draws on Asad’s 
ideas tend to be somewhat abstract. The focus is frequently on themes such as 
“discursive power” or disciplinary practices, often with particular attention to their role 
in more or less introspective processes of pious subject-formation. At least when used 
in isolation, discourse analysis in this mode offers only limited scope for exploring 
power as exercised by one identifiable actor or set of actors over another. As Samah 
Selim (2010) has argued in relation to Mahmood’s work, what is lacking is “a notion of 
daʿwa as an explicit modality of politics and power that is not only directed inward to a 
physical embodiment of the spiritual self, but outwards, at a network of other bodies”. 
The concept of daʿwa – which directly translates as a call, a summons or an invitation – 
has been invoked in contemporary and historical Islamic discourse with a range of 
connotations.15 However, in the context of this thesis I use the term primarily to 
denote missionary efforts to promote a particular understanding of what it means to 
be Muslim at the expense of alternative ways of knowing and living Islam. Daʿwa in this 
sense involves not only self-oriented projects of moral development but also power-
laden struggles between actors, of the kind identified by Asad. It is an inherently 
political venture in a dual sense. On the one hand, it involves antagonistic, relational 
struggles over identity in which actors seek to secure recognition of their status as 
adherents of true, orthodox Islam in the face of efforts by others to contest the 
definition of orthodoxy at stake and thereby to undermine their claims to this identity. 
On the other hand, daʿwa as defined here is also inherently political insofar as it 
involves efforts to assert and secure assent to normative claims about the proper 
                                                        
15 For discussion of the history and shifting valences of the term daʿwa, which has been 
employed within the Sunni and Shiʿi tradiƟons to capture such varied acƟviƟes and ideas as the 
act of prayer, efforts to call non-Muslims to Islam, social welfare projects, or even Islam itself, 
see Miloš Mendel 1995; Walker, Schulze, and Masud 1995; Eickelman and Piscatori 2004, 35–
36. 
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organisation both of social life and of the individual lives of others, in a context where 
these claims are also contested.16 Analysis of daʿwa as a missionary venture must 
engage with its status as an inherently political project. 
The two limitations outlined here intersect at the point at which one wishes to 
consider – to use Asad’s terminology – the economic conditions which make the 
exercise of power possible. This is crucial if one is to understand Saudi or Wahhabi 
religious expansion as a project enacted by a particular set of persons and institutions 
with a view to extending their influence and authority over an array of other actors 
beyond the kingdom’s borders, in ways enabled in part by access to material wealth. If 
steps in this direction are to build on the idea of Islam as a discursive tradition, it will 
be necessary to consider the ways in which material resources might figure in the 
dynamics of power, resistance and conflict involved in the development of such 
traditions. In order to think through these issues, I suggest efforts to situate discourse 
– encompassing such elements as knowledge, modes of reasoning, embodied practices, 
pre-rational intuitions, and registers of affect – within broader patterns of unequal 
exchange and struggle. It is to this end that I develop a historiography grounded in a 
particular understanding of transnational religious economies. 
This approach is suggested in part by recent work by Nile Green (2011), in which he 
uses the vocabulary of the market – religious “firms”, “products”, “services” and 
“franchises”, along with “social technologies”, “(de)regulation”, and so on – to explore 
a “religious economy” spanning the western Indian Ocean in the nineteenth century. 
To the extent that Green draws on pre-existing theoretical work as a point of 
departure for this mode of historiography, he turns primarily to a body of literature by 
sociologists who have elaborated a notion of religious economies rooted in rational 
choice theory. Within this paradigm, such economies are understood to consist in the 
aggregate of the choices made by suppliers and consumers of religious goods, who are 
                                                        
16 The definition of “the political” that I employ here draws directly on Mandaville 2001, 9–11. 
It has been noted that in many historical contexts, including under the Fatimids and the 
Abbasids, daʿwa was “used to propagate the specific claims of dynasties”, becoming “virtually 
synonymous with political propaganda” (Eickelman and Piscatori 2004, 35). Such direct 
connections with state power need not necessarily apply in order for daʿwa to be understood 
as political in the broad sense outlined here. 
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in turn assumed to act according to a profit-maximising rationality grounded in cost-
benefit analyses.17 However, this particular body of theoretical literature has limited 
utility in the context of the present study. Authors working in this vein have developed 
differing understandings of human needs, preferences and decision-making. 
Nonetheless, the underlying emphasis on self-interested profit-maximisation is worlds 
away from the subtle insights offered by the anthropologists discussed above in 
relation to the forging of different modes of agency within the terms of a discursive 
tradition, including through the cultivation of pious affect and particular configurations 
of normative reasoning. Moreover, the essentially liberal conception of religious 
markets as the aggregate of more or less free choices made by profit-maximising 
producers and consumers can do little to help achieve the goal at hand; to theorise the 
ways in which material resources may figure in the exercise of power in the context of 
struggles to define orthodoxy within a discursive tradition. In order to develop such 
analysis, it is necessary to pay attention to markets as spheres of activity characterised 
not only by choice but also by privilege and deprivation, power-laden conflict, and 
social struggle. 
I therefore turn to an alternative understanding of religious economies, informed by 
ideas whose genealogy ultimately traces back to the work of Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu 
criticised the distinction commonly made between, on the one hand, material 
economies and, on the other, areas of life seen as being fundamentally non-economic 
and somehow “disinterested”, including the arts and intellectual pursuits. Instead, he 
advocated the study of a broader “economy of practices”, in which social relations are 
conceived in terms of the accumulation and exchange not only of material capital – 
economic resources, conventionally understood – but also immaterial capital. The 
latter includes social capital, “the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of 
mutual acquaintance and recognition”. It also includes cultural capital. Cultural capital 
may be objectified in the form of “cultural goods”, like “writings, paintings, 
monuments, instruments, etc.”. It may also be institutionalised, such that a corporate 
                                                        
17 Important statements and useful overviews of this rational choice approach to the study of 
religion include Stark 1985; Stark 1997; Finke and Stark 2003; Lechner 2007. 
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body acquires the capacity to issue academic and other kinds of qualifications. Finally, 
cultural capital may be embodied, as “long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body”, 
including such things as knowledge and tastes (Bourdieu 1986, 241–52). In this case, 
through processes of learning and socialisation, cultural capital is instantiated as an 
aspect of what Bourdieu termed the habitus, a concept usefully glossed by Loïc 
Wacquant as “the system of durable and transposable dispositions through which we 
perceive, judge, and act in the world” (Wacquant 1998, 220). 
The material and immaterial forms of capital identified by Bourdieu all have in 
common the fact that they consist in “accumulated labour” (Bourdieu 1986, 241), 
whether that be work on the factory floor, efforts to build a network of friends and 
acquaintances, or academic study. Moreover, one form of material or immaterial 
capital may be translated into another (Bourdieu 1986, 242–46, 252–55). Money, for 
example, may provide for the purchase of objectified cultural capital in the form of 
artwork or books, or may be used to pay for a university education with a view to the 
accumulation of embodied cultural capital and qualifications. By the same token, 
cultural resources accumulated through a university education may pave the way for 
access to higher-paying jobs. Such diverse goods as tastes and skills, social 
relationships, and material resources thus all come to be understood as distinct 
moments in a single, integrated economy. Within this economy, some actors occupy 
positions of dominance over others by virtue of their possession of greater quantities 
of capital, in its various forms, and the control they exercise over the distribution of 
this capital. 
Bourdieu’s model of the economy of practices is of course far more complex than this 
attenuated summary suggests. It is not my intention to faithfully apply his schema in 
all its details. Rather, I take from it basic notions such as the existence of both material 
and immaterial forms of capital, the mutual translatability of these different forms, 
and the idea of power relations as defined at least in part by the differential 
distribution of capital. Even more useful for the purposes of this study is work by 
Bradford Verter, who has adapted Bourdieu’s understanding of the economy of 
practices in order to develop a model of religion which similarly “treats religious 
knowledge, competencies, and preferences as positional goods within a competitive 
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symbolic economy” (Verter 2003, 150).18 Verter proposes the concept of “spiritual 
capital”, a form of cultural capital which may again be institutionalised (“the power 
that… religious organisations exercise to legitimate an arbitrary array of religious goods, 
promote the demand for these goods, and feed the supply by bestowing qualifications 
on a select group of authorized producers”); objectified (“material and symbolic 
commodities – votive objects, exegetical texts, and ritual vestments, as well as the 
theologies, ideologies, and theodices”); or embodied (“the knowledge, abilities, tastes, 
and credentials an individual has amassed in the field of religion”, which are “the 
outcome of explicit education or unconscious processes of socialization”) (Verter 2003, 
159–69).19 
As in Bourdieu’s model, Verter understands the accumulation and expenditure of 
spiritual capital as occurring within broader symbolic and material economies. Indeed, 
he asserts that such capital “may only be acquired through the exchange of material 
forms of capital” (2003, 167). Again, an example would be a student undertaking 
religious studies in order to accumulate religious knowledge and skills. Apart from any 
possible costs associated with tuition, the student must have access to sufficient 
material wealth to cover his or her subsistence for the duration of the course of study. 
The accumulation in question in this case also calls for investment of the student’s 
time and labour, as well as that of any other actors who might be involved in offering 
instruction. On the other hand, spiritual capital may conceivably be translated in the 
reverse direction, into material wealth and social advancement. Verter gives the 
example of figures like L. Ron Hubbard, “religious leaders hailing from the lower or 
                                                        
18 While Verter draws on Bourdieu’s notion of cultural capital in particular, his work represents 
a break from Bourdieu’s own thinking on the specific issue of religion. While Bourdieu’s 
writings on this topic tended to focus on formally institutionalised modes of religious authority, 
Verter’s model makes room for agency exercised by lay actors and puts more emphasis on the 
“deregulated exchange of information and cultural resources in late modernity” (Guest 2007, 
189–90). 
19 This thesis pays only limited attention to objectified forms of spiritual capital, being more 
concerned with spiritual capital in its institutionalised and embodied states. However, it is 
worth noting parallels and connections between Verter’s notion of objectified spiritual capital 
and Gregory Starrett’s (1995) work on the production and consumption of “Islamic religious 
commodities”. 
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middle classes who managed to catapult themselves into the uppermost strata by 
establishing themselves as spiritual virtuosi” (2003, 168). 
In Verter’s conceptualisation, the value of any given form of spiritual capital is not 
fixed but is rather “the object of continuous struggle and is subject to considerable 
temporal and subcultural variation” (Verter 2003, 150, 161–62). He criticises what he 
sees as a tendency in Bourdieu’s work to assume “a large degree of cultural 
homogeneity” in any given social space (2003, 162). Instead, he argues that 
There exist, not one, but many parallel hierarchies of religious value, and these vary 
across subcultures... Scales of spiritual capital may vary widely among different groups 
of analogous social status. The definition of high spiritual capital changes dramatically 
when one compares media celebrities with Republican members of Congress, or school 
officials in Brookline, Massachusetts – a progressive, multicultural community – with 
their evangelical counterparts in Amarillo, Texas (Verter 2003, 162) 
To give an example pertinent to the project at hand, memorised knowledge of hadith 
texts from the canonical collection Sahih al-Bukhari may have greater value as spiritual 
capital within a Salafi milieu than amulets or qualifications issued to mark progression 
through the rites of a Sufi order, whereas for Muslims situated within some other 
subcultural milieus that hierarchy might be reversed. These contrasting hierarchies of 
value may exist within the same social space or even within the same institution, as in 
an Islamic university in which actors aligned with different subcultural traditions 
compete with one another for advancement. 
At this point, it will be worth pausing to consider how this conceptual schema relates 
to the other literatures discussed thus far. The notion of the habitus, which may be 
moulded through learning and socialisation to give rise to differing configurations of 
tastes, intuitions, modes of reasoning, and so on, offers a far richer understanding of 
human agency than that suggested by the profit-maximising cost-benefit calculations 
of rational choice theory. In fact, this understanding is arguably much closer to the 
ideas advanced in studies of Muslims’ engagement with Islam as a discursive tradition, 
which explore how believers employ embodied practices and religious learning with a 
view to accumulating new knowledge, mastering new modes of reasoning, and 
moulding their own instincts and desires. It should be noted that Mahmood, who 
discusses these dynamics in terms of the shaping of what she also refers to as the 
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habitus, has sought to distance herself from Bourdieu’s understanding of this concept. 
In her reading, Bourdieu’s understanding of how the habitus is forged gives far too 
much weight to the individual’s location in the hierarchy of power defined by the 
distribution of capital, reducing the notion of the habitus to merely “a theoretical 
concept to explain how the structural and class positions of individual subjects come to 
be embodied as dispositions”. Instead, she wishes to allow room for the moulding of 
the habitus as a process involving intentional “moral training and cultivation” on the 
part of the individual believer (Mahmood 2005, 136–39). However, the precise details 
of how Bourdieu conceives of the processes by which the habitus of any given subject 
is forged are open to debate (Jenkins 1992, 90). Moreover, it certainly does not seem 
necessary either to commit oneself to this idea of the habitus as merely a product of 
the individual’s “structural and class position”, or to give up on the idea of the forging 
of the habitus as at least in part an intentional moral project pursued by the believer, 
in order to build on Bourdieu’s key insight that aspects of habitus constitute forms of 
immaterial capital which contribute to defining one’s position within a power-laden 
economy of practices. It thus seems perfectly coherent to reconceptualise the 
processes discussed by Mahmood, Hirschkind and others – including the acquisition of 
religious knowledge, the learning of particular modes of normative reasoning, and the 
use of embodied practices to discipline desires and instincts, all within the terms of a 
discursive tradition – as simultaneously amounting both to a project of self-oriented 
moral cultivation and also to the accumulation of spiritual capital. 
I have already noted that Verter considers that such things as the criteria by which 
individual subjects evaluate the worth of any given form of spiritual capital may vary 
even within “groups of analogous social status”, suggesting that such dispositions 
come down to something more than just their position in a class hierarchy. In fact, the 
idea that religious aspects of an individual’s habitus are forged at least in part through 
engagement with a discursive tradition may help to make sense of the notion of 
“subcultural variation”. As noted previously, this idea is invoked by Verter but it is not 
particularly unpacked in his work; beyond remarks that “cultural products… are 
produced and received within specific social contexts” and that habitus is shaped by 
“microhistories, local and regional histories” (2003, 163). Conceiving of religion in 
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terms of a heterogeneous discursive tradition encompassing multiple sub-traditions 
offers an alternative way of thinking about such variation. The fact that Sufis and 
Salafis engage in projects of learning and socialisation shaped in part by their 
adherence to different subsidiary traditions within the overarching Islamic discursive 
tradition may explain the different religious tastes and other dispositions according to 
which they weigh the value of any given form of spiritual capital. 
It is important to note that the economic model of religion outlined here does not 
entail conceiving of social actors as engaged in an incessantly utilitarian, self-interested 
pursuit of profit or status for its own sake.20 I have suggested that spiritual capital may 
be accumulated through efforts on the part of the believer which are motivated in the 
first instance by the pursuit of a personal project of moral cultivation. Moreover, to the 
extent that an individual’s efforts to accumulate spiritual capital are informed by an 
awareness of the social status which may derive from this capital, it need not be 
assumed that this status is sought for its own sake. Rather, the accumulation of 
spiritual capital may well be valued by an individual believer as a resource to be 
mobilised in struggles over what Bourdieu himself termed “the principles of 
hierarchisation” (quoted in Verter 2003, 158). In this sense, the accumulation of capital 
is significant insofar as it bolsters the power of any given actor or institution “to define 
the value of one or another product” (Verter 2003, 158). An individual who, as a result 
of the investment of time, labour and capital, has accumulated sufficient knowledge, 
skills and pious dispositions to secure recognition as an Islamic scholar thereby 
acquires a greatly increased capacity to issue authoritative judgement on the value of 
any given religious text or ritual, for example. To tie this back to the words of Asad 
quoted earlier in this introduction, this amounts to an increased “power to regulate, 
uphold, require, or adjust correct practices, and to condemn, exclude, undermine, or 
replace incorrect ones”; in other words, increased sway in the context of struggles to 
define orthodoxy within the terms of a discursive tradition, and thereby to contribute 
to shaping the future development of that tradition. Within struggles over the capacity 
                                                        
20 Wacquant has suggested that even for Bourdieu, the engine which fundamentally drives the 
behaviour of actors within these economies is in fact “the thirst for dignity, which society 
alone can quench” (1998, 218, emphasis added). 
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to speak in the name of “correct” Islam, spiritual capital thus represents both a 
“medium” of conflict (in the sense that accumulation of capital increases one’s 
authority to engage in struggles to define orthodoxy) and also an “object” of conflict 
(in the sense that the value of any given form of spiritual capital is itself subject to 
contestation) (Verter 2003, 158). 
It will be necessary to make one further step in order to tailor these conceptual tools 
for the purposes of the present study, in this case in order to allow for the significance 
of cross-border processes. Bourdieu and Verter situate social struggles within fields, a 
concept defined by Verter as “a hierarchically structured social arena (or market) in 
which actors compete for money, prestige, and power” (2003, 153). A diversity of 
fields – including the religious field, the field of artistic production, the academic field, 
and so on – together make up a social space which in their work appears to be, at least 
implicitly, national in scope. This conception of social struggles as playing out within a 
national space is inadequate for the present study, which must be alert to flows of 
persons, ideas, practices and resources both into and out of Saudi Arabia, and also 
through cross-border connections which bypass the kingdom. This calls for awareness 
of struggles which play out in transnational space characterised by “sustained cross-
border relationships, patterns of exchange, affiliations and social formations spanning 
nation-states” (Vertovec 2009, 2). For this reason, I draw on Peggy Levitt and Nina 
Glick Schiller’s notion of “transnational social fields”. Defining a field as “a set of 
multiple interlocking networks of social relationships through which ideas, practices, 
and resources are unequally exchanged, organized, and transformed”, Levitt and 
Schiller identify transnational fields as those which “connect actors through direct and 
indirect relations across borders” (Levitt and Schiller 2004, 1009).21 
Throughout this thesis, I opt for the term “transnational” to describe phenomena 
involving cross-border flows and configurations of persons, ideas, practices, 
institutions and resources, rather than alternatives such as “translocal”. This is a 
                                                        
21 Efforts to apply such ideas in the context of the present study build on growing bodies of 
literature which have brought an awareness of cross-border processes to the study of the 
history of the Arabian Peninsula (e.g. Al-Rasheed 2004a; Piscatori and Dresch 2005; Ho 2006; 
Al-Rasheed 2008b; Bonnefoy 2011) and to the study of religion (e.g. Eickelman and Piscatori 
1990; Rudolph and Piscatori 1997; Mandaville 2001; Bowen 2004; Bonnefoy 2011). 
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conscious choice motivated by a concern to emphasise the persistent importance of 
the national state in the dynamics at stake. I seek to develop a “polycentric 
historiography” which can allow for the significance of agents, processes and spaces 
which cut across, are distinct from and at times may challenge the national state but 
which do not erase its importance, either as an actor within religious economies or as a 
framework within which transactions play out (Robin 2009, 491). Indeed, one aspect of 
the argument developed in this thesis is that the globe-spanning historical dynamics 
which are the subject of study have in complex ways been catalysed and shaped 
precisely by – and have been put to work in the service of – processes of Saudi state- 
and nation-building, projects which themselves have also drawn on transversal flows. 
Part of what is at stake is exploration of how, as noted by Nina Glick Schiller, national 
state imperialism – in the sense of the “extension of the power of a territorially based 
regime into the political, economic, social, and cultural life of other territories” – may 
operate precisely through cross-border migratory circuits and networks (Schiller 2005, 
443).22 
Before moving on to discuss how these various conceptual tools are to be put to work 
in the context of this study, it will be worth briefly considering the common objection 
that Bourdieu’s model of symbolic economies – and his understanding of the role 
played by education within these economies, in particular – tends to highlight the 
reproduction of existing distributions of power and resources, at the expense of 
attention to dynamics of contestation and transformation (e.g. Eickelman 1992, 644). 
For Bourdieu, education – within formal institutions, as well as within the family and 
society at large – plays a key role in “symbolic violence”, summarised by Richard 
Jenkins as “the imposition of systems of symbolism and meaning (i.e. culture) upon 
groups or classes in such a way that they are experienced as legitimate” (1992, 104). 
Insofar as the education system in a given social space tends to legitimate a cultural 
                                                        
22 Throughout this thesis, I refer to Saudi Arabia as a “national state” rather than a “nation 
state”, relying on Charles Tilly’s distinction between these two terms (1992, 2–3). Tilly defines 
national states as “states governing multiple contiguous regions and their cities by means of 
centralised, differentiated, and autonomous structures”. He distinguishes this from the nation 
state, “a state whose people share a strong linguistic, religious, and symbolic identity”. Just as 
Tilly excludes Great Britain from the latter definition, so it is also clear that Saudi Arabia – with 
its persistent sectarian divides, for example – does not fall under this rubric. 
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framework within which high value is assigned to the particular forms of cultural 
capital possessed by the dominant classes, and insofar as it tends to facilitate the 
accumulation of valued forms of cultural capital by new generations within the 
dominant classes in particular, education contributes to both reproducing and masking 
existing distributions of power, status and privilege (cf. Bourdieu 1973; Bourdieu and 
Passeron 1990; Jenkins 1992, 103–27). 
Several elements of this study may help to disrupt any such tendency towards a 
picture of social stasis. Firstly, tools for problematising Bourdieu’s approach to 
education and social reproduction – particularly in the context of efforts to apply some 
of his ideas to the religious sphere – are to be found in work by Dale Eickelman and 
James Piscatori on the “objectification” of religious knowledge in the modern period 
(Eickelman 1992; Eickelman and Piscatori 2004, 37–45). The notion of objectification 
has been explicitly framed by Eickelman as a way of building upon Bourdieu’s own 
work whilst seeking an analysis of power and agency which allows more space for 
contention (1992, 644). He and Piscatori note that recent decades have seen the rise 
of large-scale debates amongst Muslims about religion, informed by awareness of the 
existence of multiple modes of Islamic and non-Islamic religiosity. These debates, 
facilitated by factors including the rise of “mass education and mass communication”, 
have in turn contributed to a new capacity on the part of believers to ask such 
questions as “‘What is my religion?’ ‘Why is it important to my life?’ and ‘How do my 
beliefs guide my conduct?’” (Eickelman and Piscatori 2004, 38). The ability to engage in 
enquiry of this kind, rather than simply taking a particular form of religious belief and 
practice for granted, may create scope for the exercise of critical evaluation and 
contestation by students in their engagement with any given form of religious 
instruction; that is, the ability to challenge the legitimacy of the forms of culture which 
that system of instruction seeks to impose. It might be expected that such dynamics 
will be particularly prominent within educational circuits which cross national borders, 
since migrant students will frequently have direct experience of sharply divergent 
cultural frameworks and modes of religiosity in differing geographical settings. 
Secondly, this point might be juxtaposed with Verter’s critique of what he sees as an 
overemphasis on “cultural homogeneity” in Bourdieu’s work. Verter suggests that 
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“even economically and politically subordinate groups maintain autonomous standards 
of taste” (2003, 162). It is in developing this point that he offers the exploration, noted 
above, of how differing judgements of the value of any given form of spiritual capital 
may relate to subcultural diversity even within any given social strata or class within a 
single, nationally-defined society. Again, this disrupts the notion that education 
straightforwardly imposes and reproduces a relatively homogeneous cultural 
framework, according to which the particular forms of cultural capital possessed by the 
dominant classes are defined as high-value. Insofar as students are able to objectify 
the religious knowledge on offer in any given educational context and subject it to 
critical scrutiny, they may evaluate its worth according to differing criteria depending 
on their own subcultural backgrounds. Once again, this patchwork of subcultural 
diversity becomes even more complex when one turns to social dynamics which play 
out not only within but also across national borders, involving actors drawn from 
profoundly divergent cultural backgrounds. 
Lastly, while these two points suggest the possibility of contestation at the moment of 
students’ engagement with any given form of instruction, the fact of cultural 
heterogeneity emphasised by Verter may also provide for social and cultural 
transformations – rather than simply reproduction and stasis – in ways that relate to 
the articulation of new forms of power through projects such as the establishment of 
new educational institutions. This point, which is central to the arguments that run 
throughout this thesis, ties back to the idea that material wealth is just one form of 
capital in circulation within broader material and symbolic economies, and that it may 
be translated into other forms of capital. According to this understanding, new 
reserves of wealth made available to the adherents of a given subcultural tradition 
from sources such as oil rents may serve to empower those actors and bolster their 
standing within cultural and religious struggles. Through investment in projects such as 
the founding of new schools and universities aligned with a particular subcultural 
tradition, material capital may be translated into spiritual capital possessed by the 
adherents of that tradition. These new reserves of spiritual capital may in turn bolster 
their capacity to exert authority and influence within struggles over the principles of 
hierarchisation within a given national or transnational social space; that is, struggles 
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over the capacity to define the value of any given cultural product, which in the 
religious sphere is closely related to the capacity to define orthodoxy. If those involved 
are able to use their newfound power to redefine existing cultural frameworks, this 
might even lead to lasting shifts in common understandings of what constitutes high-
value spiritual capital. 
Gathering up the various conceptual elements unpacked thus far, I arrive at the notion 
of transnational religious economies which underlies the historiography employed 
throughout this thesis. Transnational religious economies, in the understanding 
developed here, consist in flows – both within and across national borders – of four 
elements which may be distinguished for the sake of analytic clarity. These elements 
are material capital, spiritual capital, religious migrants and social technologies. 
Material capital and spiritual capital, and the ways in which they relate to one another, 
have been explored in the preceding discussion. Religious migrants are defined as 
individuals who make journeys either within or across national borders with a view to 
engaging in religious projects including, for example, pilgrimage, missionary outreach, 
and education. Social technologies are arrangements put in place to facilitate the 
translation, exchange, investment, accumulation and expenditure of differing forms of 
material and immaterial capital. This includes the techniques of writing, printing and 
recording used to produce objectified spiritual capital in the form of manuscripts, 
books or cassette tapes. More pertinently, it also includes the various arrangements 
for religious instruction used to facilitate the accumulation of embodied spiritual 
capital by students, from the oral transmission of mosque study circles to the 
syllabuses, lectures and examinations employed in contemporary Islamic universities. 
Whilst it is analytically useful to treat these four “moments” of transnational religious 
economies as distinct from one another, it is worth noting that from an empirical point 
of view they may be very closely intertwined. Where migrants bear spiritual capital 
embodied in their very persons in the form of memorised knowledge or other religious 
competencies, for example, flows of migrants and flows of spiritual capital are 
empirically coterminous. 
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This understanding of transnational religious economies suggests new ways of thinking 
about how material capital may feature in dynamics of Wahhabi religious expansion 
exercised through cross-border circuits of scholars and students. It suggests conceiving 
of the founding and maintenance of institutions like the IUM as a form of investment 
of material capital which, through a system of pedagogical social technologies, is 
translated into particular forms of spiritual capital possessed by students. The spiritual 
capital accumulated by students may be expected to bolster their standing within 
competitive symbolic economies and struggles to define orthodoxy in their 
communities of origin or elsewhere. This approach raises a host of questions to be 
explored. If Saudi educational institutions like the IUM which sit at the heart of these 
circuits are involved in the translation of material capital into spiritual capital, what 
specific forms of spiritual capital are involved? How do the forms of spiritual capital in 
question relate to the Islamic discursive tradition and, more specifically, to the Salafi 
and Wahhabi traditions? Where does the material capital in question come from? How 
and by whom is its distribution controlled? What power relations are established as a 
result of the unequal allocation of capital within these arrangements? What social 
technologies are involved in the processes of translating material capital into spiritual 
capital in this context, and what are the genealogies of those technologies? How have 
these institutions themselves come to acquire sufficient reserves of institutionalised 
spiritual capital to authorise religious qualifications? How do students engage with 
these processes and what forms of religious authority might they secure on the basis 
of spiritual capital accumulated in these institutions? How does the value of this capital, 
and its worth as a basis of religious authority, vary across time and in different social 
and cultural contexts? I begin to indicate the answers that I will develop to some of 
these questions in the chapter outline included in the final section of this introduction. 
As a framework for exploring the role of cross-border educational circuits in Wahhabi 
religious expansion, the notion of transnational religious economies developed here 
has several advantages. First and foremost, it offers an account of power relations in 
the religious sphere which allows for the significance of material capital without falling 
back on deterministic assumptions. Power relations between any given set of actors in 
the religious sphere, in the sense of their capacity to authorise a particular set of 
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religious goods or to delegitimate others, are determined in part by their possession of 
differential quantities of spiritual capital. Reserves of material capital possessed by 
certain actors – including those available to Saudi state actors from sources such as oil 
rents – provide for the exercise of power in the religious sphere insofar as they may be 
translated into spiritual capital and distributed as such both at home and abroad. 
Other factors will of course come into play in determining power relations. These 
include discursive forms of power, such as the capacity of any given actor to construct 
coherent arguments within the terms of a shared discursive tradition. They also 
include the capacity of state actors in particular to coercively intervene in the religious 
sphere by banning particular movements, rituals and modes of discourse, or by jailing 
particular individuals. However, access to capital and control over its distribution 
represent important factors in defining power relations. That said, it is to be expected 
that these dynamics – far from being mechanical – will be subject to the agency and 
evaluation of an array of actors. Spiritual capital, as noted above, is an object as well as 
a medium of struggle. At the point where material capital is translated into spiritual 
capital, the value of that capital itself becomes subject to contestation in ways that 
may be beyond the control of those who possess it or whose material investment 
provided for its accumulation. 
This understanding of religious economies as intersecting with broader spheres of 
social interaction also offers scope for building on Schielke’s observation that research 
focused on processes of pious self-formation tend to neglect the fact that religion 
represents only one facet of life, even for especially committed believers; a point 
captured in his complaint that “there is too much Islam in the anthropology of Islam” 
(2010, 1). Given the translatability of different forms of material and immaterial capital, 
the resources in circulation within religious economies may in principle be put to work 
in the service of an array of projects both religious and otherwise. It would be wise to 
be alert to the possibility that students, amongst others, may engage in the religious 
economies which are the focus of this project not only as Muslims but also as sons, 
fathers and siblings, as Canadians and Indonesians, as youth, and so on. 
Moreover, exploring the transnational extension of religious economies may serve to 
address an additional problem with some of the anthropological literature discussed 
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earlier, which is a tendency to treat Islamic discursive traditions as distinct from and 
fundamentally different to “Western” modes of being. Salwa Ismail has noted that 
studies grounded in a concern with Islamic modes of subject-formation have 
frequently tended to ignore the many commonalities between Islamist and non-
Islamist subjectivities, and the extent to which both have been affected by recent 
global trends, including “objectification, rationalisation, individualisation and 
relativisation” (Ismail 2004, 624). In fact, this “othering” of the Islamic tradition in 
some of this literature – whereby it is contrasted with an equally reified post-
Enlightenment “Western” morality and rationality – is often far from incidental. 
Schielke notes that scholars interested in Islamic modes of subject-formation often 
advance “a master narrative that posits the Muslim tradition of ethics, affect, devotion 
and debate in juxtaposition with liberal and secular notions about the state, law, self 
and so on” precisely because they are interested in developing “a political self-critique 
of liberalism and secularism” which rests in part on showing that these latter cultural 
and political frameworks involve “historically specific notions that cannot be taken to 
be valid for all of humanity” (Schielke 2010, 6). It is only by holding up Islamic 
traditions as a contrasting alternative to “Western” traditions that such self-critique 
becomes possible. 
The notion of transnational religious economies can help to counter some of these 
issues insofar as it serves to highlight the ways in which the various elements that 
make up these economies may flow across supposed civilisational or cultural 
boundaries, such as that posited between “the West” and “the Islamic world”. This 
includes flows of migrants, many of whom will themselves have been educated and 
socialised in both of these allegedly distinct spheres. It also includes the appropriation 
of social technologies across supposed cultural boundaries. Modes of pedagogy used 
to mould aspects of students’ subjectivity and to provide for the accumulation of 
spiritual capital in Islamic educational settings, for example, may well have roots in 
diverse geographical, social and cultural contexts. 
I conclude this section with a brief comment on the use of the language of economics 
to discuss religion, a sphere of life which holds profound value for many who would 
see little obvious connection between this value and any question of financial profit. 
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The use of this vocabulary is not intended to be provocative or to offend. As noted 
previously, the point is certainly not to posit the religious sphere as merely an 
epiphenomenal superstructure erected on an ultimately material base, nor to suggest 
that participants in the religious sphere are fundamentally motivated by the self-
interested pursuit of material profit or social advancement. The framework outlined 
here also entails no specific assumptions in relation either to the sincerity of the faith 
held by religious actors, or to the truth or falsity of their convictions. Rather, it offers a 
conceptual schema which may help to highlight more subtle interconnections between 
material and spiritual aspects of social life, and which may in particular help to make 
sense of how material resources figure in the struggles of a diversity of actors to 
uphold, promote and impose upon others their own understandings of religious truth, 
moral virtue and the good life. 
Methods 
A researcher seeking to engage with the kinds of historical dynamics which are the 
subject of this project is presented with both challenges and opportunities deriving 
from their transnational extension. On the one hand, exploring processes which 
stretch across national borders calls for complex and time-consuming multi-sited 
research. On the other hand, the vast extension of these processes gives rise to 
multiple “ways in”; many different circles of people who might be approached for 
information, and many different libraries and archives containing relevant materials. In 
what follows, I outline the sources of data which have been most relevant in the 
context of the present study. 
Primary Sources 
The backbone of this project is provided by mostly Arabic-language published sources 
gathered in libraries in London, Cairo, Riyadh and Jidda. These include a raft of 
promotional literature produced by the IUM over the past half a century, not least two 
authorised histories which trace its genesis and institutional development (al-Ghamidi 
1998; al-ʿAbbud 2004). While these texts must of course be read for what they are – 
with critical awareness of the particular narratives and tropes they emphasise – they 
yield crucial names, dates and basic chronologies, which can often be followed up with 
further investigation elsewhere. They also contain reproductions of original documents, 
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including statutes, regulations and syllabuses from different periods in the university’s 
lifetime. At certain points in the thesis, I have also engaged with the narratives 
presented in these histories. Other useful kinds of promotional literature include 
university prospectuses, annual reports and staff lists. 
I have also made use of the IUM’s quarterly journal dating back to the first issue 
published in June 1968. This publication, which is available online as well as in libraries 
in Saudi Arabia, includes regular updates on university news alongside articles by staff, 
students and others on topics as diverse as Islamic history, correct creed, class struggle, 
and the dangers of smoking.23  
Other sources which inform this project include local newspapers, official publications, 
published compilations of archive documents, memoirs and other texts authored by 
participants in the historical dynamics at stake, and several biography collections. The 
latter include two weighty volumes produced by individuals who themselves moved in 
the IUM’s orbit; the Iraq-born member of the university’s Advisory Council ʿAbd Allah 
al-ʿAqil and the Syria-born faculty member Muhammad al-Majdhub. 
Particularly in relation to the first two chapters of this thesis dealing with earlier 
historical periods, my research draws on secondary works in Arabic which include a 
level of detail on education in the Hijaz and elsewhere in the Peninsula at these times 
that is mostly lacking in the existing English-language literature. I was also able to 
access the archives of the Saudi Ministry of Education in Riyadh, though my eventual 
use of sources drawn from that archive in the thesis itself has been limited. 
In addition to primary and secondary sources held in libraries and conventional archive 
collections, this project benefited from expanded notions of “the archive” that have 
gained greater legitimacy amongst historians in recent decades (Burton 2006). The 
internet proved an immensely valuable resource, yielding texts produced by and about 
an array of relevant actors and institutions, as well as multimedia materials such as 
YouTube videos of IUM graduates’ preaching. I have approached such sources with an 
awareness of issues of credibility which may arise when accessing primary materials 
                                                        
23 Online records are found at http://docportal.iu.edu.sa/iumag/home.aspx. 
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online, though I consider that the challenges presented in this regard are often not so 
different from those involved in research in conventional archives. In either case, one 
must use the available evidence to assess authorship of any given artefact, the context 
in which it was produced, and so on. Comprehensive referencing throughout this 
thesis should ensure that the reader is in a position to independently evaluate the 
reliability of all materials cited. Finally, I was also granted a certain amount of access to 
IUM graduates’ personal archives, including materials such as essays, lecture notes and 
past exam papers. 
Ethnography 
In keeping with the expanded notions of “the archive” touched upon above, this thesis 
also draws on interviews with over 30 individuals in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United 
Kingdom. Those interviewed included informed observers of the historical dynamics at 
stake, such as figures closely involved in Salafi movements and Egyptian Muslim 
Brothers. They also included Egyptian former staff members of the IUM, as well as 16 
former and current students in all three countries. 
As noted previously, primary sources form the backbone of this project. However, 
interviews served to guide my search for such sources and also yielded data of a kind 
that it would have been impossible to gather from written texts. While much of the 
information supplied in interviews was primarily useful for informing my background 
understanding and guiding my reading, I have at points in the thesis directly drawn 
upon and referenced oral accounts offered by past and current students in particular. 
Their perspectives help to address certain risks associated with over-reliance on 
printed sources such as official documentation. The latter approach has frequently 
given rise to what Benjamin Fortna has termed a “mechanical engineering” model of 
education, in which schools are depicted as machine-like apparatuses churning out 
cadres of “like-minded ‘products’”. “Self-narratives” by students themselves may help 
to remedy this problem by providing for the possibility of moving past this macro level 
picture and revealing a degree of diversity in individual trajectories and lived 
experiences of education (Fortna 2001, 1–5, 30–31). The memories of IUM students 
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also draw attention to informal and other aspects of education which do not feature in 
syllabuses or other written records.24 
Most former and current IUM students interviewed for this project were either British 
citizens or were living in the United Kingdom, though they also included non-British 
citizens based in the United Kingdom, the United States and Egypt. They constitute a 
small number of individuals and it is clear that the sample is to some extent self-
selecting, given that my attempts to reach out to IUM graduates were on occasion 
rebuffed. I sometimes pursued a strategy of “snowballing” interviews, asking one 
interviewee to introduce me to friends or acquaintances who had also graduated from 
the IUM. This proved to be a valuable way of identifying IUM graduates in the first 
place, with introductions through mutual acquaintances also helping to build trust. 
However, recognising the scope for further bias inherent in this procedure, I combined 
it with a strategy of arranging interviews by cold-calling IUM graduates identified 
through other routes, including word-of-mouth and biographies posted on the 
websites of Islamic educational initiatives and mosques. In light of the issues discussed 
here, the individuals interviewed for this project are by no means considered to 
represent all those who pass through these circuits. While the fragmentary accounts of 
their biographies and experiences that are related in the course of this thesis serve to 
highlight a degree of diversity amongst students and their experiences, and offer 
insights that would otherwise not be available, they are to be treated as representing 
possibilities rather than broadly generalisable patterns. To the extent that I have 
drawn on students’ personal experiences, I have sought to juxtapose these with 
evidence from other sources as part of efforts to piece together a bigger picture. 
Given the diversity of people with whom I met for the purposes of this project and the 
wide range of circumstances under which such meetings took place, it was necessary 
to adopt a flexible approach to interviewing. All interviewees were aware that I was an 
academic researcher and that the interview was intended to gather information for a 
doctoral project. As often as possible, I supplied interviewees with a written outline of 
my research, explaining my interests and the uses that would be made of information 
                                                        
24 On the risk that important aspects of pedagogy like peer learning may be obscured because 
of their absence from written records, see Eickelman 1978, 500. 
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gathered in the interview. Where encounters took place under circumstances that 
made this impossible or inappropriate, I have refrained from citing any substantive 
biographical information from the interview in question. Except in cases where specific 
interviewees were already relatively well-known public figures at the time when I 
conducted my research, I have replaced all interviewees’ names in footnote references 
with one-letter pseudonyms, in order to protect their identities. In all cases where an 
interviewee is referred to by a single letter, that letter is a pseudonym which bears no 
relation to the actual name of the interviewee. In all cases where a name is used to 
refer to an interviewee, that name is the actual name of the interviewee.  
Most commonly, interviews were semi-structured. Some were recorded using a digital 
device, always with the permission of the interviewee, whereas in other situations it 
proved more appropriate and more productive to limit myself to taking notes by hand. 
Where this was the case, I used these handwritten notes as a basis for typing up a set 
of notes from the meeting at the earliest opportunity. 
In addition to semi-structured interviews, this research also benefited both from 
briefer, ad hoc encounters and correspondence with IUM graduates and former staff 
members, as well as multiple meetings with certain interviewees and also much longer, 
more informal discussions. 
The Structure of the Thesis 
The first two chapters of this thesis focus on periods prior to the founding of the IUM, 
in order to set that institution and the cross-border processes which would grow up 
around it in historical perspective. This provides for the possibility of tracing some of 
the historical roots of the later dynamics and institutional developments which are the 
focus of the discussion that follows, as well as building a foundation for diachronic 
comparative analysis. Chapter 1 explores religious education in the Hijaz in the 
Ottoman and Hashimite periods, paying particular attention to mosques, madrasas, 
Sufi lodges and other sites which at that time hosted scholars and students from as far 
afield as West Africa, the Caucasus, and South, Central and Southeast Asia. Education 
in these settings was supported by cross-border flows of material capital including 
imperial spending from Istanbul and private funds from benefactors in locations as 
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distant as India, and pedagogy was largely personalised and informal. The religious 
economy constituted by this set-up was marked by considerable diversity, with 
instruction offered by and for adherents of all of the mainstream Sunni legal schools, 
and members of an array of Sufi orders. From the end of the nineteenth century 
onwards, however, it is possible to discern significant shifts which would lay the 
ground for eventual state-led efforts to reconfigure transnational religious economies 
centred on the Peninsula. New social technologies brought by religious migrants and 
imperial officials contributed to the spread of increasingly rationalised, bureaucratised 
modes of pedagogy. These in turn provided for the possibility that private and 
particularly state actors might exercise more sustained control over the distribution, 
exchange and translation of material and immaterial capital in religious educational 
settings. 
The focus in Chapter 2 shifts to the period immediately following the invasion of the 
Hijaz by the Saudis in the 1920s and explores the use of education as a tool for 
Wahhabi religious expansion within territories over which the Saudi state exercised 
direct control. At this point in history, the Saudi occupiers appropriated the 
bureaucratised modes of education which had taken shape in that region from the late 
nineteenth century and used them as a basis for investing in the promotion of 
Wahhabi modes of religiosity. Focusing on one flagship school, the Saudi Scholastic 
Institute founded in Mecca in 1926, I explore how techniques like the use of fixed 
syllabuses and hierarchical oversight were employed to create spaces in which Saudi 
state actors could closely monitor and control the processes by which their material 
investments were to be translated into particular forms of cultural capital embodied in 
students; including religious knowledge and competencies grounded in the Wahhabi 
tradition. This project was fraught with tensions, occurring as it did in the context of a 
process of state-building within an occupied territory with its own religious traditions 
quite different from those of the Wahhabi heartlands of Najd. It also involved the 
grafting of Wahhabi religious content into new discursive frameworks. To some extent, 
the conflicts which emerged were mediated by staff drafted in from Egypt, the Levant 
and beyond. I argue that this early period saw the consolidation of a number of 
strategies, including not only material investment but also cultural appropriation, 
 47 
mediation and hegemonic modification of religious discourse, which would come to 
characterise the subsequent drive to use education as a means for expanding Wahhabi 
religious influence beyond the Peninsula. 
Turning to the point in history at which Saudi state actors increasingly began to invest 
in this latter project, Chapter 3 traces the genesis and institutional evolution of the 
IUM from the time of its inception in 1961 until the present day. I argue that the 
founding of the IUM at the height of the Cold War must be understood in relation to 
Riyadh’s rivalry with the Nasserist regime in Egypt for influence in the Middle East at 
that time, as well as the efforts of its ally the United States to counter the perceived 
threat of Communist expansion in the region. It seems likely to have been further 
bound up with manoeuvring between the Saudi royals and the Wahhabi establishment, 
and efforts to bolster narratives of dynastic and national legitimacy. The IUM would 
over time come to be deeply imbricated within, and would allow Saudi actors to exert 
influence within, a transnational religious economy. However, by mapping its 
development onto milestones in Saudi national and dynastic history, this chapter 
underlines the many senses in which its missionary project was driven, enabled and 
administered by nationally-situated dynastic actors and interests. 
Chapter 4 explores the staffing of the IUM from the time of its founding and over the 
decades that followed. It builds on and simultaneously moves beyond the nationally-
framed history explored in the preceding chapter by situating the university at the 
heart of cross-border circuits of scholars, educators and administrators from across the 
Middle East and beyond. I argue that these religious migrants played an important role 
in enabling and legitimating the IUM’s missionary project. Besides offering a pool of 
skilled labour, they could also mediate between the Wahhabi establishment, the 
university’s eclectic student body, and communities around the world. Their own 
diverse backgrounds could give concrete shape to the institution’s claims to Islamic 
universality. Finally, they represented a source of spiritual capital in forms which would 
be widely recognised as legitimate amongst communities to which the IUM was 
intended to preach, including qualifications earned in established religious educational 
institutions and often prestigious centres of learning across the Islamic world. Over 
time, capital possessed by these migrants came to be institutionalised in the university 
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itself, bolstering its capacity to authorise a particular set of religious goods and to 
bestow qualifications on its students. Later, as the university’s standing consolidated 
and as foreign actors came increasingly to be seen as a political liability, steps were 
taken to purge them from its faculty and administration. 
The next two chapters explore the modes of instruction that emerged and evolved on 
the IUM campus. This discussion builds on the accounts of border-crossings explored in 
earlier sections of the thesis by further unpacking ways in which this intervention in 
transnational religious economies was itself shaped not only by dynamics within the 
Saudi national sphere but also by far-reaching flows of migrants, social technologies 
and resources. 
In Chapter 5, the focus is on the social technologies used to achieve the embodying of 
spiritual capital in students at the IUM from the time of its founding. I argue that 
pedagogies in this context contrasted sharply with practices that had prevailed in Najd 
and the Hijaz until very recently. The differences related to such matters as techniques 
of assessment and certification, the arrangement of bodies, and management of space 
and time. The methods of instruction and socialisation employed on campus tied back 
to earlier educational reforms explored in Chapters 1 and 2, and were also influenced 
by the migratory circuits unpacked in Chapter 4. I consider in particular how the IUM 
project related to the cultural politics of the post-colonial contexts from which many of 
its migrant staff members were drawn. The university was valued by many of those 
involved as a response to colonial intrusions in the cultural sphere seen as threatening 
Islamic identities and values. However, rather than engaging in an effort to shore up 
what had come to be seen as traditional modes of religious schooling, they instead 
sought to appropriate social technologies of education whose own genealogies traced 
back to European metropoles and to rework them in the name of what was 
understood to consist in a project of cultural resistance. Although it is only very 
recently that there has been talk of the IUM accepting female students, this chapter 
also considers the ideas that circulated on campus in earlier periods with regard to 
gender and the education of women. 
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In Chapter 6, the focus shifts from the social technologies in use at the IUM to the 
particular forms of spiritual capital which – through the implementation of these 
technologies – were to be embodied in its students. I consider what is arguably the 
most important form of spiritual capital in question, the specific bodies of religious 
knowledge delineated in the university’s syllabuses. This chapter builds upon and 
extends the idea that access to capital may provide for the exercise of power within 
religious economies. I argue that exploring the particular forms of spiritual capital 
which were to be accumulated by students at the IUM adds another layer to the 
picture insofar as it suggests a further, more clearly discursive form of power also at 
work within the overarching terms defined by the differential distribution of capital. 
Syllabuses in use at the IUM from the 1960s onwards display clear continuities with 
the Wahhabi tradition. At the same time, exploration of the key subject area of 
jurisprudence in particular reveals certain subtle shifts away from historical Wahhabi 
norms. These shifts, which occurred within the terms of the Wahhabi and broader 
Salafi traditions, may have been linked to factors including the arrival of migrant staff 
from far beyond Saudi Arabia. However, I argue that they also related at least in part 
to efforts by actors behind the IUM to construct a position of hegemonic authority 
over students from around the world, as suppliers of religious goods within a shared 
moral and intellectual framework. I highlight evidence suggesting that certain aspects 
of the forms of spiritual capital that were to be distributed by the IUM were adjusted 
in the course of efforts to articulate its Salafi missionary project with the pre-existing 
habituses of the array of actors who were its targets, with a view to securing their 
consent and participation. Such dynamics did not represent dialogue and exchange so 
much as unequal reciprocity and the construction of hegemonic power within the 
terms of unequal relations defined by inter alia differential distribution of capital. 
Finally, Chapter 7 focuses on the role played by students themselves as religious 
migrants, bearers of spiritual capital accumulated in Medina, and mediators of the 
university’s Wahhabi-influenced message. I further unpack and explore the contention 
that the IUM’s missionary project has functioned through the translation of material 
resources invested by the Saudi state into particular forms of spiritual capital 
possessed by its students. I show how at least some students have exercised their own 
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judgement of the worth of the religious knowledge and competencies made available 
at the IUM, leading them either to quit the university or to find ways of negotiating 
desired outcomes without necessarily assenting to the central tenets of its Wahhabi-
influenced mission. I then explore how, as spiritual capital embodied in IUM graduates 
has flowed outwards into transnational religious economies, its worth has once again 
became subject to contestation by religious authorities and lay actors across the globe. 
Those graduates who have used their newly acquired knowledge, competencies and 
qualifications to construct positions of religious authority have done so through 
processes of conflict and negotiation which play out far from Saudi Arabia. While the 
projects in which they have invested their newfound spiritual capital have often been 
strongly informed by their time in Medina, they have frequently taken shape and 
evolved with considerable autonomy with respect to the university itself and the 
broader Saudi religious establishment, in ways which can have unpredictable religious, 
social and political ramifications. 
Together, the points made in these chapters add up to the dual contribution of the 
thesis as a whole. Firstly, from an empirical point of view, it sheds light on the role 
played in Wahhabi religious expansion by transnational circuits of scholars and 
students which grew up around one particularly important state-funded missionary 
educational institution from the early 1960s, the history of which has not previously 
been subject to any kind of sustained study. Secondly, from a theoretical point of view, 
this thesis develops the notion of transnational religious economies as a framework for 
thinking about the ways in which material resources may figure in cross-border 
dynamics of cultural transformation. In doing so, it offers new tools for considering 
how Saudi state actors’ access to oil rents and other sources of wealth may have 
contributed to the worldwide proliferation of a spectrum of literalist, morally 
conservative modes of Salafi religiosity since the mid-twentieth century. These 
conceptual tools provide for a historiography of such processes which eschews 
deterministic assumptions and is alert to uneven power relations, agency exercised by 
an array of actors, and longstanding cross-border flows of persons, practices and ideas. 
The point is by no means to suggest that Saudi funding is solely responsible for the 
spread of Salafism in locations across the globe in recent decades. There is surely 
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something to Bernard Haykel’s argument that Salafism has drawn adherents in part 
because of the attraction of its “claims to religious certainty… and its seemingly 
limitless ability to cite scripture to back these up”. Haykel has also rightly observed 
that Salafism predates the founding of the modern Saudi state, that many Salafis are 
not in receipt of Saudi funds, and that such funds also flow to many non-Salafi actors, 
institutions and movements. In short, Saudi sponsorship is clearly “neither a necessary 
nor sufficient explanation for Salafism’s presence and entrenchment in Muslim life 
around the world” (Haykel 2009, 36–37). However, that is not to say that material 
resources invested by actors associated with Saudi Arabia have not played a significant, 
albeit contingent, role in the worldwide proliferation of Salafi modes of religiosity. The 
hope is that this thesis will offer some new ways of thinking about that role and its 
place within which what is no doubt a far broader, more complex tapestry of social, 
cultural, political and economic change. 
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Chapter 1 
Religious Education in the Ottoman and Sharifian Hijaz 
When the Saudis occupied the Hijaz in the mid-1920s, they took control of a region 
which had for centuries attracted migrant scholars and students from the farthest 
reaches of the Islamic world. Mosques, madrasas, Sufi lodges and private homes, 
particularly in Mecca and Medina, had long hosted educational activities providing for 
the exchange and accumulation of knowledge, skills, qualifications and other forms of 
spiritual capital. The latter flowed into and out of the Hijaz across a space which 
stretched from the Atlantic seaboard of Africa to the Indian Ocean islands of Java and 
Sumatra. The Ottoman state exerted influence within these economies by means of 
material investment, coercive intervention, and the appointment of religious actors as 
intermediaries. However, the modes of education and funding arrangements which 
prevailed at the time seem likely to have placed restrictions on the leverage that could 
be achieved in this regard. Instruction involved quite informal, personalised modes of 
pedagogy, grounded in an understanding between individual scholars and their 
students, seemingly with only limited scope for sustained supervision or regulation by 
the state. Moreover, many actors in the sphere of religious education were far from 
dependent on the state for material resources, with funding to support their activities 
flowing into the region through multiple public and private channels. 
In the second part of this chapter I explore shifts which began to occur from the late 
nineteenth century onwards. From this time, new social technologies began to take 
root in the Hijaz as a result of Ottoman state-building and flows of ideas and practices 
through private channels from locations as distant as India. Firstly in a limited number 
of state schools, then in a wave of new private schools, and finally in key sites of 
religious education like the Masjid Haram in Mecca, instruction came to operate 
according to increasingly rationalised and bureaucratised arrangements which were 
more amenable to regulation by outside actors like the state. Techniques including the 
use of fixed syllabuses, regular examinations and hierarchical systems of inspection 
allowed officials to surveil the activities of scholars and students, and to monitor and 
control the processes by which material and spiritual capital were translated, 
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exchanged and accumulated in these settings. These shifts contributed to shaping the 
system of education that the Saudis would inherit when they swept into the Hijaz soon 
afterwards, and which they would appropriate and rework in the service of their own 
political projects. 
Mosques, Madrasas and Sufi Lodges 
In the centuries prior to the Saudi occupation in the 1920s, control of the Hijaz passed 
repeatedly between various political powers. The region first came under Ottoman 
authority in 1517, when the empire under Sultan Selim I defeated the Mamluks in 
Egypt and secured suzerainty over their erstwhile dependents, the Sharifs of Mecca 
(Haykel 2010, 438–39). The Ottomans remained broadly in control through their 
Sharifian proxies until the early nineteenth century, when their hold over the region 
was challenged by the first Saudi amirate. Having initially occupied Mecca in April 1803 
and been driven back shortly afterwards, Saudi forces re-entered that city and also 
took Medina in 1805, and annexed the Hijaz that same year (Vassiliev 2000, 98–104). 
In 1811, the ruler of Egypt Muhammad ʿAli responded with a military campaign which, 
although theoretically launched on the wishes of the Ottoman sultan, was in practice 
also intended to cement his own political standing and imperial ambitions. By 1813, his 
forces had taken Mecca and Medina, as well as Jidda and Taʾif. They subsequently 
penetrated into Najd, capturing the Saudi capital al-Dirʿiyya in 1818 and razing it 
before withdrawing to the Hijaz, authority over which only passed back to Istanbul in 
the 1840s (Ochsenwald 1984, ix; Vassiliev 2000, 140–47; Commins 2005, 32–38). The 
Ottomans continued to rule through their Sharifian proxies until the early twentieth 
century, their compact temporarily surviving the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and 
the drive for centralisation that followed (Ochsenwald 1984, 216–18; Kayalı 1997, 144–
73). However, at the height of the First World War and supported by the Entente 
Powers, the then Grand Sharif Husayn ibn ʿAli threw off Ottoman control in the Arab 
Revolt starting in 1916. The region was then administered by an independent Sharifian 
state until the time of the Saudi occupation. 
Historians offer conflicting evaluations of the standing of Mecca and Medina as centres 
of religious learning throughout this period. Abdullatif Abdullah Dohaish has spoken of 
a “decay” in religious instruction in the region from the sixteenth century, in part due 
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to “the discovery of the new sea route round Africa, leading to the dwindling of the 
age-old economic function of the Near East, as a zone of transit between the Indian 
Ocean and Europe” (1974, 28). Atallah S. Copty, on the other hand, celebrates an 
increase in the status of Mecca and Medina as centres of learning which began in his 
estimation under the Mamluks and continued under the Ottomans. He puts this down 
to funding made available by both dynasties, along with improvements in shipping 
which allowed greater numbers of scholars to visit the Holy Cities (2003, 321–22). 
European travellers who passed through the Hijaz in the early nineteenth century – 
including the Spaniard Domingo Badia y Leblich who visited under the pseudonym ʿAli 
Bey al-ʿAbbasi in 1807, and the Swiss Orientalist John Lewis Burckhardt who visited in 
1814 – claimed that any lively scholarly scene that might have existed previously was 
no longer in evidence by that time. Burckhardt commented that, “I think I have 
sufficient reason for affirming that Mecca is at present much inferior even in Islamic 
learning to any town of equal population in Syria or Egypt.”25 However, comments 
such as his may be usefully juxtaposed with information offered by Christiaan Snouck 
Hurgronje, a Dutch scholar-spy who at least nominally converted to Islam and spent a 
year in Jidda and Mecca from 1884. Differences between Hurgronje’s evaluation and 
those of earlier European visitors may in part have been due to changes occurring in 
the Hijaz in the intervening decades. However, it is more likely that his longer stay 
simply afforded him a better opportunity to observe and understand. Hurgronje 
himself made the point that someone like Burckhardt, visiting the Hijaz as a pilgrim 
during the period of massive disruption brought about by the hajj season, could never 
have hoped to see a fair representation of the scholarly activity that occurred in the 
Holy Cities throughout the course of the year (Hurgronje 2007, 227–28). Hurgronje’s 
uniquely detailed account, when set alongside fragmentary information available from 
earlier periods, in fact indicates the existence of an often quite vibrant religious 
educational scene spread across a host of different institutions and sites. 
The most prestigious setting for instruction in the region was of course the Masjid 
Haram in Mecca, also known as the Grand Mosque. In this, the holiest site in Islam and 
                                                        
25 The views of these travellers are discussed in Dohaish 1974, 28–35. The quotation from 
Burckhardt is as cited in Dohaish 1974, 29. 
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the focal point of the annual hajj pilgrimage, members of the ʿulamaʾ establishment 
disbursed knowledge and qualifications in study circles, or ḥalaqāt. While lack of data 
makes it difficult to get a sense of the scale of these arrangements in earlier periods, 
Hurgronje tells us that at the time of his visit in the late nineteenth century, a total of 
perhaps 50 or 60 scholars were engaged in convening regular ḥalaqāt in the mosque’s 
courtyard and colonnades (Hurgronje 2007, 199–200).26 The Masjid Nabawi, also 
known as the Prophet’s Mosque, in Medina had also long been an important site of 
religious education. That said, by around the same time the scale of teaching there 
appears to have been significantly more limited than in the Mecca mosque. The official 
Ottoman Hijaz yearbook for 1301 H. (1883-1884) listed only 18 teachers working in the 
Masjid Nabawi (Dohaish 1974, 221). 
A further arena of religious education was overseen by Sufi scholars and orders (ṭuruq, 
sing. ṭarīqa). Sufis had for centuries been both numerous and influential in the Hijaz, 
and their activities may well have constituted an even more energetic religious 
educational sphere than that which existed in the major mosques. At least forty 
different ṭuruq were represented in Mecca and Medina in the seventeenth century 
(Copty 2003, 322). As many as 17 orders continued to operate in Mecca alone in the 
nineteenth century, maintaining a total of 53 establishments known as zawāyā (sing. 
zāwiya) (Ochsenwald 1984, 43). Major orders with a presence in Mecca at that time 
included the Sanusiyya, the Naqshabandiyya, the Qadiriyya and the Shadhiliyya. Some 
zawāyā included residential quarters, while others were used only as meeting places. 
Sufi shaykhs and their followers also operated out of private residences, sometimes 
living together in the same building. These homes were used for “dhikr meetings, 
weekly meals, [and] money doles for poor brethren”, as well as monthly feasts to mark 
the death of an order’s founder. Ṭuruq which had no access to any such site of their 
own used mosque space for daily gatherings. While there were sometimes tensions 
between these Sufi circles and the ʿulamaʾ establishment, there was also considerable 
                                                        
26 Other sources suggest that the number of ḥalaqāt in the mosque around that time, and also 
immediately prior to World War I, may have been over 100 (al-Shamikh 1973, 9, 12). Hurgronje 
notes the existence of a longer list of “professors” working in the Masjid Haram given in the 
official Ottoman Hijaz yearbook for 1303 H. (1885-1886). However, he claims that many of 
those named were not in fact actively engaged in teaching but were merely included in order 
to guarantee them an income. 
 56 
overlap. Many prominent scholars had affiliations with particular Sufi orders and 
Hurgronje reports that the Masjid Haram itself was used for instruction in Sufi 
“mysticism” on quiet days (2007, 216, 222–23). 
Other important sites of instruction included dedicated religious schools, or madrasas. 
These institutions had initially developed elsewhere in the Islamic world from the 
eleventh century, teaching such subjects as fiqh (jurisprudence), tafsīr (Qurʾanic 
exegesis), hadith and grammar, “alongside more secular disciplines such as history, 
literature, rhetoric, mathematics and astronomy” (Mortel 1997, 236). They began 
appearing in the Hijaz in the twelfth century and were commonly located in the 
immediate proximity of the Masjid Haram (Dohaish 1974, 22–23; Mortel 1997, 236). 
Richard Mortel (1997) has identified 23 madrasas that existed in Mecca prior to the 
arrival of the Ottomans in 1517. For the Ottoman period, Dohaish identifies at least 
one more founded in the sixteenth century, another in the seventeenth century, and 
three in the eighteenth century (Dohaish 1978, 29).27 However, by the end of the 
nineteenth century this traditional madrasa system had collapsed.28 Hurgronje claimed 
that mismanagement had sent all such schools into decline, with administrators and 
officials then moving in or letting them out as lodgings (Hurgronje 2007, 186). Dohaish 
confirms that none of the sources that survive from this period speak of the survival of 
any of these institutions (1974, 180). 
The status of Mecca as the destination for the hajj ensured that educational settings in 
the region attracted religious migrants from across the Islamic world. A cohort of 
important ʿulamaʾ who were based in the Holy CiƟes in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries included some, such as the hadith specialist ʿAbd Allah ibn Salim 
al-Basri (d. 1722), who had been born locally (Voll 2002). However, many others had 
arrived there following long journeys. They included Ibrahim ibn Hasan al-Kurani (d. 
                                                        
27 A list given by Dohaish (1974, 22a–22d) of madrasas founded in pre-Ottoman Mecca is less 
comprehensive than that offered by Mortel but appears to include two additional schools, the 
Sharabiyya and the Kinaniyya. Dates for the founding of madrasas and certain other details 
given by Dohaish sometimes differ from those suggested by Mortel . 
28 I designate these madrasas as “traditional” to distinguish them from a new wave of private 
and state schools which began to appear in the Hijaz towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, and which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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1689), who was born in Shahrazur in the Kurdish region of what is now Iraq and whose 
son Abu Tahir Muhammad ibn Ibrahim al-Kurani (d. 1733) also became an influential 
figure in the Hijaz (Nafi 2002, 321). They also included the prominent hadith scholar 
Muhammad Hayya al-Sindi (d. 1750), from the town of Adilpur in what is now Pakistan 
(Voll 1975; Nafi 2006). The Holy Cities continued to attract influential figures from afar 
well into the nineteenth century. Particularly notable examples included the Sufi 
figurehead Ahmad ibn Idris (d. 1837), who was born on the Atlantic coast of Morocco 
but settled for several decades in the Hijaz in the early part of the nineteenth century 
(O’Fahey and Karrar 1987). Indeed, this period saw a rapid improvement in 
transportation to the region, particularly with the growth of steamship routes from 
South Asia from the 1830s. Where performance of the hajj by Muslims from distant 
lands had previously been a privilege largely limited to elites, it increasingly became a 
mass phenomenon. The total numbers taking part in the pilgrimage each year rose 
from 112,000 in 1831 to 300,000 in 1910 (Low 2008, 269–70, 274).29 By the time 
Hurgronje arrived towards the end of the nineteenth century, those teaching in Mecca 
included ʿulamaʾ who had either been born in or traced their family histories back to 
Egypt, Central Arabia, the Hadramawt, the Caucasus, India, Central and Southeast Asia, 
and no doubt many other locations besides (Hurgronje 2007, 197–202). Scholars in the 
region often maintained connections with communities far beyond the Peninsula, 
receiving and responding to solicitations for advice. Hurgronje observed that the most 
senior scholar in the Masjid Haram during his visit, who was affiliated with the Shafiʿi 
school of jurisprudence, received such correspondence from “the Shafiʿi parts of India, 
the East Indian Archipelago, or from Daghestan” (Hurgronje 2007, 195). 
These migratory circuits gave rise to cosmopolitan religious educational settings, 
characterised by interactions not only between scholars but also between students 
from diverse social and cultural backgrounds.30 As will be discussed below, those who 
                                                        
29 See Ochsenwald (1984, 61) for estimates of the numbers of pilgrims annually between 1853 
and 1908. These figures suggest very significant variation year on year, depending on factors 
such as the political conditions in the Hijaz at any given time. It is worth noting that when 
numbers of pilgrims are cited in the literature, it is often unclear what proportion were 
travelling from within the Hijaz, compared with those arriving from beyond the region. 
30 Khaled Fahmy (n.d.) has noted that past European writings on cosmopolitanism in Middle 
Eastern settings have often been premised on erasing “natives” from the picture in favour of 
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studied in the Hijaz under figures like al-Basri, al-Sindi, and Ibrahim and Abu Tahir al-
Kurani in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries included migrant students from as 
far afield as West Africa, the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia. Again, this 
eclectic mix of students remained a feature right up until the late nineteenth century. 
Describing those attending lessons in Shafiʿi jurisprudence in the Masjid Haram at that 
time, for example, Hurgronje noted that “the great majority… come from abroad”, 
including from “Shafiʿi parts of India (Malabar and Coromandel), from the East Indian 
Archipelago, and from Daghestan” (Hurgronje 2007, 200, 203). Foreign students would 
often study for several years in Mecca with a scholar from their country of origin, 
frequently in private homes, until they acquired sufficient mastery of Arabic to join 
ḥalaqāt in the Masjid Haram (Hurgronje 2007, 203, 227). The Sufi ṭuruq in Mecca also 
mostly served religious migrants, particularly “Malays, Turks and Indians”, and 
Hurgronje noted that “pilgrims who stay only a few months are also in large numbers 
recruited for the tarîqahs” (2007, 224–25).31 
Scholars from far afield brought to the Hijaz reserves of spiritual capital – including 
knowledge, skills and qualifications – accumulated not only in their countries of origin 
but often also in many other locations besides. To give an example, by the time of his 
arrival in Medina in the seventeenth century, Ibrahim al-Kurani had already studied 
not only in his hometown of Shahrazur but also in Baghdad, Damascus and Cairo. 
Along the way, he had acquired learning in hadith, Arabic language, Sufism and history, 
as well as the jurisprudence of all four of the mainstream Sunni schools of law and 
works of theology associated with each of the Ashʿari, Maturidi and Salaﬁ tradiƟons 
(Nafi 2002, 321–22). Similarly, the West African hadith scholar Salih al-Fullani (d. 1803) 
– born in what is now the Republic of Guinea – had studied in Mauritania, Timbuktu, 
Tamgrut, Marrakesh and Cairo before settling in Medina, where he lived out the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
the perceived vibrancy and sophistication of European expatriate communities. Will Hanley 
(2008) has observed that invocation of the notion of cosmopolitanism in the more recent 
historiography has often tended to focus on supposed secular elites. In contrast, Mecca and 
Medina featured a religious sphere characterised by a socially and culturally diverse, polyglot 
milieu from which Europeans were almost entirely absent. 
31 Hurgronje’s discussion of a tussle over leadership of the Naqshabandi order in Mecca not 
long before his arrival underlines the importance of these cross-border connections. In the 
course of the dispute, the various participants had written letters to and competed for support 
in locations as distant as Delhi and East Sumatra (2007, 191–94). 
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remainder of his days. His students included Meccans and Medinans, as well as Syrians, 
an Egyptian, a Kurd, a Moroccan and other West Africans (Hunwick 1986, 141, 144). 
Such flows of spiritual capital into Mecca and Medina through migratory circuits of 
scholars made them rich destinations for aspiring students. Through studies in settings 
such as the Masjid Haram, the latter could accumulate knowledge of and certification 
in subjects as varied as fiqh, legal methodology (uṣūl al-fiqh), hadith, speculative 
theology, the fundamentals of religion (uṣūl al-dīn), tawḥīd, tafsīr, grammar, “style and 
poetic”, and logic (Hurgronje 2007, 207–09, 213). 
The cosmopolitanism of these settings also contributed to considerable diversity in the 
content of religious instruction within the terms of many of these subject areas. For 
example, in the late nineteenth century lessons were available in the fiqh of all of the 
four major Sunni madhāhib (schools of law, sing. madhhab) in the Masjid Haram, with 
students typically gravitating to a teacher from their own legal tradition. Teachers 
affiliated with the Shafiʿi madhhab, which had historically prevailed in the Hijaz, were 
most common. They numbered perhaps 20 or 30 out of the total of 50 or 60 
individuals offering regular lessons in the mosque, and many of them had been born in 
Mecca. Scholars from the Hanafi madhhab favoured by the Ottomans appear to have 
made up nearly the same proportion. They included individuals not only from Mecca 
and other parts of the Ottoman Empire but also from India and Russian-ruled parts of 
Asia. Malikis were fewer and we are not told where they hailed from, although it is 
likely that they included scholars from the regions of North and West Africa where this 
madhhab predominates. Fewest of all were the Hanbalis, who numbered only one or 
two and were exclusively from Central Arabia  (Hurgronje 2007, 197–200).32 For all this 
diversity, also reflected in the wide range of ṭuruq present in the Hijaz, there does at 
this time seem to have been some degree of conformity within the ʿulamaʾ 
establishment with regard to matters of creed. There appears to have been 
entrenched discrimination against the Shiʿa, including those communiƟes which 
existed as permanent residents of the Hijaz (Ende 1997; Hurgronje 2007, 199–200; 
Haykel 2010, 446). Furthermore, Hurgronje observed that “in dogmatic doctrine 
                                                        
32 For a list of works taught in the Masjid Haram around this time, in fiqh as well as in other 
subject areas, see Dohaish 1974, 211–12. 
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practically all are Ashʿarites” (2007, 209). Historically, the Ashʿariyya has been the 
dominant creedal tradition within Sunni Islam. Other schools of thought with respect 
to creed include the Maturidiyya, which is particularly associated with the Hanafi 
school of law; the Hanbaliyya, which gives less place to human reason and with which 
the Wahhabis and other Salafis are basically aligned; and the Muʿtazila, whose 
emphasis on human reason was taken up by modernist reformists like Muhammad 
ʿAbduh. These tradiƟons diﬀer in often quite subtle ways with respect to issues such as: 
the metaphorical or literal nature of God’s attributes as described in the Qurʾan; 
whether the Qurʾan is eternal or created; whether standards of justice exist 
independently of God’s will and whether they may be known other than by reference 
to Revelation; and questions of free will and moral responsibility.33 
Arrangements for instruction in the Hijaz during this period were seemingly largely 
personalised and informal, apparently defined more by custom than by any explicit 
system of regulations. Hurgronje offers a uniquely rich description of practices in the 
Masjid Haram at the time of his visit, which may cautiously be treated as offering 
insights into the social technologies of education which had likely prevailed in that 
mosque and in other settings in the region for some time prior to his arrival. As he 
describes it, study circles in the Masjid Haram would come together after each of the 
daily prayers, with particular subjects associated with particular times of day 
(Hurgronje 2007, 195, 197, 207–09). Teaching often took place in the mosque 
courtyard in the morning, shifting to the shaded colonnades as the sun rose higher in 
the sky and then continuing by lantern-light into the evening (Hurgronje 2007, 196, 
215). This arrangement persisted throughout most of the year, bar some minor 
disruption in connection with commemorations of the Prophet’s birthday (al-mawlid) 
and his ascension to Heaven (al-miʿrāj). It was only seriously disrupted during Ramadan 
and then in the run-up to and during the hajj season, when teaching ground to a 
complete halt (Hurgronje 2007, 226–27). 
In the context of any given lesson, a scholar would take his place on a cushion facing 
the Kaʿba and his students would sit on prayer rugs arranged in a circle around him. 
                                                        
33 Cf. Watt 2002a; Watt 2002b; Madelung 2002. On ʿAbduh and the Muʿtazili tradition, see Haj 
2009, esp. 109–52. 
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Each would have before him a copper ink stand, reed pens, penknives, writing paper, 
and a “portfolio holding several sheets of the text treated in the lecture”. A session 
would sometimes begin with an older student, known as the muqriʾ, “chanting” the 
end of the previous lesson. Occasionally, the teacher would offer “some rhymed prose 
sentences in praise of the theme”, which would then be repeated by the muqriʾ 
(Hurgronje 2007, 196–97). Discussing the teaching procedures which followed with 
reference to the example of instruction in Shafiʿi law, Hurgronje suggests that all such 
lessons were based on commentaries by scholars like “Ibn Hajar, Sharbînî and Ramlî” 
on texts by earlier authorities like “Abû Shujâ, Râfiʿî and Nawawî”: 
A professor of to-day has… to choose one of the following methods: 1) to recite to his 
scholars one of the above mentioned commentaries with the glosses of a famous 
bygone professor, so that the sole advantage of oral instruction consists in precise 
vocalisation and occasional clearing up of small difficulties, 2) to make the reading of the 
commentary fruitful by oral exposition which he derives from several of the best glosses, 
or 3) to make and publish out of those glosses a new compilation (Hurgronje 2007, 204) 
The first method was common. The second was more difficult, since it required “full 
mastery of Arabic speech”, particularly if students were allowed to intervene with 
questions. The third approach was particularly rare (Hurgronje 2007, 204).34 
By the time of Hurgronje’s visit, the arrival of printed texts had apparently already had 
a significant impact on teaching. A government press had been opened in Mecca in 
1883, prior to which books had come mostly from Cairo (Ochsenwald 1984, 79–80; 
Hurgronje 2007, 179). According to Hurgronje: 
All students now bring to lecture printed copies of the text which is being treated, which 
circumstance has entirely changed the mode of instruction. Formerly the teacher had 
first to dictate the text, in the margin of which the students then noted down his glosses. 
Now, on the contrary, the student notes down only a few oral remarks (taqârîr) of the 
professor, and often has nothing to write at all (2007, 208) 
Anyone could join these lessons and students were free to come and go as they 
pleased, with no need to register (Hurgronje 2007, 203). Most were male, though 
there was some limited provision for female seekers of knowledge, and instruction in 
                                                        
34 Hurgronje offers a similar account of a lesson on the tafsīr of al-Baydawi given by one 
particular scholar, who “always had the work with him and explained it as he went along by a 
selection of marginal glosses. He seldom added renderings of his own, though he would not be 
ashamed to explain a word by reference to the current Mekkan speech” (Hurgronje 2007, 213). 
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the Hijaz had at times also involved influential female scholars.35 Students who 
committed themselves to a sustained period of study would acquire the capacity to 
engage with complex religious texts, learning how to vocalise them accurately or 
developing new understanding of their content through commentary offered by the 
scholar. Rote memorisation was also a valued mode of knowledge acquisition in this 
context.36 In addition to these embodied capacities, students could also accumulate 
spiritual capital in the objectified form of ijāza certificates (pl. ijāzāt). These were 
traditionally issued by a scholar to affirm a student’s mastery of a particular subject or 
text, or several of each. The form of the certificates reflected the personalised nature 
of education at this time, typically deriving their authority from the fact that they 
included a list of the individuals through whom the knowledge in question had been 
transmitted; starting with the teacher, then his teacher, and so on back in history.37 
Far less information is available concerning the modes of pedagogy which prevailed in 
other settings in the Hijaz, and the forms of spiritual capital which were exchanged and 
accumulated in those settings. However, for the period when madrasas still existed in 
the region, students of those schools were also free to choose the subjects they 
wished to study and the teachers from whom they would take their knowledge. As in 
mosque halaqāt, there was no fixed time period defining the start and end of a course 
of study (Dohaish 1974, 23–24). Ijāzāt in the subjects of fiqh, tawḥīd, tafsīr and hadith 
were also issued to students who undertook studies in the context of Sufi zawāyā 
(Dohaish 1974, 25). 
                                                        
35 According to Hurgronje, “On Friday morning the… Hadrami dwarf professor, Saʿîd Bâ Besêl, 
used in 1884-1885 to devote himself to those of the fair sex who had a taste for learning. Girls 
and women of the better classes were not so much initiated by him into any one or other 
branch of knowledge as provided with all sorts of useful sentences from the different 
disciplines (Law, Dogma, Tradition, and also general culture or adab). On other days the same 
Sheikh gave also to a female audience after the afternoon prayer lectures resembling 
sermons” (Hurgronje 2007, 216). Hunwick (1986, 141–42) mentions Umm al-Zayn (b. 1739/40), 
a woman who “became one of the leading Meccan teachers of the late eighteenth century”. 
36 Hurgronje observed that “all good students” knew Ibn Malik’s famous work of Arabic 
grammar the Alfiyya “by heart” and most of those attending tafsīr lessons had memorised the 
Qurʾan. He also menƟons a Hanaﬁ scholar whose son had memorised the enƟrety of the 
famous hadith collection compiled by the ninth-century scholar al-Bukhari (2007, 208, 213–14). 
37 For discussion of the issuing of ijāzāt in the nineteenth-century Hijaz, along with examples of 
such certificates, see al-Shamikh 1973, 18–25; Dohaish 1974, 34–35. For discussion of the ijāza 
as a form of certification more generally, see e.g. Messick 1993, 92–94. 
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Just as spiritual capital flowed into the Hijaz through circuits of migrant scholars, and 
came to be distributed there and accumulated by new actors through the 
arrangements described above, so did education in these settings give rise to outward 
flows of spiritual capital as migrant students returned to their communities of origin or 
travelled on elsewhere bearing new embodied capacities and certificates of 
qualification. Many migrants who undertook at least some of their education in the 
Hijaz went on to become influential figures in their own right, embarking upon 
religious, social and political projects with significant ramifications in locations around 
the world. Students of the seventeenth-century Hijaz-based scholar Ibrahim al-Kurani, 
for example, included one Shaykh Yusuf, who would later lead a religiously-framed 
uprising against Dutch colonisers in what is now Indonesia. Al-Kurani’s students also 
included an Achehnese named ʿAbd al-Raʾuf (d. 1690), who became “a major influence 
in the revival of orthodox Sufism in Sumatra” (Voll 1975, 39; Nafi 2002, 307). Those 
who studied in the Hijaz with al-Kurani’s son Abu Tahir in the eighteenth century 
included the Delhi-born Shah Wali Allah al-Dihlawi (d. 1762), who later achieved fame 
as a major religious reformist in South Asia (Voll 1980, 266; Levtzion and Voll 1987a, 10; 
Voll 1999, 527–28). Students of Muhammad Hayya al-Sindi in Medina around that time 
included Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab (d. 1792), who subsequently established the 
revivalist tradition in Najd that is today known as Wahhabism and whose alliance with 
the Al Saʿud laid the foundaƟon for a series of expansionist poliƟcal projects which 
culminated with the founding of Saudi Arabia in the twentieth century. 
Connections of this kind have led historians such as John Voll to hypothesise that the 
Hijaz represented a key focal point of an interconnected wave of religious revival and 
reform spanning the Islamic world in the eighteenth century, broadly characterised by 
a synthesis of: hadith studies; a socially activist brand of Sufism; and rejection of the 
practice of imitating the rulings of the established schools of law (taqlīd) in favour of 
derivation of legal rulings by independent interpretation on the basis of direct access 
to the source texts (ijtihād) (Rahman 1977; Voll 1980; Levtzion and Voll 1987b; Voll 
1988; Voll 2002). Such claims are contested by other scholars, who emphasise the 
enormous differences that existed between the projects of the array of reformists in 
 64 
question.38 They have rightly underlined the need for more research into the content 
of their programmes, taking into account the importance of the particular social, 
cultural and political contexts in which each of them operated (Dallal 1993; Haykel 
2003). While this debate is ongoing, what does seem clear is that knowledge, skills and 
qualifications accumulated in the cosmopolitan setting of the eighteenth-century Hijaz 
in at least some instances contributed to both informing and lending legitimacy to 
major reformist projects around the Islamic world. In the context of this thesis, it is 
particularly worth noting that there is a strong case to be made for the claim that a 
period spent studying with Muhammad Hayya al-Sindi in Medina influenced a shift on 
the part of Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab towards criticism of taqlīd and many 
popular religious practices (Voll 1975; Nafi 2006).39 
Transactions which occurred in educational settings in the Hijaz continued to have 
comparable consequences into the nineteenth century. It was following his studies 
with the Moroccan Sufi scholar Ahmad ibn Idris in the Hijaz and Yemen, for example, 
that the North African Muhammad ibn ʿAli al-Sanusi founded the Sanusiyya order in 
Mecca which later spread to North Africa and played an important role in the struggle 
against European imperialism there (Rahman 1977; Voll 1980, 269). Others returning 
to their communities of origin following studies in the Holy Cities in the nineteenth 
century participated in projects including socio-moral reform, state-building and anti-
imperialist militancy in locations as distant as Senegambia, Somalia and the Caucasus, 
which appear to have related at least in part to their initiation in the Hijaz into Sufi 
orders like the Tijaniyya, the Qadiriyya and the Salihiyya (Voll 1999). Again, while it 
would certainly be naïve to suggest that such projects were simply a product of 
influences and symbolic resources flowing outwards from the Hijaz, the least that can 
                                                        
38 This includes Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, whose own religious project was in fact profoundly hostile 
to Sufism. 
39 Nafi’s article in particular is an important rejoinder to those historians who had previously 
been more circumspect with regard to the significance of al-Sindi and others in Medina as an 
influence upon Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s spiritual and intellectual development (e.g. Cook 1992; 
Dallal 1993). 
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be said is that knowledge, qualifications and other forms of capital accumulated there 
fed into a host of dynamics involved in shaping and legitimating them.40 
The discussion thus far has explored religious economies centred on educational 
settings in the Hijaz prior to the twentieth century from the perspective of the 
migrants who taught and studied there, the forms of spiritual capital which they 
brought, exchanged, accumulated and took away with them, and the social 
technologies which facilitated these transactions. The final element which constituted 
these economies was of course material capital, necessary in order to provide for the 
upkeep of settings for instruction, to allow the production and purchase of goods such 
as manuscripts and printed texts, and especially to cover the subsistence costs of 
scholars and students. 
These material resources were made available in part by the Ottoman authorities. 
William Ochsenwald has gone so far as to argue that religious actors and institutions in 
the Hijaz in fact drew most of their income “in one form or another from the Ottoman 
government”. He notes that revenues from religious endowments (awqāf, sing. waqf) 
were managed by a specialised official treasury and that funds of this kind which 
benefited the Hijaz, based both in Egypt and locally, were endowed by Ottoman 
sultans, as well as by the Sharifian amirs and private benefactors. He also highlights the 
role of “imperial charities” which channelled far greater quantities of resources to the 
Hijaz directly from Istanbul (1984, 55–56). In total, Ochsenwald estimates that some 
2,000 people were employed in the Masjid Haram and the Masjid Nabawi alone, 
undertaking roles as diverse as cleaning and lighting candles, carrying water and 
sweeping floors (1984, 52, 56). At least some of the Sufi orders present in the Ottoman 
Hijaz also drew on awqāf monies or material resources made available by the Ottoman 
authorities (Ochsenwald 1984, 45, 55). 
                                                        
40 Robert Launay has noted that figures who engaged in militant campaigns framed in religious 
terms in West Africa from the late eighteenth century onwards “attempted to draw their 
legitimacy from direct study in the Hijaz as opposed to local scholarly traditions”. He makes the 
important point, however, that such claims to legitimacy were mediated and contested by an 
array of actors with reference to local structures of religious authority (1990, esp. 179–80). 
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For the period when the old madrasa system still existed in Mecca, the Ottomans had 
also invested in that sphere of education. Madrasas founded in the Ottoman period 
included at least one established by the then sultan Sulayman al-Qanuni in the 
sixteenth century (Dohaish 1978, 29). Prior to the arrival of the Ottomans, funds for 
such institutions had come from investments by rulers and other elite actors across the 
Islamic world, at least partly as a marker of prestige and to display political influence in 
Islam’s holiest city (Mortel 1997, 236). The madrasas identified by Mortel in pre-
Ottoman Mecca included institutions founded by an Egypt-based Syrian merchant, an 
Ayyubid governor of Aden, a manumitted female Abyssinian slave, the ruler of Irbil, 
Mamluk elites, Rasulid sultans of Yemen, and assorted Indian rulers. 
The Ottoman state’s role as an investor in the religious economies which ran through 
the Hijaz contributed to a capacity to exert significant leverage. At the time of 
Hurgronje’s visit in the late nineteenth century, for example, the state authorities 
exercised some measure of control over who could offer instruction in the Masjid 
Haram through the figure of the Shaykh al-ʿUlamaʾ, who was "appointed like other 
guildmasters by Government" (Hurgronje 2007, 189). Little is known about this post 
and how exactly it related to the Ottoman and Sharifian frameworks (Ochsenwald 
1984, 53). However, Hurgronje tells us that the holder was usually a Mufti and we 
know that the muftis of Mecca and Medina were appointed from Istanbul 
(Ochsenwald 1984, 52). While qualification to teach in the mosque was in theory 
conferred by examination, Hurgronje suggested that in practice the Shaykh al-ʿUlamaʾ 
appointed scholars to teach “according to his pleasure” (2007, 189–190). He could call 
upon the eunuchs employed to guard the mosque or even the “Government police” to 
eject any interlopers (Hurgronje 2007, 195).41  Discussing the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, Ochsenwald reports that the qadi of Mecca – who represented the 
Ottoman state – also played a role in arbitrating in conflicts between the 
representatives of the four madhāhib within the Masjid Haram (1984, 41, 50, 84). 
Similarly, Ottoman state involvement in education in the Masjid Nabawi in Medina 
                                                        
41 There were apparently around 50 eunuchs in the Masjid Haram during the nineteenth 
century and some 120 in Medina in 1853. They were slaves, often of African origin, and “many 
had chosen to go to Mecca or Medina from Istanbul, seeing in those places an opportunity for 
a pious retirement from the imperial court” (Ochsenwald 1984, 51). 
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seems likely to have been facilitated by the fact that it was common for the Shaykh al-
ʿUlamaʾ of that mosque in the nineteenth century to concurrently hold the post of 
governor of the city on behalf of Istanbul (Ochsenwald 1984, 50). Since the first half of 
the nineteenth century, there had also existed the post of chief Sufi shaykh. The holder 
of this office, who was assisted by an advisory council, mediated between the Ottoman 
state and the many ṭuruq in the Hijaz. He sometimes had enough sway to appoint 
individuals to head particular ṭuruq, and Istanbul was even on occasion able to do so 
directly (Ochsenwald 1984, 53–54). 
In addition to exercising leverage through investment, states which ruled the Hijaz also 
had the capacity to intervene coercively in the religious sphere. As far back as 1633, 
Istanbul had banned Shiʿa from undertaking the hajj and it was also the case that 
Wahhabis were prevented from doing so up until the point when the Saudis occupied 
Mecca in the early nineteenth century (Haykel 2010, 446–47). During their own brief 
stint in control of the Holy Cities at that time, the Wahhabis tore down domes 
adorning tombs, put an end to the practice of the imams of the four madhāhib each 
leading the members of their own madhhab in prayer, destroyed Sufi texts and works 
on the discipline of logic, and blocked the arrival of pilgrims from Egypt and Syria 
(Redissi 2008, 164; Haykel 2010, 448). There were also coercive interventions in the 
religious sphere by the Ottomans in the nineteenth century, particularly against 
migrants from India. In 1849, for example, representatives of the ʿulamaʾ 
establishment in Mecca, along with the vali and deputy amir, secured Istanbul’s 
approval for the exile of Indian Muslims accused of offences including renouncing the 
mainstream Sunni madhāhib and denying miracles performed by saints. Similar moves 
against Indian pilgrims occurred in 1874, 1883, 1885 and 1886 (Ochsenwald 1984, 47–
48). At least in the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, coercive state 
interventions of this kind against non-Indians were apparently rare (Ochsenwald 1984, 
48).42 
                                                        
42 Amongst a small number of examples, Ochsenwald mentions the imprisonment of one 
individual in the 1880s over pamphlets deemed dangerous by the ʿulamaʾ, in the context of the 
dispute which occurred at this time over the leadership of the Naqshbandi ṭarīqa in Mecca; 
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In addition to providing for some degree of influence within the religious sphere, 
material investment on the part of the Ottoman authorities also allowed the state to 
draw upon the world of religious scholarship and instruction for legitimacy. This could 
occur in quite direct ways, such as when officials demanded fatwas from the Shaykh al-
ʿUlamaʾ and other top scholars to legiƟmate poliƟcal decisions (Hurgronje 2007, 190). 
Similarly, Hurgronje noted that the Sufi orders were courted by statesmen, who “vie 
for the favour of sheikhs who have at their disposal such troops of disciples” (2007, 
224). Examples of the Ottoman state’s use of the ṭuruq for political purposes include 
the role played by members of the Naqshabandi order in raising funds for the 
construction of the Hijaz railroad and in lending their backing to the pan-Islamic 
policies of Abdülhamid II (Ochsenwald 1984, 45). 
However, the leverage exercised by the Ottoman state within the religious economies 
which ran through the Hijaz – both as an investor and as a coercive regulator – appears 
to have been subject to certain limits. For a start, alternative data set out by Dohaish, 
while it does not necessarily contradict Ochsenwald’s claims about the scale of 
Ottoman investment, at the very least raises questions concerning the quantities in 
question.43 Dohaish notes that only 54 scholars out of a total of 270 who were listed as 
teaching in the Masjid Haram in the official Ottoman yearbook for the Hijaz covering 
the year 1303 H. (1884-1885) were in receipt of a stipend from the state. In itself, this 
is consistent with Hurgronje’s claim that only around 50 to 60 scholars were actually 
engaged in regular teaching in the mosque at that time. More importantly, however, 
Dohaish observes that even in those cases the sums involved were nominal. While the 
amounts in question varied, even the maximum payment of 500 piastres made to the 
most senior scholars once every year was less than the 600 piastres paid out on a 
monthly basis to a teacher in an Ottoman state school in Jidda around the same time. 
Moreover, the teacher’s salary used here for comparison would itself have been 
“barely sufficient to cover his basic daily needs” (Dohaish 1974, 89–92, 204–05). It is 
not clear whether these token stipends paid out to scholars may have been commonly 
                                                                                                                                                                  
and the execution of a Sudanese who declared himself the mahdi and mobilised a small group 
of slave followers in 1886. 
43 Dohaish’s thesis was completed prior to the publication of Ochsenwald’s book but is not 
cited in the latter work. 
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supplemented with other kinds of support controlled more or less directly by the 
Ottoman authorities, such as payments in kind, state-administered awqāf, or access to 
subsidies of grain and money disbursed to residents of the Hijaz every year as a matter 
of prestige. 
Moreover, the extent of the leverage that could be exercised by the Ottoman state by 
virtue of its investments seems likely to have been limited by the fact that many of 
those involved in the sphere of religious education also had access to alternative 
sources of income. Scholars who taught in the Masjid Haram sometimes engaged in 
“various trades which make them independent” and received valuable gifts from 
students or other admirers. They could also draw on donations made to the mosque 
teaching body collectively by wealthy pilgrims, particularly from India, although the 
state may have exercised some control over such funds by virtue of the fact that they 
were distributed by the Shaykh al-ʿUlamaʾ (Hurgronje 2007, 188–89). Other sources of 
income for those involved in the religious sphere included “performing marriages, 
notarizing documents, rendering judgments outside regular court service, [and] 
opening the Kaba or sections of the Harams outside regular hours”, while muftis were 
also able to charge foreign pilgrims for the service of authorising their adoption of 
Arabic names (Ochsenwald 1984, 55). Finally, Hijaz-based ʿulamaʾ toured other parts of 
the Islamic world to seek funding; although it was apparently the state-appointed 
Shaykh al-ʿUlamaʾ who nominated individuals to go on such travels and they 
sometimes carried letters of reference from the Ottoman sultan (Ochsenwald 1984, 49, 
53). Beyond the sphere of the ʿulamaʾ establishment, the Suﬁ orders similarly had 
access to substantial autonomous sources of funding; from a large residential 
Naqshabandi zāwiya in late nineteenth-century Mecca the cost of which was “entirely 
borne by the brethren”, to Sufi shaykhs whose residences were “filled to overflow with 
the costly gifts of their venerators” (Hurgronje 2007, 222). It is also likely that at least 
some students had access to private sources of income, including from family 
members and business activities. 
Besides the question of funding arrangements, the capacity of the state to exercise 
leverage in the religious sphere either as an investor or as a regulator appears likely to 
have been limited somewhat by the informal and personalised nature of education at 
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the time. For example, while scholars might be appointed to teach in the Masjid Haram 
by a “precise order” from the state-appointed Shaykh al-ʿUlamaʾ, Hurgronje noted that 
individuals could also come to be considered qualified to give lessons there as a result 
of more diffuse customary factors (Hurgronje 2007, 189). Furthermore, it is not at all 
clear that there was in practice any particularly close supervision of teaching in the 
mosque. While scholars appointed to offer instruction there were customarily 
expected to convene at least one lesson per day, they could apparently absent 
themselves for many months without that hiatus even coming to the attention of the 
Shaykh al-ʿUlamaʾ (Hurgronje 2007, 213). Describing part of the role of the Shaykh al-
ʿUlamaʾ as being “to direct the order of teaching in the Mosque”, Hurgronje qualified 
this with the observation that, “That is to say so far as there can be ‘order’ in things 
Mekkan, for his authority like that of all the other authorities is limited by custom, or 
alleged custom. The ‘custom’ is the more readily accepted by all because every one 
can interpret it at will” (Hurgronje 2007, 195). 
Hurgronje’s perception of what apparently seemed to him a certain laxity in the 
arrangements for teaching in the Masjid Haram cannot be explained away entirely as a 
reflection of a European colonialist’s disdain. Similar attitudes are found in an account 
of studies in the Masjid Nabawi in Medina in the early twentieth century, for example, 
this time penned by a former student in that mosque. The author, ʿAbd al-Haqq 
Naqshabandi, lamented the absence of “written regulation or responsible 
administration or supervision or organised examinations”.44 
Arrangements similar to those described here represented a valued mode of pedagogy, 
which had served the purposes for which it was intended for many centuries and 
which would persist in mosque settings for a long time to come. However, these 
personalised and informal methods of instruction were by this time coming to be seen 
by many local observers as traditional and somewhat disorderly in comparison with 
new modes of education which had begun to appear in the Hijaz from the late 
nineteenth century. In the context of this thesis, the significance of these new, 
increasingly rationalised and bureaucratised social technologies was that they allowed 
                                                        
44 As quoted in al-Shamikh 1973, 63. The original sources is an article published in the 
magazine al-Manhal in 1962. 
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for the creation of spaces in which administrators could exercise more sustained 
monitoring and control over teaching. This in turn could facilitate closer regulation of 
the religious sphere by the state. These developments traced back in part to the arrival 
in the Hijaz of the gradually expanding Ottoman state schooling system. 
Bureaucratising Education 
While the extension of state-led education had been a concern for the Ottoman 
authorities since the Tanzimat reforms several decades earlier, it was only during the 
reign of Abdülhamid II from 1876 that these efforts really took off. With developments 
such as the emergence of mass education at the primary school level, the empire 
“came into its own as an ‘educator state’ with a systematic programme of 
education/indoctrination for subjects it intended to mould into citizens” (Deringil 1998, 
93–94). Recent historiography has challenged the longstanding view that these state-
led initiatives represented part of a broader process of “Westernisation” of Ottoman 
cultural and political life. Rather, elements of European-style schooling were actively 
appropriated, assimilated into the particular social, cultural and political frameworks 
that prevailed within the empire, and put to new uses; including forging a political 
community capable of resisting threats which were perceived as emanating from 
minority populations and neighbouring states, as well as from missionaries and other 
forms of European encroachment (Fortna 2002). 
The Ottoman state education system was late in arriving to the Hijaz. It was not until 
1874 that the first state school was founded in the region; a rushdiye (advanced 
primary) school established that year in Jidda (Dohaish 1974, 74–75). Although 
legislation introduced in 1869 had provided for the establishment of education 
councils to administer schools in the provinces, it seems that no such body was 
established in the Hijaz until 1891 and there is reason to think that it may not have 
become properly functional until 1908 (Dohaish 1974, 62–71, 76–79; Somel 2001, 
100–01, fn. 41). Even by 1908, there were apparently just four schools at the ibtidai 
(lower primary) level, four at the rushdiye (advanced primary) level and a single idadi 
(secondary) school serving the entire region (Dohaish 1974, 74–75). It was only in that 
year that the first teacher training college was opened in the Hijaz, making it and Basra 
the last vilayets to receive such facilities (Somel 2001, 134). One reason for the delay in 
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rolling out state education in the Hijaz may have been the weakness of Ottoman 
administrative structures there and the consequent difficulty of collecting the taxes 
that would usually fund these new apparatuses (Somel 2001, 100,122). 
Nonetheless, this fledgling Ottoman schooling system created new spaces for 
education which, apart from being more geared towards instruction in secular subjects, 
were also in many other ways quite different from the mosque study circles and other 
arenas that had long prevailed in the Hijaz. In contrast with the informality of the 
mosque ḥalaqa, in which students came and went as they pleased and studied for as 
long as they desired or could afford, the Ottoman system provided for the division of 
schooling into a set number of consecutive chronological stages according to the age 
and ability of pupils. Ottoman schools were also expected to operate according to 
fixed, state-approved curricula, delineating the precise forms of cultural capital which 
students were to accumulate throughout the course of their attendance. Annual 
examinations were to be used to gather information about students’ acquisition of the 
knowledge and competencies in question, and to determine their progress through the 
system. At least in principle, the new Ottoman schools were also to operate within the 
terms of a hierarchical administrative framework which would provide for regular 
inspection of each institution (Dohaish 1974, 62–72). It is clear that not all of these 
provisions were effectively implemented in the Hijaz. As noted above, it was a long 
time before the proposed administrative framework was put in place. Although 
detailed syllabuses existed, there is evidence to suggest that these were not actually 
adhered to in some schools. Moreover, with instruction in Turkish, such Ottoman 
schools as existed appear to have catered largely for the children of state officials 
(Dohaish 1974, 85–88). Nonetheless, in terms of ideals even if not always in practice, 
this system marked a new drive by state actors to create sites of education amenable 
to direct and sustained monitoring and control, investment in which could allow for 
quite targeted interventions in the cultural sphere. 
The gradual expansion of the Ottoman schooling system also had a broader impact 
insofar as it helped to catalyse the emergence of a new generation of private schools 
in the Hijaz around the same time, which became another arena for the development 
of similarly rationalised, bureaucratised styles of education. The first of them, the 
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Madrasa Sawlatiyya, was established in Mecca in 1875, very soon after the founding of 
the first Ottoman state school. In Mecca alone, there subsequently appeared the 
Madrasa Fakhriyya (est. 1879), the Madrasa Islamiyya (est. 1886), the Madrasa 
Khayriyya (est. 1908) and Madrasat al-Falah (est. 1911) (Dohaish 1974, 147–49). There 
were also four new private schools founded in Jidda over roughly the same period; 
probably at least 12 in Medina, and perhaps considerably more; and possibly two in 
Taʾif (Dohaish 1974, 147–49). While the content of teaching in these institutions varied, 
instruction commonly included a very strong religious component alongside secular 
subjects like grammar and arithmetic, and occasionally history and geography. In at 
least some cases, the new schools made use of European-style classroom 
arrangements and innovations in pedagogy including fixed syllabuses and regular 
examinations yielding quantified results (Dohaish 1974, 168–78; Laffan 2003, 199). 
From the time of its founding, for example, the Sawlatiyya operated according to a 
curriculum which would take students at least ten years to complete in full. It was built 
around detailed lists of the particular texts which were to be studied at each stage in 
the process. It stipulated that fiqh classes, for example, were to be taught from a series 
of specific works associated with the Hanafi school of law favoured by the Ottomans 
(al-Saqqa 1978, 37–41). In these administrative arrangements, such schools differed 
significantly from the madrasas which had existed in the Hijaz in earlier periods, and 
which by this time had anyway entirely disappeared. 
Dohaish has argued that the appearance of this new wave of private institutions was 
driven in large part by antipathy towards the Ottoman schools, which were resented in 
particular for their use of Turkish as the main language of instruction. In response, and 
also desirous of “catching up” with developments in nearby locations like Egypt and 
Syria, he suggests local actors strove to develop new Arabic-language alternatives. 
They drew for inspiration on the traditional Qurʾan schools of the region (katātīb, sing. 
kuttāb) but also on the “improvements” witnessed in the new Ottoman system 
(Dohaish 1974, 145–46).45 This narrative of local actors simultaneously resisting and 
                                                        
45 At least in theory, the new private schools were further bound up with the Ottoman system 
insofar as they were subject to regulation and inspection by the provincial governor (vali) and 
local education administration. However, particularly in light of questions about the very 
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appropriating aspects of an apparatus of imperial intrusion tells part of the story. 
However, it was also the case that these new private schools were very much tied up 
with the cross-border flows of migrants, social technologies and resources that had 
long defined the religious economy of the Hijaz. The seminal Madrasa Sawlatiyya was 
in fact established by the Indian scholar Rahmat Allah Khalil al-ʿUthmani, who had 
arrived in Mecca in 1857 as an exile fleeing the aftermath of that year’s uprising 
against the British in his country of origin. It was named after the benefactor who 
provided the funds necessary for its launch, a wealthy woman named Sawlat al-Nisaʾ 
Begum from Calcutta who had come into contact with Rahmat Allah whilst in Mecca 
on hajj (Dohaish 1974, 149–51; al-Saqqa 1978; ʿAbd al-Jabbar 1982, 108–12). Of the 
other schools that were founded in Mecca, all either had direct links to the Sawlatiyya 
or else strong cross-border connections of their own. The Madrasa Fakhriyya was 
founded by a former teacher of the Sawlatiyya, ʿAbd al-Haqq Qariʾ, partly on the basis 
of donations by Indian benefactors (al-Shamikh 1973, 50; Dohaish 1974, 154–56).46 
The Islamiyya was established by another Indian immigrant to Mecca, ʿAbd al-Khaliq 
Muhammad Husayn al-Banghali, apparently at the suggestion of the Sawlatiyya 
founder Rahmat Allah (Dohaish 1974, 156–57). The founder of the Khayriyya was 
Muhammad Husayn al-Khayyat, a Mecca-born graduate of the Sawlatiyya (al-Shamikh 
1973, 50–52; Dohaish 1974, 157–59). Finally, Madrasat al-Falah was established by 
Muhammad ʿAli Rida Zaynal, described by Dohaish as a “widely travelled merchant” 
who “had been particularly impressed by the spirited attempts made to extend 
education in India and Egypt, and… accordingly decided to set up schools in the whole 
of the Hijaz” (1974, 162–63). In at least some cases, these schools catered not only for 
Hijazi students but also for significant numbers of Indians, Indonesians, Iranians, Iraqis, 
Bukharis, Yemenis and Hadramis.47 
                                                                                                                                                                  
existence of a local education administration in the Hijaz until 1908, it is not clear to what 
extent such powers were exercised (Dohaish 1974, 146–47). 
46 Dohaish uses the name Madrasa Tajwidiyya and names the founder as Qariʾ ʿAbd al-Haqq. 
However, it is clear that he and al-Shamikh are discussing the same institution. 
47 See Dohaish (1974, 153–54) for figures showing the proportion of students from all of these 
backgrounds at the Sawlatiyya between 1910 and 1913. In 1913, Hijazi students appear to 
have been significantly outnumbered by those from outside the region. 
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A history of the Madrasa Sawlatiyya suggests that at the time of its founding that 
influential school operated “in the style of al-Azhar and the old Islamic schools of 
India” (al-Saqqa 1978, 37). Muhammad Qasim Zaman has observed that the approach 
to education employed there had much in common with the Deobandi madrasas of 
the subcontinent (2007, 256). The Hanafi leanings of the Sawlatiyya, in addition to 
being amenable in the Ottoman context, may well have related to its connections with 
India, another region where the Hanafi madhhab prevailed. Moreover, sources from 
the time offer further specific evidence of Indian influences at work in shaping the 
social technologies in use in this new wave of Hijazi private schools. In a speech at an 
event organised by the Sawlatiyya in 1912, for example, a teacher noted that 
examinations that year had proceeded according to methods “known to the scholars 
of India”. At the same event, it was announced that the school’s director had recently 
travelled to India partly with a view to observing the results of educational reforms 
there, particularly those developed by the Nadwat al-ʿUlamaʾ “upon which we pinned 
great hopes”.48 Formally founded in 1898 but only really established in 1908, the 
flagship Dar al-ʿUlum college of the Nadwat al-ʿUlamaʾ in Lucknow represented “an 
attempt at a middle way between the ‘traditionalist’ teaching at the Dar al-ʿulum of 
Deoband and the more ‘modernist’ ideas on education elaborated at the 
‘Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College’ of ʿAligarh” (Hartung 2006, 140). The Nadwat 
al-ʿUlamaʾ movement was known for its emphasis on the Arabic language and had ties 
to Middle Eastern reformists including Muhammad ʿAbduh going back to the late 
nineteenth century. 
The bureaucratised modes of education described here – including the use of pre-
approved syllabuses, fixed-length courses of study, regular examinations, hierarchical 
systems of inspection, and so on – were thus far limited to Ottoman state institutions 
with limited local uptake and privately run schools, influenced both by the Ottoman 
system and connections with locations as distant as India. However, it was not long 
before political actors seized upon these new social technologies as a means for 
exerting more sustained monitoring and closer control over key sites of religious 
instruction. In late November 1913, apparently acting on an order from the Grand 
                                                        
48 Speeches reproduced in al-Shamikh 1973, 159–64. 
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Sharif Husayn ibn ʿAli, a commiƩee of ʿulamaʾ approved a document formally outlining 
an overhaul of teaching arrangements in the Masjid Haram in Mecca.49 Once again, 
these new arrangements differed sharply from the quite autonomous, informal and 
personalised system witnessed by Hurgronje. Where the latter had emphasised the 
prevalence of custom in combination with the personal oversight of the Shaykh al-
ʿUlamaʾ, the new document – which appears to have been the first of its kind in this 
context – outlined detailed regulations geared towards instituting a much more 
bureaucratised and rationalised system. 
Teaching in the mosque was now to be limited to a fixed list of subject areas.50 It was 
to be overseen by a council headed by the Hanafi mufti and including also the muftis of 
the three other mainstream Sunni madhāhib, along with three teaching scholars 
(Section 1, Article 1). The actual work of teaching was to be undertaken by the four 
muftis, along with 15 salaried teachers (mudarrisūn) and an unspecified number of 
adjunct teachers (mulāzimūn) (Section 1, Article 4; Section 3). The latter do not appear 
to have drawn a regular salary but did have the right to a share in donations made to 
mosque staff, which were to be divided amongst all of the teachers and adjuncts 
“according to the old arrangement” (Section 6, Article 1). Where previously scholars 
offering instruction in the Masjid Haram had enjoyed a great deal of freedom to come 
and go as they pleased, salaried teachers were now formally expected to give a 
minimum of three lessons per day and were required to seek prior permission for any 
absences (Section 3, Article 2; Section 3, Article 6).  
Students would be allowed to progress in their studies only by passing an annual 
examination, which would take place in the month of Rajab (Section 3, Articles 4 and 5). 
In a further sign of a shift away from the old personalised arrangements and towards a 
new institutionalised framework, they were now to be issued not with ijāzāt by 
                                                        
49 The document would later be published as “al-Tawaliʿ al-Saniyya fi Nizam al-Tadris al-Jadid 
bi-Masjid Makka al-Mahmiyya” 1913, which is the source of the discussion that follows. This 
document has previously been discussed in Dohaish 1974, 215–21. 
50 They were tawḥīd, tafsīr, hadith, uṣūl al-ḥadīth, fiqh, uṣūl al-fiqh, syntax, morphology, 
rhetoric (al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān wa-l-badīʿ), logic (al-manṭiq), history, biographies (siyar, 
presumably of the Prophet and other major figures in Islamic history), and mathematics 
(Section 4, Article 2). 
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individual scholars but with pro forma certificates, which included a record of their 
exam grades and bore the stamps of the four muftis and members of the mosque 
committee.51 Examinations were also to be used to determine students’ attainment of 
the status of adjunct teacher or their appointment to a post as a salaried teacher 
(Section 3, Article 7; Section 5, Article 2). 
Most significantly, the system as a whole was geared towards the systematic gathering 
of information about all of those involved, both teachers and students. In addition to 
the teaching body, the mosque was also to employ a team of salaried administrative 
staff, comprising two inspectors and a clerk (Section 2). The inspectors were to report 
to the Hanafi mufti all texts being taught, noting the title of the text in question, the 
name of the individual teaching it, and the dates on which that teaching began and 
ended. Although the document did not include a specific fixed syllabus, the inspectors 
were to draw attention to any individual who “teaches [texts] corrupting of morals and 
creed, [which are] other than the books of Ahl al-Sunna wa-l-Jamāʿa” (SecƟon 2, ArƟcle 
2). They were also to note any lack of punctuality and the presence of unlicensed 
individuals attempting to offer instruction. Information gathered through this system 
of surveillance was to be fed up a hierarchical administrative framework which was 
ultimately headed by the amir himself. 
Teaching in the Masjid Haram continued to proceed according to this new system 
following the displacement of Ottoman power by the Sharifian state that was ushered 
in with the Arab Revolt of 1916 (Dohaish 1974, 293). Many of the new private schools 
had already shut down by this time and others were converted into state schools by 
the Sharifian regime. Some, however, including the Sawlatiyya, the Fakhriyya, the 
Islamiyya and branches of Madrasat al-Falah in both Mecca and Jidda, survived as 
independent institutions (Dohaish 1974, 281–91). An initial extension of schooling for 
Hijazi boys under the Sharifian state – with teaching now in Arabic, rather than in 
Turkish – was eventually reversed as Husayn grew increasingly wary that the expansion 
of such opportunities might provoke political instability (Dohaish 1974, 229–80). 
                                                        
51 See the brief discussion of this issue, along with a reproduction of one such certificate, in 
Dohaish 1974, 293 and Appendix 1. 
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At the time of their arrival in the mid-1920s, the Saudis would thus take control of a 
region in which religious education was fragmented between different systems. On the 
one hand, many mosques, Sufi lodges and other settings likely continued to operate on 
more or less informal and personalised lines similar to those which had long prevailed 
in the Hijaz. On the other hand, a newly bureaucratised set of arrangements which 
were more amenable to close and sustained regulation by state actors were by this 
time to be found in the context of the Masjid Haram, as well as in what was left of the 
newer kinds of private and state-run schools. 
Conclusion 
For centuries prior to the Saudi occupation in the 1920s, the Hijaz had been an 
important site for transactions occurring within the terms of continent-spanning 
religious economies. Pilgrim scholars who had accumulated spiritual capital in their 
communities of origin and often in many other locations besides brought these 
resources with them to the region. In the context of mosque study circles and 
comparable arrangements in madrasas, Sufi lodges and private homes, this capital was 
distributed in the form of knowledge, skills and certificates of qualification. Migrant 
students in turn took reserves of spiritual capital acquired in the Hijaz back into cross-
border circulation, sometimes putting these resources to work in the service of 
religious, social and political projects with far-reaching ramifications. The transactions 
in the Hijaz which sat at the heart of these cross-border patterns of exchange were 
sustained by long-distance flows of material capital, including investment by the 
Ottoman authorities and endowments made available by private benefactors many 
thousands of miles away. The Ottoman state exerted significant influence within these 
economies, both coercively regulating transactions seen as politically problematic and 
also leveraging its investment through the appointment of intermediaries. 
However, new social technologies which took root in the region from the late 
nineteenth century onwards were embraced by state actors as affording the possibility 
of far closer monitoring and control of such matters. Increasingly bureaucratised 
modes of instruction, which arrived as a result of imperial state-building and through 
private channels from locations as distant as India, were eventually introduced to the 
most prestigious site of religious learning in the region, the Masjid Haram. Techniques 
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such as the imposition of explicit regulations, regular examinations and hierarchical 
systems of inspection allowed officials to gather information on the activities of 
students and scholars, to exclude undesirable religious actors, and to veto the 
exchange and accumulation of particular forms of spiritual capital. Such ends could be 
achieved in more systematic and intrusive ways than had previously been possible 
according to the relatively informal, personalised and autonomous modes of pedagogy 
which had long prevailed in the region. As I explore in the next chapter, these new 
styles of education could also facilitate efforts by state actors to exert influence in the 
religious sphere through the targeted investment of material capital. 
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Chapter 2 
Education and Wahhabi Expansion Within Saudi-Ruled 
Territories: Transformations in the Occupied Hijaz 
In September 1924, Ikhwan tribal militias loyal to ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Al Saʿud swept into the 
mountain town of Taʾif near Mecca and plundered it over a period of days, massacring 
many of those residents who stayed behind (Vassiliev 2000, 261). The capture of the 
remainder of the Hijaz over the months that followed represented a major step in the 
extension of both Saudi political power and also Wahhabi religious influence across the 
Peninsula. The violent coercion of the Ikhwan was of course crucial to each of these 
two intertwined projects. At the same time, the occupied Hijaz would also become the 
arena for the development of a more consensual – though nonetheless power-laden – 
scheme for promoting Wahhabi revivalism using new kinds of educational institutions. 
This chapter explores this early use of education to advance the Wahhabi daʿwa within 
Saudi-ruled territories as a formative precursor to the role subsequently played by 
state-run educational initiatives in Wahhabi religious expansion beyond the Peninsula. 
I begin by moving back in time to outline the institutions, texts and practices which had 
characterised religious instruction within the Wahhabi tradition in Najd from the 
eighteenth century. I then explore the Saudis’ use of the occupied Hijaz as a crucible 
for the forging of a quite new system of education from the mid-1920s, paying 
particular attention to the flagship Saudi Scholastic Institute founded in Mecca at that 
time. While the Scholastic Institute and the new schooling system which it represented 
served a variety of ends, one of their functions was to extend Wahhabi norms into a 
social milieu in which this tradition had previously enjoyed very little standing. 
Graduates were expected to form a new elite equipped with the symbolic resources 
necessary to allow them to engage effectively in struggles to redefine prevailing 
cultural frameworks, bringing them into line with Wahhabi conceptions of orthodoxy. 
At the same time, the conditions under which this initiative crystallised contributed to 
shaping it into something far more complex than simply the reproduction of earlier 
Wahhabi pedagogical traditions in a new social context. Instead, Saudi state actors set 
about appropriating elements of the educational infrastructure which had existed in 
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the Hijaz prior to their arrival and reworking them in the service of this new project of 
cultural transformation. Their efforts to do so were facilitated, mediated and informed 
by third parties drafted in from beyond the Peninsula. In the course of this initiative, 
the Wahhabi tradition itself underwent shifts, as core tenets and texts came to be 
grafted into a new discursive framework. 
The drive to advance the Wahhabi daʿwa within Saudi-ruled territories at this 
particular moment in history gave rise to certain new relationships and institutional 
structures which would feed directly into subsequent efforts to use education as a 
basis for exerting religious influence beyond the kingdom’s borders. More generally, I 
suggest that these early initiatives consolidated a set of interrelated strategies – 
including material investment, appropriation of social technologies, mediation and 
hegemonic modification of religious discourse – which would come to define and lend 
strength to later projects of Wahhabi expansion. 
Religious Instruction in the Wahhabi Tradition 
The Wahhabi tradition had from the start included an emphasis on the importance of 
religious knowledge as an indispensable basis for correct belief, ritual and conduct 
(Doumato 2000, 71–73). With the expansion of the first Saudi amirate in the 
eighteenth century, state actors took on some responsibility for promoting religious 
education, contributing funding to support instruction in urban centres in Najd 
(Commins 2005, 123). At this stage and in the nineteenth century, students in Najd 
also drew on material support made available by individuals including their own 
teachers and merchants, as well as income from awqāf. It was also common for 
ʿulamaʾ and students to fund their scholarly endeavours by involving themselves in 
trade or other commercial projects (Steinberg 2004, 86, 95–97). Core activities in the 
sphere of religious education included copying manuscripts and memorising texts, the 
importance of both tasks ensured in part by a lack of printed books (Steinberg 2004, 
88–89). 
The capital of the first Saudi amirate at al-Dirʿiyya became a centre of learning within 
the context of Central Arabia (Doumato 2000, 73). Four schools were established there, 
in which instruction was offered by Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s four sons 
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(Commins 2005, 123). Theology was taught by the Wahhabi ʿulamaʾ with reference to 
key works by Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab himself, including Kitab al-Tawhid and Kitab Kashf al-
Shubahat. Lessons in jurisprudence were based on texts by authorities associated with 
the Wahhabis’ favoured school of law, the Hanbali madhhab, including Muwaffiq al-
Din ibn Qudama (d. 1223) and Musa al-Hujawi (d. 1560/61). Instruction in Qurʾanic 
exegesis was grounded in works by Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari (d. 923), Husayn ibn 
Masʿud al-Baghawi (d. 1122), ʿAbd Allah ibn ʿUmar al-Baydawi, and Ismaʿil ibn ʿUmar 
ibn Kathir (d. 1373). Other subjects taught included Arabic language and arithmetic 
(Commins 2005, 123–24). 
During the period of the second Saudi amirate in the nineteenth century, this body of 
texts was supplemented with polemical works by the Wahhabi scholars ʿAbd al-Latif 
ibn ʿAbd al-Rahman and ʿAbd Allah ibn Aba Butayn. These were seemingly intended to 
provide students with tools for use in disputes with the scholarly establishment of the 
Ottoman Empire (Commins 2005, 124). Riyadh, Burayda, ʿUnayza and Haʾil emerged as 
centres of learning within Central Arabia (Steinberg 2004, 94). Scholars and students 
also travelled further afield. Those from ʿUnayza in parƟcular – who were relatively 
independent from the Wahhabi establishment in Riyadh – engaged with broader Salafi 
networks by travelling with merchants to locations including the Hijaz, the Levant and 
the Gulf. From the late nineteenth century, some Wahhabi students began going to 
Delhi and Bhopal to study with renowned hadith scholars like Siddiq Hasan Khan and 
Nadhir Husayn al-Dihlawi (Steinberg 2004, 91, 94–95). 
Under the third Saudi state that emerged from 1902, religious functionaries were 
provided with salaries by the political authorities. As part of the process of shoring up 
Saudi legitimacy, they were sent out to both sedentary and nomadic communities to 
offer basic religious instruction, as well as to collect zakat taxes and perform judicial 
roles (Al-Rasheed 2002, 49–58). Education initially remained under the control of the 
ʿulamaʾ and organised along traditional lines (Doumato 2000, 79–81). It was only 
following the occupation of the Hijaz in the mid-1920s that very new arrangements 
began to take shape. 
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Developments in the Occupied Hijaz 
The occupation of the Hijaz put the Saudis in control of a region where the Wahhabi 
tradition not only had little foothold but where it had in fact long been widely 
considered anathema. During Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s own lifetime and afterwards, 
Hijaz-based scholars like Ahmad ibn Barkat Tandatawi and Ahmad Zayni Dahlan had 
written treatises robustly attacking the creed he espoused (Redissi 2008, 164–65). As 
discussed in Chapter 1, the Ottoman authorities had for a long time banned Wahhabis 
from performing the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. As was clear from Hurgronje’s 
account of teaching in the Masjid Haram in the late nineteenth century, scholars 
aligned with the Hanbali madhhab – the school of jurisprudence favoured by the 
Wahhabis – had represented only a very small minority. Moreover, the Meccan 
scholarly establishment had been overwhelmingly committed to Ashʿari creed, as 
opposed to the Salafi creed which is the foundation of the Wahhabi tradition. Religious 
life in the region had also long been strongly coloured by Sufi rituals and traditional 
religious practices like the mawlid, which were vociferously opposed by the 
Wahhabis.52 It is thus little surprise that Hijazis’ resentment of the occupation came to 
focus in part on the Saudis’ imposition of Wahhabi norms in the region (Ochsenwald 
2009). 
The Saudis and their allies amongst the Najdi religious establishment and the tribal 
militias engaged in a joint campaign to assert Wahhabi strictures in the Hijaz, including 
by force. In an echo of the previous Saudi incursions into the Holy Cities in the early 
nineteenth century, the Ikhwan and Wahhabi religious functionaries proceeded to 
demolish “shrines built on the tombs of the Prophet, his relatives and Companions” 
and prohibited the smoking of tobacco in public places (Al-Rasheed 2002, 65). The 
Saudis would go on to proscribe most Sufi rituals and orders, although Sufi modes of 
religiosity – and also mawlid celebrations – persisted in less public forms (Sedgwick 
1997; Yamani 2009, 70–75; Ochsenwald 2009, 78–79). They also seized control of key 
                                                        
52 It is also instructive in this context to recall the incident discussed in Chapter 1 in which a 
group of Indian Muslims were exiled from the Hijaz in 1849 in connection with allegations that 
they renounced the mainstream Sunni madhāhib and denied miracles performed by saints. 
These practices – considered so offensive in the Hijaz that they merited exile – are strongly 
reminiscent of the Salafi emphasis on ijtihād over taqlīd and commitment to combating 
“superstitions” seen as having corrupted traditional modes of religiosity. 
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sites of religious instruction in the region. Initially, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz appointed the Najdi 
scholar ʿAbd Allah ibn Bulayhid as Grand Qadi of the Hijaz. He headed a commiƩee 
responsible for supervising instruction in the Masjid Haram, including choosing books 
and appointing teachers. In a sign of the imposition of Wahhabi concerns, scholars 
teaching there were enjoined to address the issue of illegitimate innovations and 
superstitions. In 1927, the post of Grand Qadi of the Hijaz was taken over by ʿ Abd Allah 
ibn Hasan Al al-Shaykh, a Wahhabi scholar with a more severe reputation, who also 
acquired responsibility for overseeing teaching in the Masjid Haram (ʿAbd Allah 1973, 
44–47; ʿAbd al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh 1974/5, 152–63, 344–51; Ochsenwald 2009, 77). 
Alongside the capture of key sites of religious learning like the Haramayn, the occupied 
Hijaz also became the arena for another, parallel project to employ education as a 
means for effecting cultural transformation. This involved the creation of new, 
dedicated spaces for teaching, directly funded and controlled by the Saudi state, which 
were quite distinct from the sphere of mosque instruction. The unique importance of 
the Hijaz as the crucible for the forging of new modes of schooling under the Saudis is 
underlined by the fact that it was in Mecca that they first established a Directorate of 
Education, in March 1926. The directorate was for a long time concerned with 
maintaining and expanding schooling solely in the Hijaz. Its remit would only 
eventually be extended to cover the whole of the Saudi-ruled territories much later, in 
1938 (Shalabi 1987, 278–83). While the directorate was initially a very modest affair, 
the apparatus surrounding it grew over time to include advisory and administrative 
bodies, as well as staff responsible for inspecting individual schools (Shalabi 1987, 278–
83, 289–301). The latter included pre-primary, primary and secondary schools, 
encompassing both state-run institutions and also private initiatives which came to be 
subject to Saudi state oversight (Shalabi 1987, 112–15). Higher education in the early 
years mainly involved study abroad, especially in Egypt, though there later appeared 
two state-run institutions for more advanced students: the College of Shariʿa, opened 
in Mecca in 1949, and the Teacher Training College established there in 1952 (Shalabi 
1987, 205–34). At this stage, there was no state provision for female education, 
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although there were some limited opportunities in the Hijaz for private schooling for 
girls.53 
The new Saudi state-run schooling system which emerged in the Hijaz was partly 
intended to train functionaries to serve the expanding state bureaucracy, at a time 
when the Saudis relied heavily for this purpose on personnel drafted in from beyond 
the Peninsula. By maintaining this system, the Saudis also sought to present 
themselves to the population of the Hijaz not only as occupiers but as providers of 
services and enlightened “development”. However, alongside these goals, the 
establishment and expansion of the new schooling system was very much bound up 
with efforts to extend Wahhabi norms into this newly conquered territory. Support for 
the advancement of the Wahhabi daʿwa represented an important element of state-
building for a dynasty which, ever since the pact forged between Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab 
and Muhammad Ibn Saʿud in 1744, had claimed political legitimacy in part by 
representing themselves as defenders of the true creed. The ongoing maintenance of 
the politically important alliance between the Saudi royals and the Wahhabi religious 
establishment required that the former be seen to be continuing to back this 
missionary project. Moreover, in the long term, the promotion of Wahhabi norms also 
stood to contribute to efforts to forge a more or less coherent political community out 
of the disparate populations that had come to be subject to Saudi rule. 
While the new education system overseen by the Directorate of Education would serve 
to promote the Wahhabi daʿwa in the Hijaz, it represented a clear break from the 
ʿulamaʾ-led religious educational arrangements which had existed in Najd until this 
time. This disjuncture may be illustrated by a brief outline of the biographies of those 
who were selected to run the Mecca-based directorate for the duration of its existence 
until 1953.54 The first director of education appointed by the Saudis was the Hijazi Salih 
ibn Bakri Shata, who had been raised in the late Ottoman Hijaz but had also spent time 
                                                        
53 On female education in the Hijaz at this time, see Al-Rasheed 2013, 77–107. This came to 
include at least one particularly ambitious arrangement run by members of the Southeast 
Asian community in Mecca from the 1940s, which operated along the lines of a primary school 
and even offered post-primary teacher training for its female students (Shalabi 1987, 252–57). 
54 Lists of the directors of education are found in Shalabi 1987, 284–89 and also in al-Zirikli 
1977, 647–48. 
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in Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, India and Southeast Asia for what one biographer 
described as “intellectual and cultural tourism” (ʿAbd al-Jabbar 1982, 124–27). His 
replacement was Kamil al-Qassab, a Syrian Arab nationalist who had previously held a 
senior post in the Sharifian education system (Dohaish 1974, 230, fn. 2; Shalabi 1987, 
284–85; Bidwell 1993, 231). Next came the Mecca-born printer and publisher Majid 
Kurdi (ʿAbd al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh 1974/5, 435–36; al-Muʿallimi 2000, 800–01)55 and 
then Hafiz Wahba, an Azhar-educated Egyptian who had opposed the British 
occupation of his country of origin and had been involved in the pan-Islamic Khilafat 
movement in India (Bidwell 1993, 224–25). Wahba was followed by Muhammad Amin 
Fuda, a Meccan who had previously taught in an Ottoman rushdiye school and a 
branch of the private Madrasat al-Falah discussed in Chapter 1 (ʿAbd al-Jabbar 1982, 
278–81; Shalabi 1987, 286). After Fuda came Ibrahim al-Shura, an Egyptian graduate of 
al-Azhar and the Dar al-ʿUlum college in Cairo (Shalabi 1987, 286–87; Khayyat 2004, 
344–45).56 
While all of those listed thus far served relatively short terms, from the mid-1930s the 
directorate was run for around a decade by Tahir al-Dabbagh.57 Born in Taʾif and 
educated in Mecca and Egypt, al-Dabbagh had served as the director of Madrasat al-
Falah before going on to work for the Sharifian state. As a leading activist for Hijazi 
independence, he appears to have spent a period of exile in Egypt, Yemen, India and 
Southeast Asia before eventually being brought back into the fold by the Saudis (ʿAbd 
al-Jabbar 1982, 282–85; al-Muʿallimi 2000, 423–24; Vassiliev 2000, 282–85). His 
successor from the mid-1940s was Muhammad ibn Maniʿ who, having been born in 
ʿUnayza, was the first director of education to hail from the Saudi heartlands of Central 
Arabia.58 However, as was relatively common for students and scholars from ʿUnayza, 
he too had spent a great deal of time abroad, travelling between Iraq, Egypt, Syria and 
                                                        
55 Kurdi was formally an agent (wakīl) to the directorate but in practice apparently performed 
the functions of a director. 
56 Although al-Shura was formally only deputy director of education, Shalabi includes him in his 
list of those who were apparently de facto in charge. 
57 Shalabi (1987, 287) notes that he took over in late 1354 H., which would probably have 
corresponded to the first quarter of 1936. 
58 Shalabi (1987, 288) notes that he took up the post of director of education in 1364 H., which 
would put the date sometime in 1944 or 1945. 
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Bahrain, and then spending over two decades in Qatar (ʿAbd al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh 
1974/5, 411–17). Ibn Maniʿ remained in charge of the directorate unƟl, following the 
death of ʿAbd al-ʿAziz in 1953, it was replaced by a new ministry of education based in 
Riyadh and overseen by the future king Fahd (al-Zirikli 1977, 648). 
As is clear from these potted biographies, none of those who directly oversaw the 
early development of the new Saudi education system came from any kind of 
straightforwardly Wahhabi background. Although we are told that Shata on his travels 
had read works by Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, he was also apparently engaging with texts by 
modernist religious reformers like the Egyptian Muhammad ʿAbduh and the Persian 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (ʿAbd al-Jabbar 1982, 125). Wahba is another example of a 
figure from this cohort who – at least in his widely available later writings – expressed 
admiration for what he saw as the progressiveness of scholars like ʿAbduh and a 
certain measure of resigned frustration with regard to the “outstandingly fanatical” 
ʿulamaʾ of Riyadh (Wahbah 1964, 52–63; Wahbah 2001, 1–21). Even the first Najdi 
director of education Ibn Maniʿ had studied with leading Salafi figures of his day 
outside the Wahhabi tradition. They included Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi and ʿAbd al-
Razzaq al-Bitar in Damascus, as well as the Baghdad-based Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi 
(ʿAbd al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh 1974/5, 412).59 Rather than clear links between the new 
Saudi schooling system and the Wahhabi study circles of Najd, what comes through in 
these biographies are instead continuities with the bureaucratised educational 
arrangements which had appeared in the Hijaz in the decades prior to the Saudis’ 
arrival; both in the Ottoman and Sharifian state-run systems and also in the wave of 
new private schools like Madrasat al-Falah. It is also clear from these biographies that 
the new Saudi system was by no means hermetically sealed from institutions, practices 
and ideas circulating far beyond the Peninsula. 
In order to uncover the dynamics which played out as these diverse influences came 
together in the service of an educational project which was in part about extending 
Wahhabi norms across a recently conquered population, it is necessary to move past 
the level of overarching administrative frameworks and explore developments at the 
                                                        
59 On al-Qasimi and al-Bitar, see Commins 1985; Weismann 2001. On al-Alusi, see Fattah 2003. 
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level of individual institutions and classrooms. To this end, the remainder of this 
chapter pays particular attention to one seminal school, the Saudi Scholastic Institute 
(al-Maʿhad al-ʿIlmi al-Suʿudi). Opened in Mecca in 1926 or 1927, the Scholastic Institute 
was the first school of its kind founded by the Saudis, offering secondary-level 
instruction to all-male students in both religious and secular subjects.60 As an elite 
institution whose first graduates were described in January 1932 by its then director as 
“the stars of the students of knowledge in the Hijaz”, it was in some ways atypical.61 
Yet its importance as a case study of dynamics playing out in the wider system at this 
time is multiplied by the fact that the intention was for its Hijazi and Najdi graduates to 
go on to work as teachers in the emerging network of Saudi state-run primary 
schools.62 
The original location of the Scholastic Institute at the site of an old Ottoman rushdiye 
school is symbolic of its indebtedness to the educational infrastructure which had 
crystallised in the Hijaz in the decades prior to the Saudis’ arrival, and which they 
inherited when they invaded.63 At the same time, instruction at the Institute from the 
start clearly reflected the new direction in which that infrastructure would be taken 
under the Saudis. A newspaper article published in February 1927, describing a course 
of evening classes that had just begun at the Institute at that time, noted that topics 
covered included Arabic grammar, dictation, reading, discourse (al-muḥādatha), 
composition, oratory, arithmetic, bookkeeping, geography, engineering, “the habits of 
things created” (sunan al-kāʾināt)64, morals (al-akhlāq), and French language. There 
were also plans to begin teaching English as soon as the necessary books arrived (al-
Qassab 1927b).65 However, instruction also included religious content and it is clear 
                                                        
60 Abu Raʾs and al-Dib (1986/87, 148) note that it is considered to have been the “first Saudi 
educational institution”. Shalabi (1987, 171) describes it as “the oldest governmental 
educational institution in the kingdom above the primary level”. The Syrian Khayr al-Din Zirikli, 
who was employed by the Saudi state from the 1930s, puts the opening of the Institute in 
1927 (1977, 636). Other authors suggest that it first opened in early 1345 H., which would 
correspond with 1926 (Abu Raʾs and al-Dib 1986/87, 148n4; Shalabi 1987, 171). 
61 “Tidhkar al-Walaʾ wa-l-Ikhlas” 1932, 4. 
62 “Tidhkar al-Walaʾ wa-l-Ikhlas” 1932, 7; al-Zirikli 1977, 636. 
63 On the Institute’s original location at the site of an old Ottoman school, see al-Shura 1979, 
276. 
64 My translation of this phrase is borrowed from Jansen 1980. See further discussion below. 
65 See also al-Qassab 1927a. 
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that this was from the start geared towards promoting the Salafi creed which lies at 
the heart of the Wahhabi tradition. According to the aforementioned Ibrahim al-Shura, 
whose stint in charge of the Directorate of Education was preceded by a period in 
which he served as head of the Scholastic Institute, the school was founded with a 
view to “spreading Islamic culture and the unadulterated Salafi creed”, along with 
“mathematical and social sciences”.66 It was expected that the Institute’s graduates, 
including those born and raised in the Hijaz, would be equipped to engage in the 
struggle to legitimise core tenets of Wahhabi religiosity in the region. ʿAbd Allah 
Khayyat, writing in a piece of promotional literature published in 1932 when he was 
himself in his third year studying at the Scholastic Institute, emphasised the role that 
he and his cohort were to play in a characteristically Salafi project of purifying Islamic 
belief and practice from perceived corruptions: 
They [students at the Institute] study [tawḥīd] in order that they might know that which 
has entered into people’s religion by way of misleading innovations [bidaʿ muḍilla] and 
destructive passions, so that they may avoid them. And they strive and expend their 
energies in advising the people to distance themselves from them and to extricate 
themselves from their entanglements, in order that they might become like their 
Forebears [salafuhum]; the best umma, commanding right and forbidding wrong, and 
having faith in God67 
Yet when the Scholastic Institute first opened, it initially proved an utter failure; for 
reasons which seem to have related in large part precisely to its role as a vehicle for 
the Wahhabi daʿwa. Although it began offering instruction to an eclectic mix of Hijazis 
and Najdis of mixed ages and abilities, their numbers rapidly dwindled over a period of 
months until, with only five still attending classes, the directorate was forced to admit 
defeat and announce a temporary closure (A. ʿAli 1976/7, 71–72). Al-Shura later 
recalled that, following this setback, he had looked into the reasons for the difficulties 
faced by the Institute in attracting and retaining students. In what seems likely to have 
been something of an understatement, he observed that one factor had been that 
“some of the youth do not wish to study the Salafi – or ‘Wahhabi’, as they say – school 
of thought” (al-Shura 1979, 276). Taqi al-Din al-Hilali, a Moroccan scholar who would 
also later teach at the Scholastic Institute, concurred that perceptions of the new 
                                                        
66 “Tidhkar al-Walaʾ wa-l-Ikhlas” 1932, 6. 
67 “Tidhkar al-Walaʾ wa-l-Ikhlas” 1932, 9. 
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school as a “Wahhabi institute that teaches the Wahhabi doctrine to its pupils” had 
been a reason for its teething problems.68 
The Scholastic Institute eventually reopened in September 1928, this time with greater 
success. Again, students came both from the Hijaz and from Najd.69 While no clear 
information is available concerning their average age, over time it came to be expected 
that incoming students would be in possession of a primary school certificate (Shalabi 
1987, 177). Although the Institute focused on training Saudi subjects, it also took on a 
certain number of students from outside Saudi-ruled territories, including from 
Southeast Asia.70 The standard period of study was initially four years, including a 
preparatory year designed for those who did not already have a primary-level 
education (Shalabi 1987, 177). By the mid-1940s, the duration of study had been 
increased to five years, with students earning an initial qualification after the first 
three years (shahādat al-qism al-tajhīzī, or “certificate of the preparatory department”) 
and then full qualification upon completion of the remaining two years (shahādat qism 
al-muʿallimīn al-thānawī, or “certificate of the secondary department for teachers”).71 
In 1933, a department for training shariʿa judges was also opened at the InsƟtute, 
though this only survived for around three years before closing.72 
The eventual ability of the Scholastic Institute to attract and retain students, including 
Hijazis, came despite the fact that instruction there still included religious training 
grounded firmly in the Wahhabi tradition. This is particularly clear in relation to the 
teaching of the concept of tawḥīd which had always been central to Wahhabism. 
                                                        
68 Quoted in Lauzière 2008, 152. 
69 Zirikli (1977, 642–43), for example, mentions one group of students who were dispatched 
from Najd at the behest of ʿAbd al-ʿAziz and who arrived at the InsƟtute in 1929. 
70 ʿAbd Allah Khayyat speaks of “Indonesian” students amongst his cohort at the InsƟtute from 
the late 1920s (2004, 330). His apparent wonder at their eventual proficiency in public 
speaking in Arabic may imply that they had grown up in Southeast Asia, rather than having 
been born and raised in Mecca. Ahmad ʿAli, who also studied at the InsƟtute in its early years, 
mentions a peer referred to as “the Libyan” who would go on to work in the judiciary in Libya 
(1976/7, 79). Efforts were apparently made to increase provision of scholarships to non-Saudi 
students, including Malaysians and Indonesians, in the 1950s (ʿAbd Allah 1973, 109). 
71 Shalabi (1987, 179–80) suggests that this change was made in 1366 H., i.e. 1946 or 1947. 
However, a syllabus from February 1945 shows that this setup was already in place at that 
time. 
72 “al-Maʿhad al-ʿIlmi al-Suʿudi: Farʿ al-Qadaʾ al-Sharʿi” 1933; Shalabi 1987, 179. 
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Tawḥīd was especially important in this context, since the Wahhabis’ distinctive Salafi 
understanding of this concept was intimately bound up with their opposition to many 
Sufi practices and other modes of religiosity which had long been common in the 
Hijaz.73 The aforementioned Hijazi student ʿAbd Allah Khayyat later recalled that 
lessons on tawḥīd during his time at the reopened Institute from the late 1920s were 
taught from Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s key manifesto Kitab al-Tawhid, along 
with a well-known commentary on this work titled Fath al-Majid (Khayyat 2004, 
317).74 The latter was authored by Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s grandson ʿAbd al-Rahman ibn 
Hasan Al al-Shaykh, the most prominent Wahhabi scholar in nineteenth-century Najd. 
Furthermore, Khayyat recalled that lessons in fiqh during the same period were 
grounded in the Hanbali madhhab, the school of jurisprudence favoured by the 
Wahhabis (Khayyat 2004, 36). 
Efforts to understand the growing capacity of the Institute to secure the assent of 
Hijazi students to a regime of instruction rooted in the Wahhabi tradition must take 
into account three factors which consolidated in the workings of the school at this 
stage. These were: Saudi state actors’ increased investment of material resources; the 
appointment of foreign staff to lend credibility to the project and to mediate in 
conflicts which arose from it; and the ability of the Institute to claim new kinds of 
legitimacy by virtue of the grafting of Wahhabi-oriented religious content into new 
discursive frameworks. 
The first of these factors, growing material investment by Saudi state actors, allowed 
the newly reopened Scholastic Institute to offer its students access to a scholarships 
programme including both a standard allowance and also material incentives to 
reward good grades. At a meeting of education officials in November 1927, the 
decision had been made to introduce a daily stipend of three piastres per student as a 
way of addressing the previous lack of uptake. It had also been decided that students 
would receive a payment of 1,000 piastres for a first class grade and 500 piastres for a 
                                                        
73  Wahhabi and more broadly Salafi understandings of tawḥīd were discussed in the 
introduction to this thesis and are considered in more detail in Chapter 6. 
74 Khayyat spent two and a half years at the Institute, finishing “at the end of 1349 H.”, so 
probably sometime in the first half of 1931 (Khayyat 2004, 40). 
 92 
second class grade. The standard stipend was subsequently increased to two gold 
pounds paid out to every student on a monthly basis (Shalabi 1987, 173–74). Ahmad 
ʿAli, who had been amongst the first students to join the Institute during its abortive 
initial phase and who returned again when it reopened, later claimed that the 
scholarships programme was “the first of its kind in the history of the schools of the 
Hijaz, or of the entire Arabian Peninsula”. He argued that these stipends were the key 
factor behind greatly increased enrolment at this stage (A. ʿAli 1976/7, 73). In the mid-
1940s, scholarships were extended to cover all of the Institute’s students, implying 
that at least a proportion had not previously been eligible (Shalabi 1987, 180). 
The scholarships programme transformed the terms of students’ engagement with the 
Institute. Previously, in addition to the investment of time and labour necessary in 
order to complete a course of instruction there, it would presumably also have been 
necessary for the student or his family to invest the material capital required to 
provide for his subsistence while he withdrew from labour markets for long enough to 
complete his studies. In return, the student would acquire bodies of knowledge and 
skills, core aspects of which were anyway considered by many Hijazis to be culturally 
offensive in the first place. The scholarships now on offer, however, reduced or 
removed the requirement for any material investment on the part of the student or his 
family. Moreover, it soon became clear that knowledge, competencies and 
qualifications accumulated at the Scholastic Institute could serve as valuable cultural 
capital in the new environment of the Saudi-occupied Hijaz, providing for certain kinds 
of social advancement including employment in the state apparatus. As had been the 
intention when the Institute was founded, some members of the first group of 
students to graduate in 1930 took up positions in the educational administration or as 
school teachers in places like Mecca, Taʾif and Yanbuʿ. Others secured jobs elsewhere 
in the expanding Saudi bureaucracy, including in the judiciary, the foreign ministry, the 
health system, the police, and the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the 
Prevention of Vice.75 A newspaper article promoting the Scholastic Institute some 
years later, in 1947, promised that those who studied there stood to become “ʿulamaʾ, 
                                                        
75 “Tidhkar al-Walaʾ wa-l-Ikhlas” 1932, 4. That the first graduates of the Institute completed 
their education there in 1930 is confirmed in A. ʿAli 1976/7, 80. 
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men of letters (udabāʾ), shariʿa judges (quḍāt) and advisers (murshidūn)”, that they 
would receive high salaries in keeping with the qualifications that they secured at the 
Institute, and that they would be given preference in employment and promotion.76 
As noted above, the forms of cultural capital accumulated by students, through 
processes enabled by material investment on the part of the state, included 
knowledge and skills grounded in the Wahhabi tradition. At least in principle, such 
embodied spiritual capital acquired at the Institute might provide its graduates with 
bases of social authority which could be put to work in the service of advancing 
Wahhabi understandings of orthodoxy in a social context in which Wahhabism still 
represented a marginal subcultural tradition. The capacity of Saudi state actors to 
channel material resources into this kind of targeted intervention in the region’s 
religious economy was bolstered by the funding arrangements and social technologies 
in place in schools like the Scholastic Institute. In some of the past arrangements in the 
Hijaz discussed in Chapter 1, state investment in the sphere of religious education had 
trickled down to the level of instruction through an array of intermediaries and was 
often just one revenue stream amongst many. Moreover, instruction had been a quite 
personalised affair, worked out largely informally between a scholar and his students 
with considerable autonomy with respect to the state and other funders. In contrast, 
Saudi state actors could use their status as sole funders of schools like the Scholastic 
Institute to dictate the terms according to which their material investment was to be 
translated into spiritual capital, ensuring that this capital took the form of knowledge 
and skills in line with Wahhabi mores. The use of technologies such as detailed, state-
approved syllabuses, regular examinations and a hierarchical system of inspection 
which fed information up through the Directorate of Education to senior state actors 
further bolstered their capacity both to set the terms of these transactions and also to 
closely monitor their progress. In this way, bureaucratised modes of education of the 
kind used in schools like the Scholastic Institute – modes of education which the Saudis 
had inherited from their Ottoman and Sharifian predecessors in the Hijaz, and which 
were no doubt bolstered at this stage by the involvement of administrators and 
educators drafted in from beyond the Peninsula – could be put to work in the service 
                                                        
76 “al-Maʿhad al-ʿIlmi al-Suʿudi ﬁ ʿAhdihi al-Jadid” 1947. 
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of efforts to channel material capital with some precision into a cultural project geared 
towards advancing the Wahhabi daʿwa. 
However, these arrangements could not guarantee that the forms of spiritual capital in 
question would be seen as legitimate and valuable either by students themselves or in 
wider society. In fact, in the environment of the occupied Hijaz of the 1920s, the 
legitimacy and value accorded to Wahhabi knowledge, skills and attendant 
qualifications of the kind accumulated at the Scholastic Institute were deeply 
contested. Moreover, while Saudi investment in scholarships and the promise of 
employment could help to encourage students to engage with a Wahhabi-oriented 
system of instruction, these arrangements could not guarantee students’ own assent 
to the Wahhabi content of teaching, in the sense that they might come to recognise 
this knowledge as legitimate and might seek to assert it in the context of broader 
social struggles. In the remainder of this chapter, I suggest that efforts to secure 
legitimacy for the Scholastic Institute and its Wahhabi teachings were bound up with 
two further, closely intertwined factors: on the one hand, roles played at the Institute 
by staff from outside the Najdi scholarly establishment; and on the other, the grafting 
of core components of Wahhabi religious content into a quite new discursive 
framework. 
Figures from outside Saudi-ruled territories had played important roles at the 
Scholastic Institute from the start. When it first opened, the individual appointed to 
run it was Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar, a Syrian who had studied with major Salafi 
scholars in Damascus including his own grandfather ʿAbd al-Razzaq al-Bitar and the 
aforementioned Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi (al-Muʿallimi 2000, 317–18). Others who taught 
at the Institute at this early stage included at least three other Syrians and an 
Egyptian.77 This was in keeping with the employment of figures from beyond the 
Peninsula to work in senior roles in the Directorate of Education and also as teachers in 
the wider schooling system. 
                                                        
77 Ahmad ʿAli (1976/7, 71) names the Syrians as Mahmud al-Humsi, Saʿdi Yasin and Hasan 
Zakariya, and the Egyptian as Suliman Abaza al-Azhari. 
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The policy of bringing in staff from beyond the Peninsula remained in place after the 
Institute reopened in 1928. Al-Bitar’s successor as director was Ibrahim al-Shura, the 
Egyptian Dar al-ʿUlum graduate mentioned earlier in this chapter. Other teaching staff 
in the early period included individuals who hailed from as far afield as Egypt, Morocco, 
Syria and India. Some were connected with circles close to the Cairo-based Syrian 
reformer Muhammad Rashid Rida, who had by this time positioned himself as a 
prominent supporter of the Saudi political elites and their Wahhabi allies (Redissi 2008, 
172–76; Lauzière 2008, 179–81). Indeed, several of these figures appear to have been 
introduced to ʿAbd al-ʿAziz by Rida himself. Acquaintances and former students of Rida 
who taught at the Institute included the Moroccan Taqi al-Din al-Hilali and the 
Egyptians ʿAbd al-Zahir Abu al-Samh and ʿAbd al-Razzaq Hamza, as well as the director 
al-Bitar.78 Although the evidence is not conclusive, there is also some reason to think 
that the Institute may have employed another important Egyptian acquaintance of 
Rida, Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqi.79 Al-Fiqi, who certainly spent some years in the Hijaz 
around this time, had recently founded a Salafi movement in Egypt known as Ansar al-
Sunna al-Muhammadiyya, with which Abu al-Samh was also linked.80 Ansar al-Sunna 
remains a major actor in the religious sphere in Egypt until today and is discussed 
further in Chapter 4 of this thesis, in connection with its members’ subsequent 
involvement in the Islamic University of Medina from the early 1960s. 
Other foreigners came to the Scholastic Institute through different routes. One 
example is the Ethiopian Muhammad Nur al-Din al-Jimmawi, who arrived in Mecca 
around the same time that the Institute opened. He appears to have subsequently 
                                                        
78 On their relationships with Rida and the latter’s role in introducing them to the Saudi 
establishment, see Lauzière 2008, 114–44. ʿAli (1976/7, 73) also mentions a Moroccan teacher 
working at the Institute named ʿAbd al-Rahman Abu Hajar, who was probably another disciple 
of Rida’s with this same name and nationality who appears to have relocated to the Hijaz 
during this period. It is worth noting that, having been appointed to teach at the Scholastic 
Institute by the Consultative Council in the Hijaz in early 1929, al-Hilali and ʿAbd al-Razzaq 
Hamza were removed from their posts by ʿAbd al-ʿAziz some months later for reasons which 
are unclear (Lauzière 2008, 172–73). 
79 ʿAli (1976/7, 73) recalls an Egyptian teacher at the Institute named Hamid al-Fiqi. The former 
Scholastic Institute student ʿAbd Allah Khayyat (2004, 336), who was acquainted with 
Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqi, obliquely remarks that “perhaps he was a teacher in the Institute”. 
80 On the role played by Abu al-Samh in founding a branch of Ansar al-Sunna in Alexandria, see 
ʿAbd al-Jabbar 1982, 227; Tahir 2006, 226. 
 96 
been offered a teaching post there after studying in the Masjid Haram under figures 
including al-Bitar, Abu al-Samh and ʿAbd al-Razzaq Hamza, as well as the Saudi-
appointed Grand Qadi of the Hijaz ʿAbd Allah ibn Hasan (al-Muʿallimi 2000, 345–46). 
Still others were seemingly recruited by officials from the Saudi Directorate of 
Education who travelled abroad to identify suitable staff members. Hasan al-Banna, 
the schoolteacher who launched the Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt in 1928, later 
recalled having been invited by Hafiz Wahba that same year to teach in the Hijaz. Al-
Banna had at the time apparently been keen to take up a post at the “Saudi Institute in 
Mecca”, though in the event this never came to pass (al-Banna 1974, 77–78).81 Other 
foreigners teaching at the Institute in these early years, including Egyptians named 
Muhammad ʿAbd Allah al-Ghazali and Suliman Abaza al-Azhari, may well have been 
recruited in this way (A. ʿAli 1976/7, 73; Khayyat 2004, 338–40). 
These foreigners taught at the Scholastic Institute alongside Hijazis82 and what appears, 
at least in the early years, to have been a comparatively limited contingent of Najdi 
staff. The latter included Muhammad ibn ʿUthman al-Shawi, a blind religious expert 
from al-Qasim who had studied with members of the Wahhabi establishment in Riyadh. 
Al-Shawi had first arrived in Mecca as a religious functionary accompanying the Ikhwan 
on their campaigns and he also taught at the Masjid Haram (ʿAbd al-Rahman Al al-
Shaykh 1974/5, 337–38; Khayyat 2004, 320–22). Another example is Muhammad al-Biz, 
who grew up in Shaqra and had previously been appointed to undertake religious 
duties in one of the hujar (sing. hijra) settlements established with the aim of settling 
nomadic communities (ʿAbd al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh 1974/5, 430–31; Khayyat 2004, 
322–25). 
                                                        
81 Al-Banna had first heard about the Saudis’ search for teachers via the Cairo-based Syrian 
activist Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, after Wahba sought advice on suitable candidates from the 
Association of Muslim Youth (Jamʿiyyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin) with which al-Khatib was 
associated. Al-Banna recalls that his own appointment was blocked by the Egyptian authorities 
and notes that al-Shura was eventually sent instead. He suggests that the obstacle to his own 
move to the Hijaz was Cairo’s refusal to recognise Saudi sovereignty there at the time, which 
he explains as having been in line with British policy. On fraught relations in this period 
between Cairo and the Saudis, in part due to a clash between Egyptian pilgrims and ʿAbd al-
ʿAziz’s forces in 1926, see Vassiliev 2000, 270, 349. 
82 ʿAli (1976/7, 73, 83) recalls teachers named Muhammad ʿAli Khuqayr, Hasan Katabi and Amin 
Fuda, without specifying their background. Shalabi (1987, 177) judges them to have been 
Hijazis. 
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The presence of foreign staff members at the Scholastic Institute is very much bound 
up with the second issue under discussion here, the integration of Wahhabi religious 
knowledge into new discursive frameworks. It is likely that it was these foreign staff 
who were largely responsible for introducing content onto the Institute’s syllabuses 
which had previously been unknown even in the Hijaz, let alone in the much more 
restricted pedagogical arrangements which had existed in Wahhabi circles in Najd until 
this time. This gave rise to a situation where bodies of religious knowledge grounded in 
the Wahhabi tradition for the first time came to be integrated into programmes of 
study which also included a host of self-consciously “modern” disciplines. 
The earliest full syllabus which is available for the period after the Institute reopened is 
from February 1945. In keeping with the bureaucratised modes of education in use at 
the school, it was a detailed, state-approved document published by the Directorate of 
Education. This syllabus confirms that religious instruction made up a very large 
proportion of teaching. Even discounting subjects like Arabic grammar and history, 
which had substantial religious relevance or content, specifically religious subjects like 
tawḥīd, fiqh, tafsīr and its principles (uṣūl al-tafsīr), hadith and the principles of hadith 
studies (uṣūl al-ḥadīth), and inheritance law accounted for nearly 40 per cent of weekly 
classes during each of the five years of study. Moreover, the Wahhabi orientation of 
this religious instruction was still very clear to see. The important subject of tawḥīd 
was still taught with reference to the key Wahhabi work on this subject, Ibn ʿAbd al-
Wahhab’s Kitab al-Tawhid, along with a gloss on this text titled Qurrat ʿUyun al-
Muwahhidin by the aforementioned nineteenth-century Wahhabi scholar ʿAbd al-
Rahman ibn Hasan Al al-Shaykh. Also in keeping with Wahhabi norms, fiqh was taught 
from a Hanbali legal manual, al-Hujawi’s Zad al-Mustaqniʿ. 
However, this Wahhabi religious content sat alongside courses in an eclectic array of 
more or less secular disciplines. These included topics which had been taught at the 
Institute in its initial, abortive period of operation, such as grammar, composition, 
dictation, geography, reading comprehension, arithmetic and engineering. They also 
encompassed newly added or newly specified subjects, including philology (fiqh al-
lugha), rhetoric (al-balāgha), literature, calligraphy or handwriting (al-khaṭṭ), pedagogy, 
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history, drawing, the principles of science, and health training and physiology (tadbīr 
al-ṣiḥḥa wa-waẓāʾif al-aʿḍāʾ).83  
In addition to their usefulness in the training of potential state functionaries, some of 
these areas of study may well also have been introduced with a view to equipping 
students to undertake further training in Egypt and elsewhere. Certainly, when the 
first students had been sent by the Saudis to Egypt for this purpose, their lack of 
knowledge of the natural sciences – as well as their lack of knowledge of English – had 
been highlighted as a problem by educational administrators there (al-Zirikli 1977, 638). 
However that may be, it seems clear that foreign staff employed both in the 
overarching Saudi education system and at the Scholastic Institute itself were directly 
responsible for introducing much of this content. 
One example is the topic “sunan al-kāʾināt”, or “the habits of things created”, which 
had been taught at the Institute during its initial, abortive phase and which was 
apparently the subject of much public curiosity in the Hijaz at that time (A. ʿAli 1976/7, 
71). This not a common phrase in Arabic and it seems probable that it derived in this 
context from the physician and anti-Christian polemicist Muhammad Tawfiq Sidqi, 
whose articles on subjects such as chemistry and biology in Rashid Rida’s journal al-
Manar were published in a collection with this exact title. Given the involvement of so 
many of Rida’s acquaintances at the Scholastic Institute – including al-Bitar, who was in 
charge of the school at this early stage – this collection may well have been used as the 
basis for teaching this course.84 
Similarly, it seems likely that Egyptians working at the Institute and in the overarching 
education system were responsible for the fact that the literature course detailed in 
the 1945 syllabus included consideration not only of modern Hijazi literature but also a 
string of recent major Egyptian figures and their works, such as the poetry of Ahmad 
Shawqi and Mahmud al-Barudi, the writings of the modernist religious reformer 
Muhammad ʿAbduh, and the oratory of the nationalists Mustafa Kamil and Saʿd Zaghlul. 
                                                        
83 “Manhaj al-Maʿhad al-ʿIlmi al-Suʿudi” 1945. 
84 See Sidqi 1935/6. The full title of Sidqi’s book suggests that its contents drew on lectures 
given at Rida’s own Cairo-based missionary training school Dar al-Daʿwa wa-l-Irshad. The 
discussion of Sidqi and his work in this paragraph draws on Jansen 1980, 43–44. 
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These foreigners may well also have had a hand in shaping a wide-ranging history 
syllabus, which included not only subjects like Islamic history and Saudi dynastic 
history but also such topics as the French Revolution, nineteenth-century national 
“awakenings” in Europe and beyond, the Great War, and the League of Nations 
mandate system. 
A final important example is the discipline of pedagogy included in the 1945 syllabuses, 
which it seems clear was brought by staff drafted in from abroad. This is particularly 
significant in light of evidence that the introduction of this discipline was bound up 
with broader discursive transformations, including a shift in the methods used for 
teaching Wahhabi religious content. Former student Ahmad ʿAli recalled that he and 
his cohort at the Scholastic Institute in the earliest years of its existence were the first 
in the Hijaz to study “the science of pedagogy and the methods of teaching” (ʿilm al-
tarbiya wa-ṭuruq al-tadrīs). He specifies that the Egyptian Ibrahim al-Shura was “the 
first teacher of this discipline in the history of these lands” (A. ʿAli 1976/7, 74). This sets 
up a link with al-Shura’s alma mater, the Dar al-ʿUlum college which was founded in 
Cairo in 1872 as Egypt’s first specialised institution for training teachers and which 
drew on both religious and civil models of education (Kalmbach 2011). While 
instruction at Dar al-ʿUlum had initially focused on developing students’ knowledge of 
the subjects that they were to teach, from 1895 it had begun offering theoretical 
training in pedagogy as a self-contained area of expertise. Dar al-ʿUlum came to teach 
a conception of pedagogy rooted in social scientific disciplines like psychology, which 
was likely influenced by trends that prevailed in France at the time (Kalmbach, 
forthcoming). The Scholastic Institute’s 1945 syllabus confirms that lessons in 
pedagogy by that time echoed these shifts. They included not only practical training in 
how to teach but also consideration of the theory behind different teaching methods 
and, for more advanced students, lessons in psychology. 
The introduction of new theories of pedagogy at the Institute appears to have been 
very much bound up with the emergence of particular styles of instruction which came 
to be employed for teaching across the range of subject areas in its own classrooms. 
These styles of teaching, which were apparently quite novel in the context of the 
Arabian Peninsula, reflected a shift in ideas about how knowledge was to be acquired 
 100 
by students. Most obviously, this included a devaluation of the rote memorisation 
which had until this time been such an important part of instruction both in the Hijaz 
and also in the Wahhabi study circles of Najd. The 1945 syllabus for lessons in the 
discipline of pedagogy taught at the Institute makes it clear that successful teaching 
and learning were understood to involve not just memorisation but also such things as 
exposition (al-ʿarḍ), comparison (al-muwāzana), inference (al-istinbāṭ), application (al-
taṭbīq), and questions and answers. Lessons in psychology went further, exploring such 
matters as the unconscious (al-ʿaql al-bāṭin), emotional life (al-ḥayāt al-wijdāniyya), 
the imagination (al-takhayyul), training of the senses (tarbiyat al-ḥawāss), and the 
moderation of impulses (taʿdīl al-gharāʾiz).85 
Memoirs written by the former students Ahmad ʿAli and ʿAbd Allah Khayyat both 
include remarks suggesting that the introduction of such conceptions of teaching and 
learning led to the appearance of quite novel styles of instruction at the Institute, 
marked in particular by the relative absence of rote memorisation. According to 
Ahmad ʿAli: 
The customary method in the teaching of geography and history and other sciences in 
schools was dependence on memorisation and the learning by heart of texts and 
summaries [al-iʿƟmād ʿalā al-ḥifẓ wa-istiẓhār al-mutūn wa-l-khulāṣāt]. [However], we 
saw in the Institute a new method of teaching these subjects, the university method. 
That is to say, the teacher presents his lessons in the form of lectures and the students 
note down summaries in their notebooks, with none of them required to memorise any 
lesson other than ten parts of the Qurʾan (A. ʿAli 1976/7, 74–75) 
This theme is expanded upon in remarks made by Khayyat. By the time he enrolled at 
the Institute, Khayyat had already studied in the private Madrasat al-Khayyat and 
Madrasa Fakhriyya, in a Sharifian-era state-run school, and in ḥalaqāt in the Masjid 
Haram (Khayyat 2004, 25–35). Yet despite this wide-ranging experience of different 
educational settings, his memoirs of his time at the Scholastic Institute suggest that 
the methods of instruction employed there had seemed to him very novel indeed. He 
recalled that in this context, rote memorisation was required only of parts of the 
Qurʾan and al-Rahbiyya, the text used for the study of inheritance law. Otherwise, 
instead of memorisation, “that which was relied upon was the ordering of information 
                                                        
85 “Manhaj al-Maʿhad al-ʿIlmi al-Suʿudi” 1945, 29–35. 
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and the embedding of understanding” (kāna al-muʿawwal bi-hi tansīq al-maʿlūmāt wa-
tarkīz al-fahm) (Khayyat 2004, 36–37). Khayyat found this approach so alien that he 
had to ask his teachers how exactly he ought to go about achieving “the embedding of 
information in his mind without [having recourse to] memorisation” (tarkīz al-
maʿlūmāt fī dhihnihi dūna al-ḥifẓ).86 They suggested that he should try such things as 
reading a passage and then testing himself on the information contained in it, or using 
the solution for one problem in his engineering lessons as a basis for working out how 
to approach other problems (Khayyat 2004, 37).  
What is especially significant, in the context of the arguments being made in the 
present chapter, is that Khayyat’s recollections make it clear that Wahhabi religious 
content also came to be integrated into this new epistemological and pedagogical 
framework. To his apparent surprise, students even studied texts like Kitab al-Tawhid 
and works of Hanbali fiqh without being expected to commit them to memory (2004, 
37). In this sense, Wahhabi pedagogical traditions did not simply sit alongside novel 
content and modes of teaching at the Scholastic Institute, even if such a juxtaposition 
would in itself have been a significant development. More than that, modes of 
teaching grounded in the Wahhabi tradition came to be intertwined with and 
influenced by these other disciplines. There is a clear parallel here with Dale 
Eickelman’s observation of a shift in styles of religious knowledge in Morocco in the 
twentieth century, “from that which is mnemonically ‘possessed’ to material that can 
only be consulted in books” (1978, 511). 
New configurations of Wahhabi content and self-consciously modern disciplines at the 
Scholastic Institute gave rise to considerable tensions. I have already suggested that 
conflicts arose as a result of efforts to teach Wahhabi religious content to Hijazi 
students. It is also the case that many of the other new subjects discussed above 
proved controversial. The former student Ahmad ʿAli claims that the InsƟtute was the 
first school in the Hijaz to offer instruction in English; this subject being taught by an 
Indian named Ahmad Muʾmin, whose ability to communicate his excellent knowledge 
                                                        
86 It should be noted that this particular passage from Khayyat’s memoirs is written in the third 
person. It is not immediately clear whether the author is Khayyat himself or an editor writing 
on the basis of Khayyat’s memories of this period. 
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of English was apparently somewhat hampered by his poor grasp of Arabic. While ʿAli 
recalls that many students were eager to learn this new language, there was a 
contingent who felt that an “Arab, religious school” like the Scholastic Institute should 
be “far from the language of the Christians and this gibberish” (A. ʿAli 1976/7, 74). It is 
worth noting that the 1945 syllabus no longer included instruction in any foreign 
language. As will be discussed further below, there is also evidence that the teaching 
of geography at the Institute was controversial amongst Najdi students in particular. 
These tensions mapped onto broader controversies which arose in relation to the 
education system as a whole at this time. In June 1930, Najdi ʿulamaʾ mounted sizeable 
protests in Mecca over the introduction of certain new areas of study to school 
syllabuses, including drawing, foreign languages, and geography. Lessons in drawing 
were likely seen by the scholars as violating an injunction on representations of God’s 
creations. Foreign languages were seen as paving the way for the entry of corrupting 
influences from abroad and geography was considered objectionable because it was 
taught with reference to such controversial theories as that of a rotating, spherical 
Earth. On this occasion, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz overruled the objecƟons advanced by the ʿulamaʾ, 
declaring their positions religiously unfounded (Wahba 1964, 49-51). 
While the outsiders hired by the Saudis to work at the Scholastic Institute and 
elsewhere in the education system appear to have contributed to such conflicts by 
bringing new subjects with them to the Hijaz, they also played a role in mediating 
them.87 On the one hand, at a time when the Wahhabi ʿulamaʾ were protesƟng against 
the introduction of new subject matter onto syllabuses, these foreigners – including 
the contingent of Salafis recruited from the circles around Rashid Rida – were quite 
open to these new aspects of schooling. We are told, for example, that ʿAbd Allah 
Khayyat was originally urged to enrol at the Scholastic Institute by the aforementioned 
Egyptian Salafi Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqi. Al-Fiqi apparently insisted that it was 
                                                        
87 The discussion which follows builds on observations previously made by Henri Lauzière 
(2008, 151–54) on the mediating role played by foreign Salafis at the Scholastic Institute and in 
the 1920s Hijaz more generally. It is worth noting that the Saudis’ employment of foreigners to 
work in state institutions could also be a political liability. Examples of dissent organised 
around such issues included an incident in which a poster appeared on the wall of the post 
office in Mecca, demanding to know inter alia why Syrians should be running affairs in the 
Hijaz (Ochsenwald 2009, 81). 
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important for Khayyat to complement his already advanced religious training with an 
academic qualification which would carry wider prestige in contemporary society. At 
the same time, he also emphasised that even a student whose primary concern is with 
religious knowledge ought to acquire at least a basic familiarity with subjects like 
modern sciences, mathematics and foreign languages, in order not to be ignorant of 
disciplines which play an important role in contemporary social life (Khayyat 2004, 35). 
On the other hand, in a situation in which many Hijazis – under conditions of 
occupation – were bristling at the imposition of religious frameworks that were 
profoundly antagonistic to much of what they stood for, foreigners were in a position 
to promote key tenets of Wahhabi religiosity without themselves being immediately 
identifiable with the Najdi scholarly establishment. While Najdi staff were involved in 
teaching Wahhabi religious content like Hanbali fiqh at the Institute, foreigners also 
became directly involved in this process. Lessons on tawḥīd based on Ibn ʿAbd al-
Wahhab’s Kitab al-Tawhid from the late 1920s were taught by the Egyptian Salafi ʿAbd 
al-Razzaq Hamza (Khayyat 2004, 317). The Moroccan al-Hilali also later recalled 
teaching Salafi tawḥīd at the Scholastic Institute (Lauzière 2008, 151). Particularly in 
the case of the many figures drawn from circles connected with Rashid Rida, these 
foreigners were often themselves sympathetic to core elements of the Salafi theology 
which is the cornerstone of the Wahhabi tradition (Lauzière 2008, 153). 
The importance of the mediating role played by foreigners in this context is explicitly 
emphasised in retrospective comments by Ibrahim al-Shura, the Egyptian director of 
the Institute who had blamed resistance to instruction in Wahhabi theology for its 
teething problems. At the time when the Institute was temporarily closed and 
discussions were underway over the question of re-launching it, al-Shura recalls having 
told the then director of education Hafiz Wahba that, “I am ready to take responsibility 
for opening the Saudi Scholastic Institute, on one condition; which is that I personally 
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undertake the teaching of tawḥīd, in order to convince the Hijazis of it, and [also] the 
teaching of geography, in order to convince the Najdis of it” (al-Shura 1979, 276–77).88 
The various factors touched upon in the preceding discussion intertwined in ways 
which stood to lend legitimacy both to the Scholastic Institute and also to the Wahhabi 
content of its teaching. The fact that foreigners taught at the Institute was a point of 
pride, explicitly emphasised in promotional announcements.89 Such arrangements 
could help to frame the Wahhabi content of instruction as something other than 
simply a particularistic Najdi innovation imposed by the Saudi occupiers in a naked act 
of symbolic violence. Instead, Hijazi students were invited to view the Wahhabi creed 
as part of a wider cultural framework assented to and communicated by these 
ostensibly impartial, non-Najdi outsiders. The Institute, and thereby the content of its 
teaching, could acquire religious legitimacy not so much from any association with 
Najdi scholarly personalities and traditions – which were subject to considerable 
contention in this context – as by the fact that foreign staff members had studied in 
such illustrious and widely respected centres of learning as al-Azhar and the 
Qarawiyyin in Morocco.90 Azharis in particular taught at the Institute from the early 
days and continued to do so for a long time after its founding, allowing for 
qualifications and other forms of capital accumulated in such settings – which had far 
greater cachet in the Hijaz than equivalent forms of spiritual capital accumulated in 
Wahhabi circles – to be invested in the Scholastic Institute itself, bolstering its 
institutional capacity to legitimate a particular set of religious goods and to issue 
authoritative qualifications in this particular social context. 
                                                        
88 It is worth nothing that al-Shura’s recollection that he played the leading role in re-launching 
the Institute seems at odds with ʿAli’s memory (1976/7, 73) that when it reopened, it was 
initially once again headed by the original director Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar.  
89 One newspaper article in 1947, for example, pointedly noted the role played at the Institute 
by “a distinguished elite of native and Egyptian professors with skill and competence in the 
religious and Arabic sciences” (“al-Maʿhad al-ʿIlmi al-Suʿudi ﬁ ʿAhdihi al-Jadid” 1947). 
90 For example, al-Hilali had a degree from the Qarawiyyin (al-ʿAqil 2008, 812), while ﬁgures 
like Ibrahim al-Shura, ʿAbd al-Razzaq Hamza and Abu al-Samh had all studied at al-Azhar (ʿAbd 
al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh 1974/5, 514; ʿAbd al-Jabbar 1982, 227). That such foreigners were 
distinguished from the Wahhabi scholarly establishment in part by their possession of such 
qualifications has previously been noted by Lauzière (2008, 152–53). 
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Moreover, in part as a result of the influence of these foreigners, core aspects of 
Wahhabi religiosity for the first time came to be grafted into a corpus of knowledge 
which included self-consciously “modern” disciplines, even leading to Wahhabi 
religious knowledge itself being taught according to epistemologies rooted in a new 
science of pedagogy. In this way, promotion of the Wahhabi tradition could also be 
presented as an integral part of a broader cultural project associated with a certain 
kind of progressive modernity. 
As a call for students published in the newspaper Umm al-Qura in 1947 put it, 
capturing many of the interconnected dynamics outlined here, one of the features 
claimed for the Institute was “an integration of the two cultures, the old and the 
modern, at the hands of the best domestic, Azhari and university professors”.91 Such 
statements framed the Scholastic Institute as simultaneously forward-looking and also 
historically and religiously authentic, whilst eliding the crucial distinction between the 
historical and religious prestige of al-Azhar, on the one hand, and the far more 
contentious Wahhabi traditions imbued in the Institute’s syllabuses, on the other. 
Conclusion 
The Hijri year 1381 (1961/2) saw both the closure of the Saudi Scholastic Institute in 
Mecca and also the opening of the institution which is the focus of the remainder of 
this thesis, the Islamic University of Medina (IUM). Certain loose links may be 
identified between the two institutions. The Scholastic Institute represented the seeds 
of the modern Saudi education system, which would eventually come to be rolled out 
from the Hijaz to the remainder of the Saudi territories, and out of which the IUM 
would in some ways emerge. It is also the case that certain employees of the Scholastic 
Institute, like the Syrian Bahjat al-Bitar and the Moroccan Taqi al-Din al-Hilali, would 
later take up advisory and teaching posts at the IUM. 
There is a more general sense, however, in which the history of the Scholastic Institute 
presaged that of the IUM. The Scholastic Institute reflected efforts by the Saudis to 
train personnel to staff their expanding state bureaucracy. But it also represented an 
early experiment in using education to extend the Wahhabi daʿwa beyond its historical 
                                                        
91 “al-Maʿhad al-ʿIlmi al-Suʿudi” 1947. 
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Central Arabian habitat, bringing it under conditions of occupation to a population 
which had previously not been favourably disposed towards Wahhabism. In pursuing 
this project as part of a broader process of state-building, the Saudis reached outside 
the Wahhabi pedagogical tradition, appropriating bureaucratised modes of education 
which had existed in the Hijaz prior to their arrival. They put these new social 
technologies to work in the service of an initiative which involved the use of targeted 
material investment in the name of effecting cultural transformation. However, the 
power of this project of cultural transformation derived not only from material wealth 
but also necessarily from a variety of sources of symbolic legitimation. Actors drafted 
in from beyond the Peninsula brought widely recognised forms of spiritual capital, 
including qualifications from respected Islamic centres of learning like al-Azhar, which 
might lend the Institute and its teachings credibility in the Hijazi context. The input of 
these foreigners also contributed to processes whereby Wahhabi content came to be 
grafted into a new discursive formation, integrating it with a cultural project which laid 
claim to a certain kind of progressive modernity and giving it the appearance of 
something other than simply symbolic violence perpetrated by an occupying power. 
Finally, these purportedly neutral outsiders enjoyed a certain capacity to mediate in 
the complex array of tensions and conflicts which erupted out of this endeavour. 
As I argue in the remainder of this thesis, the intertwined set of strategies which 
underlay the promotion of the Wahhabi daʿwa at this early stage in the history of the 
modern Saudi state – including material investment in scholarships to support study in 
state-controlled institutions, the appropriation of new social technologies of education 
from outside the Wahhabi pedagogical tradition, the use of non-Wahhabi actors as 
sources of spiritual capital and as mediators, and the modification of religious 
discourse in ways which might help to secure recognition of its legitimacy by an array 
of actors – would remain important as this daʿwa later came to be extended beyond 
the kingdom’s borders through initiatives like the IUM. 
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Chapter 3 
National Politics and Global Mission: The Founding and 
Expansion of the Islamic University of Medina from 1961 
The establishment of the Islamic University of Medina in 1961 represented the 
beginning of a new era in which Saudi state actors’ efforts to mould religious belief and 
practice within the territories over which they exercised sovereignty would be 
accompanied by novel initiatives geared towards exerting religious sway far beyond 
the kingdom’s own borders. Over the subsequent decades, the IUM would come to sit 
at the heart of cross-border flows of actors, resources, ideas and practices. It would 
host staff from across the Middle East and beyond who would help to legitimate and 
shape its operation. Through its provision of fully-funded, Wahhabi-influenced 
instruction to thousands of students from across the world, it would contribute to 
religious and cultural transformations in far-flung locations. However, in this chapter I 
explore the extent to which both the university’s genesis and its evolution over the 
half a century that followed were driven and shaped by actors, material resources and 
concerns located firmly within the framework of the Saudi national state. 
I begin by situating the inception of the IUM in its historical context, a period in which 
the future of Saudi rule was called into question by vigorous challenges emanating 
both from within and from outside the kingdom’s territories. Across the wider Middle 
East, the momentum was very much with various brands of radical republicanism, the 
proponents of which decried and actively sought to end the hereditary privileges of 
monarchy. Within Saudi Arabia itself, the ruling family was fractured by the competing 
claims of the then king Saʿud, his brother Faisal and other, more junior princes. In this 
context, the new missionary project represented an effort on the part of Saudi 
dynastic actors to bolster their positions of power and privilege within the state 
framework, and to shore up that framework itself. Firstly, the IUM stood to counter 
the transnational extension of leftist republican projects by advancing a competing 
programme grounded in claims to historical and religious authenticity, in ways which 
dovetailed with the Cold War policy of Saudi Arabia’s ally the United States. Secondly, 
insofar as the IUM represented an award to the Wahhabi religious establishment, it 
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served a purpose in the maintenance of patronage relations between dynastic actors 
and this key political constituency. Thirdly, coverage of the founding of the IUM in the 
contemporary Saudi press underscores the ways in which the project was woven into 
narratives of national and dynastic legitimacy for consumption by domestic audiences. 
In the second part of the chapter, I move on from the founding of the IUM to trace 
some basic aspects of the university’s institutional history and its relationship with the 
Saudi state over the following decades. I argue that university staff stood in a 
clientelistic relationship with state actors, who provided the economic capital 
necessary for the project’s functioning. I demonstrate how state actors consolidated 
the position of strength that derived from this arrangement through the bureaucratic 
mapping of rights and responsibilities formally granting themselves and their ʿulamaʾ 
allies oversight and control over the use that was to be made of this material 
investment. Finally, I explore how this relationship between university and state – in 
terms of both material support and regulation – evolved over time in ways that map 
directly onto developments in Saudi national and dynastic politics. This chapter thus 
underscores the importance of national state actors and resources within the broader 
transnational religious economies that are the subject of this thesis. 
Geopolitics, Domestic Discord and a New Missionary Project 
Both the official historiography of the IUM and Saudi media coverage from the time 
tend to frame the founding of the university in 1961 as having been driven primarily by 
piety. Saudi monarchs are presented as having established and later continually 
maintained this missionary project purely on the basis of an earnest desire to offer 
Muslims across the world the gift of enlightenment, knowledge of eternal truths, and 
the capacity to live their lives in line with God-given moral imperatives. There is surely 
no doubt that many of those who would become involved in the university were 
indeed driven by an understanding that it could serve such ends. Yet to be fully 
understood, the project must also be situated in relation to the particular historical 
juncture in which it emerged. This was a time when the Saudi regime was mired in 
serious crisis, facing challenges to its legitimacy and stability from actors both at home 
and abroad, as well as deep divisions within its own ranks. In this context, the founding 
of the IUM stood to serve a variety of political ends. 
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On the regional stage, there had emerged various modes of radical republicanism 
which at least in principle were committed to sweeping away what were seen as 
retrograde dynastic regimes like the Saudi monarchy. While particularly influential 
political projects of this hue took shape in Syria, Iraq and later also in Yemen, in the 
1950s relations with Egypt were especially critical. Saʿud had initially made the 
pragmatic decision to recognise the new regime brought to power in Cairo by the Free 
Officers coup of 1952. Saʿud maintained friendly relations with Gamal Abdel Nasser 
after he emerged as leader of the new Egyptian regime, both of them sharing a view of 
Hashimite Iraq and Jordan as adversaries. Saudi Arabia subsequently backed Cairo’s 
opposition to the 1955 Baghdad Pact, fearing the consequences of Iraq and Iran joining 
the British-led military alliance. It also supported Egypt during the invasion by Israel, 
France and the United Kingdom which followed Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez 
Canal in 1956 (Vassiliev 2000, 349–51; Al-Rasheed 2002, 114–15). However, this 
honeymoon of sorts did not last long. As early as 1955, an attempt by Egyptian-trained 
Saudi officers to topple the Saudi monarchy underscored the gravity of the challenge 
emanating from Cairo (Al-Rasheed 2002, 112). Relations soured in the second half of 
the decade, particularly in the wake of allegations of another Egyptian-backed effort to 
bring down the Saudi regime in 1957 (Vassiliev 2000, 351–53). In 1958, Saʿud was in 
turn publicly accused of conspiring to have the Egyptian president assassinated 
(Vassiliev 2000, 354). Following the toppling of the imamate in Yemen in 1962, the two 
countries fought a proxy war there, with Egypt sending troops to support the new 
republican regime and Saudi Arabia backing the royalists. A rapprochement would only 
eventually come about with the new strategic situation that arose with the 1967 
conflict against Israel, and particularly following the death of Nasser in 1970 (Vassiliev 
2000, 372–77, 384–85). 
Throughout this period, differing projects of moral and intellectual leadership – and 
their transmission across borders – were an important factor in regional politics 
(Chalcraft 2010). The socialist, pan-Arab and anti-imperialist politics of Nasser’s Egypt 
struck at the very foundations of Saudi dynastic legitimacy, and were promoted with 
considerable success across the region by Cairo’s Sawt al-ʿArab (Voice of the Arabs) 
radio station from 1953. Sawt al-ʿArab iniƟally focused its attention on issues of neo-
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imperialist interference in the Middle East, including the presence of British troops in 
the Suez Canal Zone, the role of the British head of the Arab Legion in Jordan John 
Glubb, and the British-led Baghdad Pact. From the end of the 1950s onwards, however, 
with these salient issues to some extent resolved, its energies were increasingly 
directed at “reactionary” regimes in the region like the Saudi monarchy (Boyd 1975, 
647–53). 
As will be discussed further below, circuits of students travelling from their countries 
of origin to Cairo for studies at al-Azhar were also at the time seen as playing a role in 
the diffusion of Nasserist politics beyond Egypt’s borders. In June 1961, just a few 
months before the IUM opened its doors, the Egyptian regime tightened its grip on al-
Azhar. This involved the introduction of new legislation which, apart from paving the 
way for faculties teaching secular subjects like medicine, engineering and business 
administration, also ensured that the holders of top posts were to be government 
appointees (Crecelius 1966). This move thus consolidated the degree of control 
exercised by Nasser’s republican regime over an institution which exerted considerable 
ideational sway both within Egypt and also across the Islamic world. 
Tensions with Egypt fed into the second major threat facing the Saudi monarchy at this 
point in history, which was the jostling that had begun between three factions within 
the royal family itself: one centred on the incumbent King Saʿud; another mobilised by 
his brother Crown Prince Faisal; and a third consisting of a group of younger princes 
including Talal ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, who shiŌed their loyalty between Saʿud and Faisal 
according to circumstances and leant somewhat towards Nasserist politics (Al-Rasheed 
2002, 109–10). The public scandal surrounding Saʿud’s alleged plot to assassinate 
Nasser in 1958 – at a time when the latter enjoyed immense popularity across the 
region and considerable support within Saudi Arabia itself – was one step in a string of 
events that led to Faisal wresting effective power from his brother in March of that 
year (Vassiliev 2000, 354). It exacerbated what were already much more entrenched 
tensions relating to Saʿud’s failure to rein in spending during a period of financial 
difficulty, and unresolved issues concerning the balance of power between the king 
and the Council of Ministers which had been created just prior to the death of ʿAbd al-
ʿAziz in 1953 (Al-Rasheed 2002, 106–09). In March 1958, Saʿud was forced to grant 
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Faisal extensive sway as prime minister. Through a mixture of obstruction and alliance-
building, the king managed to claw back authority from his brother in December 1960 
(Vassiliev 2000, 354–58). However, he prevailed only until March 1962, at which point 
he once again had to pass de facto power back to Faisal (Vassiliev 2000, 358–62). Saʿud 
was eventually deposed in favour of Faisal in 1964 (Vassiliev 2000, 366–68). 
Throughout this period, the various actors seeking to secure the stability of the Saudi 
state and to consolidate their own positions within it sought ways to mobilise the 
support of potential allies and to bolster their political legitimacy both at home and 
abroad. The founding of the IUM must be understood in relation to this manoeuvring. 
On the one hand, with Egypt and other states in the region proactively promoting 
radical republican politics beyond their own borders through platforms such as Sawt 
al-ʿArab, and with Nasserist ideas diffusing abroad through conduits including cross-
border religious educational circuits centred on al-Azhar, the IUM stood for the 
possibility of countering these dynamics by advancing an alternative, Saudi-led 
counter-project of moral and intellectual leadership grounded in claims to religious 
authenticity and calls for Islamic solidarity. Efforts to pursue such a strategy were not 
limited to the IUM but would gather pace through the 1960s and beyond, with Saudi 
Arabia taking a leading role in initiatives including the founding of the Muslim World 
League in 1962, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference from 1969, and the World 
Assembly of Muslim Youth in 1972. The religiously-framed style of foreign policy that 
such projects represented would come to be associated especially with the figure of 
Faisal (Sindi 1980; Piscatori 1983; Schulze 1995). 
In the Cold War context, the Saudis’ investment in the IUM and other state-backed 
missionary endeavours dovetailed with the Middle East policy of the kingdom’s ally the 
United States. The years immediately preceding the founding of the IUM were marked 
by Washington’s commitment to the Eisenhower Doctrine, promising US military aid to 
any country in the region seen as threatened by the forces of “international 
Communism”. Washington was keen to bolster Saudi Arabia as a bulwark against 
Nasserism and other forms of leftist politics, the spread of which was viewed as 
undermining US interests in the Middle East. It was hoped that religion would play a 
certain role in this initiative, with US president Dwight Eisenhower in 1956 noting his 
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jejune hope that, given Saudi sovereignty over Mecca and Medina, the then king Saʿud 
might usefully be “built up as a spiritual leader”. This reflected Washington’s broader 
“Islamic strategy” for the region, which Nathan Citino locates within a US policy 
establishment imbued with the Orientalist prejudice that “religious faith was the 
essential, defining characteristic of Muslims and that a monolithic ‘Islam’ could 
somehow be manipulated to shape the political future of the Middle East” (Citino 2002, 
95–98).92 Some US policymakers were convinced that “Western” advances had left the 
Middle East in a state of “social fragmentation”, by eroding the firm foundation 
formerly provided by religious faith and institutions. If left unchecked, this supposed 
breakdown of social and moral order might leave the region’s hapless peoples quite 
unable to resist the seductions of communism (Citino 2002, 125–27). Faith-based 
projects like the IUM were just the sort of prophylactic measures required. In this light, 
it is worth noting that the IUM is still viewed in some quarters in Saudi Arabia as having 
originally emerged as a creature of the Cold War, shaped by “the international struggle 
against Soviet atheism” (al-ʿAskar 2011). 
It is especially revealing that in 1956, shortly before the IUM project began to gather 
momentum, British officials were themselves engaged in discussions over the 
possibility of establishing a directly comparable initiative, which they hoped might 
receive material support from the US and states in the region which were signatories 
to the Baghdad Pact. What they had in mind was the founding of a Centre for 
Advanced Islamic Studies, "in a British or at least politically reliable territory" – with 
Aden, Sudan, Libya, Pakistan, and British colonial dependencies in East Africa all 
mooted as possible locations. The hope was that such an institution might compete 
with al-Azhar as a centre of religious learning for students from across north and east 
Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and perhaps beyond, with the provision of a scholarships 
programme suggested as one way of helping to bolster its capacity to do so. The 
purpose of the plan was explicitly to counter “Egyptian nationalism, in its present 
expansionist stage”, which was understood to represent “a threat to Middle East 
stability only second to Soviet pressure”; and which was specifically seen as imperilling 
                                                        
92 For a journalistic account of the US position on such matters at the time, see Dreyfuss 2005, 
120–46. 
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“the security of those British dependencies and protectorates in East Africa and the 
Arabian Peninsula where the inhabitants are either wholly or in large part Moslems”. 
The problem, as these British officials viewed it, was that the effects of Egyptian radio 
“propaganda” were bolstered by Cairo’s capacity to use its “virtual monopoly of 
training facilities for advanced Islamic studies” to build a far-reaching network of 
“influential sympathisers on the ground”: 
At present, for lack of alternative, students wishing to pursue the higher Islamic studies 
necessary to qualify them as teachers in Moslem schools, Qadis etc. must go to El Azhar, 
or to lesser but hardly less notorious centres, where no effort is spared to indoctrinate 
them. They return thence to take up posts in British territories with a wide range of local 
influence, providing the direct contact required. An already serious situation seems 
likely to take a particularly sinister twist if the U.S.S.R. succeeds in gaining its intended 
foothold in Cairo.93 
It is not clear that these British ambitions to counter Nasserist influence through the 
establishment of an alternative centre of religious learning ever came to fruition, and it 
is certainly the case that concerns were raised at the time about the expense and 
practicality of such a project. Against this background, these same officials would 
surely have taken some succour from the founding of an equivalent initiative like the 
IUM, sponsored by a Saudi administration which maintained close relations with 
Washington and which was soon to resolve its longstanding rift with London over 
border disputes with British protectorates in the Gulf.94 
From the perspective of Riyadh, in addition to serving political ends beyond Saudi 
Arabia’s borders in the context of struggles for moral and intellectual leadership which 
were playing out across the region and beyond, the IUM also stood to bolster the 
domestic standing of individual dynastic actors and the Saudi state system as a whole. 
At a time when the Saudi state looked distinctly fragile, the new university represented 
both patronage for the Wahhabi religious establishment whose political support was 
                                                        
93 This and the quotations in the immediately preceding paragraph are taken from “Proposal 
for the Establishment of an Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies,” an undated document 
circulated by officials at the Colonial Office in April 1956. This document and other relevant 
items of correspondence which inform the discussion here are reproduced in Burdett 1998, 
4:371–94. 
94 On Saudi relations with Washington and London in this period, see Vassiliev 2000, 342–48, 
380; Al-Rasheed 2002, 117–20. 
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so important to Saudi rule and also a means for bolstering narratives of pious 
leadership which had long been promulgated with a view to legitimating that rule. 
As will be explored in more detail below, while a large proportion of staff would 
ultimately be drafted in from outside Saudi Arabia, key posts at the IUM – particularly 
in the early days – went to figures at the heart of the Wahhabi establishment. The 
university thus afforded leading Wahhabi scholars an opportunity to extend their 
influence and authority over ever greater audiences. While the use of state funds to 
make a gift of this kind to the ʿulamaʾ was characterisƟc of the longstanding patronage 
relations which bound this important political constituency to the Saudi monarchy and 
helped to ensure their ongoing support for Saudi rule, the timing is once again 
significant. Judging by local press coverage, plans for the IUM appear to have really 
gathered pace around 1958, just as Faisal seized effective power from his brother 
Saʿud and the conflict between the two became particularly fractious. The views and 
loyalties of the ʿulamaʾ were an important factor that had to be taken into 
consideration and managed by all parties to this power struggle in the upper echelons 
of the monarchy. Saʿud’s victory in reclaiming power from Faisal in December 1960 
followed a year in which he had toured the kingdom, meeting and distributing 
patronage to an array of constituencies. This included regular meetings with scholars 
and the provision of funds for the construction and maintenance of mosques both at 
home and abroad (Vassiliev 2000, 357). Saʿud’s relationship with the ʿulamaʾ became 
more tense after he took back power that year and brought reformists like Talal ibn 
ʿAbd al-ʿAziz and the naƟonalist ʿAbd Allah al-Tariqi into his new government. The 
Grand Mufti Muhammad ibn Ibrahim wrote to the king “reminding him of the mufti’s 
right to examine all laws and government orders before they came into effect and to 
give rulings on whether they corresponded to the sharia”, and he secured concessions 
on significant issues including labour legislation (Vassiliev 2000, 358–60). The ʿulamaʾ 
joined princes in pressuring the increasingly unpopular Saʿud to reappoint Faisal to the 
post of prime minister in 1962 (Vassiliev 2000, 364). During the end game of the power 
struggle, senior scholars initially dragged their heals on whether or not to back the 
outright removal of Saʿud – a king who had over the years tended to fold quite readily 
to their demands – before eventually being persuaded to issue fatwas lending 
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important legitimacy to the handover of effective power to Faisal and then ultimately 
to Saʿud’s deposition (Yizraeli 2012, 86–93). 
In this context, the award of the IUM to the Wahhabi establishment stood to shore up 
the patronage relations which bound them to the Saudi monarchical regime, and 
which over the decades would increasingly serve to direct their attention away from 
politics and towards the social sphere, at a time when the regime was at its most 
vulnerable and was deeply in need of support. It has specifically been suggested that 
the IUM was offered to the ʿulamaʾ as compensaƟon of sorts for the founding of the 
University of Riyadh in 1957, which was expected to be a broadly secular institution 
(Commins 2005, 126). It is plausible to go further and to speculate that the new Islamic 
university may have been backed by one or other of the individual actors who were 
then vying for influence within the state framework, as a way of bolstering his own 
personal standing. As will be discussed further below, source materials available from 
the period overwhelmingly attribute credit for the IUM project to Saʿud, and it is 
certainly the case that the formal royal decrees which confirmed the founding of the 
IUM in September 1961 were issued in Saʿud’s name and at a time when he had 
temporarily managed to claw power back from Faisal. However, the fact that Faisal 
exercised so much authority for much of the period leading up to the launch of the 
new university, and the lack of source materials offering insights into the murky 
behind-the-scenes wrangling of this period, means that any such suggestions must 
remain speculative. It is worth noting that Faisal paid personal visits to the IUM in its 
early years, once prior to becoming king and again immediately after he secured the 
throne at the expense of his brother (al-Ghamidi 1998, 90). Whether or not any 
particular royal was uniquely responsible for backing the IUM project, the imbrication 
of university staff in the politicking of this period is highlighted by the curious fact that, 
when the country’s top scholars did finally give the go-ahead for the replacement of 
King Saʿud by Faisal in 1964, the person they dispatched to break the news to the 
deposed monarch was Muhammad al-Amin al-Shinqiti. Al-Shinqiti, whose biography is 
discussed in Chapter 4, was a Mauritania-born scholar who had resided in the kingdom 
for many years, had become close to the Wahhabi establishment, and had been 
teaching at the IUM from the time that it opened (al-Majdhub 1992, 1:185). 
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Finally, in addition to serving a function in political struggles at the regional level and in 
the consolidation of patronage relations with the Wahhabi scholarly establishment, 
investment by state actors in the IUM stood to affirm narratives of Saudi political 
legitimacy directed at broader constituencies within the kingdom. The ways in which 
the founding of the university was bound up with the promulgation of such narratives 
is plain to see in contemporary Saudi press coverage of the project.95 The years 
immediately prior to the opening of the IUM saw a series of public calls for the 
establishment of just such an institution, concentrated particularly in the Medina-
based newspaper al-Madina al-Munawwara. These were written by a number of 
individuals, most if not all of whom appear to have been Hijazis by birth and family 
background. The circumstances surrounding the publication of these articles calling for 
the founding of an Islamic university in Medina is not clear. It certainly cannot be ruled 
out that they were choreographed to pave the way for a plan that had already been 
put in motion by state actors, perhaps to help secure local legitimacy for an institution 
which was to be dominated by the Najdi Wahhabi establishment. However that may 
be, these articles offer insights into the ways in which the new university was at the 
time presented to audiences within Saudi Arabia, and the kinds of political rewards 
that state actors could hope to reap from their investment. Above all, they illustrate 
how the founding of the IUM was framed simultaneously in terms of narratives of 
Saudi dynastic beneficence – generosity, pious leadership, religious mission, and the 
guardianship and nurturing of the Holy Cities – and also of national pride.96 
Many of these threads are illustrated in two linked articles published in consecutive 
issues of al-Madina al-Munawwara in May 1960, written by ʿAbd Allah al-Fasi (al-Fasi 
1960b; al-Fasi 1960c). Al-Fasi claimed to have been the originator of the campaign to 
found an Islamic university in Medina at this time and he was certainly one of the most 
                                                        
95 The discussion that follows is informed by coverage of the initiative to establish an Islamic 
university in Medina found in: al-Madina al-Munawwara issues 816, 818, 821, 827, 830, 860, 
861, 880, 883, 887, 891, 893, 901, 940, 971, 975, 978, 993, 994, 1012, 1015, 1016, 1020, 1027, 
1030, 1032, 1037, 1038, 1042; al-Bilad issue 349; al-Nadwa issues 320, 322; and issues of al-
Manhal published in Rabiʿ al-Akhir 1380 H. and Ramadan 1381 H. I have cited specific 
examples of such coverage in instances where these relate directly to a point being made.  
96 On the role of historical narrative in the construction of Saudi political legitimacy, see e.g. Al-
Rasheed 1998; Al-Rasheed 2004b; Determann 2012, 44–90, 136–83. 
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prolific of the authors writing in support of such a project.97 He was himself a Mecca-
born graduate of the Saudi Scholastic Institute discussed in Chapter 2. He had also 
studied in Egypt and had subsequently penned volumes of poetry and worked in 
various roles for the Saudi state in the Hijaz, including for the government printing 
house and radio (Yusuf 2002, 2:132). 
The headline that tops these pieces, “The Concern of the Father of the People for the 
Founding of the Islamic University”, reflects the fact that most of those who were 
penning newspaper articles of this kind at the time depicted Saʿud himself as 
personally responsible for establishing the IUM.98 It also captures the prevailing 
tendency to portray this act as one of paternal munificence, to be received with 
gratitude by the king’s subjects.99 Elsewhere in these same two articles, al-Fasi weaves 
the issue of benevolent paternalism with that of the pious ruler, linking the IUM 
project to Saʿud’s role as “the father of the people, the guardian of its renaissance, the 
vigilant protector of the eternal Islamic heritage, and the combatant fighting for the 
defence of the essence of the [Islamic] religion and the widening of it’s daʿwa”. 
He also invokes another very common theme, Saʿud’s guardianship over the sacred 
geography of the Hijaz and the importance of returning to Medina its historical status 
as a hub for the spread of Islam to the peoples of the world. He celebrates Saʿud’s 
recognition of 
the necessity of restoring the glory of these lands, and not simply their glory but what 
they were like in the era of the Prophet and his Companions. That is to say that His 
Majesty will make [these lands] into a centre of radiation [of the Islamic daʿwa] once 
                                                        
97 On al-Fasi’s claim to have originated the call for an Islamic university in Medina, see al-Fasi 
1960b. Elsewhere, al-Fasi, ʿUbayd Madani, Muhammad Saʿid ʿAmudi and Amin Madani are 
identified as “the writers who were the first to call for the founding of the Islamic University of 
Medina” (“Amal al-Muslimin al-Kabir Yatahaqqaq ʿala Yadd Hami al-Haramayn Jalalat al-Malik 
Suʿud” 1960). In authorised histories of the IUM, the university is depicted as having been 
established in response to these requests from public figures (al-Ghamidi 1998, 27–34; al-
ʿAbbud 2004, 229–40). 
98 In the run-up to the founding of the IUM, some also addressed themselves to the then 
education minister and future king Fahd (e.g. ʿUbayd Madani 1960). Faisal’s name was 
mentioned in connection with the project, but only rarely (e.g. al-ʿAmudi 1960).  
99 In other articles, the IUM was described as “a gift from the Father of the People to his 
people and to the Muslims” and as “one of the eternal works of His Majesty King Saʿud” (al-
Fasi 1960a; “al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya min al-Aʿmal al-Khalida li-Jalalat al-Malik Suʿud” 1961). 
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again; that His Majesty carries the flag and lights the torch, that flag and that torch 
which were carried by Muhammad and his Companions 
In this way, Saʿud is presented as the inheritor of the religious mission first launched in 
Medina by the Prophet himself.100 
The themes of sacred geography and the need to emulate the example set by the 
Prophet are in turn interwoven by al-Fasi with the invocation of national pride. In this 
mode, he uses vocabulary like “we” and “our” to frame the call for an Islamic 
university in Medina in terms of a sense of collective identity, privilege and 
responsibility distinct from the appeals to the individual person of the king. Expressing 
his own hope that such an institution would itself then be in a position to open 
institutes in other, disadvantaged Islamic lands, al-Fasi asserted that:  
I know that we are more deserving than any Arab country to assume this mission and to 
carry it out. Some Islamic states have stirred up the issue of these remote lands, and 
some of them have sent missionaries to the True Religion, while some have opened 
institutes in those countries. I saw and read about this and I said to myself that we are 
more worthy and that the constitution of our king is that our lands [once again] assume 
the standing that they had in the era of the Prophet and his Companions (italics added) 
In a further twist, several authors suggested that the founding of an Islamic university 
in Medina by the Saudis would represent the fulfilment of plans that had first been put 
in place in the late Ottoman period.101 On 19 April 1913, the then Ottoman Sultan 
Mehmed V had decreed the establishment of the Salah al-Din al-ʿAyyubi University in 
Medina, which was intended to exist alongside similar institutions in Baghdad, 
Damascus and Yemen.102 Instruction was to be in Arabic and while the intention was 
for the university to recruit primarily from the graduates of a secondary school in 
Medina, it also received applications from as far afield as Morocco, Algeria, Iraq and 
Syria. Its mission was “to spread the knowledge of Islam”, although it was also to 
                                                        
100 Efforts to bolster the political legitimacy of a contemporary head of state by constructing 
claims to historical continuity with prestigious bygone eras are not unique to Saudi Arabia, of 
course; one directly comparable example being the steps taken in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq “to 
link the Baʿath to ancient Mesopotamia”, epitomised in a “reconstruction of the ancient city of 
Babylon” with “Saddam’s initials… inscribed on every brick” (Davis 2005, 17). 
101 See especially ʿUbayd Madani 1960, but also “al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya fi al-Madina: Tawhid al-
Thaqafa” 1959; “Amal al-Muslimin al-Kabir Yatahaqqaq ʿala Yadd Hami al-Haramayn Jalalat al-
Malik Suʿud” 1960. 
102 This paragraph draws on Dohaish 1974, 98–101. 
 119 
include colleges offering training in agriculture and commerce. The individual lined up 
to take charge was ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Shawish, an EgypƟan graduate of al-Azhar and Cairo’s 
Dar al-ʿUlum who had previously been selected to work as a professor of Arabic 
literature at Cambridge University. He had been jailed in Egypt for his public stance 
against the British occupation and would go on to co-found the Association of Muslim 
Youth (al-Zirikli 1980, 4:17). Other prominent figures involved in the project included 
Shakib Arslan, a Lebanon-born activist who based himself in Switzerland and whose 
platform has been characterised as “Islamic nationalist” (al-Zirikli 1980, 3:173–75; 
Lauzière 2008, 235–86). In the end, the eruption of World War I in 1914 ensured that 
the plans for the Salah al-Din University came to naught. It thus remained for the Saudi 
state, some of the authors of these contemporary newspaper articles suggested, to 
make good on these ambitions on the part of their predecessors in Medina. 
Again, the connection between the hoped-for Saudi initiative and these earlier 
Ottoman plans could be presented as an issue of national pride. The writer Amin 
Madani, for example, invoked a comparison between the stature and capacities of the 
contemporary Saudi polity, on the one hand, and those of its erstwhile Ottoman 
competitor, on the other: 
If Constantinople responded positively not long ago to the idea of founding the 
university in the Home of the Revelation [i.e. Medina], we today are worthier of bringing 
this idea to fruition, with the widest scope and the strongest system [possible] to 
achieve its great objective 
For Madani, the need for this project was all the more pressing in the Cold War context 
in which he was writing. Giving an account of the recent history of the Arab world 
marked by colonialism and the encroachment of “destructive socialism from the East 
and Zionist capitalism from the West”, he underlined the importance of resisting both 
of these two competing frameworks. Tying the founding of the IUM now to Arab 
nationalist themes, he asserted that the idea to establish the university 
was built on a profound study of the history of the Arab world, which will not achieve 
strength and dominion, just as its nationalism will not have significance or sovereignty, 
until the Arabs adhere to Islamic principles and proceed according to the guidance of the 
Muhammadan legislation (A. Madani 1960) 
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It is thus clear that the decision by Saudi state actors at this point in history to invest 
economic resources in a project that was primarily intended to effect change abroad 
must be understood in relation to political developments that were playing out within 
and around the Saudi national sphere. The founding of the new university was bound 
up with the need for the Saudi monarchy as a whole – and also for individual actors 
who were competing for influence within the monarchy – to build alliances with key 
constituencies within this national space, and to communicate broader claims to 
political legitimacy grounded in narratives of pious leadership, religious mission, 
guardianship of the sacred geography of the Holy Cities, royal beneficence, and the 
protection and nurturing of national prestige. It was furthermore linked to struggles 
between national states, as those in power in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and elsewhere 
mobilised their respective state apparatuses to advance antagonistic projects of moral 
and intellectual leadership as part of what was at the time a particularly high-stakes 
regional competition for authority and influence. The remainder of this chapter 
explores the important role that Saudi national politics continued to play as the IUM 
took shape and subsequently evolved in the decades that followed. 
Resources and Regulation: The Evolving Relationship between the 
Islamic University and the Saudi State 
In addition to emerging in part out of a particular juncture in Saudi national politics, 
the IUM was from the start in principle also subordinated to the Saudi political 
authorities. It was reliant for resources upon dynastic elites and the national state. 
Furthermore, bureaucratic frameworks were installed to ensure that state actors and 
their allies within the Wahhabi establishment maintained oversight and influence over 
the processes by which material and spiritual capital were to be translated and 
distributed under its auspices. 
The IUM was formally established on 6 September 1961 by a royal decree attributed to 
King Saʿud, during a period when he had temporarily managed to regain effective 
power from Faisal. Setting the university budget for its first year of operation at 3 
million Saudi riyals, the decree noted that the institution would draw its resources 
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from “our royal property”.103 It had earlier been announced that the university would 
be housed in a palace personally donated by Saʿud. The king was thus from the start 
placed in a position of patronage over the IUM, insofar as it was he who was projected 
as the provider of the economic resources upon which its operation depended. The 
quantities of material goods required for any such educational project to operate were 
multiplied by the missionary nature of the IUM and its global ambitions. There would 
be all the usual expenses associated with maintaining premises, purchasing equipment, 
paying staff, and so on. There would also be the additional costs involved in recruiting 
students from across the globe, facilitating their travel to and from Medina, and paying 
out stipends such that they would be able to remove themselves from economic 
markets for the several years required to complete their education there. The 
provision of the necessary funding by national state actors established a clientelistic 
relationship between those state actors and the university, grounded in “asymmetric 
but mutually beneficial, open-ended transactions based on the differential control by 
individuals or groups over the access and flow of resources”.104 As I explore in what 
follows, the position of strength that dynastic and state actors derived from their place 
in this relationship was further consolidated through the bureaucratic mapping of 
rights and responsibilities, ensuring that they were in a position to exert influence over 
the processes by which this investment was to be translated into spiritual capital and 
distributed. 
The decree founding the IUM was followed by another on 19 September 1961, which 
approved statutes outlining how the university would function.105  This founding 
document again situated the IUM firmly as a royal project, undertaken by King Saʿud 
out of his “consideration for the affairs of Islam and his striving to champion the 
fortunes of Muslims in the East and in the West”.106 As “the founder of the Islamic 
                                                        
103 “Royal Decree No. 11,” reproduced in al-Ghamidi 1998, 38. 
104 This definition is adapted from a conference paper by Luis Roniger, quoted in Hertog 2010, 
21. Roniger’s definition specifies that the transactions in question occur within “stratified 
societies”, a feature which is not especially relevant to the particular set of institutionalised 
relationships described here. 
105 “Royal Decree No. 17,” reproduced in al-Ghamidi 1998, 50; “al-Nizam al-Asasi li-l-Jamiʿa al-
Islamiyya bi-l-Madina al-Munawwara,” reproduced in al-Ghamidi 1998, 52–58. 
106 “al-Nizam al-Asasi,” Article 2. 
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University and the guarantor of its resources”, King Saʿud was named personally as its 
Supreme President.107 This title not only gave him symbolic sovereignty over the 
institution but also came with substantive powers. As Supreme President, he in 
principle retained the right to review recommendations made by the university’s 
Advisory Council – made up of prominent Islamic personalities from around the world, 
who were to offer counsel on its operation – before passing them on for further action. 
He also had the right to ratify the appointment of the initial cohort of teaching staff, 
and to approve the initial distribution of places to students from different countries.108 
Furthermore, his input would be required in the event that any changes were to be 
made to the university statutes themselves.109 
In addition to outlining this personal role for the king himself, the same founding 
document also defined the IUM in national terms – as a “Saudi religious scholarly 
foundation” – and set up regulations that would serve to stitch it more broadly into 
the apparatus of the national state.110 The university’s revenues, no matter what their 
source, were to be treated as public funds; its staff were to be subject to the same 
rulings as government functionaries; the university was to be headed by the nation’s 
Grand Mufti, as University President; and the latter’s powers in relation to university 
personnel were explicitly described as equivalent to those of a minister in relation to 
the employees of his ministry.111 
Although the university statutes were amended substantially in September 1966 and 
again in August 1975, senior royals and other state actors retained far-reaching 
oversight powers.112 It is worth noting that from the time of the 1966 statutes, the 
university was described as receiving its funding not from the king personally but from 
                                                        
107 “al-Nizam al-Asasi,” Article 4. 
108 “al-Nizam al-Asasi,” Articles 17 and 18; and “Nizam al-Majlis al-Istishari al-Aʿla li-l-Jamiʿa al-
Islamiyya bi-l-Madina al-Munawwara,” Article 3. This latter document is reproduced in al-
Ghamidi 1998, 146–48. 
109 “al-Nizam al-Asasi,” Articles 26 and 27. 
110 “al-Nizam al-Asasi,” Article 1. 
111 “al-Nizam al-Asasi,” Articles 3, 23 and 25. 
112 The second statute and the royal decree approving it are reproduced in al-Ghamidi 1998, 
62–66. The third statute and the royal decree approving it are reproduced in al-Ghamidi 1998, 
72–81. 
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“that which the state allocates to it in its general budget”.113 By the time of the 
revisions introduced in 1975, organs within the university had taken charge of certain 
important tasks. This included drawing up syllabuses, whereas the original statutes had 
themselves included a pre-approved programme of study. By 1975, the university was 
also permitted to supplement the funding allocated to it by the state with monies 
derived from sources such as awqāf, bequests or donations.114 Moreover, the formal 
status of the king – at this time, Khalid – in relation to the university was now reduced 
to Honorary President, a title which in itself conferred no clear powers. The 
university’s Advisory Council was replaced by a new body. While it still included a 
significant proportion of prominent figures drafted in from outside the kingdom, it was 
now renamed the Supreme Council and was granted a certain amount of executive 
power. These developments notwithstanding, state actors retained scope for a very 
considerable degree of influence over the university. Royal decrees were still required 
for key matters, including filling the important post of University President and 
approving the university budget.115 For other issues, such as the allocation of financial 
support to associations and organisations that worked in cooperation with the 
university, approval was required from the country’s Council of Ministers.116 Moreover, 
the choice of international figures to sit on the university’s Supreme Council was to be 
ratified by the king and the council itself was to be headed by a Supreme President; 
with Crown Prince Fahd duly appointed to this post by royal decree.117 In practice, 
Fahd only attended a handful of council meetings in all the years that this body existed, 
with others usually deputised to attend on his behalf (al-Ghamidi 1998, 164–90). 
Nonetheless, his role as Supreme President was symbolic of the continuing prerogative 
of Saudi state actors to exercise influence over the university insofar as they chose to 
do so. 
                                                        
113 Article 4. 
114 Article 26. The 1966 amendments had also permitted the university to derive funding from 
sources other than the state. However, it had included a requirement for prior approval from 
the king which was no longer present in the 1975 document. 
115 Articles 14 and 17. 
116 Article 14. 
117 Article 10; al-Ghamidi 1998, 69. 
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Besides being subject to oversight by actors and institutions at the heart of the royal 
family and the state framework, the IUM was from the start also put in the charge of 
key figures from the loyal Wahhabi ʿulamaʾ establishment. As noted above, the IUM’s 
founding statutes issued in September 1961 asserted that the post of university 
president would automatically go to the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of his 
status in that role. The Grand Mufti at the time was Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Al al-
Shaykh, who was no mere state functionary but was in religious standing also the pre-
eminent Wahhabi authority of the period (ʿAbd al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh 1974/5, 169–
84; Al Bassam 1998/9, 1:242–64; al-Majdhub 1992, 247–54; al-ʿAqil 2008, 763–70). In 
practice, Muhammad ibn Ibrahim was not very involved in the running of the 
university. That task went to the person appointed as his deputy; ʿAbd al-ʿAziz ibn Baz, 
another figure born in Riyadh who was very much a part of Wahhabi scholarly circles 
there and would also later be appointed Grand Mufti (al-Majdhub 1992, 1:77–106; al-
ʿAqil 2008, 444–56). At an early stage prior to the opening of the IUM, it was decided 
that the post of secretary general – with responsibility for the university’s 
administrative staff – would go to Muhammad ibn Nasir al-ʿAbbudi, who came from 
the Wahhabi stronghold of Burayda and was at that time in charge of a state-run 
Scholastic Institute there (al-Majdhub 1992, 2:331–41; al-ʿAbbad 2010). 
The division of the presidency between Ibn Ibrahim and Ibn Baz, two doyens of the 
Wahhabi establishment, does not seem to have been planned from the start. 
Interestingly, two figures who were apparently originally considered to run the IUM 
both stood in more complicated relationships to the Najdi religious establishment. We 
are told in the memoirs of ʿAbd Allah Khayyat (b. 1908), the graduate of the Saudi 
Scholastic Institute in Mecca who was discussed in Chapter 2, that he had in fact 
originally been appointed by royal decree to be the IUM’s founding president, having 
been nominated for the role by Muhammad ibn Ibrahim (Khayyat 2004, 15, 235–42). 
Although we are not given an exact date for this decree, it is clear from the context 
that it was issued at least as early as September 1960. The appointment apparently did 
not take place only because he declined it, citing personal reasons. As a Mecca-born 
scholar from a Hanafi background who had passed through the private and Hashimite 
schooling systems in the Hijaz, ʿAbd Allah Khayyat was far from being an archetypal 
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representative of the Najdi Wahhabi establishment. However, his trajectory had been 
powerfully shaped by the environment created in the Hijaz following the Saudi 
invasion in the 1920s. His teachers both at the Scholastic Institute and in the Masjid 
Haram included many of the foreign Salafis drafted in by the Saudis to perform 
religious and educational functions at that time, including the Egyptians Muhammad 
Hamid al-Fiqi, ʿAbd al-Zahir Abu al-Samh and ʿAbd al-Razzaq Hamza, the Syrian Bahjat 
al-Bitar and the Moroccan Taqi al-Din al-Hilali.118 He also studied in both sites with 
Wahhabi scholars, including the then Grand Qadi of the Hijaz ʿAbd Allah ibn Hasan Al 
al-Shaykh, and he had subsequently been hired by ʿAbd al-ʿAziz to school the king’s 
sons. He was therefore far closer to the political and religious establishment than the 
circumstances of his birth might suggest, a fact later underlined by his appointment as 
one of the founding members of the official Council of Senior Scholars in 1971 
(Khayyat 2004, 13–17). It is possible that he may have been seen as a potentially useful 
mediator between the Najdi Wahhabi establishment, the Hijazi setting in which the 
university was to take root, and what was expected to be a diverse, international 
student body. 
The same goes for Muhammad ʿAli al-Harakan, another figure who was early on 
apparently seen as being in the running to take charge of the IUM (al-ʿAbbad 2010).119 
Although he was also born and raised in the Hijaz, in his case in Medina shortly before 
the collapse of Ottoman rule there, al-Harakan’s background was similarly complex. 
His genealogy traced to Najd, and his family had only been settled in Medina from the 
time of his grandfather, a merchant who had traded between that city and ʿUnayza (Al 
Bassam 1998/9, 6:317–25; al-Qarʿani 2009, 183–89). His teachers as a young man in 
the Masjid Nabawi included both Najdi scholars who were resident in Medina and the 
prominent Mali-born scholar Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Ansari. 120  Prior to being 
considered to run the IUM, al-Harakan had worked in the judicial system and his 
                                                        
118 All of these figures are discussed in Chapter 2. 
119 It is worth noting that Muhammad al-Harakan was amongst the small number of Saudi 
scholars who sat on a committee convened in 1960 to discuss proposed plans for the IUM. This 
committee is discussed at the start of Chapter 4. 
120 Al-Zirikli’s biography of what seems to be the same Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Ansari 
describes him as having been Maliki in jurisprudence but “Salafi in creed” (al-Zirikli 1980, 
6:178–79). For another biography, see al-Qarʿani 2009, 33–42. 
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relationship with the Saudi political and religious establishments was such that he 
would become Saudi Arabia’s first minister of justice in 1970 and would later be 
appointed secretary general of the Muslim World League.  
In the event, Muhammad ibn Ibrahim remained president of the IUM until the time of 
his death in 1969. In November of the following year, Ibn Baz was formally promoted 
to the presidency. He remained in that post until October 1975, when he left to take 
charge of one of the top Saudi state religious agencies, the Permanent Committee for 
Scholastic Research and Legal Opinion (al-Ghamidi 1998, 216–17; Al-Atawneh 2010, 
24–29, 32). In the years that followed, he remained a degree of involvement in the 
university as a member of its Supreme Council, over which he frequently presided in 
place of the formal head of that body Crown Prince and later King Fahd (al-Ghamidi 
1998, 164–90). From the time that Ibn Baz departed as university president, the IUM 
was run for four years by ʿAbd al-Muhsin al-ʿAbbad (b. 1934), who had taught at the 
institution since it first opened and had until this time been Ibn Baz’s deputy. Al-ʿAbbad 
himself hailed from the town of Zilfi, north of Riyadh. He had studied as a young man 
in new-style educational institutions overseen by the Wahhabi establishment in Riyadh 
– including the country’s second Scholastic Institute, founded there in the early 1950s 
– and he counted Ibn Baz amongst his teachers (al-Qarʿani 2009, 373–79; al-ʿAbbad 
2010). The IUM was subsequently run by a series of graduates of the system of Islamic 
universities which had grown up in the kingdom by this time. The first was ʿAbd Allah 
al-Zayid from al-Aflaj in Najd, a graduate of the Imam Muhammad ibn Saʿud Islamic 
University, which had been established in Riyadh in 1974 and had absorbed the various 
Islamic educational institutions which had existed in the capital until that time. The 
IUM presidency was then taken over in the early 1980s by ʿAbd Allah ibn Salih al-
ʿUbayd (b. 1941) from al-Qasim, who combined a bachelor’s degree from the Imam 
Muhammad ibn Saʿud University with a doctorate in human resources management 
from Oklahoma State University (Al-Obaid 1979; al-Ghamidi 1998, 222–23). He would 
later go on to become minister of education. His successor at the IUM from 1995 was 
Salih ibn ʿAbd Allah al-ʿAbbud, another ﬁgure from al-Qasim. He had been one of the 
last students to graduate from the Mecca-based Saudi Scholastic Institute discussed in 
Chapter 2 before it closed its doors in the early 1960s, and his own education had 
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culminated with a doctorate from the IUM (al-Ghamidi 1998, 224–25). Since 2007, the 
IUM has been run by the Mecca-born Muhammad ibn ʿAli Farraj al-ʿUqla (b. 1959), who 
holds a PhD in Islamic economics from King ʿAbd al-ʿAziz University.121 
It is thus clear that the IUM project was from the start in many ways stitched into the 
Saudi national state apparatus. It was founded by state actors using dynastic and 
national resources. From the position of strength afforded to them by their access to 
the material capital necessary for the project to function, those state actors were able 
to map out bureaucratic regulations which at least in principle gave them considerable 
sway over the processes by which this investment was to be put to work, translated 
into spiritual capital, and distributed beyond the borders of the kingdom. They ensured 
that the university was at least initially put in the charge of scholars from the heart of 
the loyal Wahhabi establishment in Riyadh. Though the backgrounds of later IUM 
heads varied, they had in common that they were all royal appointees. 
This close relationship between university and state is reflected in the fact that many 
other basic aspects of the institutional history of the IUM from 1961 until today can 
quite clearly be mapped onto political and economic milestones in and around the 
Saudi national sphere, including: the 1973 oil boom; the challenges posed to the 
regime by the 1979 Haram siege, the Iranian revolution and protests by the kingdom’s 
own Shiʿi populaƟon; the 1980s recession; the emergence of a domestic Islamist 
opposition; and the early-1990s Gulf crisis. Throughout this period, state actors 
continually modified their behaviour towards the IUM – in terms of the provision of 
economic capital and the exercise of bureaucratic regulation of the use of this 
investment – in response to such developments. 
When it first opened, the IUM had consisted of only a school-level Secondary 
Department (al-qism al-thānawī) and a university-level Higher Studies Department (al-
qism al-ʿālī). In 1963, the latter department was renamed the College of Shariʿa and 
the following years saw the founding of a range of additional colleges: a College of 
Daʿwa and the Principles of Religion in 1966; a College of the Qurʾan and Islamic 
Studies in 1974; a College of Arabic Language in 1975; and a College of Hadith and 
                                                        
121 “Muʿali al-Ustadh al-Duktur Muhammad al-ʿUqla” 2013. 
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Islamic Studies in 1976 (al-Ghamidi 1998, 290, 301, 312, 323, 336).122 The university 
also acquired a new Department of Higher Studies in 1975, which would go on to offer 
training at masters and doctorate level (al-Ghamidi 1998, 282). Pre-university level 
training came to be divided between a secondary institute and an intermediate 
institute geared primarily towards students from countries where opportunities for 
Islamic education were lacking even at this basic level, in addition to a standalone 
department offering Arabic language instruction to non-native speakers.123 
In 1964, the IUM absorbed a pre-existing educational institution in Medina known as 
Dar al-Hadith. This had been founded in 1931 by Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Dihlawi 
from Delhi, who was associated with the South Asian Salafi movement the Ahl-i Hadith 
and had settled in the Hijaz in the wake of the Saudi occupation of that region. The 
school offered a ten-year programme starting at the primary level. Prior to being 
incorporated into the IUM framework, the Medina Dar al-Hadith had been given Saudi 
state funding and had been managed for a period by Dar al-Ifta.124 In 1971, the IUM 
absorbed another institution in Mecca, also known as Dar al-Hadith. The Mecca Dar al-
Hadith had been founded in 1933 by the same Ahmad al-Dihlawi, this time in 
cooperation with ʿAbd al-Zahir Abu al-Samh and ʿAbd al-Razzaq Hamza, two of the 
Egyptian Salafi associates of Rashid Rida whose involvement in the Mecca-based Saudi 
Scholastic Institute was discussed in Chapter 2 (ʿAbd al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh 1974/5, 
514–16; ʿAbd al-Jabbar 1982, 227–28; al-Ghamidi 1998, 367–74). In addition to 
incorporating these schools into its framework, the IUM also cooperated with the 
Muslim World League in the running of a Saudi state-funded Institute of Islamic 
Solidarity (Maʿhad al-Tadamun al-Islami) in Mogadishu, Somalia. The Mogadishu school 
used the same syllabuses prepared for the IUM’s secondary-level institute in Medina 
and the strongest of its students, the first cohort of whom graduated in the early 
1970s, were given scholarships to study at the university.125 
                                                        
122 The dates given here correspond with the issuing of royal decrees approving the various 
colleges, which may in fact have begun work a little later. 
123 “Dalil al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya” 1971, 87, 111; al-Ghamidi 1998, 347–60. 
124 “Dalil al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya” 1971, 127; al-Ghamidi 1998, 361–66; Lacroix 2011, 88–89, fn. 
36. 
125 “Dalil al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya” 1971, 125–26. 
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The dates for the establishment of the three new colleges at the IUM focusing on 
Qurʾanic and hadith studies and Arabic language reflect a rapid expansion of the 
university in the 1970s. At the beginning of that decade, the two colleges that made up 
the core of the university at that time had employed a total of 33 professors and 
lecturers.126 By early 1982, the total number of staff at the university’s five colleges 
and in its higher studies department had increased to a total of 234 professors, 
associate professors, assistant professors and lecturers, in addition to 142 teaching 
assistants.127 The total number of students in the university’s colleges, which had 
grown from 85 at the time of its founding to 575 in 1391/1392 H. (circa. 1972), 
reached 2,179 by 1399/1400 H. (circa. 1979).128 
Expansion of the IUM had been in the offing for some time. An article published in the 
university journal in February 1969 outlined an ambitious ten-year plan that was 
already in place at that stage, which included the construction of accommodation for 
4,000 students (al-Hariri 1969). Nonetheless, the growth of the university must also be 
understood in relation to developments in the Saudi national economy. The oil 
embargo put in place by Saudi Arabia and other Arab states against the United States 
and Europe in 1973, in solidarity with Egypt in the conflict that had erupted with Israel 
that year, led to a sharp rise in oil prices and an enormous boost to the Saudi economy, 
which translated directly into a very marked increase in public spending (Al-Rasheed 
2002, 136–40; Hertog 2010, 84–136). A huge leap in the IUM budget at this time, 
relative to its previous size, maps so directly onto the timing of the broader increase in 
public spending as to leave little doubt that it was a direct upshot of the oil boom. 
Having risen only gradually since 1961, in the wake of the spike in oil revenues the 
IUM’s annual budget suddenly grew nearly five-fold over the space of just two years; 
from not much more than 40 million Saudi riyals in 1394/1395 H. (circa. 1975) to over 
196 million SR in 1396/1397 H. (circa. 1976) (al-Ghamidi 1998, 281). 
                                                        
126 “Dalil al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya” 1971, 45–46, 71–72. 
127 “Dalil Aʿdaʾ Hayʾat al-Tadris wa-l-Muhadirin wa-l-Muʿidin” 1981/2, 7, 11. 
128 Figures for the total number of students in each of the colleges are given in al-Ghamidi 1998, 
295, 305, 317, 329, 341. These figures exclude students in the university’s various other 
institutes and departments.  
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Following a slight drop, the university budget shot up again from a little over 180 
million SR in 1399/1400 H. (circa. 1979) to a peak of over 381 million SR in 1402/1403 
H (circa. 1982), which would have been equivalent to nearly 111 million US dollars 
according to the exchange rates of the day (al-Ghamidi 1998, 281).129 The scale of 
student recruitment also peaked at this time, with the total number enrolled in the 
IUM’s colleges in the same year reaching over 3,100, although it is worth noting that 
the IUM was still dwarfed by the kingdom’s other major universities which catered 
mainly for Saudis.130 Again, these developments map directly onto twists and turns in 
Saudi national political economy in this period. This second massive boost in the IUM 
budget coincided with a period of soaring revenues and public spending nationwide, at 
a point in time when oil prices were again ascending in the wake of the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979. It also came in the context of a renewed emphasis on religious 
discourse in the public sphere and increased spending on religious projects across the 
board in Saudi Arabia around this time (Prokop 2005, 61; Okruhlik 2005, 194–96; 
Hertog 2010, 126–28). 
These latter moves were intended to burnish the image of the monarchy and shore up 
its foundations in the face of a host of new challenges that had emerged right at the 
end of the 1970s. The first of these was the Iranian Revolution in 1979, which gave rise 
to a regime that was stridently critical of the Saudi monarchy, including its alliance 
with the United States. It became common for Iranian pilgrims to mount protests and 
to clash with Saudi police during the hajj season, with one particularly serious incident 
in July 1987 resulting in the deaths of more than 400 pilgrims and injuries to thousands 
more (Al-Rasheed 2002, 156–57; Matthiesen 2009). On the other hand, the Iranian 
regime was also intent on promoting its revolutionary politics amongst Shiʿa across the 
region, including the sizeable Shiʿi populaƟon in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province (Al-
                                                        
129  The rough figure in US dollars given here for comparison is calculated using 
http://fxtop.com/en/historical-exchange-rates.php. 
130 The enrolment figures cited in this paragraph are based on data given in an authorised 
history of the IUM (al-Ghamidi 1998, 295, 305, 317, 329, 341). Sarah Yizraeli (2012, 248), citing 
state documents, suggests that there were 3,271 students at the IUM in 1982 and 3,395 in 
1983; numbers which may well include students enrolled in the university’s pre-undergraduate 
level institutes. In comparison, she suggests that in 1983 there were 20,061 students at King 
Saʿud University, 20,546 at King ʿAbd al-ʿAziz University, 8,757 at the Imam Muhammad Ibn 
Saʿud Islamic University and 7,721 at Umm al-Qura University. 
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Rasheed 2002, 156–57). The revolutionary politics emanating from Tehran represented 
one dynamic feeding into a major uprising by Shiʿa of the Eastern Province in 1979, 
even if these events at root had much more to do with entrenched grievances 
stemming from socioeconomic inequities, cultural discrimination and political 
repression. Neither the Saudi authorities’ initial response of brutal military suppression 
nor their subsequent promises of reforms were enough to put down the unrest, which 
continued with riots in 1980 and the mobilisation of the dissident Organisation of the 
Islamic Revolution (Al-Rasheed 2002, 146–47; Jones 2010, 179–216). 
A distinct challenge arose with the occupation of the Masjid Haram in Mecca in 1979 
by a militant Salafi group led by Juhayman al-ʿUtaybi, who charged the Al Saʿud with 
corruption and impiety. Juhayman himself had in fact previously attended classes at 
the IUM-affiliated Dar al-Hadith. Furthermore, prior to embarking on a militant 
trajectory, he had started his activist career in a proselytising and vigilante movement 
known as the Jamaʿa Salafiyya Muhtasiba (Salafi Group that Commands Right and 
Forbids Wrong), which had ties to major IUM scholars including Ibn Baz and the 
Algeria-born Abu Bakr al-Jazaʾiri (Hegghammer and Lacroix 2007). In the wake of the 
Haram mosque siege, the IUM journal ran a number of articles on the events, including 
one by Ibn Baz himself condemning the actions and ideology of Juhayman and his 
comrades (Ibn Baz n.d.). Nonetheless, the IUM was viewed in some quarters as a part 
of the problem, its very project of drawing in foreigners for missionary purposes seen 
as being inherently bound up with the potential for religious and political 
corruption.131 Such views notwithstanding, the peak in IUM budgets at this time 
suggests that the university at least initially benefited from the regime’s broader 
strategy of seeking to bolster its alliances with key parts of its support base by upping 
financial backing for actors and institutions in the religious sphere. 
The IUM’s budget then dropped sharply over a period corresponding with the 
recession that hit Saudi Arabia from 1982 before broadly levelling out in the mid-1980s, 
around the same time that the most dramatic phase of the economic crisis came to an 
                                                        
131 One Riyadh-based imam quoted at the time in the newspaper al-Riyadh suggested that, “An 
atmosphere favourable to heresy existed [in Medina] because of the presence of large 
numbers of foreign students” (quoted in Buchan 1982, 123). 
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end. Following these same trends in national revenue, national public spending and 
IUM budgets, student numbers in the IUM’s five colleges dropped off to a little over 
2,000 in the depths of the recession in 1406/1407 H. (circa. 1986) before creeping up 
again to some 3,500 by the late 1990s. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 4, in the first decades of its existence the IUM – like the 
Saudi higher education system more broadly – had come to host non-Saudi staff from 
a whole range of geographical, social, cultural and political backgrounds. Amongst 
them were members and sympathisers of the Muslim Brothers and other politically 
engaged groups who seem clearly to have played a certain role in the rise of a wave of 
Islamist activism within Saudi Arabia’s own borders that became known as the Sahwa, 
or “The Awakening”.132 In the early 1990s, in the wake of dissent over matters such as 
the appeal to US troops to defend the kingdom during the Gulf War, and following the 
issuing of political demands by Sahwi activists in the form of petitions, the Saudi 
regime increasingly came to see the movement as a threat. In this context, the IUM 
was caught up in a drive by state actors to take a tighter grip on the country’s higher 
education system. This included the introduction in 1993 of new legislation regulating 
the internal affairs of all universities across the kingdom, which replaced the IUM’s 
existing statutes left over from 1975 and strengthened such provisions as had already 
existed for official oversight.133 Under the new regulations, it remained the case that 
university heads were to be appointed by royal decree. 134  Furthermore, each 
university was now to be overseen by a council headed by the minister of higher 
education himself, and including several other officials or official appointees, which 
would be responsible for such crucial tasks as setting syllabuses and deciding on 
appointments of teaching staff.135 Deans of individual colleges within universities were 
now required to be Saudi and were to be put in post by the minister of higher 
education; whereas such appointments at the IUM had previously been dealt with 
                                                        
132 The debate between scholars like Madawi Al-Rasheed and Stéphane Lacroix concerning the 
importance of this role is discussed in the introduction to this thesis. 
133 “Nizam Majlis al-Taʿlim al-ʿAli wa-l-Jamiʿat” 1993. For an earlier discussion of these moves, 
see Lacroix 2011, 207. 
134 Article 23. 
135 Articles 19 and 20. 
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internally.136 A body made up of figures from around the world who would lend their 
advice and prestige to the IUM – like the earlier Advisory Council and Supreme Council 
– was no longer in evidence. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, steps were also taken to 
replace figures at the IUM seen as sympathetic to politically activist modes of 
religiosity with supporters of an exclusivist, politically quietist Salafi tradition whose 
figureheads included the IUM scholars Muhammad Aman al-Jami and Rabiʿ ibn Hadi al-
Madkhali, and the university was already well into the process of being purged of non-
Saudi staff. 
As of February 2011, the IUM was reported to have 13,000 students from 160 
countries (al-Dhibyani 2011). At the time of writing, preparations are underway for the 
launch of new colleges specialising in computer studies, medicine, applied sciences, 
engineering and pharmacy. The university is said to have received approval to accept 
female students for the first time, to be planning to implement distance learning 
programmes amid efforts to expand student numbers, and even to be preparing to 
employ non-Muslim staff at new sites outside the Medina ḥaram boundary (al-Salih 
2010; al-Dhibyani 2011). The IUM has also recently hosted conferences on topics such 
as “extremism” and “the combating of terrorism”.137 The latter development must 
surely be understood not only in connection with the wave of religiously-framed 
militancy that hit Saudi Arabia from 2003 but also the kingdom’s strategically 
important alliance with the United States and its role in the production of a “reformed 
Islam” in the context of the US-led War on Terror (Ismail 2008). 
All of these moves have occurred against the backdrop of what has been hailed in 
some sections of the Saudi press as an “opening up” (infitāḥ) in recent years of an 
institution that had previously been seen as an enclave of exclusivism (al-Ansari 2010; 
e.g. al-ʿAskar 2011). This has involved the creation of space for a wider range of 
viewpoints than had been found within the university at the height of its domination 
by the strongly exclusivist, quietist currents associated with al-Jami and al-Madkhali. 
This wider range of viewpoints includes the reappearance of a certain amount of room 
                                                        
136 Article 36. Cf. Article 32 of the 1975 statutes. 
137 “Muʾtamar al-Irhab Bayna Tatarruf al-Fikr Wa Fikr al-Tatarruf” 2013; “al-Muʾtamar al-Duwali 
al-Thani li-Mukafahat al-Irhab” 2013. 
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for voices associated with more activist modes of Islamism. This development is to be 
understood in connection with the release of activist figureheads like Salman al-ʿAwda 
and Safar al-Hawali from prison in 1999 and the regime’s subsequent cooption of the 
Sahwa, as allies and mediators in its growing confrontation with domestic Islamist 
militants (Al-Rasheed 2007, 81–95). 
This purported “opening up” of the university has not been without controversy. 
Former IUM head ʿAbd al-Muhsin al-ʿAbbad for one has spoken out very strongly 
against what he views as the disastrous corrosion of what had been a venerable 
institution. He has argued inter alia that the founding of colleges teaching “worldly” 
subjects will dilute the university’s religious specialisation and will detract from its 
pursuit of the goals for which it was founded. He has derided what has been depicted 
elsewhere as a new lease of life for the university as in fact representing "a period of 
old age and senility" (al-ʿAbbad 2011). 
Conclusion 
This review of the institutional history of the IUM underscores the extent to which it 
was, from the time of its founding, deeply imbricated in a politics that was distinctly 
Saudi, in both the dynastic and the national senses of the term. It was established and 
maintained using Saudi state resources, by state actors who were devoted to shoring 
up the political legitimacy of the Riyadh regime and their own places within it. The 
founding of this new missionary project served their interests in relation to a range of 
concerns, including: the geopolitical manoeuvring of the Cold War and the rivalry with 
Nasser’s Egypt; the maintenance of patronage relations with the politically important 
Wahhabi establishment; and the promulgation of narratives of dynastic and national 
legitimacy for broader domestic audiences. Moreover, the university continued to 
evolve over the subsequent decades in ways that clearly map onto the shifting 
fortunes and interests of the Saudi monarchy. 
Saudi state actors enjoyed a certain position of strength in relation to others involved 
in the IUM project by virtue of their access to and control over the material capital 
necessary for its very functioning. This status was consolidated insofar as the 
bureaucratised, rationalised modes of education which had emerged in the Saudi 
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context in previous decades facilitated efforts to stipulate, monitor and otherwise 
exert influence over the processes by which their material investment would be put to 
work and distributed within the university’s ambit. Certainly there were limits on the 
extent of direct state involvement; but to a certain degree, this came down to state 
actors choosing to grant autonomy to the university and to those who operated within 
its confines. As the 1993 reordering of the Saudi higher education system showed, 
state actors could tighten their grip on institutions like the IUM when it suited them to 
do so. 
Yet while funding made available by state actors played a crucial role in the project of 
religious expansion institutionalised in the IUM from the early 1960s, a series of 
further transactions would be required in order for this material wealth to translate 
into cross-border dynamics of religious transformation. The remainder of this thesis 
explores how these resources were put to work in the accumulation of new reserves of 
spiritual capital, the injection of which into globe-spanning religious economies would 
contribute to the construction of new relations of religious authority within and across 
national borders in far-flung locations. In the process, the IUM’s missionary project 
came to draw on a far broader range of resources than material wealth alone, and its 
impact came to be mediated by the agency of a far more diverse array of actors than 
just Saudi political and religious elites. 
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Chapter 4 
Migration and the Legitimation of the Islamic University 
In 1960 Abul Aʿla Mawdudi, the head of the South Asian Islamist movement the 
Jamaat-i Islami, had arrived in Saudi Arabia carrying with him proposed plans, 
apparently drawn up at the request of King Saʿud, for the institution that would open 
its doors the following year as the Islamic University of Medina (IUM). His travelling 
companions included Khalil Ahmad al-Hamidi, a long-standing member of the Jamaat 
and its point man for relations with Islamic movements in the Arabic-speaking and 
wider Islamic world. Saʿud convened a committee to discuss the proposals which, 
besides Mawdudi himself, included: Muhammad ibn Ibrahim, the Saudi Grand Mufti 
and future IUM president; the Medina-born Muhammad ʿAli al-Harakan, who at one 
stage was seemingly considered to run the new university and who would later go on 
to become Saudi justice minister and head of the Muslim World League; the Indian 
scholar Abul Hasan ʿAli Nadwi of the reformist Nadwat al-ʿUlamaʾ movement, who 
would join the IUM’s founding Advisory Council; and one ʿAbd al-Latif ibn Ibrahim, who 
seems likely to have been the individual of this name – a brother of the Grand Mufti – 
who was charged with overseeing a new system of religious colleges and institutes 
founded by the Saudis in Riyadh and elsewhere since the early 1950s.138  The 
committee apparently approved Mawdudi’s proposals with only minor amendments. 
Having performed ʿumra, Mawdudi travelled on to Medina, where he visited the site at 
Wadi al-ʿAqiq that had already been earmarked as the locaƟon for the new missionary 
institution (al-ʿAqil 2008, 263).139 
While the IUM’s founding and its evolution over the decades that followed relied on 
material support made available by the Saudi state to which it was bureaucratically 
                                                        
138 On ʿAbd al-Latif ibn Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh, the brother of the Grand Mufti discussed here, see 
Al Bassam 1998/9, 3:553–54. It is also at least possible that this last attendee was in fact ʿAbd 
al-Latif ibn Ibrahim Al ʿAbd al-Latif, a scholar from Shaqraʾ who had studied under both 
Muhammad ibn Ibrahim and ʿAbd al-ʿAziz ibn Baz and who would teach hadith at the IUM, 
seemingly from the time that it opened its doors (Al Bassam 1998/9, 3:555–59). 
139 ʿAbd Allah al-ʿAqil, the Iraq-born Muslim Brother upon whose account of the meeting this 
paragraph is based, was acquainted with several of the participants and himself later joined 
the IUM Advisory Council. 
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subordinated, the meeting described here is emblematic of the ways in which its 
operation also depended on the cooptation of a diversity of actors hailing from far 
beyond the kingdom. Constructing a project intended to effect religious 
transformations in locations around the world required a much broader array of 
resources than money alone. An initiative of this kind called for staff with the know-
how to undertake the spiritual labour of tuition and pastoral care, and to administer 
what was to be a relatively large-scale, bureaucratised institution. It would benefit 
from actors who could mediate between the Wahhabi establishment, the IUM’s 
diverse student body, and the communities to whom it hoped to project its message. 
Equally importantly, it required that this missionary university be endowed with the 
institutional capacity to issue judgements on religious beliefs and practices which 
would be considered authoritative by a student body made up of young men from 
divergent backgrounds. It also called for the capacity to issue qualifications and bestow 
other symbolic resources upon students which would hold weight in a wide range of 
social contexts across the globe, such that its graduates might themselves come to be 
seen in those contexts as authoritative arbiters in matters of religious truth and moral 
virtue. In short, what was required was that the IUM be endowed with reserves of 
institutionalised spiritual capital in forms that would be recognised as legitimate and 
valuable by a very diverse range of actors outside Saudi Arabia. 
In this chapter, I explore how this search for the skilled labour and spiritual capital 
necessary to run and legitimate a project like the IUM led Saudi state actors and their 
allies in the Wahhabi establishment to hire staff from far beyond the kingdom. I begin 
by outlining the large-scale involvement of non-Saudi staff at the university from the 
time of its founding and for many decades afterwards. I then develop a more detailed 
account of the different kinds of cross-border pathways that brought these religious 
migrants to Medina, dividing them loosely into sojourners, immigrants and itinerants. I 
go on to explore some of the overlapping continent-spanning circuits and social fields 
which helped define the contexts within which their journeys took place. I argue that 
those in charge of the IUM drew upon these transnational formations as a pool of 
resources to bolster a missionary project which was itself, as I have suggested, in many 
ways a distinctly Saudi national endeavour. The involvement of migrants bearing 
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spiritual capital accumulated in established religious educational institutions around 
the world stood to lend the IUM a broader legitimacy than it could ever have derived 
solely from its association with a Wahhabi scholarly establishment which in the mid-
twentieth century remained relatively introspective and marginal on the global stage. 
Finally, I consider steps underway by the early 1990s to purge foreign actors from the 
IUM, which had by that time become quite self-sufficient in its operation. This shift 
occurred as the forms of spiritual capital which had been brought in part by migrant 
staff came to be institutionalised in the fabric of the university itself. 
Reaching Abroad 
At the time of the founding of the IUM in 1961, the Wahhabi scholarly establishment 
remained in some respects somewhat limited in capacity. Madawi Al-Rasheed has 
noted that the majority of religious experts within the Wahhabi tradition in Najd had 
historically been concerned largely with questions of jurisprudence and correct 
worship, at the expense of the many other disciplines which make up the Islamic canon. 
These actors, who “practised their expertise in conjunction with agriculture and trade” 
and were known as the muṭawwaʿa, are to be distinguished from the far smaller 
number of individuals with broader learning who merited the label ʿulamaʾ (Al-Rasheed 
2002, 49–50). Writing in the first half of the 1960s, Hafiz Wahba – the Egyptian whose 
employment by the Saudi state from the 1920s onwards was touched upon in Chapter 
2 – noted that: 
Very few of the Arabian Ulema have a complete knowledge of the Arabic language and 
its literature, of rhetoric, etymology, or elocution, and not one of them knows Moslem 
history properly. Historical knowledge is limited to the Life of the Prophet, and the 
Caliphs to the end of the Abbasides Dynasty, and, in ancient history, to Tabari and Ibn 
Alathir. News of the recent discoveries which have contributed so much to our 
knowledge of ancient times has not yet penetrated to Arabia. Since the deaths of Sheikh 
Abdulla Ibn Abdul Latif and Sheikh Said Ibn Atik, Nejd has had almost no Alam who is 
really thoroughly versed either in the Haddith or in Moslem Jurisprudence. With the 
death of Hamad Ibn Faris, Nejd lost a great authority on the Arabic language (Wahbah 
1964, 62)140 
                                                        
140 For biographies of ʿAbd Allah ibn ʿAbd al-Latif (d. 1920) and Hamad ibn Faris (d. 1927), see 
ʿAbd al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh 1974/5, 129–41, 288–89. The scholar referred to as Said Ibn Atik 
is presumably in fact the famous Saʿd ibn ʿAƟq (d. 1930) (ʿAbd al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh 1974/5, 
323–28). 
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By this time, the new Saudi state-run education system, the emergence of which in the 
1920s Hijaz was discussed in Chapter 2, was being rolled out to Najd and other parts of 
the country. This led to the supplementation of Wahhabi study circles offered by 
individual scholars in Najd with growing opportunities for instruction in new-style 
religious educational institutions. These were overseen by ʿAbd al-Latif ibn Ibrahim Al 
al-Shaykh, the brother of Muhammad ibn Ibrahim who seems likely to have been in 
attendance at the meeting with Mawdudi discussed at the start of this chapter. They 
included an expanding network of Scholastic Institutes, the first of which outside of the 
Hijaz was founded in Riyadh in the early 1950s (Shalabi 1987, 198–99). They also came 
to include Colleges of Shariʿa and Arabic Language, founded in Riyadh in 1953 and 
1954 respectively, which were intended to offer further training to graduates of the 
Scholastic Institutes (Abir 1986, 231; Al Bassam 1998/9, 3:553–54). Nonetheless, while 
this system would eventually begin to produce new generations of religious experts, it 
remained in its infancy when the IUM first opened. 
It was also the case that the Wahhabi scholarly establishment at this time remained 
relatively inward-looking and marginal with respect to the rest of the Islamic world. 
Although there had always been internal debate concerning how to deal with non-
Muslims and non-Wahhabi Muslims, Wahhabism had on the whole been characterised 
by a unusually harsh attitudes on such matters (Al-Fahad 2004; Wagemakers 2012b). 
Conversely, earlier attempts to spread Wahhabi thinking and practices beyond Najd, 
including the dispatch of letters to “ʿulamaʾ and poliƟcal leaders” in Iraq, Syria, North 
Africa and Persia from the eighteenth century onwards, had routinely been met with 
derision (Redissi 2008, 157–72). The international reputation of Wahhabism began to 
improve somewhat by the 1930s, as the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance won the support of 
high profile figures like Rashid Rida (Redissi 2008, 172–77). Around the same time, the 
1929 suppression by ʿAbd al-ʿAziz of the exclusivist Ikhwan miliƟas which had 
previously served his cause consolidated the standing of those sections of the Wahhabi 
establishment which displayed relatively pragmatic attitudes in regard to dealings with 
non-Wahhabi Muslims (Lacroix 2011, 13). Backed by material resources made available 
by the Saudi state, projects like the IUM now allowed this Wahhabi establishment to 
engage with Muslim communities around the world from a new position of strength. 
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Nonetheless, such proactive engagement remained a relatively novel development in 
the early 1960s. The founding of the new university came just a few years after 
Muhammad ibn Ibrahim had first chaired a formal meeting between senior Wahhabi 
scholars and non-Wahhabi religious dignitaries from beyond the Peninsula in 1954 
(Lacroix 2011, 14). 
The missionary project that was to be institutionalised in the IUM thus faced clear 
challenges: on the one hand, a lack of skilled personnel and, on the other, the 
likelihood of difficulties securing recognition from many of the audiences upon whom 
it was expected to exert influence. In this chapter, I argue that these problems were 
addressed through the cooptation of staff from far beyond Saudi Arabia. These 
migrants would bring the knowledge and skills seen as necessary to operate the kind of 
relatively large-scale, self-consciously “modern” institution that the IUM was to 
become. They could also connect the university to communities around the world and 
play a mediating role between the Wahhabi establishment and non-Wahhabi students, 
with their own diverse backgrounds lending credence to its claims to speak on behalf 
of a universal Islam rather than a particularistic sub-tradition. Finally, these migrants 
brought spiritual capital in forms which would be recognised in Muslim communities 
across the Islamic world. Their presence could thus lend crucial legitimacy to a 
missionary institution which was intended to address the entire umma but which 
might otherwise have been exceedingly vulnerable to charges of exclusivist 
parochialism. 
For decades after the IUM’s founding, non-Saudis from divergent geographical, 
religious, social and political backgrounds were numerically dominant both amongst its 
teaching staff and also on its senior Advisory Council. The Advisory Council functioned 
broadly like a board of directors. According to its founding document, Council 
members were to be selected to achieve geographical breadth and a range of 
expertise, and they were to meet regularly to discuss the university’s structure and 
functioning. 141  Their recommendations were to be communicated to the IUM’s 
supreme president, originally King Saʿud, who would then forward them to the 
                                                        
141 “Nizam al-Majlis al-Istishari al-Aʿla”. Reproduced in al-Ghamidi 1998, 147–48. 
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institution’s working president.142 Issues discussed by the Council included syllabuses, 
amendments to the university’s statutes, and the establishment of new colleges (al-
Ghamidi 1998, 149–58). 
The first Advisory Council included just two Saudis, the de facto head of the IUM and 
future Grand Mufti ʿAbd al-ʿAziz ibn Baz; and ʿAbd al-Muhsin al-ʿAbbad, who had 
taught at the IUM since it opened and would also later take charge there. Alongside 
these two Saudis sat three prominent scholars and activists from South Asia: Mawdudi 
and Nadwi, who attended the meeting described at the start of this chapter, and also 
Muhammad Dawud al-Ghaznawi of the Ahl-i Hadith Salafi movement in Pakistan. Two 
Egyptians on the first council were ʿAbd al-Razzaq ʿAﬁﬁ, who had just given up his post 
as president of the Salafi movement Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya to settle in 
Saudi Arabia, where he had taught in the past; and Hasanayn Muhammad Makhluf, a 
prominent Azhari and former Grand Mufti of Egypt. The body also included three 
Syrians: Muhammad al-Mubarak, a co-founder of the Syrian Society of Muslim 
Brothers; the scholar ʿAli al-Tantawi, who would shortly afterwards settle in Saudi 
Arabia; and Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar, the reformist scholar whose role in the Saudi 
Scholastic Institute in 1920s Mecca was discussed in Chapter 2. Two Iraqis on the 
council were Muhammad Mahmud al-Sawwaf, a senior Muslim Brother who relocated 
to Saudi Arabia around this time; and Muhammad Bahjat al-Athari, a student of the 
prominent turn-of-the-century Iraqi Salafi scholar Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi. The 
remaining members were the Indonesian modernist educational reformer Mahmud 
Yunis; the Salafi scholar Muhammad Salim al-Bayhani from Aden; Muhammad al-Amin 
al-Shinqiti, a Mauritanian scholar who had been living in Saudi Arabia for some time 
and was teaching at the IUM; Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, a hadith specialist 
born in Albania who was also teaching at the IUM; and the Jordanian ʿAbd Allah al-
Qalqili and Tunisian Muhammad al-Tahir ibn ʿAshur, each of whom would at some 
point in his career serve as Grand Mufti of his country of origin.143 Through this diverse 
                                                        
142 Article 3. Initially, members were to be appointed by the Saudi government, with the 
Council then free to review its own make-up (Article 5). However, amended statutes passed in 
1966 and 1975 gave the king ongoing control over appointments. 
143 Founding members of the Advisory Council are listed in “Dalil al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya” 1971, 
31–32; al-Ghamidi 1998, 149–50. It is worth noting that Muhammad al-Tahir ibn ʿAshur and 
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collective of individuals, the IUM could lay claim to the backing and input of “the 
leaders of Islamic thought and scholars of religion in the main Islamic countries”.144 
In practice, the Advisory Council’s membership overlapped with teaching staff and – as 
will be touched upon later in this chapter – there is at least circumstantial evidence 
that the setup of the Council also contributed to shaping broader patterns of staffing, 
through use of these scholars’ existing networks. Since the language of instruction at 
the IUM was Arabic, non-Saudi teaching faculty were hired mainly from the wider 
Middle East and North Africa. According to an authorised history of the IUM, at the 
time of its founding the faculty was made up of twelve Saudis and seven non-Saudis 
(al-Ghamidi 1998, 274). However, these figures almost certainly obscure the 
involvement of scholars from outside the kingdom who had settled there and had 
taken Saudi citizenship. By 1971, faculty lists described just eight of the 33 faculty 
members as Saudi. Of the remainder, 15 were Egyptian nationals and others were 
listed as Jordanian, Syrian, Moroccan and Pakistani.145 In this case, enough information 
is available to confirm that, even out of the staff members listed as Saudi at this point, 
more than half had in fact acquired citizenship after relocating from their home 
countries.146 These non-Saudis brought with them a range of qualifications, which 
were publicly displayed in university promotional literature. Many held the shahāda 
ʿālamiyya, equivalent to a master’s degree, while others had undergraduate and 
master’s degrees or doctorates from their countries of origin or elsewhere. Their 
qualifications covered subject areas including jurisprudence, Qurʾanic studies, hadith 
studies, grammar, literature and pedagogy. 
In the early 1980s, non-Saudis still outnumbered Saudis amongst IUM staff. In lists 
from that period, only 149 of 376 staff members were identified as Saudi; and it is 
clear from the available information that this category included scholars born outside 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Mahmud Yunus are named in al-Ghamidi 1998 as Muhammad al-Fadil ibn ʿAshur and 
Muhammad Yunus. This appears to be an error. I am grateful to Jeff Hadler for sharing his 
expertise on the professional biography of Mahmud Yunus. 
144 “Nizam al-Majlis al-Istishari al-Aʿla,” Article 1. 
145 “Dalil al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya” 1971, 45–46, 71–72. 
146 They included the Mauritania-born Muhammad al-Amin al-Shinqiti, the Algeria-born Abu 
Bakr Jabir al-Jazaʾiri, the Mali-born Hammad al-Ansari, the Egypt-born ʿAbd al-Qadir Shaybat al-
Hamd, and the Pakistani ʿAbd al-Karim Murad. 
 143 
the kingdom who had since settled there and taken citizenship. Those listed as non-
Saudi were made up of 137 Egyptians, forty-eight Sudanese, eighteen Syrians, eight 
Jordanians, four Iraqis, four Indians, two Pakistanis, two Moroccans and one person 
from each of Palestine, South Yemen, Mauritania and even Australia. The vast majority 
of staff at this stage bore university qualifications ranging from bachelors degrees to 
doctorates. As will be discussed later in this chapter, an especially large proportion of 
foreign staff were graduates of al-Azhar. Significant numbers also came from ʿAyn 
Shams University, Alexandria University and Cairo University in Egypt; and Khartoum 
University and the Islamic University of Umm Durman in Sudan. Others held 
qualifications from the University of Damascus, the University of Baghdad, King 
Muhammad V University in Morocco, the Libyan University, the University of the 
Punjab in Pakistan, the University of London, and the University of Edinburgh.147 
While the IUM was always headed by Saudi scholars, it is nonetheless the case that 
many of these non-Saudis and naturalised citizens held prominent positions within the 
university framework. The Syrian Muslim Brother Muhammad al-Majdhub spent 15 
years as a member of the editorial board of the university journal, a publication that 
included contributions from countless non-Saudi staff and which bore the stamp of 
foreign social movements whose members were involved in the IUM project.148 
Foreign members of the university’s teaching staff and Advisory Council would later 
claim to have exercised influence over its syllabuses and, as will be discussed in 
Chapter 6, reading lists in use in the early 1990s display evidence of their impact.149 As 
well as being numerically dominant on the university’s Advisory Council and amongst 
teaching staff, non-Saudis and naturalised citizens were represented on the University 
Council, a separate body which had more direct oversight of operational matters. They 
also sat on the councils which advised on the operation of he university’s constituent 
colleges and served as heads of departments within the colleges. 
                                                        
147 “Dalil Aʿdaʾ Hayʾat al-Tadris wa-l-Muhadirin wa-l-Muʿidin” 1981/2. 
148 Just two examples include an article in the first issue of the journal by the recently executed 
Sayyid Qutb (Qutb 1968) and later a laudatory obituary of Mawdudi (al-Ziʾbaq n.d.). On al-
Majdhub’s role on the journal, see al-Majdhub 1992, 3:355. 
149 For example, such claims were made by Council member Muhammad al-Mubarak and 
faculty members ʿAbd al-Ghaffar Hasan and Muhammad al-Majdhub (al-Majdhub 1992, 1:250, 
2:331, 3:355; U. Hasan 2009). 
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Flows: Sojourners, Immigrants and Itinerants 
Most of the remainder of this chapter is devoted to considering how these migrants 
arrived in Medina and the ways in which their presence benefited the IUM’s 
missionary project, followed by a brief discussion of steps that would eventually be 
taken to purge them from the system. I begin here by exploring the diverse array of 
journeys that made up the migratory circuits which contributed to sustaining – and 
which were in turn shaped and sustained by – the emergence of this missionary 
initiative. These journeys included brief sojourns, as well as instances of permanent 
immigration and more convoluted itinerant pathways. In what follows, these issues are 
considered with reference to the biographies of some especially prominent staff 
members who hailed from outside Saudi Arabia. 
A proportion of those from beyond the kingdom who became involved in the 
university stayed for a limited period before returning to their countries of origin. For 
some sojourners, including Advisory Council members who had no other long-term 
business in Saudi Arabia, visits to Medina might simply have been long enough to 
attend a meeting. For others, the stay could be very lengthy indeed. The leading Ahl-i 
Hadith scholar ʿAbd al-Ghaffar Hasan recalled that after being hired by an IUM 
delegation which had travelled to his home in Pakistan probably in 1963 or 1964, he 
had hoped to spend the rest of his life in Medina. In the event, he taught hadith 
studies there for 16 years before returning to Pakistan and taking up a position as an 
Ahl-i Hadith representative on the official Islamic Ideological Council charged with 
advising the government on matters of shariʿa (U. Hasan 2009). Similarly, Muhammad 
al-Majdhub, who been a teacher, an active Muslim Brother and something of a 
litterateur in his home country of Syria prior to arriving in Medina around 1963, spent 
two decades teaching at the IUM. He only finally returned to Syria in 1996, where he 
settled down to an isolated life of writing in Latakiyya until his death in 1999 (al-
Majdhub 1992, 3:345–57; al-ʿAqil 2008, 1014–26). Particularly as the university 
expanded and its teaching body grew, it is likely that a great many staff fell into the 
sojourners category, often delegated temporarily from institutions like al-Azhar in 
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Egypt.150 These circuits of sojourners were facilitated in part by deputations of IUM 
staff who travelled abroad – including to Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Pakistan – 
with a view to contracting new employees.151 
Other migrants who became involved at the IUM had either already settled 
permanently in Saudi Arabia or would do so following their arrival at the university. 
They remained for the duration of their lives, frequently becoming naturalised citizens 
and otherwise integrating into the new social, cultural and religious milieu in which 
they found themselves. Such immigrants included the aforementioned Muhammad al-
Amin al-Shinqiti, who had made the epic overland journey to the Hijaz from his home 
in Mauritania to perform the hajj in the 1947 or 1948. We are told by his colleague and 
biographer al-Majdhub that as a student prior to arriving in Saudi Arabia, al-Shinqiti 
had held reservations about the Wahhabi tradition. However, after meeting Saudi 
scholars in the Haramayn, reading major works of the Hanbali law school for the first 
time, and encountering the writings of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim, he apparently 
underwent a religious transformation, putting his Maliki upbringing behind him and 
dedicating himself to re-studying hadith collections in light of his new understanding of 
their status as a key source of fiqh derivation. Al-Shinqiti was subsequently granted 
Saudi citizenship and taught in the Masjid Nabawi, as well as in the new Scholastic 
Institute and religious colleges opened in Riyadh in the 1950s, before being invited to 
join the IUM at the time of its opening. He was later appointed to Saudi Arabia’s 
Council of Senior ʿUlamaʾ (ʿAƟyya Muhammad Salim n.d.; ʿAbd al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh 
1974/5, 517–20; al-Majdhub 1992, 3:179–91; al-Qarʿani 2009, 133–53). Another 
prominent immigrant was Abu Bakr Jabir al-Jazaʾiri, who taught at the university from 
its opening. Al-Jazaʾiri had similarly arrived in the Hijaz as a pilgrim nearly a decade 
earlier from Algeria and had spent the intervening period studying and teaching in a 
number of the kingdom’s institutions (al-Majdhub 1992, 3:27–39; al-Qarʿani 2009, 
353–60). A final example is ʿAbd al-Fattah al-Qariʾ, who was born in Kokand, in the 
Fergana Valley in what is now Uzbekistan, around 1911 but had relocated to the Hijaz 
                                                        
150 Interviews with Egyptians who had taught at the IUM and in other Saudi Islamic universities, 
Cairo, April, May and October 2011. 
151 “Akhbar al-Jamiʿa” 1969a; “Akhbar al-Jamiʿa” 1972. 
 146 
as a young man.152 He studied and taught at the Madrasa Sawlatiyya in Mecca, 
mentioned in Chapter 1, before taking up posts at various other schools including the 
Scholastic Institute in Riyadh. He was transferred to teach Qurʾan and Qurʾanic 
recitation (tajwīd) at the IUM from the time of its establishment (al-Qariʾ 2008). 
These immigrants put down family roots in Saudi Arabia. In several cases, their 
integration and that of their families in the Saudi milieu was reflected in the 
appointment of their sons to teaching posts at the IUM. ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Qariʾ, a son of 
ʿAbd al-Fattah al-Qariʾ, studied at the IUM and went on to become a senior and 
longstanding member of its staff, including serving as dean of its College of the Qurʾan 
(al-Qariʾ 2013). Two sons of Muhammad al-Amin al-Shinqiti – the uṣūl al-fiqh scholar 
Muhammad al-Mukhtar and the tafsīr specialist ʿAbd Allah – would also become 
prominent figures at the university. Other examples include ʿAbd al-Bariʾ al-Ansari, 
who teaches in the College of Hadith and is the son of the Mali-born Hammad al-Ansari 
mentioned elsewhere in this chapter; and a son of Abu Bakr al-Jazaʾiri.153 
For a final category of migrants, a stint in Medina represented just one stage on far 
longer and more convoluted cross-border pathways. Such itinerants included the 
Moroccan reformist scholar Taqi al-Din al-Hilali, whose earlier stay in the Hijaz in the 
1920s was discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. Al-Hilali was invited back to Saudi 
Arabia by Ibn Baz to join the IUM faculty in 1968. By this time in his life, he had also 
spent periods studying and teaching in Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, India and 
Germany. During these peregrinations, he had made contact with Rashid Rida in Cairo, 
taught Arabic literature and studied English at the Dar al-ʿUlum college run by the 
Nadwat al-ʿUlamaʾ in Lucknow, earned a doctorate from the University of Berlin during 
the Nazi era and been arrested by the Spanish colonial authorities in northern 
Morocco over his work as a correspondent for the newspaper published by the 
Egyptian Muslim Brothers (al-ʿAqil 2008, 811–22; Lauzière 2008). Perhaps the best-
known example of such itinerant trajectories is that of Nasir al-Din al-Albani, the 
Albania-born hadith scholar who moved to Syria with his family at a young age and, 
                                                        
152 He was born in 1329 H., which would probably correspond with 1911. 
153  Interview with IUM graduate A, London, 2 December 2011, and subsequent email 
correspondence. 
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having come under pressure there, later joined the faculty and Advisory Council of the 
newly-opened IUM. While his thinking would have a major impact at the university, his 
distinctive religious outlook – which included a strident emphasis on independent legal 
reasoning and rejection of adherence to the established schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence, in tension with the de facto faithfulness to the Hanbali madhhab which 
had long characterised the Wahhabi tradition – proved controversial in Saudi Arabia.154 
The resulting friction led to his departure from the university and from the kingdom in 
1963. His trajectory thereafter included stays in Syria, where he was jailed twice, a 
second period serving on the IUM’s advisory board in the mid-1970s, and relocation to 
Jordan at the end of that decade (Lacroix 2009, 63–67). Rather than necessarily 
standing for a kind of rootless mobility that flouted national borders and the 
sovereignty of national states, such roaming trajectories were sometimes in fact 
facilitated precisely by migrants’ involvement in multiple national state projects. Prior 
to taking up a teaching post at the IUM in 1976, for example, the Egyptian Azhari 
Muʿawwad ʿAwad Ibrahim had already been officially deputised by al-Azhar to teach in 
the Shariʿa College of Beirut, had worked in a girls’ school in Aqaba, and undertaken 
daʿwa tours through the West Bank. He had also held positions at the state-run College 
of Shariʿa in Riyadh and in the central oﬃces of the Saudi religious bureaucracy. He 
would later go on to head a Department of Preaching established by the Kuwaiti 
Ministry of Religious Endowments, a role that involved further travel beyond the Gulf 
state’s borders (al-Majdhub 1992, 3:269–77). 
Structures: Transnational Circuits and Social Fields 
As is clear even from these potted biographies, the IUM in its early days sat at the 
intersection of a diverse array of cross-border circulations. As I have suggested, a 
simple hub-and-spokes set-up, whereby staff were deputised from their countries of 
origin to teach in Medina for a fixed period before returning home, did exist. However, 
it represented only one part of a more complex picture which also involved immigrants 
making new lives for themselves in Saudi Arabia, as well as itinerants for whom 
Medina was just a way station on much longer journeys which took them back and 
                                                        
154 Wahhabi positions on jurisprudence, and their relevance in the IUM context, are discussed 
further in Chapter 6. 
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forth across the Islamic world. This section considers some of the overlapping 
transnational circuits and social fields – built around pilgrimage routes, scholarly 
networks, exile politics, social movements and the efforts of individual energetic 
entrepreneurs – which contributed to structuring and fostering the broader web of 
relationships within which the university was situated. These circuits and social fields 
often pre-dated the IUM and represented a valuable resource for those behind the 
university who were concerned with bolstering its credibility and networks. 
To some extent, pre-existing pilgrimage and educational circuits – the two frequently 
intertwined – led to actors from across the Islamic world effectively turning up 
independently on the Saudis’ doorstep. Mention has already been made of a number 
of prominent IUM scholars like the Algerian Abu Bakr al-Jazaʾiri and the Mauritanian 
Muhammad al-Amin al-Shinqiti, who arrived through such circuits. Another 
Mauritanian, Muhammad al-Mukhtar al-Shinqiti, who took up a teaching post at the 
IUM soon after it opened and continued to work there until the early 1980s, had 
similarly left his country of origin in his late teens, apparently travelling most of the 
5,000-kilometre journey on foot and arriving in 1939 to perform pilgrimage and study. 
Between arriving in the Hijaz and beginning work at the IUM, he had studied with 
scholars in Mecca and Medina, and had taught in the Masjid Nabawi, the private 
Madrasat al-Falah in Jidda, and at the Scholastic Institute in Riyadh (al-Majdhub 1992, 
3:251–60; al-Qarʿani 2009, 193–99). ʿUmar ibn Muhammad Fallata, who headed the 
IUM-affiliated Dar al-Hadith in Medina and served as secretary general of the IUM 
itself between 1978 and 1983, had himself been born as his parents were approaching 
Mecca at the end of a long migration from Nigeria in the 1920s. That journey in turn 
built on pilgrimage links to the Hijaz tracing back to his grandfather. He arrived in 
Medina as an infant with his parents and remained in Saudi Arabia until his death in 
1999 (al-Majdhub 1992, 3:151–64; al-Qarʿani 2009, 283–94). 
On a local level, the configuration of individuals who came together to staff the IUM 
was shaped in part by educational networks in Najd and the Hijaz which overlapped 
with these transnational pilgrimage and scholarly circuits. Numerous members of the 
IUM faculty in the early days had already studied under or taught alongside 
Muhammad ibn Ibrahim or Ibn Baz or both, at earlier stages in their careers. Students 
 149 
or colleagues of these Wahhabi figureheads who worked at the IUM from around the 
time of its inception included Saudis, like the hadith scholar ʿAbd al-Latif ibn Ibrahim Al 
ʿAbd al-Latif and the future university head ʿAbd al-Muhsin al-ʿAbbad. However, they 
also included non-Saudi migrants, like the Egyptian ʿAƟyya Muhammad Salim and the 
Mauritanian Muhammad al-Mukhtar al-Shinqiti. The new institutions overseen by the 
Wahhabi establishment in Riyadh from the early 1950s, like the Scholastic Institute and 
Colleges of Shariʿa and Arabic, appear to have been particularly important focal points 
for the forging of such connections. Their students and staff included not only Saudis 
but also foreigners like the aforementioned Muhammad al-Amin al-Shinqiti and Abu 
Bakr al-Jazaʾiri, as well as an EgypƟan named ʿAbd al-Qadir Shaybat al-Hamd, the 
Malian Hammad al-Ansari and the Ethiopian Muhammad Aman al-Jami, all of whom 
were later hired by the IUM. 
Nonetheless, the educational circuits upon which the IUM drew were not limited to 
those which intersected directly with the Arabian peninsula. Al-Azhar and the patterns 
of migration which had long revolved around that institution – both within Egypt and 
from beyond its borders – were particularly important in this regard. Staff lists from 
the beginning of the 1980s show that at least forty out of the 131 teaching staff at the 
IUM’s College of Shariʿa at that stage were graduates of al-Azhar. They included 27 
Egyptians but also individuals from Jordan, Sudan, Syria and Saudi Arabia itself. 
Although the deans of the university’s five colleges at that time were all Saudi citizens, 
at least three of them were also al-Azhar graduates.155 The existence of links between 
Wahhabi scholarly circles and al-Azhar was not unprecedented. Scholars descended 
from Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab who were exiled to Egypt following the invasion of Najd by 
Muhammad ʿAli’s forces in the nineteenth century had spent time at al-Azhar. One of 
them, ʿAbd al-Rahman ibn Hasan Al al-Shaykh, had risen to the top of the Wahhabi 
establishment upon his return to Najd in 1825 at least partly off the back of his studies 
there (Commins 2005, 42, 45). Some of those sent by the Saudi regime to undertake 
their education in Egypt from the 1920s onwards had also enrolled at al-Azhar (Shalabi 
1987, 212–18). Significant numbers of staff at the IUM in the early 1980s had been 
trained at the Islamic University of Umm Durman in Sudan, an institution which itself 
                                                        
155 “Dalil Aʿdaʾ Hayʾat al-Tadris wa-l-Muhadirin wa-l-Muʿidin” 1981/2. 
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had strong historical ties both to al-Azhar and also to Cairo’s Dar al-ʿUlum (Reid 1990, 
198). 
In addition to pre-existing educational and pilgrimage circuits, exile politics also played 
a part in shaping the emergent IUM faculty. The role played in the Saudi education 
system by Muslim Brothers fleeing jail, torture and wider political pressures in their 
home countries is particularly well known. Since the earliest days following the 
founding of the Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt in 1928, key figures in the 
movement had held ambitions to use the Hijaz as a platform for outreach to the wider 
Muslim world and had maintained warm relations with the Saudi state (Tammam 2006, 
69–71). As was discussed in Chapter 2, Brotherhood founder Hasan al-Banna had 
himself apparently pursued an offer to work in the Mecca-based Saudi Scholastic 
Institute, though this plan never came to fruition. Crackdowns on Muslim Brothers in 
Egypt in 1954 and again in the mid-1960s, the release of many members of the 
organisation from jail under Anwar al-Sadat in 1971, and periods of concerted 
repression in Syria and Iraq from the late 1950s onwards contributed to driving large 
numbers of Muslim Brothers from across the region into employment in the Saudi 
education system and wider economy (Lacroix 2011, 38–42). 
The biographies of many of those who would take up roles at the IUM broadly fit this 
pattern. The Egyptian judge ʿAli Juraysha, for example, taught ﬁrst at the University of 
Riyadh and then at the IUM, having been imprisoned and tortured in his country of 
origin for his connections with the Brothers (al-Majdhub 1992, 1:155–70). As has 
already been mentioned, the IUM’s founding Advisory Council included the prominent 
Muslim Brothers al-Mubarak and al-Sawwaf, from Syria and Iraq respectively. The 
Council would later include the Sudanese Hasan al-Turabi, the Iraqis ʿAbd Allah al-ʿAqil 
and ʿAbd al-Karim Zaydan, and the Egyptians Muhammad al-Ghazali, Yusuf al-Qaradawi 
and Muhammad Qutb, all of whom were also in one way or another seen as being 
close to the movement. Some of these figures were employed at educational 
institutions elsewhere in the kingdom, and some settled permanently there. The 
leading Iraqi Muslim Brother al-Sawwaf, for example, had fled Iraq in the wake of the 
1958 coup there. Besides taking up a position on the IUM’s founding Advisory Council, 
he also taught at the College of Shariʿa in Mecca, became a founding member of the 
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Muslim World League, worked as an advisor to the Saudi education ministry, and 
undertook missions for King Faisal, including heading a delegation to Pakistan charged 
with reconciling Afghan factions (al-ʿAqil 2008, 1040–51). 
At the same time, it is worth noting that the role of exile politics in driving migration to 
the Hijaz and to the IUM did not start and end with the crackdowns on the Brothers. 
The prominent IUM scholar Hammad al-Ansari recalled that he was originally 
compelled to leave his home in Mali for the Hijaz as a result of increased pressure 
exercised by the French colonial authorities during the Second World War (al-Majdhub 
1992, 1:49–61). Similarly, IUM secretary general ʿUmar Fallata had himself been a 
devoted student of ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Ifriqi, a scholar from the French Soudan colony 
in West Africa who settled in the Hijaz, apparently after fleeing a run-in with the 
colonial authorities in his country of origin. Along with Mohamed Ali Ag Ataher, al-Ifriqi 
was viewed by the French as a key expatriate leader of anti-colonial contention 
(Brenner 2001, 96–102, 146–9). Al-Ifriqi succeeded the founder of the Medina Dar al-
Hadith, the Indian Ahmad al-Dihlawi, in running that institution prior to its absorption 
into the IUM. It was after al-Ifriqi died in 1957 that charge of the Medina Dar al-Hadith 
passed to ʿUmar Fallata. 
These cross-border circulations of pilgrims, exiles and scholars, involving patterns of 
migration driven by religious traditions, the ebb and flow of nation-state politics, and 
institutions like universities, schools and mosques, go some distance towards 
explaining how the IUM’s diverse Advisory Council and faculty came together. In other 
ways, however, the process of staffing the university tapped into and fostered more 
intensive and extensive sets of transnational social fields, involving sustained and 
multivalent cross-border relationships between social movements and individual 
activists spanning the Arabic-speaking world, South Asia and beyond, and often going 
back decades.156 
To some extent, this wider set of transnational social relations that helped to 
undergird the IUM traced back to networks that had grown up around the Cairo-based 
                                                        
156 Cf. Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick Schiller’s definition of a transnational social field, discussed 
in the introduction to this thesis. 
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Syrian reformist Muhammad Rashid Rida, who died over a quarter of a century before 
the university opened its doors. Certain individuals who would become involved at the 
IUM had originally been recommended to the Saudi political establishment by Rashid 
Rida back in the 1920s. They included Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar, who had run the 
Saudi Scholastic Institute in 1920s Mecca and later became a founding member of the 
IUM’s Advisory Council. They also included Taqi al-Din al-Hilali, the Moroccan scholar 
who had also taught at the Mecca Scholastic Institute and who would become a key 
link in networks connecting individuals, movements and institutions in Saudi Arabia, 
the wider Middle East and South Asia (Lauzière 2008, 137–38, 141–42; al-ʿAqil 2008, 
812). Other high-profile figures involved at the IUM in its earliest days had long been 
party to shared debates through transnational participation in and distribution of 
Rashid Rida’s journal al-Manar.157 
The networks that grew up around Rashid Rida were, however, just one small part of a 
much wider framework of globe-spanning relationships facilitated by new 
transportation and communications technologies, shared concerns and social 
movement structures. In addition to Muslim Brothers, discussed above, the IUM also 
involved figures associated with a range of other movements including the Egyptian 
Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya, and the South Asian Jamaat-i Islami and Ahl-i 
Hadith. In what follows, I unpick some of the relations that linked these movements to 
Saudi Arabia and to each other, both prior to the university’s founding and also in the 
course of its evolution and expansion. 
Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya, a Salafi daʿwa movement established in Egypt in 
1926, already had a long-standing relationship with the Saudi religious and political 
establishments by the time the IUM emerged. As was discussed in Chapter 2, the 
organisation’s founder Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqi, himself a student of Rashid Rida, 
had settled in the Hijaz in the 1920s and had forged a close relationship with the Saudi 
                                                        
157 Al-Majdhub recalls being inspired by al-Manar as a young man and says that it was in that 
journal that he had first heard of Muhammad ibn Ibrahim (al-Majdhub 1992, 2:253, 3:347). Al-
Manar also had an important influence on the young al-Albani (Lauzière 2008, 340; Lacroix 
2009, 63–65). Just some of those involved in the IUM whose work had been published in its 
pages included Taqi al-Din al-Hilali, Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar, Muhammad Amin al-Husayni 
and Muhammad Bahjat al-Athari (Yashushi, Ibish, and Khuri 1998). 
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political establishment. ʿAbd al-Zahir Abu al-Samh, who had taught at the Saudi 
Scholastic Institute in the occupied Hijaz and played a leading role in founding the 
Mecca Dar al-Hadith which would later be absorbed by the IUM (cf. Chapters 2 and 3), 
was also close to Ansar al-Sunna. When the IUM was founded, the movement secured 
an effective presence on the first Advisory Council in ʿAbd al-Razzaq ʿAﬁﬁ, an Ansar al-
Sunna stalwart who had previously taught in Saudi Arabia and ended a brief stint as 
president of the organisation in Egypt in order to settle permanently in the kingdom 
around 1960. ʿAﬁﬁ was subsequently appointed to top religious bodies there, including 
the Council of Senior ʿUlamaʾ (Al Bassam 1998/9, 3:275–79; Younus 2006, 196–200; 
Tahir 2006, 173–84; al-ʿAqil 2008, 435–43). A number of Egyptian scholars associated 
with Ansar al-Sunna would take up teaching positions at the IUM. They included 
Muhammad ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Banna and his younger brother Hasan ʿAbd al-Wahhab 
al-Banna, as well as Saʿd Nida and ʿAbd al-Fattah Salama. The latter had spent some 
years deputised to the Libyan Ministry of Religious Endowments prior to arriving at the 
IUM in 1977. As was sometimes the case for members of Ansar al-Sunna, whose Salafi 
creed was considered sound by the Wahhabi establishment, he was trusted not only to 
teach tawḥīd but even to take part in setting syllabuses on this sensitive subject.158 The 
network of relations linking the IUM and Ansar al-Sunna is further illustrated by the 
range of figures associated with the university whose work was published in the 
movement’s journals al-Hady al-Nabawi and al-Tawhid.159 
The South Asian Ahl-i Hadith movement for its part had ties to the Arabian peninsula 
going back even further than those of the relatively young Ansar al-Sunna. In the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, Najdi ʿulamaʾ – including Saʿd ibn ʿAƟq, a future 
teacher of Ibn Baz – had begun travelling to Delhi and Bhopal to study with Ahl-i 
Hadith scholars like Siddiq Hasan and Nadhir Husayn al-Dihlawi (ʿAbd al-Rahman Al al-
Shaykh 1974/5, 323–28; Al Bassam 1998/9, 2:220–27; Steinberg 2004, 94–95; al-ʿAqil 
                                                        
158 “al-Shaykh al-Duktur ʿAbd al-Fattah Salama, 1358-1418 H., 1938-1998 M.” 1998. 
159 They included individuals mentioned earlier in this chapter, such as Muhammad ibn Ibrahim, 
Ibn Baz, al-Bitar, al-Hilali, al-Bayhani, Saʿd Nida, al-Ansari, al-Albani, al-Jazaʾiri and ʿAbd al-Qadir 
Shaybat al-Hamd, as well as the IUM teacher ʿAbd al-Qadir Habib Allah al-Sindi (Tahir 2006, 
289–94, 319–21). 
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2008, 444–56; Lacroix 2011, 84).160 As discussed in Chapter 3, the movement’s Ahmad 
ibn Muhammad al-Dihlawi had founded the two institutions each known as Dar al-
Hadith in Medina and Mecca – the latter in cooperation with the abovementioned 
Ansar al-Sunna scholar Abu al-Samh – which would later be absorbed into the IUM. 
In addition to the appointment of the Ahl-i Hadith’s Muhammad Dawud al-Ghaznawi 
to the founding Advisory Council, the relatively small number of texts included in 
syllabuses in use at the IUM at the time of its establishment included work by the 
forefather of the movement Siddiq Hasan. 161  Ahl-i Hadith scholars who would 
subsequently take up teaching posts at the IUM included Hafiz Muhammad Gondalavi, 
ʿAbd al-Ghaffar Hasan and ʿAbd al-Karim Murad.162 Besides his status as a prominent 
scholar in the Ahl-i Hadith, it is worth noting that ʿAbd al-Ghaffar Hasan had also earlier 
been involved in the Jamaat-i Islami, taking responsibility for its educational initiatives 
and even accepting a brief appointment as amir of the movement during a period 
when Mawdudi was jailed. He had eventually left the Jamaat in 1957 over internal 
disputes linked at least in part to Mawdudi’s resolve to participate in elections. ʿAbd al-
Ghaffar Hasan himself believed that the correct path to establishing an Islamic state is 
through education of the masses (Nasr 1994, 29, 31, 34, 36, 38, 123–24; U. Hasan 
2009). 
Mawdudi’s own involvement in the IUM should perhaps not be overstated. He does 
not, for example, appear to have attended any further sessions of the university’s 
Advisory Council after its second meeting in 1963 (al-Ghamidi 1998, 149–51). However, 
it is worth noting that his role in planning for the university, as discussed at the start of 
this chapter, also likely built on earlier encounters linking his Jamaat-i Islami 
movement to the Saudi religious and political establishments, as well as lateral 
                                                        
160 Metcalf (1982, 277–78) also notes links between the Ahl-i Hadith and the Wahhabis in the 
nineteenth century, with Indians meeting the latter whilst performing hajj and also “in the 
courts of Bhopal”. However, her description of the Yemeni reformist scholar Muhammad al-
Shawkani as one Wahhabi scholar who was particularly influential in South Asia suggests that 
she uses the label very loosely indeed. 
161 An advanced hadith studies course was to be taught from Bulugh al-Maram, a collection 
compiled by Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqalani (d. 1448), with reference to a commentary by the Ahl-i 
Hadith’s Siddiq Hasan (al-Ghamidi 1998, 52–58). 
162 Interview with IUM graduate B, London, 27 June 2011. 
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connections with other actors who would become involved in the university. 
Important points of contact included a 1949 tour of Arab states by Masʿud ʿAlim Nadwi, 
a former student of Taqi al-Din al-Hilali at the Lucknow Dar al-ʿUlum who had since 
taken part in the founding of the Jamaat and would also take charge of the Dar al-
ʿUruba publishing house responsible for promoting the movement’s ideas in Arabic (al-
ʿAqil 2008, 813, 1123). During this trip, Masʿud Nadwi had met with the future Saudi 
Grand Mufti and IUM president Muhammad ibn Ibrahim in Riyadh (Nadwi 1954, 23). 
With introductions from the Moroccan Taqi al-Din al-Hilali, under whom he had 
studied during the latter’s stint at the Lucknow Dar al-ʿUlum, Masʿud Nadwi also met in 
Basra with ʿAbd Allah al-ʿAqil, an Iraq-born Muslim Brother who would subsequently 
take up a place on the IUM’s Advisory Council. The encounter was later remembered 
by a Jamaat insider as the first occasion on which links were forged between the two 
movements. They discussed their respective organisations and swapped books by 
Mawdudi and al-Banna, and when al-ʿAqil travelled to Egypt later that same year to 
enrol at al-Azhar, he took Mawdudi’s writings with him and helped to get them 
published there (al-ʿAqil 2008, 262, 1121–1128).163 From the mid-1950s, as his fame 
spread in the Middle East, Mawdudi visited and gave lectures in Cairo, Damascus, 
Amman, Mecca, Medina, Jidda, Kuwait and Rabat (Ahmad and Ansari 1979, 364).  
Besides mutually interacting social movement structures, the transnational social fields 
within which the IUM came to be situated had also been bolstered by the activities of 
energetic brokers like Taqi al-Din al-Hilali and Abul Hasan ʿAli Nadwi, whose peripateƟc 
pathways connected individuals and institutions the world over. The Indian Nadwat al-
ʿUlamaʾ, within which Abul Hasan ʿAli Nadwi was a key figure, had links to the Middle 
East going back to the nineteenth century when its Muhammad Shibli Nuʿmani had 
toured the region meeting major scholars like Muhammad ʿAbduh. It subsequently 
developed contacts with Rashid Rida through introductions offered by the 
globetrotting al-Hilali (Hartung 2006, 140–45). As discussed in Chapter 1, by the early 
twentieth century the Nadwat al-ʿUlamaʾ was an influence on the important Madrasa 
                                                        
163 It is worth noting that the Egyptian Muslim Brother Saʿid Ramadan was also subsequently 
an influence on the Jamaat-supervised student organisation the Islami Jamiʿat-i Tulaba (IJT) in 
Pakistan between 1952 and 1955, during a period in which he lived in Karachi (Nasr 1994, 64). 
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Sawlatiyya in the Hijaz. Links with the Hijaz are further underlined by the fact that at 
least one of the first group of graduates of the Scholastic Institute founded by the 
Saudis in Mecca in the 1920s departed immediately for India, in order to undertake 
further studies with scholars of the same movement.164 
Abul Hasan ʿAli Nadwi, himself also a former pupil of al-Hilali at the Lucknow college 
(al-ʿAqil 2008, 813), had begun to put himself forward as a key point of contact 
between scholars and movements in South Asia and the Middle East well before the 
opening of the IUM. He had made his first trip to Saudi Arabia to perform the hajj in 
1947, staying for six months and making overtures to the Saudi religious and political 
establishments (Nadwi 1979, 23–24). In early 1951 he used another visit to the 
kingdom as a stepping stone to a tour of Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Jordan and Jerusalem. A 
diary that he kept of this journey makes it clear that his books were already being read 
and published in the Arabic-speaking world at that time, and that he had himself long 
been familiar with the works of a wide range of contemporary scholars and activists 
from the region. While in Cairo, and apparently with the help of Ansar al-Sunna 
founder Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqi, he paid a visit to the future Saudi Grand Mufti and 
IUM president Muhammad ibn Ibrahim, who was in Egypt for medical treatment 
(Nadwi 1954, 18, 22–23). Others that Nadwi spent time with who would later join the 
IUM either as teaching staff or as members of its senior advisory bodies included in 
Egypt Hasanayn Muhammad Makhluf, Muhammad al-Ghazali, ʿAbd Allah al-ʿAqil, Yusuf 
al-Qaradawi and the former Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Hajj Amin al-Husayni; and in 
Syria Muhammad al-Mubarak and Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar. He also consolidated his 
relationship with the Muslim Brothers, a movement he held in high regard. 
Furthermore, Nadwi met regularly during his time in Egypt with Ahmad al-Sharbasi and 
Sayyid Qutb whose brothers al-Saʿid al-Sharbini al-Sharbasi and Muhammad Qutb 
would later be involved at the IUM, the former as a member of its faculty and the 
latter as a member of its Advisory Council. Nadwi’s efforts to construct transnational 
relationships at this stage continued to build on the earlier energies expended by 
people like Rashid Rida and Taqi al-Din al-Hilali. We know, for example, that he had 
first heard of al-Bitar from al-Hilali (Nadwi 1954, 221). The young Nadwi had also 
                                                        
164 “Tidhkar al-Walaʾ wa-l-Ikhlas” 1932, 4. 
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translated works by Mawdudi into Arabic, helping to get the latter’s thinking known in 
the Middle East, although he subsequently became more critical of Mawdudi in the 
1960s (Lauzière 2008, 208, 371 fn. 46). 
Many who moved within these continent-spanning circuits and social fields, including 
many of those who took up places at the IUM, operated as “transmigrants”, building 
and maintaining multivalent networks of social relations that traversed national 
borders – including those of Saudi Arabia, their countries of origin and often multiple 
other nations besides – and frequently making concurrent use of local, national and 
global resources and platforms to advance ambitions that they held both for 
themselves and for others.165 As Jan-Peter Hartung has suggested, for an individual like 
Abul Hasan ʿAli Nadwi, involvement in Saudi-backed missionary initiatives offered both 
a way of acting on concerns about the rise of secular Arabism and Nasserist Egypt’s 
nationalisation of al-Azhar, and simultaneously a source of prestige and leverage in 
manoeuvring within the religious scene in the Indian national context (2006, 15–46, 
153). Saudi connections also brought material support for the local projects of 
movements whose members were involved at the IUM (Sikand 2007). On one occasion 
in the mid-1970s, the IUM made a donation of 50,000 riyals to the Nadwat al-ʿUlamaʾ 
(al-ʿAbbud 2004, 841). In the few years after the Ahl-i Hadith founded a madrasa 
known as the Jamiʿa Salaﬁyya in Banaras in 1966, the IUM sent teachers to support the 
fledgling institution.166 The Banaras Jamiʿa Salaﬁyya also happened to be part-funded 
by Saudi Arabia and to have been opened by the Saudi ambassador. In addition, the 
IUM maintained formal relations with an Ahl-i Hadith madrasa of the same name 
which had been opened in Faisalabad in 1955, graduates of which have progressed to 
further studies in Saudi universities and have often subsequently returned to work as 
teachers in Ahl-i Hadith schools (Zaman 2002, 175). 
                                                        
165 The first element of my usage of the term “transmigrant” draws on Glick Schiller, Basch and 
Blanc’s definition of transnational migration as “the process by which immigrants forge and 
sustain simultaneous multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin 
and settlement” (Schiller, Basch, and Blanc 1995). My own usage is broader, allowing for 
border-crossings that traverse more than two states. The second element of my usage of the 
term – the simultaneous exploitation of local, national and global platforms and resources – 
draws on Saunier 2009, 461. 
166 “Akhbar al-Jamiʿa” 1969a. See also al-ʿAbbud 2004, 840. 
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On a more workaday level, for many teaching staff a spell at the university offered an 
opportunity to combine employment seen as benefiting the global umma with career 
advancement and the chance to take advantage of relatively high wages to support 
projects in their countries of origin like accumulating the funds necessary to set up a 
home and start a family. Egyptians interviewed by the author in Cairo in 2011 who had 
previously worked at the IUM or in Saudi Arabia’s other Islamic universities frequently 
emphasised the material remittances made possible by these circular migrations, as 
well as the value associated with spending time in the proximity of the Holy Cities.167 
Muhammad al-Majdhub, on the other hand, recalled his time at the IUM as the 
happiest period of his life thanks to a sense of harmony with the atmosphere in which 
he was working and the opportunity that his teaching position offered to build spiritual 
relationships with Muslims of all nationalities (al-Majdhub 1992, 3:355–56). 
This talk of harmony and collaborative service to the umma should not be allowed to 
obscure the fact that there were many schisms within this project. Nadwi, for example, 
had to work to overcome tensions with the Ahl-i Hadith in the South Asian context. He 
also seems to have fallen out of favour with the Saudi religious establishment, as well 
as figures associated with the IUM like his own former teacher al-Hilali, particularly 
following the assassination of his erstwhile backer King Faisal. These tensions related 
both to Nadwi’s relative ecumenism and to his close links with the Islamic missionary 
movement the Tablighi Jamaat, which had roots in the South Asian Deobandi tradition 
and was considered misguided by these Salafis (Hartung 2006, 146–47, 149). A 
comparable example is that of Muhammad al-Ghazali, the prominent Egyptian scholar 
who taught at Umm al-Qura University in Mecca and served briefly on the IUM’s 
Supreme Council in the mid-1970s. In 1989 al-Ghazali caused a storm by publishing a 
book which, although he was careful in his choice of language, effectively slated the 
Wahhabi tradition for narrow-minded literalism (Abou El Fadl 2007, 88–94; Al-Rasheed 
2007, 7n8). 
The point of the preceding discussion is not to suggest that the individual migrants, 
social movements and transnational formations addressed here each necessarily 
                                                        
167 Interviews conducted at Dar al-ʿUlum and al-Azhar, Cairo, April, May and October 2011. 
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wielded a unique degree of influence over the IUM. Rather, it is to illustrate some of 
the ways in which the emerging university established a place for itself within, and also 
served to foster, a capillary network of radial and lateral cross-border connections. 
These cross-border connections linked it to the communities around the world upon 
which it sought to exert influence, through individuals and movements which were 
already themselves established and recognised actors in those communities. These 
connections also provided for cross-border flows of spiritual capital, brought to the 
IUM by individual staff members who were often educated in well-established 
universities and longstanding, prestigious centres of Islamic learning, and who were 
therefore in possession of qualifications recognised as valuable in social contexts 
across the Islamic world. Over a period of decades, this capital would come to be 
institutionalised in the very fabric of the IUM, until the university eventually enjoyed 
sufficient prestige to do away with migrant staff. 
Domesticating the IUM  
By the early 1990s the era of non-Saudi staffing at the IUM was already coming to an 
end. Near the beginning of the decade, 336 of the 385 members of the university’s 
teaching council were reported as being Saudi and towards its end, this proportion had 
risen to 360 out of 369. An authorised history of the university frames this 
development as part of countrywide efforts to “Saudise” the national economy, 
depicting the IUM as being at the forefront of a drive to remove obstacles to the 
employment of young Saudi citizens (al-Ghamidi 1998, 277).168 
This effort to replace foreigners with Saudi staff became possible as know-how 
brought by migrants over the preceding decades came to circulate within the confines 
of the IUM and the broader Saudi education system, and as the reserves of spiritual 
capital that they possessed came to be institutionalised in the fabric of the university 
itself, lending it a standing and authority of its own. Within years of opening its doors, 
the IUM had begun hiring its own graduates to teach in its affiliated secondary- and 
intermediate-level institutes.169 Even by the early 1980s, the 131 staff working at its 
                                                        
168 On the relative success of efforts to “Saudise” public institutions, in contrast with the 
chaotic failure of equivalent measures in the private sector, see Hertog 2010, 185–222. 
169 “Akhbar al-Jamiʿa” 1969b; “Akhbar al-Jamiʿa” 1973. 
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flagship College of Shariʿa had included 37 IUM graduates, almost all of them drawn 
from the small minority of Saudis who were given places to study at the university.170 
The IUM was also by that time employing graduates of other relatively new Saudi 
institutions, including King ʿAbd al-ʿAziz University in Jidda, Umm al-Qura University in 
Mecca, and the Imam Muhammad ibn Saʿud Islamic University in Riyadh. In this way, 
Saudis trained and certified by a faculty including a very large proportion of foreigners 
– whose own capacity to offer such training and certification very often rested on their 
education in institutions outside the kingdom – came to secure recognition as suitably 
qualified to undertake teaching roles themselves. 
Besides economic considerations, the drive to reduce foreign staffing at institutions 
like the IUM – now that it was possible to do so – seems likely to have been linked in 
part to efforts to limit political dissent at home. Given the perceived role of non-Saudi 
Muslim Brothers and others in helping to mobilise Islamist political activism in the 
kingdom, the Saudi authorities would surely have been glad to see the back of foreign 
faculty from potential hotbeds of dissent like the IUM. They had received an early 
reminder of the political challenges that might emerge from such contexts with the 
seizure of the Masjid Haram by Juhayman al-ʿUtaybi and his followers in 1979 which, 
as discussed in Chapter 3, had been framed by some at the time as an upshot of 
corrupting influences brought by foreign IUM students. In the wake of the Gulf War 
and increasing nervousness on the part of the Saudi authorities about Islamist 
mobilisation turning against the state, the Saudi authorities undertook the 
reorganisation of the country’s university system discussed in Chapter 3. There were 
also efforts to purge politically activist staff from institutions across the country, 
including the IUM.171 Such moves helped to ensure that the IUM came increasingly 
under the sway of adherents of the politically quietist tradition most prominently 
associated with the Saudi scholar Rabiʿ ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, himself a graduate of the 
IUM who had gone on to work in its College of Hadith. This mode of Salafism, 
                                                        
170 “Dalil Aʿdaʾ Hayʾat al-Tadris wa-l-Muhadirin wa-l-Muʿidin” 1981/2, 34–44. 
171 This included the replacement of IUM staff Musa al-Qarni, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Qariʾ and Jubran al-
Jubran, all with reputations for alignment with Islamist political activism, with perceived 
quietists Tarahib al-Dawsari, Sulayman al-Ruhayli, and ʿAbd al-Salam al-Suhaymi (Lacroix 2011, 
214). Other staff known for an inclination towards activism were transferred to research posts, 
away from contact with students. Interview with IUM graduate A, London, 1 December 2011. 
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stridently exclusivist and opposed to politically activist modes of Islamism, came to 
strongly colour the IUM’s missionary project in the 1990s and would spread through its 
graduates to locations around the world. 
Representatives of this trend did not look kindly on the past involvement of foreigners 
associated with the Brotherhood and other politically activist strands at the IUM and in 
the wider Saudi universities system. Al-Madkhali himself, who remained at the 
university until the late 1990s, had risen to prominence in part off the back of his 
criticism of Mawdudi, one of the very people who had originally drawn up plans for the 
university (Lacroix 2011, 212). Others associated with this current, like ʿAbd al-Salam 
al-Suhaymi of the IUM’s College of Shariʿa, have condemned foreign Muslim Brothers 
who previously worked in the Saudi education system for supposedly exploiting their 
naively generous Saudi hosts with a view to spreading political and religious corruption 
(al-Suhaymi 2005). By advancing this view in the context of a discussion of the roots of 
Islamist militancy in Saudi Arabia, al-Suhaymi echoes the tendency in official circles to 
depict domestic Islamist contention as having resulted from foreign influences rather 
than indigenous frameworks and grievances.172 
At the same time, although it rose to prominence during a period when the IUM was 
being thoroughly “Saudised”, the genealogy of the pietist tradition associated with 
figures like al-Madkhali itself also reflects the broader pattern discussed in this chapter, 
whereby persons and resources drawn in part from outside the kingdom came to serve 
projects operated by and for Saudi actors; whether as part of general efforts to 
legitimate the IUM’s missionary drive, or in this case specifically as part of an attempt 
to build up political quietists as a bulwark against Islamist challenges to the regime. 
This quietist tradition itself has a far-reaching genealogy, tracing back in part to the 
influence of al-Albani, born in Albania and raised in Syria, and to the Indian Ahl-i Hadith 
(Lacroix 2009). Its diverse roots come through in the biography of Muhammad Aman 
al-Jami, a founding staff member of the IUM, the first head of its College of Hadith 
until 1985 and a teacher of al-Madkhali, whose association with this mode of religiosity 
is so strong that its adherents are commonly referred to pejoratively by their critics as 
                                                        
172 Cf. the discussion of this issue in the introduction to this thesis. 
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“Jamis”. Born in eastern Ethiopia in the early 1930s and educated in the Shafiʿi 
environment of his village and nearby settlements, al-Jami had made the journey to 
Saudi Arabia via Somalia and Yemen, arriving in Mecca in time to perform the hajj in 
1950. He stayed on to study in the Masjid Haram, came into contact with Ibn Baz and 
accompanied him to Riyadh, where he enrolled in the city’s new Scholastic Institute 
and College of Shariʿa amongst peers including the future IUM head ʿAbd al-Muhsin al-
ʿAbbad. During his time in Mecca and Riyadh, al-Jami associated not only with Najdi 
scholars like Ibn Baz and Muhammad ibn Ibrahim but also with an array of migrants 
already mentioned in this thesis, including the West African future IUM faculty 
members ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Ifriqi, Muhammad al-Amin al-Shinqiti and Hammad al-
Ansari, the Egyptian Ansar al-Sunna scholars ʿAbd al-Razzaq ʿAﬁﬁ and Muhammad 
Khalil Harras, and the Egyptian Salafi ʿAbd al-Razzaq Hamza. He would subsequently 
earn a masters degree from the University of Punjab and a doctorate from the Cairo 
Dar al-ʿUlum (al-Qarʿani 2009, 225–35). Al-Jami, a migrant whose own thinking was 
shaped by these far-reaching connections and whose religious standing was 
legitimated with reference to his studies with this broad array of Saudi and non-Saudi 
scholars, as well as qualifications acquired in both Saudi and non-Saudi institutions, 
remained an important point of reference at the IUM long after his death in 1996. His 
biography is emblematic of the ways in which, even as the university came to be 
largely purged of foreigners in line with the shifting interests of national state elites, its 
operation continued to be in part influenced and legitimated by earlier cross-border 
flows of migrants and capital. 
Conclusion 
From the early 1960s until at least the 1980s, the IUM was a hub for religious 
migrations undertaken not only by students from all over the world but also by staff 
who hailed from across the Middle East and beyond. The sojourners, immigrants, and 
itinerants brought together on its campus were hired in part directly from existing 
educational institutions like al-Azhar. The university also tapped into cross-border 
circuits and networks, built around inter alia pilgrimage routes, interacting social 
movement structures, and the efforts of individual brokers. These border-spanning 
formations often considerably pre-dated the existence of the IUM and even that of the 
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Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. To a large extent, these staff members were drawn to 
Medina as labour migrants, seeking to access material capital distributed from the 
coffers of the Saudi state in the form of generous salaries. However, they could also 
benefit from proximity to the Holy Cities, political asylum, the opportunity to be 
involved in a project seen as serving the global umma, and sometimes material and 
moral support for broader projects in their communities of origin or elsewhere. 
In return for their salaries and these other benefits, they performed the labour of 
instruction and administration necessary for the university’s functioning. More than 
that, however, their presence helped to legitimate its missionary endeavour. The very 
diversity of the IUM faculty stood to lend an appearance of universality to a project 
which was fundamentally about promoting a quite particular set of religious tenets, to 
which some but by no means all of these staff members were themselves committed. 
These outsiders were well positioned to mediate between the Wahhabi establishment 
and a student body drawn from far and wide, and their own pre-existing links in 
communities across the world facilitated the university’s efforts to establish global 
reach. Furthermore, they brought spiritual capital accumulated through far-reaching 
scholarly networks or in often venerable centres of learning like al-Azhar, as well as in 
newer but nonetheless established Islamic educational institutions like the University 
of Umm Durman. Their relatively widely-recognised qualifications and reputations 
stood to bolster the capacity of the IUM to legitimate a particular array of religious 
ideas and practices with broad audiences beyond Saudi Arabia, and to issue 
qualifications to its own students which might similarly be widely recognised as bases 
of religious authority. Over time, the know-how and spiritual capital brought by these 
migrants came to be institutionalised in the IUM itself, until the university was 
eventually able to function self-sufficiently and their presence was no longer required. 
As I explore further in the following two chapters, these migrant staff members had by 
that time also come to exert a certain amount of – often lasting – influence over the 
styles and content of instruction that prevailed on the IUM campus. 
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Chapter 5 
Post-Colonial Contestation and Social Technologies of 
Education at the Islamic University 
Born in al-Sharqiyya in Egypt in the late 1920s, ʿAƟyya Muhammad Salim had relocated 
to the Hijaz in his youth. He began studying with scholars in Medina in the mid-1940s 
and would later travel to Riyadh to enrol in the Scholastic Institute and the Colleges of 
Shariʿa and Arabic Language there, before being appointed to teach at the Islamic 
University of Medina from 1961. In a later nostalgic recollection of his studies as a 
young man in ḥalaqāt in the Masjid Nabawi, he implicitly invoked the contrast 
between that style of instruction and what he had subsequently come to witness in 
new-style institutions like the IUM: 
That [mode of] study [in the Masjid Nabawi] was the basis for knowledge acquisition; 
linked to the book being studied, not to the course or the curricula. The goal was not 
completion of a curriculum in a specific time; what was sought was understanding of 
what was being read without chasing time. The objective was not success in a test in 
order to obtain a degree certificate; it was equipping oneself with learning, knowledge 
and devoted study of God’s religion. For this reason, the student wasn’t compelled to 
disengage himself and occupy himself exclusively with the quest for learning. Rather, 
everyone who was brought together by the study circles in the evening had different, 
diverse jobs in the daytime. But in the lesson they were equal, with nothing 
distinguishing them from each other except excellence in learning. They were truly 
brothers in sincerity [fa-hum bi-ḥaqq ikhwat ṣidq].173 
This chapter considers the social technologies of education that came to be employed 
at the IUM from the early 1960s; the institutional arrangements and pedagogical 
techniques used to achieve the embodying in students of various forms of spiritual 
capital, including religious knowledge but also modes of comportment, attitudes and 
dispositions. The methods employed in pursuit of these ends at the IUM differed 
markedly from practices that had prevailed in Najd and the Hijaz even just a few 
decades earlier. As ʿAtiyya Muhammad Salim’s recollections suggest, the disparities 
related not only to the selection and organisation of the knowledge that was to be 
transmitted, but also to the ways in which education at the IUM came to be structured 
around the “chasing of time” according to curricula and fixed schedules, the use of 
                                                        
173 Quoted in al-Majdhub 1992, 2:201. The details of ʿAƟyya Muhammad Salim’s life are based 
on al-Majdhub 1992, 2:201–226; al-Qarʿani 2009, 303–06. He died in 1999. 
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systematic examinations, and a greater degree of disengagement from life outside the 
educational institution. 
In order to pave the way for understanding this shift, I begin this chapter by locating 
the IUM in relation to struggles in the post-colonial contexts from which so many of its 
early staff were drawn.174 The new missionary university was valued by many of those 
involved as a response to colonial and neo-imperial intrusions in the cultural sphere in 
parts of the world with Muslim populations; infringements which were viewed as 
presenting an existential threat to Islamic identities, lifestyles and values. However, 
many were clear that this response could not involve a retreat into newly-barricaded 
traditional modes of schooling. 
Instead, as I argue in the second part of this chapter, the spirit of pedagogical 
innovation prevalent amongst many of those behind the university led them to 
consciously and actively appropriate social technologies whose own genealogies were 
bound up with what they understood as “Western” history and values. These included 
techniques which were arguably strongly coloured by disciplinary market culture. In 
the IUM setting, efforts were made to recalibrate these pedagogies in the name of 
producing industrious, activist and pious duʿāt equipped to engage effectively in 
contemporary cultural politics; precisely as part of what was understood to amount to 
a project of resistance to the “Western” aggressor. 
Rethinking Religious Education 
The time of upheaval in religious educational structures during which those who 
designed and staffed the emergent IUM had come of age was reflected in their own 
varied backgrounds. A great many had started their education in traditional katātīb 
schools, commonly focused on basic literacy and rote memorisation of the Qurʾan. 
However, beyond this point their paths diverged considerably. At one end of the 
spectrum, many major figures who joined the IUM early on had completed their 
                                                        
174 The term “post-colonial” is used advisedly in the context of this chapter to refer to the 
period following formal independence in countries which had previously been subject to the 
direct sovereignty of foreign powers. It is not intended to deny the reality of the forms of 
material exploitation, clientelism, violence and cultural sway which former colonial powers 
continued to exercise beyond this point in time (cf. Duara 2011), and which remained a matter 
of considerable concern for many of those involved in the IUM. 
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advanced training in mosque study circles. One example is the prominent scholar 
Muhammad al-Amin al-Shinqiti, who taught at the university and served on its 
Advisory Council from the start. He had been educated as a young man in rural 
Mauritania by members of his family, scholars of his tribe and marabouts.175 A former 
student recalled that, playing on the fact that the Arabic word for a university or school 
certificate also refers to the formula by which Muslims avow their faith, al-Shinqiti 
used to declare, “I have only one shahāda: ‘lā ilāha illā Allah’.”176 Under quite different 
circumstances, the Syrian Muslim Brother Muhammad al-Mubarak, who sat on the 
IUM’s Advisory Council for some fifteen years from the time that the university first 
opened, had started out pursuing a two-track education in Syria encompassing 
“regular schools” (madāris niẓāmiyya) alongside “old-style education” (al-dirāsa al-
qadīma) in mosque study circles. He subsequently enrolled at Damascus University and 
the Sorbonne in Paris (al-Majdhub 1992, 1:232–235, 250; al-ʿAqil 2008, 990–91). Saudi 
staff who joined the IUM faculty in its earliest days had also studied and taught both in 
mosque study circles and in the new-style institutions founded in recent decades by 
the state, including the Scholastic Institute and the College of Shariʿa in Riyadh. Later 
on, university backgrounds became increasingly prevalent amongst IUM faculty. Staff 
lists from the early 1980s show that by that time the vast majority bore university 
qualifications ranging from bachelors degrees to doctorates.177 
Particularly in the IUM’s formative years, prior to the overwhelming influx of 
university-trained faculty, staff thus brought with them a diverse range of experiences 
and ideas about how education, religious and otherwise, could and should function. 
Nonetheless, one view agreed upon by many was that educational reforms initiated by 
colonial officials and local client elites across the Islamic world had come to represent 
a profound threat in Muslim communities in their lifetimes, contributing to moral 
degradation and an imbalance of power between Muslims and what was often 
                                                        
175 Al-Shinqiti’s biography is discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. His education is discussed in 
some detail in al-Majdhub 1992, 1:172–74.  
176 Interview with IUM graduate B, London, 24 June 2011. This first part of the Islamic 
declaration of faith translates as “there is no God but God”. The full declaration of faith 
finishes with “and Muhammad is the messenger of God”. 
177 “Dalil Aʿdaʾ Hayʾat al-Tadris wa-l-Muhadirin wa-l-Muʿidin” 1981/2. The universities at which 
staff had earned such qualifications were discussed in Chapter 4. 
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referred to as “the West”. Such views were given particularly full expression in an 
article by Abul Hasan ʿAli Nadwi, the Indian scholar who would become a founding and 
exceptionally longstanding member of the IUM Advisory Council (Nadwi 1969a). In that 
document, in turn based on a memorandum that Nadwi had presented to a 
conference of Arab education ministers in Kuwait just a few years before the IUM 
opened, he argued that any given education system has “a soul and a conscience”, 
which is “a reflection of the doctrines and mentality of its creators, their goal in 
knowledge and the study of existence, and [their] view of life, and a manifestation of 
their morals”, and which pervades its entire structure across all branches of knowledge 
(1969a, 26). The imposition of “Western” educational systems as a result of 
colonialism and cultural imperialism, he argued, had transformed the mentality of 
Muslim youth such that they were no longer able to accept “correct Islam” or to 
integrate into an Islamic society (1969a, 40–41). Moreover, it had produced a 
generation of rulers acculturated in the same vein (1969a, 42–43). In his view, 
“Western”-style secular schooling had shattered forms of social solidarity which might 
be found in religion, giving rise instead to a Manichean conflict – a zero-sum struggle 
between “two mentalities, two philosophies, two points of view” – within Islamic 
societies, pitching those who remained fully committed to Islam against those who had 
effectively abandoned their faith (1969a, 43). In this supposed corruption of shared 
Islamic identities and moral frameworks by “Western”-inspired educational reforms, 
Nadwi and others thought they discerned an explanation for the success of colonial 
and neo-imperial subjugation of Islamic societies; the result of such reforms being that 
“the emotion of the Muslim peoples, their sacrifices, their efforts, their sincerity and 
their fidelity (which are the direct, fundamental motivation for the founding of Islamic 
governments and the liberation of colonised countries) became wretched fuel in the 
fire of modernisation and Westernisation” (1969a, 44–45).178 
This perceived threat was frequently located as part of a broader ghazw fikrī, or 
intellectual invasion, a campaign of cultural imperialism seen as threatening the very 
                                                        
178 Similar views were expressed in works by other prominent members of the Advisory Council 
(e.g. Mawdudi 1956; Mawdudi 1977), and also in articles published in the IUM journal (e.g. 
Mahmud 1972; Mahmud 1971; Qadiri n.d.). 
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foundations of Islamic belief and practice. A particularly full discussion of the ghazw 
fikrī appeared in the university journal in 1969, authored by Mamduh Fakhri, a teacher 
in the IUM’s College of Daʿwa. He deﬁned it as including the spread of naƟonal and 
other kinds of particularistic identities which had shattered an erstwhile Islamic 
solidarity; the exclusion of religious values from the political sphere; the “liberation” of 
women, which really amounted to separating them from their faith; and the 
proliferation of a misguided notion of progress entailing the celebration of all things 
new and the rejection of all things old. While pernicious educational reforms were the 
key factor driving such developments, other instruments of the ghazw fikrī included 
the media and the capture of centres of power like the military (Fakhri 1969). The 
actors behind this aggression were variously defined by Fakhri and others at the IUM 
as “the West”, “Europe”, “Crusader” forces, Jews and Christian missionaries, in league 
with local client politicians and intellectual classes (al-Qadmani 1968; Fakhri 1969). It 
was also commonly related to the intrusion of political and intellectual schools of 
thought associated with both sides in the Cold War. A course on the ghazw fikrī that 
was being taught at the IUM by the early 1990s listed in this regard: pragmatist 
philosophy, existentialism, secularism, nationalism, capitalism, socialism, Zionism, and 
Westernisation (al-ʿAbbud 2004, 542–45). 
On occasion, the ghazw fikrī was framed in terms of an age-old conflict between truth 
and falsity (cf. al-Qadmani 1968). More commonly, however, it was presented as both 
a legacy and a continuation of the recent history of direct European colonisation of 
Islamic lands. According to the then IUM president ʿAbd al-ʿAziz ibn Baz, writing in the 
IUM journal in 1973, the shift to the use of new “weapons” like books, newspapers and 
magazines represented nothing more than a change in styles of imperialism. This move 
had been made only when old-style direct colonialism came to be judged by its 
perpetrators as ill-equipped to deal with popular resistance in the modern period (Ibn 
Baz 1973). 
Without denying the role played in various forms of colonialism and neo-imperialism 
by factors like coercive violence, administrative social control and economic 
domination, the discourse of the ghazw fikrī shifted the focus instead to questions of 
culture, communal identity and moral rectitude. Understanding the problem of 
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“Western” political expansion in these terms meant searching for analogous solutions. 
Just as malicious, “Western”-inspired educational reforms were seen as having been 
integral to the ghazw fikrī, figures associated with the IUM saw education – with the 
scope it offered for the remaking of Islamic societies through the transmission of 
correct knowledge and the proper training of attitudes, instincts, preferences and 
other aspects of subjectivity at the level of the individual – as a key weapon with which 
to respond. This thinking was bound up with a view that youth ought to be a special 
focus of such efforts. On the one hand, youth were viewed as an internal threat to 
Islamic societies and the umma, an impulsive and potentially subversive element 
especially vulnerable to corruption. On the other hand, they were seen as a potential 
source of the strength and vitality that was so badly needed in order to bring about a 
desired religious revival.179 Proper education was necessary in order to ensure that 
they would serve as a force for positive change rather than further degradation. 
When it came to training this new generation, IUM figures insisted on the need for a 
strongly activist approach to religious schooling. In the words of ʿAbd Allah ibn Ahmad 
Qadiri, a Saudi citizen with a masters from al-Azhar writing as dean of the IUM’s 
College of Arabic Language in the late 1970s, ties to God are strengthened through 
“learning for the sake of acting on knowledge” rather than “for the sake of culture and 
scholastic and intellectual luxury” (Qadiri n.d.). While it may be the case that as a 
consequence of such an activist education, “the horizons of thought of the actor will 
broaden”, this was effectively a contingent benefit rather than the primary goal. As 
things stood, Qadiri suggested that a lack of commitment amongst scholars and 
students to applying their religious knowledge in the real world had gone so far as to 
transform them into more of a corrupting influence than ordinary Muslims. It was the 
duty of every person working in the teaching profession to realise the necessary 
                                                        
179 Such views come through in numerous articles on the subject of youth in the IUM journal, 
including Babelli 1969; al-ʿAbbadi 1970; Abu Farha 1971; Mahmud 1971; Bahzad 1972; 
Maghribi n.d.; ʿAbd al-Rahman Billah ʿAli n.d.; Butrush n.d.. Omnia El Shakry (2011) has 
observed the emergence of very similar views of youth as simultaneously “peril and promise” 
in 1930s Egypt, “partly as a response to the widespread student demonstrations of 1935 and 
1936 that ushered in the figure of youth as an insurgent subject of politics”. 
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activist epistemology “in his own self and in the selves of his students”.180 His words 
echoed the insistence of the IUM teacher Mamduh Fakhri a decade earlier that 
learning (al-taḥṣīl) should never be allowed to become disconnected from proactive 
conveyance of the Islamic message (al-tablīgh) (Fakhri 1968). 
It was in this spirit that university statutes stipulated that its graduates were to be not 
merely passive religious experts but duʿāt, a term best translated in this context as 
missionaries.181 In an open letter to graduates in 1976 the then de facto head of the 
university, the Saudi scholar ʿAbd al-Muhsin al-ʿAbbad, emphasised this acƟvist ethos 
using militaristic imagery that was common in university literature. He reminded them 
that they had secured their qualification in order to embark upon “the stage of 
struggle (marḥalat al-jihād) in the battalions of the daʿwa to your Lord: as a guidance 
to the people, a rectification of the programmes of their lives, a realisation of their 
happiness in their world and their triumph in their hereafter.” This, he reminded each 
individual reader, “is the mission of your university; it is the goal for the purpose of 
which you came from your country and shunned your people, and exerted yourself for 
years in order to reach it, and you have arrived; it is the loftiest of goals in your life” 
(al-ʿAbbad 1976). The prevalence of such martial language in IUM literature may well 
have related in part to the perception of the university as representing a response to a 
form of “intellectual colonialism” which was itself directly continuous with “military 
colonialism”.182 It is also worth noting that military metaphors were by no means 
limited to this particular educational context. They had also historically been found, for 
example, in Ottoman educational discourse and in the language of Christian 
missionaries in the region (Deringil 1998, 100; U. Makdisi 2008, 67, 84). 
                                                        
180 Qadiri cites two passages from the Qur’an to support his position that religious knowledge 
should be treated primarily as a basis for action: Q. 61:2-3 (“O ye who believe! Why say ye that 
which ye do not? Grievously odious is it in the sight of Allah that ye say that which ye do not.”); 
and part of Q. 62:5 (“The similitude of those who were charged with the [obligations of the] 
Mosaic Law, but who subsequently failed in those [obligations], is that of a donkey which 
carries huge tomes [but understands them not].”). The English-language renderings of these 
verses here are quoted from Yusuf Ali 1997. 
181 “Al-Nizam al-Asasi li-l-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya,” Article 1. 
182 See, for example, use of these two parallel terms in al-Qadmani 1968. 
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At least for the first half a century of its existence, women were to have no role either 
as teachers or as students in this project as it played out at the IUM.183 That is not to 
say that the notion of educating women was in itself taboo. However, views expressed 
in the IUM journal in the university’s formative years suggested that their own training 
should be directed towards their role in the private sphere, in contrast with this public 
missionary endeavour. According to the Syrian Ibrahim al-Salqini, a teacher in the 
IUM’s College of Shariʿa, the primary responsibility of women is to raise children, a task 
for which they are suited by virtue of their nature (fiṭra). Using language familiar from 
nationalist and other forms of twentieth-century reformist discourse, both religious 
and otherwise,184 he argued that with this role comes great responsibility: “The 
woman, by concerning herself with the cradle and taking care of her children correctly, 
builds the future of her nation” (al-Salqini 1969). This responsibility necessitated that 
women should themselves be educated; however, this education should focus on skills 
and bodies of knowledge suited to their role as homemakers and shapers of the next 
generation, including child psychology, “the methods of caring for [children] morally 
and bodily”, and housekeeping. While al-Salqini also emphasised the need for women 
to receive religious education, this was to be geared towards the same priorities; 
religious training was valuable insofar as it “cleanses her soul and elevates her 
emotions, purifies her heart and stamps her with the character of correct motherhood 
and proper [moral] nature, and informs her about her rights and duties in relation to 
her husband and children”.185 
                                                        
183 Recent talk of providing facilities for female education at the IUM is discussed in Chapter 3. 
184 For example, on broader debates in colonial and post-colonial Egypt concerning the 
relationship between the education of women, their role in the private sphere, and the 
implications of this for the proper ordering of the public sphere and the nation, see e.g. 
Noorani 2010, 107–47. 
185 In a comparable example, the Moroccan scholar Taqi al-Din al-Hilali argued against those 
who suggest that women should be given only an absolute minimum of education for fear that 
even literacy might expose them to corrupting influences like newspapers and magazines. He 
suggested that a certain amount of correct education might in fact protect women from 
corrupting influences. However, he railed against those “Europeanisers” who suggest that 
women should have full access to education and should be free to become lawyers, politicians 
and presidents. Like al-Salqini, he argued that women’s education should be tailored to suit 
“that for which she was created”; housekeeping, the raising of children and supporting her 
husband (al-Hilali 1970). 
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Such views on female education – grounded in a strictly binary conception of gender as 
mapping directly onto morphological sex, with men and women having clearly 
distinguished roles tied to what were understood to be their distinct physical, mental 
and moral natures – left little scope for women undertaking the kind of advanced, 
activist, socially-engaged religious training offered at the IUM. Moreover, they 
combined with concerns about the moral corruption that would certainly ensue from 
coeducation (ʿAƟyya Salim 1968; al-ʿUmari 1968). 
As far as the campaign to counter the ghazw fikrī through education was concerned, 
when it came to the methods that were to be used many were convinced that what 
they understood to amount to effective resistance would require something other 
than simply a retreat into what had now come to be seen as the “traditional” 
instruction of mosque study circles. Rather, what was required was a fundamental 
reconfiguration of how education operated. 
The Pakistani Jamaat-i Islami leader Abul Aʿla Mawdudi, who was involved in planning 
for the IUM, was one figure who had long called for efforts to apply such sentiments in 
the area of educational reform.186 He was concerned to replace or transform existing 
Islamic educational institutions, which he saw as “rigid” and as being bogged down in 
the delusion that the only legitimate knowledge is “that which is passed down to us by 
[our] forebears”. The new institutions he envisaged would embrace what he saw as a 
cumulative process of advancement of human understanding of the world, grounded 
not only in preserving acquired knowledge but also in embracing new knowledge 
developed through observation and inference. This was not to involve wholesale 
importation of existing “worldly sciences” into syllabuses, imbued as these disciplines 
were with an irreligious Western view of existence (1956, 20). Rather, the new 
institutions would seek to narrow the gap between these sciences and religious 
knowledge, and would channel students’ and teachers’ energies towards the goal of 
building a new way of life grounded in faith and obedience to God (Mawdudi 1956, 5–
7, 18–35). 
                                                        
186 Mawdudi’s views on educational reform have previously been discussed in connection with 
the IUM in Zaman 2007, 254–56. 
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In the event, the IUM would remain devoted to specifically religious subjects and 
would not undertake the critical engagement with the “worldly sciences” that 
Mawdudi envisaged, at least for the first decades of its existence.187 As a missionary 
institution with the goal of imbuing its students with religious knowledge, skills and 
other forms of spiritual capital which they would take with them when they returned 
to their home societies or travelled on elsewhere to offer spiritual and moral guidance, 
this was not within its remit. However, its focus on the transmission of religious 
knowledge certainly does not mean that it took the form of a traditional madrasa; 
rather, the spirit of openness to pedagogical innovation found in Mawdudi’s work took 
root at the IUM more broadly. Accounts of Salafi belief and practice frequently 
reference efforts to combat illegitimate innovations (bidaʿ, sing. bidʿa) seen as having 
corrupted Muslims’ lifestyles and religious beliefs and practice in the centuries since 
the time of the Prophet and his Companions. This was indeed a matter of profound 
concern for many who became involved at the IUM. However, there appears to have 
been a consensus on the belief that this would be best achieved through openness to 
legitimate innovations in the sphere of pedagogical practice. This attitude is reflected 
in an article published in the university journal around 1980 by Muhammad al-
Majdhub, the Syrian Muslim Brother who had previously worked in a Christian college 
in Latakiyya. Apparently addressing himself to students who might consider entering 
into teaching themselves after graduation, al-Majdhub discussed styles of instruction 
with reference to the Qurʾan and the pracƟces of the Prophet. However, what he really 
sought to emphasis was an understanding of teaching as a living practice, informed by 
experience of what works and involving an open-ended process of adaptation and 
improvement (al-Majdhub n.d.). 
This spirit of pedagogical innovation was juxtaposed with a broader willingness to 
appropriate thinking, practices and technologies drawn from what was identified as 
“Western” culture, as long as this was done critically and the specific elements in 
question were judged to be compatible with Islamic values. In the words of the 
Sudanese assistant professor ʿAbd al-Rahman Billah ʿAli in the early 1980s, “That which 
                                                        
187 Recent steps to establish colleges offering instruction in medicine, information technology, 
applied sciences, pharmacology and engineering are discussed in Chapter 3. 
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comes from the West is not all evil; rather, there are [also] splendid, benevolent 
aspects. We must stop, scrutinise and distinguish” (ʿAbd al-Rahman Billah ʿAli n.d.). 
For many of those involved in its formative years, the IUM represented an opportunity 
to rethink existing religious educational practices, including appropriating ideas and 
methods from the “West”. This was to be done in part as part of a process that was 
understood to offer a way of resisting colonial and neo-imperial cultural intrusions 
seen as emanating from precisely that same source.188 As I explore in the remainder of 
this chapter, such attitudes gave rise to a Wahhabi missionary university which in 
many regards – from the spatial discourse of its campus to the modes of instruction 
employed in its classrooms – was not only a “modern” institution, in the simple sense 
of being very much a product of the era in which it existed, but was also quite self-
consciously so. 
Forging Industrious Duʿat 
Before exploring the methods of education implemented at the IUM, it will be worth 
considering what education itself was understood to involve in this context, in the 
abstract. The notion of education is commonly denoted in IUM discourse and in Arabic 
more generally by two words – taʿlīm and tarbiya – each with differing valences. Taʿlīm 
derives from the same root as the word ʿilm, meaning knowledge. According to 
Muhammad al-Sharbini, an educational expert employed at the IUM in the 1970s, 
taʿlīm may be defined as follows: 
It is the process of the acquisition of information, knowledge, experiences and skills… 
Taʿlīm is a process continuing from the cradle to the grave. Taʿlīm is an individual duty, 
not a collective duty. Taʿlīm is not mere dictation of knowledge; it is a process of training, 
studying [taʿallum], cultivation of the mind [tathqīf], and exercise. Taʿlīm is not based on 
quantity so much as it is concerned with the how and the what [al-kayf wa-l-nawʿ]. 
Taʿlīm is not for the purposes of knowledge for the sake of a job, or knowledge for the 
sake of knowledge, or knowledge for the sake of society; but rather all of these aspects 
together, such that the individual is turned into an enlightened and devout person who 
upholds his duties to his Lord, to his family, to his society and to his nation [naḥw 
mujtamaʿihi al-ṣaghīr wa waṭanihi al-kabīr] (al-Sharbini 1976) 
                                                        
188 Cf. Benjamin Fortna’s (2002) argument that the appropriation of pedagogical methods from 
Western Europe in the late Ottoman Empire was partly precisely about mounting a defence 
against perceived Western European cultural and political encroachment. 
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Al-Sharbini’s conception of taʿlīm is very much bound up with the same activist 
epistemology expounded by Qadiri earlier in this chapter, in which individual learning 
is intimately linked both to one’s relationship with God and also to one’s action as a 
member of society. Moreover, while the concept of taʿlīm entails a particular emphasis 
on the transmission of knowledge, it is clear that for al-Sharbini it means more than 
this, also implying such things as the acquisition of skills and the “cultivation of the 
mind”.  
These latter aspects of education are even more strongly associated with the notion of 
tarbiya. Tarbiya is characterised by al-Sharbini as being “more general and more 
comprehensive” than taʿlīm: 
It is linked to the development of the life of the individual in terms of body, reason [ʿaql], 
sentiment [wijdān], society, behaviour and morals. This comes about by means of the 
family, the school, and the environment in which the student lives. Through this, he is 
influenced by and he influences what is around him in terms of circumstances and 
natural and unnatural conditions, such that a process of interaction and adaptation 
occurs which has a major influence on his formation [takwīn], behaviour, inclinations 
[ittijāhāt], thoughts and various aspects of his life [mukhtalaf ḥayātihi] in the series of 
stages of his development in general (al-Sharbini 1976)189 
This definition of tarbiya further underscores concern in the IUM context with the role 
of education not only in the transmission of knowledge but also in the training of other 
aspects of subjectivity, including modes of normative reasoning, instinctual 
dispositions and registers of moral affect.190 For example, IUM staff spoke about the 
need – generally, not only in the university context – to imbue students with deep faith 
in God, love of the Prophet, desire for Paradise and fear of Hell (e.g. Nadwi 1969b, 92; 
Naghash 1977). In the remainder of this chapter, I suggest that the pedagogical 
technologies in use at the IUM were also geared towards efforts to instil in students an 
internalised sense of industry in the acquisition of religious knowledge and pious self-
betterment that would facilitate their studies and equip them to venture out into the 
contemporary world as activist agents of social, cultural and political change. 
                                                        
189 Elsewhere, tarbiya is defined by the IUM College of Shariʿa staﬀ member Muhammad 
Naghash as “the development of rational, moral and bodily faculties” (Naghash 1977). 
190 Cf. recent anthropological work discussed in the introduction to this thesis, by scholars like 
Saba Mahmood (2005) and Charles Hirschkind (2006). 
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To a certain extent, the embodying of spiritual capital at the IUM was to involve a quite 
personalised, performative process which put university staff in a paternal position as 
role models to be emulated by students. According to the IUM teacher Salih Rida, 
people 
cannot, by their nature and disposition, assimilate abstract truths and follow moral 
systems unless they are displayed before them in men who are endowed with them and 
who call them into being in themselves then in their society. If teachings and morals do 
not rise up in men, they remain letters that blacken books... (Rida 1969) 
Naturally, Rida identified the Prophet Muhammad as the ideal human exemplar, as did 
others writing in this context (e.g. M. al-M. M. ʿAli 1972). However, he and others also 
emphasised the importance of finding virtuous contemporaries to emulate. This was to 
include the university’s staff themselves, who – as it was put in the IUM’s founding 
documents – were to be not only qualified in their areas of expertise but also 
“venerable, known for praiseworthy conduct, righteousness and piety”. 191  The 
personalised, paternal nature of this aspect of education at the IUM is underlined by 
the frequency with which students were referred to in its publications as “sons” of the 
university and its staff.192 
However, the ways in which the university operated to achieve the embodying of 
spiritual capital in its students also involved a quite different set of pedagogical 
techniques. From the earliest days, this included features in common with schools and 
universities in Europe, North America and many other locations around the world, 
which in turn were informed by the basic principles underlying an approach to 
education popularised by Joseph Lancaster in early nineteenth-century England. 
Lancaster’s methods have been discussed at length elsewhere and the details of his 
approach are not of primary concern here; it is certainly not the case that those behind 
the IUM were engaged in studying, adapting and implementing his techniques, which 
were by this time well over 150 years old and had long since gone out of vogue even in 
the English context in which they had first gained a foothold. Rather, what is 
observable at the IUM is a broader application of two key principles that underlay his 
                                                        
191 “Al-Nizam al-Asasi li-l-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya,” Article 16. 
192 E.g. “Akhbar al-Jamiʿa” 1970; “Dalil al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya” 1971, 11; “Dalil al-Talib al-Jamiʿi” 
2013, 47. 
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influential approach and which retain traction in so many educational contexts to this 
day: regulating students’ behaviour through the implementation of a system of 
continual observation, normative judgement and periodic correction; and promoting in 
them a sense of competitive industry by integrating their performance into an 
economy of rewards and punishments. Efforts to discipline students’ minds and bodies 
in these ways in the IUM context, as elsewhere, were necessarily incomplete and by no 
means gave rise to a totalising system. Yet, for all their limitations and interstices, they 
reflect a significant shift in approach from the ways in which instruction had been 
conducted in the mosque study circles which had been the most important sites of 
advanced religious education in Najd and the Hijaz just a few decades earlier 
In what follows, I explore efforts to implement these basic principles at the IUM with 
reference to two interrelated themes: firstly, the arrangement of students’ bodies in 
space and time; and secondly, provisions for surveillance, examination, reward and 
punishment. 
A concern for fixing students’ bodies in space was most clearly to be seen in the 
campus model put in place at the IUM. Whereas ʿAƟyya Muhammad Salim at the start 
of this chapter described a system in which the norm had been for students to move 
back and forth between lessons, economic pursuits and other spheres of life beyond 
the mosque, at the IUM students were mostly to be engaged full-time during the 
academic year as members of a residential community. In the early days of the 
university, students were accommodated in buildings that had formerly served as 
barracks, without even electricity in the daytime to power fans.193 Later, the university 
expanded into a purpose-built campus, with input from the Canadian architect Arthur 
Erickson who had previously designed the Simon Fraser University in British 
Columbia.194 Although some students report having lived away from the campus – 
including but not limited to those who were able to bring their families to Medina – 
the default expectation has always been that students should be accommodated on-
site, ensuring that the agents, processes and objects of education are confined to a 
                                                        
193 Interview with IUM graduate B, London, 17 December 2010. 
194 Cf. “Arthur Erickson” 2013. 
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single, dedicated location.195 Within the campus environment, students were further 
partitioned through assignation to the university’s growing number of specialist 
colleges, as well as individual dormitory rooms and classrooms. A graduate who 
arrived in Medina in the early 1990s recalled that he and his peers were assigned 
numbered desks at which they would sit for the duration of the academic year, a 
system that he suggested helped to ensure that attendance could be easily 
monitored.196 Although students are of course free to leave the campus site and have 
long been provided with transport to and from the Masjid Nabawi, there have also 
been efforts – at least in theory – to contain their interactions beyond the campus 
setting. According to the letter of current regulations, for example, they are expected 
to avoid spending time unnecessarily in places like cafes and markets, and are subject 
to a curfew requiring them to be in their accommodation by 11pm.197 
Pedagogy at the IUM was also from the start marked by a system of temporal 
distribution that contrasted with the ways in which religious education had long 
operated in mosque study circles. Time was structured around academic years – at 
least three for the secondary level and four for the advanced level, according to the 
1961 arrangements. These were to last nine months each, with lessons taking place 
every day of the week, excluding official holidays; six classes per day at the secondary 
level and four per day for university-level students.198 Where mosque ḥalaqāt had 
historically operated according to the shifting rhythm of the five daily prayers, at the 
IUM lessons came to be fixed according to the profane clock. Where any given series 
of ḥalaqāt had historically finished when the teacher came to the end of the text at 
hand, the IUM’s nine-month academic year had a finality to it marked by an 
examination, which determined whether the student would re-sit the same year or 
                                                        
195 The expectation that all staff and students would live on campus was stipulated in Article 24 
of the original university statutes. At least according to the letter of current regulations, any 
non-Saudi student wishing to reside off campus is expected to submit handwritten 
confirmation from a guardian that the student is living with that guardian (“Dalil al-Talib al-
Jamiʿi” 2013, 39).  
196 Interview with IUM graduate C, London, 14 July 2011. 
197 “Dalil al-Talib al-Jamiʿi” 2013, 39, 48. 
198 “Al-Nizam al-Asasi li-l-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya,” Articles 7 and 8. 
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progress to the next in a succession of temporal segments that made up the duration 
of the course and which would conclude with the certificate of qualification. 
Within this overarching timetable, specific teaching activities were scheduled 
according to fixed curricula. When the university first opened, undergraduate-level 
instruction was limited to a single, generalist programme within what was then known 
as the Higher Studies Department. The syllabuses in place at that point were quite 
minimal. Most courses were built around one or two texts, with the syllabus listing 
how many lessons per week were to be dedicated to each course during each year of 
the four-year programme. Sometimes the syllabuses specified a few further details, 
such as the key issues to be covered, the particular parts of the text which were to be 
dealt with in particular years, or the particular quantities of material that were to be 
taught or memorised. As the IUM expanded and acquired new colleges, it began to 
offer a much larger number of increasingly specialist programmes, with each 
programme further divided into increasingly specialised courses. Curricula in use by 
the early 1990s were much more elaborate, including not only specifications for the 
time to be spent on each course at each stage in the process but also lists of teaching 
objectives, set texts and additional texts for further reference.199 
Making campus life a compulsory part of education for most students at the IUM 
captured their bodies for the purposes of moralisation. According to the founding 
statutes, students were required “to observe the principles of the Islamic University of 
Medina, derived from the spirit of the true religion, to behave according to excellent 
Islamic morals within and outside the university, and to submit to all rulings of the 
shariʿa.” Any who were considered to have strayed into “apostasy, deviation in creed 
or deviation in morals” were to be expelled.200 
While the IUM’s Advisory Council did consider the possibility of distance learning (al-
intisāb) within the first decade of the university’s existence, according to the then 
secretary general Muhammad ibn Nasir al-ʿAbbudi this option was rejected precisely 
because “the goal of founding the university is not merely the attainment of a 
                                                        
199 The content of instruction is discussed further in Chapter 6. 
200 “Al-Nizam al-Asasi li-l-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya,” Articles 12 and 19. 
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scholarly qualification; rather, what is intended is that the student lives in an Islamic 
atmosphere, which will impart to him decent morals and excellent manners” (al-
ʿAbbudi 1970). Although there remained acknowledged reasons for considering 
distance learning as an option – staff member Muhammad al-Sharbini argued a few 
years later that it would help the IUM to achieve expanded reach abroad (al-Sharbini 
n.d.) – provision for this would not be made until several decades down the line, 
following a decision to do so in 2007.201 
The task of moralising students within the campus space was to be performed in part 
by a dedicated system of social supervision, set up soon after the founding of the 
university and responsible for “guidance of students, spurring them to be distinguished 
by excellent morals, the fulfilment of religious rites, [and] the abandonment of the 
pursuit of that which violates masculine virtues [mā yukhill bi-l-murūʾa] or harms 
health”. Its monitoring efforts were facilitated by direct ties to those university 
employees who were routinely on duty outside of normal working ours, including night 
supervisors, drivers and doormen.202 The Syrian Muslim Brother Muhammad al-
Majdhub, who was responsible for overseeing the system of social supervision for 
eighteen months, recalled that he was occupied “night and day” with reports of 
quarrels and students who were lax with their prayers. He blamed the intensity of the 
role for driving him to serious illness (al-Majdhub 1992, 2:331–32).203 
From very early on, the system of social supervision also involved regular trips, during 
which students would be taken to visit locations like the sites of major battles from the 
                                                        
201 When distance-learning was eventually introduced, it was on a fee-paying basis, in contrast 
with the scholarships system which had always been the bedrock of the IUM. There had also 
been an earlier IUM-linked initiative to launch online study programmes with international 
reach; however, this project ended up breaking away from the IUM and becoming affiliated to 
a university in Malaysia. Interview with IUM graduate A (London, 1 December 2011) and 
subsequent email correspondence. 
202 “Dalil al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya” 1971, 140. 
203 It should be acknowledged that students themselves have differing perceptions of the 
extent to which they were subject to such moral surveillance during their time at the IUM, a 
fact which may depend in part on the periods when they studied there. One who graduated 
from the IUM in the early 1990s spoke of a feeling of being constantly watched and said he 
knew of students being expelled for reasons such as repeated laxity in performing their prayers 
(Telephone interview with US-based IUM graduate D, 30 November 2010). Another, who was 
there through most of the 1990s, felt that matters such as prayer had been entirely voluntary 
(Interview with IUM graduate C, London, 14 July 2011). 
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time of the Prophet. During these trips, they would hear lectures from staff members, 
and would practice their own preaching skills by delivering talks themselves and 
offering guidance to local people. Students also took part in regular seminars on 
campus. According to arrangements in place in the early 1970s, all students resident 
on campus were divided into four groups. In any given week, one of these groups 
would attend a seminar, such that every student would attend a seminar at least once 
a month.204 During these sessions, they and staff members read poetry and gave 
presentations on themes from Marxism and the ghazw fikrī, to hadith studies, the 
notion of fraternity, or the situation of Muslims in their respective countries of origin. 
Such occasions thus helped to expand the presence of teaching staff beyond the 
classroom setting, allowing them a greater role in observing and correcting students’ 
behaviour and expressed views. An account of one such seminar notes that staff 
presented towards the end of the session, in order that they could first observe “their 
sons, the students” and would be in a position to offer necessary guidance.205 By the 
early 1990s, the IUM also hosted authorised student societies devoted to such themes 
as Qurʾan studies, hadith studies, creed, legal methodology, inheritance law, daʿwa, 
history, oratory and Arabic calligraphy (al-ʿAbbud 2004, 689–709). 
For long periods of the IUM’s history, figures associated with the Muslim Brothers 
played particularly important roles in these extra-curricular spheres of university life. 
Besides al-Majdhub, another example is al-Sayyid Nazili, who was freed from jail in 
Egypt and relocated to Medina in the mid-1970s, where he was responsible for student 
activities at the IUM for nearly a decade.206 
It is worth noting that in addition to this system of social supervision operated by 
university staff, students have also been subject to the surveillance regime of the 
modern state. Some former students interviewed for this project spoke of a feeling of 
being – as one put it – “surrounded” by the Saudi intelligence services during their 
                                                        
204 “Dalil al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya” 1971, 140–41. 
205 “Akhbar al-Jamiʿa” 1970. 
206 Interview with al-Sayyid Nazili, Cairo, 9 November 2011. See also “al-Ustadh al-Sayyid 
Nazili” 2013. Al-Sayyid Nazili’s role at the IUM is also touched upon in S. al-D. Hasan 2012, 90. 
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time in Medina.207 IUM students who have been arrested in Saudi Arabia include 
Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, a United States citizen who was picked up by the Saudi 
authorities on the university campus in June 2003 over his alleged links to an al-Qaʿida 
cell in the city. He was subsequently sent back to the United States, where he was 
convicted on charges including providing material support to a foreign terrorist 
organisation, conspiring to destroy aircraft and conspiring to assassinate the US 
president.208 
Observation and normative evaluation of students on the IUM campus was further 
achieved through the regular examinations upon which depended their progress 
through the system, which also served the purpose of instilling a sense of meritocratic 
competition. In keeping with this goal, exams were organised in such a way that 
students’ performance could be surveilled, evaluated and put on display not only 
individually but also in comparison with that of their peers. From an early stage, the 
results of these examinations were calculated in quantitative terms and were then 
converted into a hierarchical grading system; ranging from “acceptable” for a score of 
between 50 and 70 per cent, to “excellent” for a score of between 91 and 100 per 
cent.209 This mechanism for calculating evaluative judgement was in turn integrated 
into an economy of rewards and punishments. In extreme cases, students who failed 
to perform satisfactorily could be made to re-sit an academic year or could be expelled 
from the university.210 On a more routine basis, the quantified outcomes for exams 
were given further import insofar as they were put on public display as a source of 
pride or shame. Annual reports published by the IUM sometimes included full lists of 
students studying in each of its colleges, along with their exam results, ordered 
according to their relative success.211 Exam results also came to be routinely tied to 
financial rewards: by the early 1990s, students who earned top grades were eligible for 
an award of 1,000 riyals, which was paid out in addition to the routine financial 
support made available under the university’s scholarship programme and which 
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amounted to more than a whole month’s stipend.212 In at least some cases, outcomes 
of exams were given further import by means of being rendered visible in the 
distribution of bodies. A student who arrived in Medina in the early 1990s recalled that 
not only were he and his peers assigned to a hierarchical spectrum of classes according 
to their exam results from the previous year, but that the allocation of individual 
students to numbered desks within the classroom was also organised according to a 
corresponding system. The student with the strongest exam results would be assigned 
table one, at the front of the room, while the student with the weakest results would 
be made to sit at the highest-numbered table at the back, with the rows in between, 
as well as the ordering of students within rows, arranged on the same principle. The 
distribution of students’ bodies thus had inscribed upon it a visible display of relative 
achievement.213 In addition to the implicit sense of rivalry engendered by such 
practices, the university also organised regular competitions focused on such themes 
as oratory, and memorisation of the Qurʾan, poetry and hadith (al-ʿAbbud 2004, 689–
709). 
None of the above is intended to suggest that pedagogical arrangements at the IUM by 
any means constituted a seamless disciplinary regime. It is certainly the case that there 
were innumerable interstices which allowed for students to escape this system of 
order and surveillance, such as it was. A student who was at the IUM in the 1980s and 
who recalled a sense of being constantly under observation, for example, also 
remembered that he used to evade a ban on televisions in student accommodation by 
going to the lobbies of hotels in Medina to watch FA Cup matches, and that he and 
others would form closed circles of trusted friends to discuss “injustices in Saudi 
Arabia” and other topics which were felt to be taboo on campus.214 
Yet the incorporation of these basic techniques into university life reflected a 
significant shift in approaches to religious education which was the outcome of the 
openness to pedagogical innovation expressed by many of those behind the university 
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in its formative years, and their willingness to reach beyond any narrowly-defined 
Islamic tradition in their quest to develop new ways of embodying and distributing the 
religious knowledge, skills and other forms of spiritual capital needed in order to drive 
the hoped-for religious revival. This was not a case of a pristine and self-contained 
Islamic pedagogical tradition being corrupted or reinvigorated by a distinct and equally 
self-contained Western pedagogical tradition. The “West” imagined by many of those 
at the IUM was of course a construct. Furthermore, the kind of disciplinary techniques 
of surveillance, normative evaluation and periodic correction which had originally been 
popularised in the field of education by Lancaster had far-reaching genealogies, such 
that it would be far too narrow to depict his method as simply a product of the 
England of his day. Historically, the use of disciplinary techniques of timetabling, 
observation and periodic correction in the training of moral subjects has a history 
going back at least to the Middle Ages, when they had featured in Christian monastic 
life (Foucault 1979, 149–50; Asad 1993, 125–67). Geographically, disciplinary methods 
of controlling and managing persons and their labour that would later become 
entrenched in industrial modes of production in Europe were arguably to be found 
earlier on the sugar cane plantations of the colonised Caribbean (Mintz 1986, 48–52). 
Indeed, Lancaster was himself engaged in an intense rivalry with the Reverend Dr 
Andrew Bell, who claimed credit for developing very similar methods of disciplinary 
schooling; in his case, whilst working as an Anglican missionary in Madras from the late 
eighteenth century (Sedra 2011, 19–20). Over time, Lancaster’s disciplinary approach 
to education had been put to work in the name of countless differing projects. 
Lancaster himself had sought to use his system to promote Christian values amongst 
the lower classes, and his methods had subsequently been taken up and spread to the 
Middle East and elsewhere by actors including utilitarian reformers, state functionaries 
and evangelicals, with its manifestation and impact in each case mediated by their 
respective goals and concerns (Mitchell 1991; Sedra 2011). 
However, as David Hogan has suggested, the particular configuration of principles 
underlying Lancaster’s approach was arguably informed by the sociohistorical context 
in which he himself lived; in the context of the market revolution and the concomitant 
consolidation of bourgeois values. On the one hand, methods like the capturing of 
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bodies in time and space, and provision for pervasive monitoring, evaluation and 
correction, reflected a capillary extension of power which could be put to work in the 
name of training morally disciplined subjects. On the other hand, the integration of 
these techniques with methods like classification, examination, and gratification-
punishment according to results represented the “embourgeoisement” of the 
classroom, tied to the rise of the market as an organising principle of society. By 
levelling the playing field within any given group of students, assigning them to the 
same tasks and subjecting them to the same standards of evaluation geared to 
produce comparable results which were in turn correlative with pride, shame, rewards 
and punishments, these techniques encouraged them to contend against each other in 
a purportedly meritocratic manner; thereby channelling their energies, generating a 
desire for relative advancement, and encouraging the internalisation of competitive 
industry (Hogan 1989). 
Disciplinary aspects of education in modern Saudi institutions like the IUM may trace in 
part to the emergence in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century Hijaz of 
techniques like the division of instruction into seamless consecutive stages, the 
development of detailed syllabuses, the use of examinations producing quantified 
results, and so on. As was explored in Chapter 1 of this thesis, such methods appeared 
first in Ottoman state schools and in private schools shaped in part by influences from 
the Indian Subcontinent, before taking root in locations like the Masjid Haram. They 
subsequently became central features of instruction in the new Saudi state-run 
institutions which first took shape in the Hijaz, as explored in Chapter 2. Their role at 
this stage was no doubt consolidated by the input of teaching staff from Egypt and 
other locations in which such techniques had long been widely used. The genealogies 
of certain disciplinary aspects of instruction at the IUM also trace quite directly to US 
universities, which had a major impact on the higher education system in Saudi Arabia. 
Connections between the two systems built up through routes including the early 
involvement of employees of the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) in the 
development of the Saudi education system, the dispatch of employees of the Saudi 
education ministry to the US for training, and proactive efforts by US officials to extend 
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such influence as a matter of political expediency.215 As noted in Chapter 3, the IUM 
was from the early 1980s headed by ʿAbd Allah al-ʿUbayd, an alumnus of Oklahoma 
State University. In the IUM context, such influences played out through developments 
like the introduction of the US-style Grade Point Average system as a way of 
quantifying, ranking and publicly displaying students’ academic performance.216 
While Lancaster’s own project was strongly shaped by the market revolution and 
bourgeois values of the time and place in which he lived, at the IUM the basic 
principles of disciplinary instruction were to be adapted and put into the service of a 
missionary project within the terms of which the expansion of capitalism as an 
organising framework for society was itself understood as an element of the broader 
imperial and neo-imperial campaign glossed as the ghazw fikrī. The moral disciplining 
achieved through continual observation, evaluation and correction was in this context 
to be geared towards the forging of pious Islamic selves, as part of a collective project 
of religious revival; and the industry generated through meritocratic competition was 
to be channelled into the acquisition and missionary dissemination of particular bodies 
of Islamic knowledge. This would involve not only tailoring the content of instruction 
but also seeking to link the classroom psychology of desire, competition and ambition 
to ends other than the pursuit of material profit which defines capitalist market culture. 
The dynamic of appropriation at work here is illustrated by the IUM teacher Mamduh 
Fakhri, in an instance in which he touches upon the sense of time-consciousness that 
became a notable feature of the pedagogical technologies in place at the university; 
the “chasing of time” in the pursuit of the completion of curricula and the passing of 
examinations, as identified by Salim at the start of this chapter. Fakhri reminded his 
readers of six basic duties that are incumbent upon the Muslim university student. 
These included continual repentance (al-tawba), remembrance of God, attachment to 
Islamic heritage old and new, performing all action on the basis of intention dedicated 
to God, and a firm grounding in the real world and the problems of the age. A sixth 
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duty, he suggested, is “utilisation of time in all its fragments, in righteous and 
beneficial deeds”. However, he was quick to emphasise that this sense of time-
consciousness was to be detached from any sense of bourgeois productivity in the 
pursuit of material profit: 
He who said that “time is money” [al-waqt min al-dhahab] greatly diminished [the value 
of] time. This is the logic of the worshippers of gold and material possessions. As for the 
logic of the worshippers of God, time in their eyes is more exalted and more important 
than that. It is that by which he reaches the proximity of God, the sight of His noble face, 
and life in paradise (Fakhri 1968)217 
Another example is found in a piece penned by one Mahmud Babelli, published in the 
IUM journal in 1970, in which he played on the notion of the ranked exam grades 
which were now such a central feature of the pedagogical technologies used to 
discipline students at the IUM and to instil in them a sense of competitive industry. 
Babelli urged students to strive not merely for a pass mark (al-najāḥ) but for excellence 
(al-tafawwuq) in the pursuit of knowledge, as a basis for excellence in other areas of 
life. He reminded his readers that it is only through a continual quest for self-
betterment on the part of the individual – to be achieved through endeavour, 
determination, enterprise and perseverance – that there could be hope for collective 
advancement of the Islamic umma (Babelli 1970). 
Conclusion 
For many of those involved in the university’s formative years, the IUM was in part 
valued because it was understood to offer a potential means of resistance to various 
brands of Cold War-era cultural imperialism which they saw as standing in the way of 
the formation of pious individuals, the constitution of pious societies and the 
establishment of truly sovereign polities. The discourse of the ghazw fikrī often lent 
itself to the construction of a stark binary between what were understood to be 
Islamic civilisation and values, on the one hand, and what were understood to be 
Western civilisation and values, on the other. 
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However, those who shaped the project – both in practice and often also quite 
consciously and explicitly – were perfectly willing to draw on social technologies with 
genealogies which stretched far beyond the Islamic tradition. While the IUM by no 
means represented a seamless disciplinary machine, it did come to operate on the 
basis of broad pedagogical principles informed by disciplinary market culture. These 
processes of appropriation helped to give rise to an institution which was partly built 
around techniques of partitioning, timetabling, pervasive surveillance, systematic 
evaluation, gratification-punishment, and the implicit promotion of competition, which 
differed significantly from styles of instruction in the mosque ḥalaqāt that had been 
the core sites of advanced religious instruction in the Peninsula just a few decades 
earlier. At the same time, those involved in shaping the IUM engaged critically with 
these technologies, seeking to adapt them to new ends; the embodying of religious 
knowledge, skills, pious dispositions and other forms of spiritual capital, and the 
production of self-motivated and activist Islamic missionary subjects. 
Exploration of the social technologies of education which took shape at the IUM, and 
the discourse which surrounded these, serves to emphasise ways in which this 
intervention in transnational religious economies was shaped not only by the interests 
and resources of Saudi state elites but also by a broader set of logics of cultural 
othering and antagonism, on the one hand, and intertwining and appropriation, on the 
other. 
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Chapter 6 
Unequal Reciprocity and the Construction of Correct 
Religious Knowledge at the Islamic University 
From the time that the Islamic University of Medina opened its doors, one of the most 
important forms of spiritual capital distributed to and through its migrant students was 
religious knowledge, or ʿilm, transmitted via processes of instruction referred to as 
taʿlīm. As might be expected, the bodies of knowledge which made up the content of 
teaching at the IUM from the early 1960s onwards were in many ways strongly bound 
up with the Wahhabi modes of religiosity which dominated the Saudi national sphere. 
Yet they were also marked by significant departures from past modes of Wahhabi 
instruction and spiritual practice. In this chapter, I argue that the particular bodies of 
knowledge which came to sit at the core of the university’s daʿwa evolved within the 
terms of the Wahhabi and broader Salafi discursive traditions, in ways shaped in part 
by struggles for influence and authority between actors occupying positions of varying 
strength within transnational religious economies. 
This chapter begins with an overview of the subjects taught at the IUM from the early 
1960s onwards. I then consider ways in which knowledge transmitted to students 
served to mark the external boundaries of the university’s daʿwa through processes of 
othering. This knowledge went some way towards defining the project negatively, in 
contrast to those who were considered to fall beyond the pale of a correct 
understanding of Islam. I go on to explore two core areas of religious knowledge which 
helped to make up the positive content of the IUM’s mission; creed and jurisprudence. 
In all of these aspects of teaching, it is possible to discern ways in which the 
boundaries and content of the IUM daʿwa were influenced by interactions between 
the Wahhabi establishment figures behind the university, on the one hand, and staff 
and students who arrived there from all over the world, on the other. However, creed 
was a particularly crucial subject area for the Wahhabi scholars and it is clear that they 
used their position of strength within the IUM context to press a particular 
understanding of God and worship which had always been the bedrock of Wahhabi 
reformism. When it comes to the subject of jurisprudence, on the other hand, it is 
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easier to trace dynamics of unequal reciprocity at work between the IUM and its 
foreign staff and students; subtle, power-laden processes of give and take which saw 
these migrant actors influencing the content of the university’s daʿwa at the same time 
as they were influenced by it. 
These dynamics of reciprocity were bound up with power relations in two ways. On 
the one hand, they were in the first place unequal insofar as they occurred within the 
context of institutional and social relations which placed foreign staff and especially 
students in subordinate positions relative to the key Wahhabi scholars and Saudi state 
actors involved in the project, in terms of access to capital and control over its 
distribution. On the other hand, these processes of reciprocity also had a role to play in 
forging power relations, in that they were part and parcel of the construction of the 
IUM’s missionary enterprise as a hegemonic project. The bodies of knowledge – as well 
as skills, modes of comportment, embodied virtues, and other kinds of spiritual goods 
– distributed by the IUM were part of a heterogeneous, mutable Salafi tradition. 
Within the terms of this tradition, there was space for those behind the university to 
adjust the precise content of instruction in ways intended to help secure the consent 
of students and those to whom they would preach, in the sense of facilitating a 
process by which they would come to value the forms of spiritual capital in question. It 
was hoped that such moves would help to channel their energies into the missionary 
endeavour to distribute these resources to communities worldwide. 
Delineating the Content of Teaching 
When the IUM first opened its doors, advanced instruction took place only in its single, 
generalist, undergraduate-level Higher Studies Department (al-qism al-ʿālī). The 
subjects taught there were tawḥīd, Islamic sects, tafsīr, hadith studies, fiqh, uṣūl al-fiqh, 
Arabic grammar, reading, composition and rhetoric (al-inshāʾ wa-l-khiṭāba), literature 
(mukhtārāt adabiyya), and the art of good linguistic style (al-balāgha). Students in this 
undergraduate-level department were presumably expected to already have a solid 
grounding in a number of other subjects which were taught in the secondary school-
level department which also existed at that stage. These subjects included 
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memorisation of the Qurʾan, calligraphy or handwriting (al-khaṭṭ), inheritance law, and 
Arab and Islamic history.218 
The founding documents also provided for a special department to teach languages 
other than Arabic outside of the usual hours of study.219 Advertisements for a teacher 
of English and French which appeared in the local press as early as November 1961 
were presumably answered, since contemporary newspaper reports show that a 
department dedicated to teaching English as a foreign language did indeed open at the 
IUM, seemingly in early 1962.220 Within a decade of the university’s founding, English 
was being taught as an integrated part of the main study programmes in the 
intermediate school-level institute, the secondary school-level institute and in the 
College of Daʿwa that had all come into being within the IUM by that time.221 This is a 
noteworthy development in an institution controlled by Wahhabi scholars, given the 
extent of ʿulamaʾ resistance to the teaching of European languages at the time of the 
emergence of the new Saudi state education system just a few decades earlier.222 
Previously, the study of European languages had been seen as a route by which 
corrupting influences might enter into society. Now, mastery of foreign languages 
came to be viewed as important precisely in order to exert influence in the other 
direction. In the months running up to the opening of the IUM, the local newspaper al-
Madina al-Munawwara had published an article urging that the university’s students 
should be trained in foreign languages in order to facilitate their daʿwa and their 
disputations with Christian missionaries (Manaʿ 1961). In the university’s founding 
documents, the teaching of European languages was justified with reference to “the 
need for conveyance of the Islamic daʿwa”.223 It is worth noting that by the early 1970s 
English was being taught in the College of Daʿwa, which was especially geared towards 
training missionaries, but not in the College of Shariʿa. 
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Over time, as the IUM took on more staff and expanded to include multiple colleges, it 
began to offer a greatly expanded range of subjects structured into increasingly 
specialised courses of study. By the early 1990s, this included separate programmes 
devoted to Qurʾanic studies, hadith studies, creed, daʿwa, the Prophetic biography and 
history, jurisprudence and Islamic judicature (al-qaḍāʾ al-sharʿī), Islamic education, and 
Arabic language.224 Each of these programmes included numerous specific areas of 
focus; the flagship programme of jurisprudence and Islamic judicature, for example, 
encompassing classes in inter alia jurisprudence, inheritance law, the history of Islamic 
legislation (tārīkh al-tashrīʿ), uṣūl al-fiqh, judicature in Islam, Islamic politics (al-siyāsa 
al-sharʿiyya), and the history of judicature. 
These broad subject headings give a sense of the range of teaching that took shape at 
the IUM and how this changed over time. However, in order to better understand the 
nature of the university’s missionary endeavour, it is necessary to explore more 
specific aspects of the religious knowledge that circulated in class and on campus. 
Knowledge of Others 
The university’s founding document framed its mission in generically Islamic terms, as 
a project undertaken by and for Muslims without further specification. Its graduates 
were to be “callers to the religion and followers of the truth, to give lectures and write 
in reply to the atheists, and to protect the territory of religion and solve problems that 
befall Muslims in their religious and worldly affairs”.225 
In reality, however, it is clear that the IUM was set up to promote a very particular 
understanding of Islam, adhered to only by a portion of those worldwide who would 
consider themselves to be Muslims. In an account of the goals of the IUM attributed to 
its then president Ibn Baz in 1971, the university was described as promoting “a correct, 
complete understanding [of Islam], as it was understood by the Salaf al-Salih and the 
first Muslims” (italics added). Its graduates were to undertake not only to “explain the 
merits of Islam” but also to “purify it from that which has become linked to it by way of 
superstitions and errors, and that which has become attached to it by way of the lies 
                                                        
224 al-ʿAbbud 2004, 461–83, 484–521, 522–35, 536–46, 547–59, 560–98, 599–617, 618–63. 
225 “Al-Nizam al-Asasi li-l-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya,” Article 1. 
 193 
and innovations which have been spread by its enemies and those who are ignorant of 
it”. It was hoped that the university’s efforts would serve to draw new converts to 
Islam. However, more importantly, these efforts were “a means of enlightening 
Muslims with regard to their religion”.226 
Similarly, writing in the IUM journal in the late 1970s, the then de facto head of the 
IUM ʿAbd Allah al-Zayid noted that 
The goal [of the IUM] is to strive to produce ʿulamaʾ who follow in the footsteps of the 
Pious Ancestors [al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ] and who drink from the correct religious sciences, 
which are based on the creed of tawḥīd and which turn in its orbit; far from the falsity 
that has duped Muslims into mistaking untruth for truth. [The IUM] returns these 
graduates… to their countries in order for them to assist the Muslims, many of whom 
have been led by illegitimate innovations [bidaʿ] in every madhhab, and have been 
carried away by superstitions [khurāfāt] in every school of thought, and many of whom 
have become like feathers blown in the wind (al-Zayid n.d.) 
The boundaries of the correct understanding of Islam promoted by the university were 
demarcated in part through processes of othering, whereby students were informed 
and warned about those who were considered to fall beyond the pale of orthodoxy. To 
this end, the original syllabus from the early 1960s provided for students in the fourth 
year of the university-level department to receive three classes per week on the 
genesis, teachings and principles of “the sects which trace their genealogies to Islam”. 
While little further information is available about the precise content of this course, 
the spirit of it is clear from the title of what appears to have been a two-volume text 
used as its basis: The Godless Modern Doctrines and Their Principles, with an 
Explanation of Their Falsity with Reference to Proofs both Rational and Handed Down. 
At least from the title and the context in which it featured on the syllabus, this appears 
to have been a work geared towards mobilising evidence from the Qurʾan and the 
Sunna, and also evidence derived from thinking independently of these source texts, to 
prove the illegitimacy of certain minority sects whose adherents claim allegiance to 
Islam. 
By the early 1990s, various classes taught at the IUM served to define correct spiritual 
belief and practice in opposition both to other religions and also in opposition to 
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Islamic sects which were understood as having strayed from orthodoxy. A course on 
religions taught to third-year undergraduates enrolled on the creed programme was 
intended to impart the awareness that anyone who subscribes to a faith other than 
Islam will be “amongst the losers in the afterlife”.227 Students were to be taught about 
the extent of the distortion which Christians and Jews have inserted into the Torah and 
the Bible, and they were to learn the “truth” about Judaism and Christianity, past and 
present. The course was based in part on Hidayat al-Hayara, a refutation of Judaism 
and Christianity by Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350), the Damascene student of Ibn 
Taymiyya who is an important influence within the Wahhabi tradition.228 Two other 
core texts on Judaism and Christianity were polemical works authored by well-known 
contemporary Egyptian authors, both trained at Cairo’s Dar al-ʿUlum. One of these is 
Lectures on Christianity by Muhammad Abu Zahra (b. 1898), which was originally 
written as an aid for students at a time when the author was teaching on this subject 
at al-Azhar. It contrasts Christian beliefs with understandings of the life and legacy of 
Jesus grounded in the Qurʾan and the Islamic tradition.229 The other is Judaism by 
Ahmad Shalabi, who was born in the early 1920s and had also studied at Cambridge 
University under such figures as Arthur John Arberry. This work depicts Moses as the 
first Zionist, portrays Protocols of the Elders of Zion as a Jewish holy book, and in later 
editions details supposed Jewish conspiracies aimed at world domination.230 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion also appeared on the IUM syllabus for the same course 
as further reference material. Other texts which were listed for further reference 
included works by the Syrian activist Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib (d. 1969), a close 
associate of Rashid Rida and co-founder of the Salafiyya Bookstore in Cairo in 1909, 
and the Egyptian Muhammad ʿAbd Allah Diraz (b. 1894), who was trained at al-Azhar 
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and the Sorbonne.231 Also listed for reference was the famous nineteenth-century 
refutation of Christianity Demonstration of the Truth by an author named here as 
Rahmat Allah al-Hindi (d. 1891). The latter was in fact the same Indian scholar, actually 
from a Shiʿi background, who had eventually seƩled in the Hijaz and had founded the 
Madrasa Sawlatiyya discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis. This particular text had 
become very influential right from the time that it was first published, partly because 
of the author’s engagement with what was then a quite new European tradition of 
Bible criticism.232 
Many authors have drawn attention to the phenomenon of anti-Semitism and hostile 
attitudes to adherents of faiths other than Islam in Saudi educational institutions. Such 
discourse was indeed entrenched in IUM syllabuses and was also common in the 
university journal, and it played a role in marking the outer limits of the institution’s 
daʿwa. It is worth remarking that the literature drawn upon in this context derived not 
from a specifically Wahhabi corpus but from a broader tradition of anti-Christian and 
anti-Jewish polemic by non-Wahhabi Muslim authors, as well as the European anti-
Semitism found in documents like Protocols of the Elders of Zion. It is also worth noting 
that at least some of the literature cited here, including Demonstration of the Truth, 
had originally been produced in response to polemic refutations of Islam by European 
Christian missionaries.233 Through the inclusion of these texts on the IUM’s syllabuses, 
profoundly hostile forms of othering which had long been deeply embedded in the 
Wahhabi tradition came to be fleshed out and related to broader discursive 
frameworks, both Islamic and otherwise. 
In addition to being distinguished from faiths other than Islam, in the early 1990s the 
IUM’s daʿwa also continued to be defined in contrast to forms of religious belief and 
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practice which were in one way or another related to the Islamic tradition. It is 
possible to get a sense of the kind of discourse that circulated on such issues from the 
outline of a separate course on “sects”, taught to fourth-year students on the creed 
programme.234 At first sight, the works set as core texts for this course seem 
somewhat surprising. One is The Book of Sects and Systems of Thought235, an epic and 
historically quite unique study of Islamic sects and other religions and philosophies by 
Abu al-Fath Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim al-Shahrastani (d. 1153). This scholar from 
Khurasan in what is now Iran described himself as adhering to Ashʿari creed, which is 
mainstream within Sunni Islam but is generally understood as standing in a position of 
antagonism with the Salafi creed which is at the core of the Wahhabi tradition.236 
Moreover, al-Shahrastani was even accused – both during his lifetime and later – of 
Ismaʿili Shiʿi leanings which would certainly not sit comfortably with Wahhabi 
understandings of orthodoxy (Monnot 2002; Esposito 2003a). The other core work on 
the same IUM course at that time was Maqalat al-Islamiyin, a survey of the varying 
views of Muslim thinkers on key issues of theology written by Abu al-Hasan al-Ashʿari 
(d. 935), who was in fact the originator of the Ashʿari tradiƟon of creed (Watt 2002c; 
Leaman 2009). The inclusion of these works as core texts on IUM syllabuses must be 
understood in terms of their historical importance as part of the broader Islamic 
corpus. It is also possible that these texts may have been valued insofar as they helped 
to frame critique of what were considered to be heterodox factions in such a way that 
this critique would not be perceived by students as a mere expression of narrow 
Wahhabi or Salafi exclusivism. Finally, the use of a work by Abu al-Hasan al-Ashʿari in 
particular ought also to be understood in connection with broader efforts to 
undermine contemporary Ashʿaris by emphasising arguments that the views of al-
Ashʿari himself were in fact much more in line with Salafi understandings of orthodoxy; 
                                                        
234 al-ʿAbbud 2004, 531–33. 
235 This English-language rendering of the original title Kitab al-Milal wa-l-Nihal is borrowed 
from Esposito 2003a. 
236 The various creedal traditions are discussed briefly in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
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and that it was only his later followers who – at least partly because of the corrupting 
influence of Greek philosophy – led the Ashʿari tradiƟon into deviaƟon.237 
The description of the specific goals of this course make reference to familiar Salafi 
themes. Amongst its objectives were “that students know the Islamic sects and that all 
but one of them are in Hell”, and “that students know the saved sect, which is al-
Jamaʿa”. The laƩer term is presumably used here to refer to those believers 
understood as being faithful to the original beliefs and practices of the Prophet and his 
Companions; those who claim this status commonly referring to themselves in Arabic 
as “Ahl al-Sunna wa-l-Jamaʿa”. Students on this course were also expected to come to 
understand “that the basis of division is bidʿa and that the basis of al-Jamaʿa is the 
Sunna”.238 
A series of works listed for further reference included more predictable candidates. 
Among them were a text by Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib condemning Twelver Shiʿism.239 
Students were also directed to an anti-Sufi tract by ʿAbd al-Rahman ibn ʿAbd al-Khaliq, 
an Egyptian who had studied at the IUM and subsequently became a leading, Kuwait-
based proponent of fusing Salafi religiosity with politically-engaged activism.240 Also 
listed was The Phenomenon of Postponement in Islamic Thought by another IUM 
graduate, the Saudi Sahwi figurehead Safar al-Hawali. After completing his 
undergraduate studies at the IUM, al-Hawali had written this text as his PhD thesis 
under the supervision of Muhammad Qutb, the brother of Sayyid Qutb, at Umm al-
Qura University in Mecca. It dealt with the Murjiʿa movement in the early centuries of 
Islam, which over time came to be criticised for “emphasising ‘faith’ over ‘works’” 
(Zaman 2002, 156). Building on his earlier work critiquing secularism, al-Hawali used 
the Murjiʿa as a point of reference to censure those today who think it possible to 
                                                        
237 On the evolution of the Ashʿari tradiƟon in ways which strayed from the posiƟons of its 
eponymous founder, see Watt 2002b. 
238  The term Sunna refers to “established custom, normative precedent, conduct, and 
cumulative tradition, typically based on Muhammad's example” (Esposito 2003b). 
239 The text in question is al-Khutut al-ʿArida li-l-Usus allati Qama ʿalayha Din al-Shiʿa al-
Imamiyya al-Ithna ʿAshariyya. 
240 The text in question is al-Fikr al-Sufi fi Dawʾ al-Kitab wa-l-Sunna. 
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remain faithful to Islam in belief whilst eschewing fulfilment of their religious duties in 
practice (Zaman 2002, 156–57; Alshamsi 2007, 69–71). 
Articles published in the university journal confirm a propensity on the part of those 
involved to engage in strident refutations of sects considered unorthodox. It is worth 
noting that the ways in which these processes of othering played out at the IUM were 
very much bound up with the particular sociohistorical context in which the university 
existed, as well as its status as a site for the gathering together of scholars and 
students from a whole array of geographical and cultural backgrounds. Some who 
came under attack in the university journal, like the Shiʿa, had long been targets of 
criticism within the Wahhabi tradition.241 However, other attacks focused on groups – 
such as the Ahmadis and the Bahaʾis – which had originated and remained 
concentrated in locations far beyond the Peninsula, and which had not even existed at 
the time when Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab first embarked on his revivalist 
mission.242 The role of long-distance connections in shaping the particular processes of 
othering that occurred at the IUM is neatly illustrated by an article published in the 
university journal in the mid-1970s refuting the Ahmadi movement, which had 
emerged in the late nineteenth-century Punjab on the basis of claims to prophecy 
made by its leader Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.243 The article in question was framed as 
having been written in response to a letter sent by Thai Muslims to a Thai student at 
the IUM, concerning efforts by Ahmadis to proselytise in that country (ʿAbd al-Ghaffar 
Hasan n.d.). It was written by the hadith specialist ʿAbd al-Ghaffar Hasan who, as a 
South Asian scholar associated with the Ahl-i Hadith Salafi movement in Pakistan, 
would have been particularly well-placed to engage with the claims of the Ahmadis. 
Before arriving at the IUM, ʿAbd al-Ghaffar Hasan had in fact been jailed in Pakistan for 
11 months in 1953 in connection with anti-Ahmadi sectarianism by Mawdudi’s Jamaat-
i Islami movement, with which he had also for a time been affiliated (U. Hasan 2009). 
                                                        
241 Examples of articles on the Shiʿa in the IUM journal include al-Muhaysin n.d.; al-Ghamari 
1971. 
242 For an example of an article in the IUM journal portraying Bahaʾism as the product of 
Russian espionage, Masonic conspiracy and international Zionism, see Shaybat al-Hamd n.d. 
243 Ghulam Ahmad “claimed to be a ‘nonlegislating’ prophet (thus not in opposition to the 
mainstream belief in the finality of Muhammad's ‘legislative’ prophecy) with a divine mandate 
for the revival and renewal of Islam” (Esposito 2003c). 
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The extent to which these processes of identity formation were bound up with the 
particular sociohistorical context within which the university emerged and evolved is 
further illustrated by a section in the IUM journal catalogue on “contemporary schools 
of thought” (al-madhāhib al-muʿāṣira). Articles grouped together under this heading 
deal with a whole range of topics including not only religiously-defined groups like the 
Ahmadis but also Orientalists, the Masons, communism and socialism, secularism and 
Zionism. Thus heterodox religious groups are treated alongside contemporary social 
and political movements as illegitimate – and often threatening – “others”. Such 
discourse may well have been introduced into the IUM context by foreign staff 
members associated with the Muslim Brothers, and those influenced by them. 
Stéphane Lacroix observes that a course on “contemporary schools of thought” was 
first introduced onto the creed curriculum at Umm al-Qura University in Mecca thanks 
to the efforts of the Syrian Muslim Brother Muhammad Amin al-Masri, and that it was 
taught at different times by the Egyptian Muhammad Qutb and the Saudi Sahwi 
figurehead Safar al-Hawali (Lacroix 2011, 48). In that light, it is notable that al-Masri 
served on the IUM’s Advisory Council from 1974 and that a similar course on IUM 
syllabuses included texts by both Qutb and al-Hawali as further reading.244 
In the ways outlined here, knowledge transmitted to students through course content 
and the university journal went some way towards defining the IUM’s mission and 
constructing a sense of identity in opposition to non-Muslims, perceived heterodox 
sects, and various contemporary social and political trends which were presented as 
being incompatible with a correct understanding of Islam. In many ways, these 
processes of othering were not particularly distinctive to the IUM. Groups like the Shiʿ a, 
and especially the Ahmadis and the Bahaʾis, might equally come in for strident criƟcism 
in many Sunni contexts. However, the special attention given to the issue of 
recognising and condemning heterodox sects – and particularly the inclusion of anti-
Sufi material on the syllabus – points in the direction of the university’s Wahhabi-
influenced mission. In order to understand this mission more fully, it is necessary to 
explore not only its external boundaries by also its positive content. In what follows, I 
                                                        
244 The course in question was that focusing on the ghazw fikrī, as discussed in Chapter 5. Cf. 
al-ʿAbbud 2004, 1:542–45. 
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do so with reference to two areas of religious knowledge that were considered 
particularly important in this context, creed and the jurisprudence. 
Knowledge of God 
In many ways, the setting of boundaries as described in the preceding section related 
directly to the issue of creed (al-ʿaqīda), a field of inquiry which – within the Islamic 
tradition, broadly conceived – encompasses debates over such issues as the attributes 
of God, the uncreated nature of the Qurʾan, the Last Day and the afterlife, the 
infallibility of the prophets, the question of whether or not there exist standards of 
good and evil independent of God’s will, and the conceptual tensions between free will, 
determinism and moral responsibility (Watt 2002a). As was mentioned in the 
introduction to this thesis, one particularly significant aspect of creed in Wahhabi or 
more broadly Salafi contexts like the IUM is a distinctive understanding of the 
fundamental concept of tawḥīd, or the unicity of God. The understanding of tawḥīd in 
question pre-dated Wahhabism but became the cornerstone of the Wahhabi mission 
from the time of its emergence in the eighteenth century. 
The Salafi conception of tawḥīd to which Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab subscribed 
encompasses three distinct aspects to God’s unicity: tawḥīd of lordship (tawḥīd al-
rubūbiyya), tawḥīd of divinity (tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya), and tawḥīd of names and attributes 
(tawḥīd al-asmāʾ wa-l-ṣifāt).245 In the context of a broader discussion of Salafi creed, 
Bernard Haykel explains these three terms as follows: tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya implies 
“that God has certain powers as the Lord of Creation and to attribute any of these to 
other than Him constitutes unbelief”; tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya “implies that all forms of 
worship must be directed exclusively towards God and no one else, and to worship 
other than God constitutes unbelief”; and tawḥīd al-asmāʾ wa-l-ṣifāt entails “believing 
in the depiction of God as it is presented in the texts of revelation without inquiring 
about modality or metaphorical interpretation” (2009, 39, fn. 14). As Haykel notes, the 
particularly significant distinction is that between tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya and tawḥīd al-
ulūhiyya, terms which he suggests appear to have been in use since the time of Ibn 
                                                        
245 On Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s understanding of the concept of tawḥīd, see DeLong-Bas 2004, 
56–61. The translations of the particular Arabic terms used for the three types of tawḥīd here 
are borrowed  from DeLong-Bas and Haykel 2009, 39. 
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Taymiyya (d. 1328), a scholar who was a key inspiration for Wahhabi revivalism. The 
Wahhabis’ commitment to distinguishing between these two forms of tawḥīd helped 
to lay the ground for their fierce opposition to many popular religious practices. This is 
because a person who asserts their commitment to tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya by standing by 
the declaration that “There is no God but God” can still be understood as violating the 
principle of monotheism – specifically, tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya – if they engage in practices 
seen as in effect constituting worship of entities other than God. Even if they fulfil 
other key Islamic duties such as performing the five daily prayers, undertaking the 
pilgrimage and paying zakat taxes, they may nonetheless thereby be understood as 
straying into shirk, or polytheism. Insofar as practices perceived as violating tawḥīd al-
ulūhiyya might be understood to amount to shirk, this could result in condemnation 
not only of the act but also of the actor in question – as a mushrik, or polytheist, and 
therefore outside the fold of Islam. 
Common practices that came to be forcefully condemned in light of the Wahhabi 
understanding of tawḥīd included certain kinds of visitation of shrines and tombs, 
where this was seen as amounting to worship of the deceased; seeking the 
intercession of saints; use of charms and amulets; and sorcery and fortune-telling 
(DeLong-Bas 2004, 61–77; Haj 2009, 30–66).246 The anti-Sufism that became a hallmark 
of Wahhabism – and which distinguished it from many other forms of eighteenth 
century revivalism – was also bound up with the view that many common Sufi beliefs 
and practices similarly violated the principle of tawḥīd, correctly understood. Related 
concerns underlay the Wahhabis’ condemnation of the Shiʿa, while some scholars 
within the tradition were even prepared to write off whole populations of self-
professed Sunni Muslims – such as the Ottoman forces which invaded Najd in the 
nineteenth century and those local residents who allied with them – as polytheists (Al-
Fahad 2004; Wagemakers 2012b, 95). 
As was discussed in Chapter 2, from the eighteenth century theology was taught in 
Wahhabi circles in Najd with special reference to core works by Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab; 
                                                        
246 It is worth noting that the DeLong-Bas text cited here has been criticised as an apologetic 
for Wahhabism, written “under the patronage of Saudi princes and research centres” (Al-
Rasheed 2007, 10). It is cited in the present thesis advisedly and sparingly. 
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these included his key treatise Kitab al-Tawhid and a polemical tract which he had 
written to counter his opponents titled Kitab Kashf al-Shubahat (Commins 2005, 123–
24). 
When the IUM opened its doors some two centuries later, correcting creed and 
combating perceived polytheism remained of paramount concern for the Wahhabi 
establishment. It was thus to be anticipated that Wahhabi scholars like Muhammad 
ibn Ibrahim and ʿAbd al-ʿAziz ibn Baz would use their positions of strength within the 
university – deriving from their close relationship with the state actors who disbursed 
the material capital that made the project possible and their own bureaucratically 
mapped influence over the processes by which capital was distributed – to ensure that 
the teaching of this subject dealt with these core concerns. 
At the time when the IUM began operation, it did so on the basis of founding statutes 
which included a pre-approved syllabus listing the specific works that were to be used 
for teaching and offering some further details about what were to be the goals and 
methods of instruction. According to this document, students were to be taught about 
“the three parts of tawḥīd, and they are tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya and al-rubūbiyya, and 
tawḥīd al-asmāʾ wa-l-ṣifāt”.247 It is thus clear that the university was indeed explicitly 
committed from the start to the tripartite Salafi conception of tawḥīd that is so central 
to Wahhabi theology. 
In line with this approach, the study of tawḥīd in the IUM’s secondary school-level 
institute at that time was to involve memorisation of text from Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s 
key manifesto Kitab al-Tawhid. Students were also expected to engage with Fath al-
Majid, a famous commentary on Kitab al-Tawhid by Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s grandson 
ʿAbd al-Rahman ibn Hasan which had earlier been taught in the Scholastic Institute in 
1920s Mecca. In the third year, students were to study al-ʿAqida al-Wasitiyya by Ibn 
Taymiyya, a scholar who was a key influence on Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab. In 
fact, al-ʿAqida al-Wasitiyya was itself such an important work in this context that it has 
been suggested that at least one text on the subject of creed penned by Ibn ʿAbd al-
Wahhab – a letter to the populace of al-Qasim – was basically a paraphrased version of 
                                                        
247 “Al-Nizam al-Asasi li-l-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya,” Article 15. 
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it (Al-Fahad 2004, fn. 12). It is thus abundantly clear that the knowledge of 
fundamental aspects of correct creed transmitted to students at this basic level of 
study at the time when the IUM first opened was situated very firmly indeed within 
the Wahhabi tradition. 
The content specified for lessons on tawḥīd that were to be delivered to students at 
the undergraduate level at this early stage in the university’s history is at first sight 
somewhat less obviously “Wahhabi” in character. The equivalent course at this level 
was to last three years and this entire period was to be devoted to the study of a 
commentary on al-ʿAqida al-Tahawiyya, an important statement of creed by Abu Jaʿfar 
al-Tahawi (d. 933).248 The commentary in question was authored by Ibn Abi al-ʿIzz, a 
fourteenth-century qadi who lived in Damascus and Egypt.249 It merits some brief 
discussion, since it remained an important reference for the teaching of creed at the 
IUM for decades. What is initially slightly surprising in relation to the inclusion of this 
text in an IUM course concerned with creed is that al-Tahawi and apparently also Ibn 
Abi al-ʿIzz came from Hanafi backgrounds. Those who adhere to the Hanafi madhhab in 
jurisprudence are commonly committed to Maturidi or Ashʿari creed, rather than the 
Salafi creed which is such an important component of the Wahhabi tradition and 
which is far more closely associated with the Hanbali madhhab.250 However, on closer 
inspection the genealogy of Ibn Abi al-ʿIzz and his commentary on al-ʿAqida al-
Tahawiyya actually turn out to be quite closely interwoven with that of the Wahhabi 
tradition. An edition of the same commentary had been published in Mecca as far back 
as 1930, under the supervision of a committee headed by ʿAbd Allah ibn Hasan Al al-
Shaykh, the Wahhabi scholar who was at that time the Saudi-appointed Grand Qadi of 
                                                        
248 On Abu Jaʿfar al-Tahawi, see Calder 2002. 
249 The syllabus names the text to be taught as Sharh al-Tahawiyya, without specifying the 
author. However, individuals who studied at the IUM in this early period confirm that the text 
in question was the commentary authored by Ibn Abi al-ʿIzz. E.g. interview with IUM graduate 
Suhaib Hasan, London, 14 January 2013. Details of the author’s biography, along with an 
overview of the work itself and its location within the broader canon, are given in the front 
matter in ʿAli ibn ʿAli ibn Muhammad Ibn Abi al-ʿIzz n.d.; ʿAli ibn ʿAli Ibn Abi al-ʿIzz 2000. 
250 Cf. Al-Fahad 2004, 489n10. Al-Fahad notes that the Hanbali madhhab is distinguished from 
the other mainstream Sunni madhāhib in that it is tightly bound up with positions on matters 
of both creed and jurisprudence, rather than just the latter. 
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the Hijaz (ʿAbd Allah ibn Hasan ibn Husayn Al al-Shaykh 1930).251 While the editors of 
that edition were somewhat circumspect about the precise identity of the author, they 
noted that the text itself makes it clear that he was a student of the Syrian Shafiʿi 
scholar ʿImad al-Din Ismaʿil Ibn Kathir (d. 1373).252 The latter was in turn a student of 
the influential Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyya, who was such a key reference for 
Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab and his successors (Laoust 2002b). Ibn Kathir’s own 
work, particularly his tafsīr, was also given considerable weight in Wahhabi circles 
(Commins 2005, 48–49, 124; Williams 2009). 
One early graduate of the IUM suggested that this particular work by Ibn Abi al-ʿIzz 
may have been included on syllabuses – in place of creed texts more commonly 
associated with the Wahhabi tradition, by Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab himself and 
others like Ibn Taymiyya – partly because it would have been more readily accepted by 
the wide range of people travelling to the university from far beyond the Peninsula.253 
This text has the virtue of communicating a Salafi approach to creed amenable to the 
Wahhabis, whilst establishing a link with broader Islamic scholarship beyond the 
confines of the Wahhabi traditions of Najd. Ibn Abi al-ʿIzz approvingly cites work by the 
founder of the Hanafi madhhab, Abu Hanifa, whilst distancing himself from the creedal 
views developed by many of Abu Hanifa’s later followers in the Hanafi tradition254; the 
implication being that Ibn Abi al-ʿIzz’s own Salafi positions on matters of creed are 
more authentically orthodox – and more in keeping with the views of Abu Hanifa – 
than those of many contemporary Hanafis. There is a clear parallel here with the ways 
                                                        
251 It was published by the Salafi Press, a printing house founded in Mecca in 1928 by the 
Syrian ʿAbd al-Fattah Qatlan and the Hijazi Muhammad Salih Nasif, apparently emulating the 
Salafiyya Press established earlier in Cairo by Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib with Qatlan’s 
involvement (Lauzière 2008, 162–63). I am grateful to Saud al-Sarhan for drawing my attention 
to this connection. 
252 It is worth noting that the editors of the 1930 edition suggest that the most likely candidate 
to have authored the text is Sadr al-Din ʿAli ibn Muhammad ibn al-ʿIzz al-Adhraʿi al-Dimashqi al-
Hanafi (d. 746 H.) (cf. ʿAbd Allah Al al-Shaykh 1930). Ahmad Muhammad Shakir, editing a later 
edition, identifies the author as Sadr al-Din ʿAli ibn ʿAli ibn Muhammad ibn ʿAbi al-ʿIzz al-Hanafi 
(731-792 H.) (cf. ʿAli ibn ʿAli ibn Muhammad Ibn Abi al-ʿIzz n.d.). It is clear that there are some 
discrepancies here, particularly in the dates given. 
253 Interview with Suhaib Hasan, London, 14 January 2013. 
254 This point is made in the translator’s preface in ʿAli ibn ʿAli Ibn Abi al-ʿIzz 2000, xx. 
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in which the works of Abu al-Hasan al-Ashʿari are “reclaimed” from contemporary 
Ashʿaris, as discussed earlier in this chapter. 
While such considerations are worth taking into account, it should be noted that 
another more recent graduate suggested that Ibn Abi al-ʿIzz’s commentary on al-ʿAqida 
al-Tahawiyya is a common enough reference in Salafi scholarship that he saw no need 
to think that its inclusion on the IUM’s syllabuses had anything specifically to do with 
the university’s efforts to reach out to non-Wahhabi Muslims.255 At the time of writing, 
I am unable to offer any more conclusive view about the context of the inclusion of 
this particular commentary as the key work for teaching tawḥīd at the IUM. However, 
it is worth noting that I have been unable to locate any reference to this work in al-
Durar al-Saniyya fi al-Ajwiba al-Najdiyya, the several-thousand-page compendium of 
Wahhabi scholarship going back to the eighteenth century, suggesting that it may not 
historically have been an important point of reference in the Wahhabi tradition.256 On 
the other hand, it is also significant that another edition of the same text appears to 
have been produced prior to the founding of the IUM specifically for use in the system 
of Saudi Scholastic Institutes, which were not primarily concerned with training non-
Saudis, suggesting that it was not only introduced at the IUM in order to appeal to 
foreign students.257 
Syllabuses in use for tawḥīd courses at the IUM in the early 1990s show many 
continuities with this earlier set-up. In the intermediate school-level institute linked to 
the university, the subject was again to be taught with reference to Ibn ʿAbd al-
Wahhab’s own Kitab al-Tawhid, as well as an introduction to Risalat Ibn Abi Zayd al-
Qayrawani.258 The original author of this text, Abu Muhammad ʿAbd Allah ibn Abi Zayd 
al-Qayrawani (d. 996) was a north African Maliki scholar who wrote in opposition to 
perceived excesses of mysticism and claims of miracle-working, concerns which were 
                                                        
255 Interview with IUM graduate A, London, 24 January 2013. 
256 I am grateful to David Commins for correspondence on this issue. 
257 I am grateful to Saud al-Sarhan for sending me an image of the front cover of this edition. 
The title is Sharh al-ʿAqida al-Tahawiyya and it appears to have been published in Damascus, 
although the name of the publisher is unclear. 
258 The intermediate institute tawḥīd syllabus is reproduced in al-ʿAbbud 2004, 1:427–8. 
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of course later of paramount importance in the Wahhabi tradition (Idris 2002).259 
Students enrolled in the secondary school-level institute were again to study the whole 
of ʿAbd al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh’s Fath al-Majid and the whole of what seems to be a 
commentary on Ibn Taymiyya’s al-ʿAqida al-Wasitiyya written by Muhammad Khalil 
Harras, a contemporary Egyptian Azhari with links to the Ansar al-Sunna al-
Muhammadiyya Salafi movement.260  
At the undergraduate level, a list of objectives set for the teaching of tawḥīd included 
that students should acquire a detailed knowledge of the distinction between tawḥīd 
al-ulūhiyya and tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya, as well as being informed about tawḥīd al-asmāʾ 
wa-l-ṣifāt. Furthermore, they were expected to know “the sound Salafi method for the 
determination of creed”, as well as the methods employed by those who transgress 
from this creed and how to go about critiquing them (al-ʿAbbud 2004, 1:524–5). The 
main texts taught on tawḥīd at this level were a series of works by Ibn Taymiyya; Shifaʾ 
al-ʿAlil by Ibn al-Qayyim; the same commentary by Ibn Abi al-ʿIzz on al-ʿAqida al-
Tahawiyya; and Taysir al-ʿAziz al-Hamid, another commentary on Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s 
Kitab al-Tawhid by his grandson Suliman ibn ʿAbd Allah.261 
These main texts at the undergraduate level were backed up by a long list of additional 
texts to be used for further reference. These included many works by Ibn ʿAbd al-
Wahhab and the earlier scholars who had always been key touchstones in the Hanbali 
tradition, including Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim, Ibn Kathir and Ahmad ibn Hanbal, the 
originator of the Hanbali madhhab. They also included works by recent and 
                                                        
259 The syllabus is unclear but appears to suggest that the introduction in question was itself 
actually penned by one Ahmad ibn Mushrif al-Maliki al-Ahsaʾi, whose name intriguingly implies 
origins in the Maliki community in the al-Ahsa region of what is now Saudi Arabia's Eastern 
Province. I am grateful to Stéphane Lacroix for drawing my attention to this possible 
significance. 
260 The secondary institute tawḥīd syllabus is reproduced in al-ʿAbbud 2004, 442. Confusingly, 
the syllabus as reproduced here lists "al-ʿAqida al-Wasitiyya by Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya" 
amongst the texts to be studied but includes a footnote attributing authorship of this text to 
Muhammad Khalil Harras. Since the latter’s published works include a commentary on al-
ʿAqida al-Wasitiyya (cf. Tahir 2006, 201), it seems safe to assume that this is the text in 
question. 
261 The key texts taught on tawḥīd at the undergraduate level are listed in al-ʿAbbud 2004, 
1:525. On Suliman ibn ʿAbd Allah ibn Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab and his Taysir al-ʿAziz al-
Hamid, see ʿAbd al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh 1974/5, 44–47. 
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contemporary Saudi scholars like Hafiz al-Hikmi, the strongly exclusivist Hammud al-
Tuwayjri, and the IUM’s own ʿAbd Allah al-Ghunayman.262 In addition, there are some 
further signs of at least a limited opening up beyond the Wahhabi corpus. For example, 
the list includes works by Rashid Rida and the South Asian forebear of the Ahl-i Hadith 
Muhammad Siddiq Hasan.263 
It is clear, then, that the teaching of tawḥīd at the IUM – both at the time when the 
university opened its doors and also according to the syllabuses in use in the early 
1990s – was strongly influenced by the Wahhabi tradition. It was grounded in the 
tripartite understanding of this concept which had since the eighteenth century been 
the foundation of the Wahhabis’ opposition to a whole host of popular religious 
practices and perceived heterodox sects, including but not limited to those discussed 
in the preceding section of this chapter. It is true that works by quite recent figures 
from outside the Wahhabi tradition like Rashid Rida and Muhammad Siddiq Hasan 
were in use as secondary references. These seem likely to have arrived via earlier 
transnational connections or through the influence of the non-Saudi scholars who 
became involved in the IUM project, as discussed in Chapter 4. However, most of the 
works set as core readings on the subject of tawḥīd were either by Muhammad ibn 
ʿAbd al-Wahhab himself, his Najdi successors, or the circle of scholars influenced by Ibn 
Taymiyya in fourteenth-century Damascus who were the central inspiration for 
Wahhabi reformism. Where the syllabuses gave important places to texts by scholars 
like Ibn Abi al-ʿIzz and al-Qayrawani who might not be immediately associated with the 
Wahhabi corpus, such figures turn out to have had spiritual genealogies and 
commitments which overlap in significant ways with those of the Wahhabis. Overall, it 
seems quite clear that the Saudi scholars who dominated the university right from the 
start used their position of strength to ensure that teaching of this subject remained 
firmly in line with their key concerns. At least in terms of the fundamentals that have 
been the focus of the discussion here, the conception of tawḥīd that they sought to 
                                                        
262 For a biography of Hafiz al-Hikmi, see al-Zirikli 1980, 2:159. On al-Tuwayjri, see Lacroix 2011, 
103–09. 
263 The names given in this paragraph are examples only. The list includes many other authors, 
including a substantial number who I have not been able to identify at the time of writing.  
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promote would also have been congenial to many of the foreign Salafis who became 
part of the project. 
This situation with regard to the teaching of tawḥīd contrasts with other areas of 
instruction at the IUM, where there is clearer evidence of shifts driven by dynamics of 
power-laden give-and-take between the university’s Wahhabi backers, on the one 
hand, and staff and students recruited from around the world, on the other. This 
dynamic is reflected particularly neatly in the teaching of jurisprudence, or fiqh, which 
is the focus of the remainder of this chapter. 
Knowledge of God’s Law 
Whereas the concept of shariʿa denotes “God’s will expressed as an ideal reflecting 
perfect justice and equality”, fiqh is “a human attempt to know the shariʿa”. Fiqh 
encompasses substantive legal rulings on both “ritual law or acts of devotion (ʿibādāt)”; 
including “issues associated with ritual purity, performance of prayer, charity and 
almsgiving, fasting during the month of Ramadan and at other times, and performance 
of the pilgrimage (ḥajj)”. It also encompasses substantive legal rulings on “commercial 
transactions and other matters (muʿāmalāt)”; which may include “personal status law 
(munākaḥāt), penal law (jināyāt or ʿuqūbāt), public law and political theory (siyar or 
aḥkām al-sulṭāniyah), and judicial procedure and evidence (qaḍāʾ or mukhāṣamāt)” 
(Rabb 2009). Fiqh is in turn distinguished from uṣūl al-fiqh, “the body of principles and 
the investigative methodology through which practical legal rules are derived from 
their particular sources” (Ziadeh 2009). 
There has long been a tension within the Wahhabi tradition in matters of 
jurisprudence. On the one hand, Wahhabi scholars have tended to be critical of taqlīd, 
the practice of simply imitating the substantive legal rulings laid down by any one of 
the four – Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Shafiʿi – mainstream Sunni madhāhib. Instead, 
there has been an emphasis on the derivation of legal rulings through ijtihād, or 
independent interpretation on the basis of direct access to the source texts. On the 
other hand, Wahhabi scholarship has in practice been associated very closely indeed 
with the Hanbali madhhab which had already prevailed in Najd prior to Ibn ʿAbd al-
Wahhab’s lifetime. Wahhabi positions on these issues merit some discussion here, 
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since they are important for understanding the significance of the ways in which fiqh 
came to be taught at the IUM. 
One way of making sense of this tension is in terms of the assertion by ʿAbd Allah ibn 
Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, a son of the eponymous figurehead of the tradition, 
that the Wahhabis followed the Hanbali madhhab in legal methodology (uṣūl al-fiqh), 
rather than necessarily emulating the actual substantive legal rulings issued by earlier 
Hanbali scholars. According to an important statement of Hanbali uṣūl al-fiqh by Ibn al-
Qayyim, this particular methodology for deriving legal rulings gives priority to the 
Qurʾan and the Sunna as bases of law. Where clear rulings do not present themselves 
in these sources, the views of the Companions of the Prophet are considered next, 
taking the position closest to the Qurʾan and the Sunna in cases where the 
Companions differed on a given issue. Where these routes are not available, Hanbali 
legal methodology then provides for use of “certain weak or technically deficient 
hadiths”. Only when all of these options have been exhausted does it make space for 
the use of qiyās (analogy) (Vogel 2000, 73). At least in principle, the approach 
described by ʿAbd Allah ibn Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab would have provided for 
the possibility of departures from established legal rulings by earlier Hanbali scholars 
where the application of this Hanbali methodology was in fact found to give rise to 
alternative positions; for example, where it was judged that an existing ruling by earlier 
Hanbali scholars was actually at odds with a clear text in the Qurʾan or the Sunna. 
However, Frank Vogel has suggested that such departures from Hanbali substantive 
law in early Wahhabi scholarship were in practice few and far between. This may have 
been partly because early Wahhabi authorities introduced further, even more 
restrictive conditions on the practice of ijtihād. These included suggesting that ijtihād is 
only legitimate in cases where there is found to be divergence on a given issue 
amongst scholars within the Hanbali madhhab, or that the final ruling on any given 
matter may not be unprecedented but must rather be selected from amongst the 
rulings already established according to the other mainstream Sunni madhāhib. In 
practice, Vogel suggests, early Wahhabi authorities “preached ijtihād more 
consistently than they practiced it”; “deviations from the late Hanbali school are 
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reportedly rare, and most of these turn out to be opinions advocated by Ibn Taymiyya” 
(Vogel 2000, 74–76). 
This situation is illustrated by the legal theory of the early Wahhabi qadi Hamd ibn 
Nasir ibn Muʿammar (d. 1810), a student of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab. In the absence of 
dedicated works of legal theory by Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab himself, for whom fiqh always 
took second place to the priority issue of correcting tawḥīd, the work of Ibn Muʿammar 
has been treated by historians as a particularly important representation of early 
Wahhabi legal practice. Ibn Muʿammar argued against the practice of blind taqlīd, 
where it is assumed that the one being emulated is infallible even in the face of 
contradictory evidence. He argued that those who are sufficiently qualified should 
perform a limited kind of independent reasoning which he referred to as “ijtihād mixed 
with taqlīd” (ijtihād mashūb bi-l-taqlīd). For Ibn Muʿammar, this only came into play 
when the rulings of the various madhāhib differed on a given issue. In that case, the 
scholar should compare the evidence and arguments behind the existing rulings 
associated with the different madhāhib in order to identify and select the strongest. 
Even this limited form of ijtihād was only to be performed by a select few. Laymen and 
even scholars and judges without the requisite skills and knowledge were permitted to 
perform taqlīd of one madhhab. Furthermore, Ibn Muʿammar, like other Wahhabi 
scholars, was himself strongly inclined towards the Hanbali madhhab (Peters 1980; 
Steinberg 2004, 92–93). Steinberg has suggested that Ibn Muʿammar’s conservative 
approach was a practical adaptation to the situation in Najd at the time, where the 
performance of even this limited kind of ijtihād was made difficult by factors including 
simply a lack of the necessary legal texts setting out the rulings of the different 
madhāhib (Steinberg 2004, 93). 
While the Hanbali madhhab remains very important in Saudi Arabia, some have noted 
a shift in the kingdom in the twentieth-century, with judges and scholars becoming 
somewhat less constrained by adherence to Hanbali law (Vogel 2000, 77–81; Al-
Atawneh 2010, 55–81).264 Vogel has explained this shift in terms of an increasing 
                                                        
264 Al-Atawneh emphasises the extent to which this has involved not just shifts in attitudes to 
the substantive legal rulings of the various madhāhib but also a more fundamental opening up 
in the methodology used to arrive at rulings, beyond traditional Hanbali uṣūl al-fiqh. 
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integration of Wahhabi scholarship with mainstream Sunni scholarship worldwide 
(Vogel 2000, 77–81). Steinberg (2004, 93) has noted the significance of the increasing 
availability of the books necessary for more involved kinds of legal reasoning, to which 
one might add the increasing availability of advanced religious instruction. 
Historically, religious education in Wahhabi circles reflected the Hanbali leanings that 
were so characteristic of the tradition. Mohamed Al-Freih, citing Najdi chronicles, has 
suggested that in parts of the Peninsula that came under Wahhabi control in the early 
period of the movement, “they ordered that all books of law, accepted by the four 
Sunnite legal schools should be taught” (Al-Freih 1990, 343). However, other historians 
are agreed that in Wahhabi circles in eighteenth and nineteenth-century Najd, fiqh was 
taught from Hanbali manuals, as it had been in Central Arabia prior to the rise of the 
reform movement. According to Commins, Wahhabi scholars in this period taught fiqh 
from “standard works” by Hanbali figures like the Levantine Muwaffiq al-Din ibn 
Qudama (d. 1223) and Musa al-Hujawi (d. 1560/61) (Commins 2005, 124).265 According 
to Steinberg, there was an effort on the part of Wahhabi scholars to effect a shift in 
the texts used for the teaching of fiqh; but this was to be a shift entirely within the 
Hanbali canon. Works by more recent Hanbali authorities – like al-Muntaha by Ibn al-
Najjar and al-Hujawi’s al-Iqnaʿ – were to give way to more of a focus on earlier Hanbali 
works by Ibn Qudama – like his al-Muqniʿ, al-ʿUmda, al-Mughni and al-Kafi – “from 
which all later Hanbali writings had derived” (Steinberg 2004, 90). 
The syllabuses put in place at the time of the founding of the Islamic University in 1961 
show that fiqh – in the sense of substantive law – was to be taught entirely from works 
by Ibn Qudama. In the secondary school-level department, the text used was Ibn 
Qudama’s al-ʿUmda and at the undergraduate level it was his al-Muqniʿ. This use of 
Hanbali legal manuals – moreover, manuals by Ibn Qudama, in particular – as a basis 
for instruction makes it clear that at this very early point in the university’s history the 
arrangements for teaching substantive law closely reflected the Hanbali leanings that 
had historically been very strongly characteristic of Wahhabi legal practice and 
education. It is worth noting that in the earliest days of the IUM, separate courses on 
                                                        
265 On Ibn Qudama, see G. Makdisi 2002. 
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uṣūl al-fiqh were to be taught at the secondary level from a book authored by staff 
from the Colleges of Arabic Language and Shariʿa in Riyadh, and at the advanced level 
from Ibn Qudama’s Rawdat al-Nazir. 
In a contemporary description of the teaching of fiqh at the IUM at this early stage, 
published in the local newspaper al-Madina al-Munawwara in January 1962, Ibn Baz 
sought to downplay these strong Hanbali leanings in the syllabus. In practice, he 
insisted, teaching staff took a comparative approach to this subject that went beyond 
just this one madhhab: 
Teaching of the subject of fiqh in the university… is not restricted to explaining the 
matter of that madhhab the teaching of which is stipulated [on the syllabus]. Rather, the 
teacher expands as if he is teaching [multiple] madhāhib, not one madhhab, and he 
acquaints the student with the best interpretation according to evidence from the Book 
and the Sunna, or from one of them (Ibn Baz 1962) 
That there was at least a limited comparative component in the teaching of fiqh at this 
very early stage in the university's history is also evidenced by an explanatory note in 
the original syllabus, which stipulates that – where possible – instruction in this subject 
should include exploration of cases where there is disagreement between the 
madhāhib and declaration of the preponderant position (tarjīḥ) on the basis of 
evidence. 
However that may be, changes were soon made which took things much more clearly 
in the direction of an opening up beyond Hanbali jurisprudence. An IUM alumnus who 
was amongst the first group of students from Pakistan to enrol at the university in 
1962 recalled that his cohort at the undergraduate level had studied fiqh partly from 
Ibn Qudama's al-Muqniʿ, as set in the original syllabus. However, they had also studied 
another work altogether; Bidayat al-Mujtahid wa Nihayat al-Muqtasid by Abu al-Walid 
Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Rushd (d. 1198), the Cordoba-born 
polymath who became known in Latin as Averroes and who is perhaps most famous in 
European scholarship for his works on philosophy (Arnaldez 2002).266 The title of this 
text, which would subsequently become the key reference for the teaching of fiqh at 
the IUM, has been rendered in English by Yasin Dutton as “The beginning for the one 
                                                        
266 Interview with Suhaib Hasan, London, 14 January 2013. For an English translation of Bidayat 
al-Mujtahid, see Averroes 1994. 
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who would exercise ijtihād (independent reasoning) and the end for the one who 
would limit himself [to a basic knowledge of the shariʿa]” (DuƩon 1994, 191). Ibn 
Rushd, who himself came from a Maliki background, wrote it in part as a resource for 
“those who want to understand the basics of the shariʿa so that they will then be in a 
position to think for themselves and exercise ijtihād on new matters that may arise 
about which there is no clear ruling” (Dutton 1994, 191). In the words of Dutton, Ibn 
Rushd in this text criticised fiqh scholars of his day “for too strong an attachment to 
the opinions of their predecessors (shiddat al-taqlid)”, accusing them of “measuring 
knowledge by quantity rather than quality and thus being like shoe-sellers who, 
although they have plenty of shoes for sale, are not able to actually make a shoe 
themselves when the need arises” (Dutton 1994, 193). 
What is especially significant about Bidayat al-Mujtahid in the context of the present 
discussion is that it is an example of ikhtilāf literature, meaning that it is dedicated to 
presenting the differences between the rulings of the various schools of Islamic law. In 
Bidayat al-Mujtahid Ibn Rushd uses this comparative approach to consider not only the 
four mainstream Sunni madhāhib – Maliki, Hanafi, Shafiʿi and Hanbali – but also the 
Zahiri school of jurisprudence which was influential in the Iberian Peninsula during his 
lifetime, and even the views of “the founders of old schools of law that eventually 
disappeared, as well as Muslims of the first generations” (Fierro 1999, 241; cf. Dutton 
1994, fn.20). In fact, Bidayat al-Mujtahid goes further than many other examples of 
the ikhtilāf genre in that it explores not only the differences between the rulings of 
these various schools of jurisprudence but also the reasons behind those differences 
(Dutton 1994, 192). Although further research would be required to arrive at a 
conclusive judgement, it is not immediately obvious that there is any substantial 
history of Bidayat al-Mujtahid being used for the study of fiqh within the Wahhabi 
tradition.267 
Syllabuses in use in the early 1990s show that by that time, fiqh was still being taught 
in the IUM’s intermediate school-level institute from Ibn Qudama’s ʿUmdat al-Fiqh.268 
                                                        
267 I am grateful to Saud al-Sarhan for correspondence on this issue. 
268 This text had replaced al-Hujawi’s Zad al-Mustaqniʿ for teaching at this level in 1982 (al-
ʿAbbud 2004, 1:428). 
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In the secondary school-level institute, students were to study fiqh from a commentary 
on this text titled al-ʿIdda Sharh al-ʿUmda by Bahaʾ al-Din ʿAbd al-Rahman ibn Ibrahim 
al-Maqdisi. At this level, they were to study uṣūl al-fiqh from a work produced by a 
number of scholars including the IUM’s own ʿAƟyya Muhammad Salim, Ɵtled Tashil al-
Wusul ila ʿIlm al-Usul (al-ʿAbbud 2004, 1:443). However, at the undergraduate level, it 
was now established practice for fiqh to be taught from Ibn Rushd's Bidayat al-
Mujtahid. What is more, this text was to be studied alongside the most important 
works from each of the four mainstream Sunni madhāhib (ummahāt kutub al-fiqh fī 
kull madhhab min al-madhāhib al-arbiʿa) (al-ʿAbbud 2004, 1:565). Uṣūl al-fiqh was to 
be taught primarily from Ibn Qudama’s Rawdat al-Nazir wa Jannat al-Manazir, along 
with a commentary on this text titled Nuzhat al-Khatir al-ʿAtir by the prominent 
modern Syrian Hanbali scholar ʿAbd al-Qadir Ibn Badran (d. 1927) (al-ʿAbbud 2004, 
1:572).269 
It is thus clear that Hanbali texts remained important in the teaching of legal 
methodology at the IUM well into the 1990s, and that Hanbali manuals were also in 
use at this time for the teaching of substantive law at the less advanced levels. Some 
graduates suggest that it remains the case that the experience of studying fiqh at the 
IUM even at the undergraduate level tends to leave the student with a better grasp of 
Hanbali jurisprudence than that of the other madhāhib.270 However, even allowing for 
any such residual Hanbali bias and even allowing for Ibn Baz’s insistence that fiqh 
teaching at the IUM in its earliest days had included a comparative component, the 
introduction of Bidayat al-Mujtahid as the primary text for the teaching of fiqh at the 
university level soon after the university's founding nonetheless reflected a significant 
change at that very early stage. In appearance and framing, at the very least, it 
represented a shift towards a much more emphatically comparative approach, far less 
obviously wedded to Hanbali substantive law. 
                                                        
269 On Ibn Badran, see Commins 1985, 116–17. 
270 One graduate suggested that studying the various madhāhib in Saudi Arabia is comparable 
with travelling to the United Kingdom to study both English and Spanish; one would certainly 
depart with better English than Spanish. Interview with IUM graduate F, London, 25 January 
2011. 
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This shift towards a greater emphasis on comparative fiqh is further reflected in the 
goals set for the teaching of fiqh at the university level by the early 1990s. Students 
were expected to understand “the emergence of the various juristic madhāhib and the 
factors behind the survival of only the madhāhib of the four imams: Abu Hanifa, Malik, 
al-Shafiʿi and Ahmad, may God have mercy upon them”. They were to learn “the 
reasons for difference of opinion between the scholars of fiqh, and its status as an 
enrichment to the juristic discipline”. They were to graduate with a honed “juristic 
aptitude in deduction from the Book and the Sunna” and “the capacity to instruct the 
people and to issue them with fatwas regarding juristic issues and problems”. They 
would represent a “new generation each year which resists the trends of man-made 
laws creeping into the lands of the Muslims” (al-ʿAbbud 2004, 1:564–5). 
The approach eventually settled upon at the IUM – teaching fiqh from the comparative 
text Bidayat al-Mujtahid whilst teaching uṣūl al-fiqh from Hanbali works – is in many 
ways reminiscent of the ideals advanced by early Wahhabi authorities like Ibn 
Muʿammar. Such figures had defended Hanbali legal methodology whilst advocating 
consideration of the substantive rulings of the other madhāhib under certain 
circumstances; even if, in practice, they tended to cleave to the rulings of the Hanbali 
school. The eventual choice of methods for teaching fiqh at the IUM should also be 
seen in the context of a period in which Wahhabi scholarship more broadly was 
undergoing a shift away from narrow adherence to Hanbali substantive law, as 
discussed above. It is worth noting that the IUM was not unique in this regard; other 
institutions founded in Saudi Arabia in the twentieth century also came to offer 
instruction in the fiqh of the various madhāhib and in the practice of selecting the 
strongest position from amongst their rulings (tarjīḥ) (Vogel 1993, 197; Vogel 2000, 79). 
Nonetheless, the move at the IUM from use of Hanbali legal manuals to use of a work 
of ikhtilāf like Bidayat al-Mujtahid represents a specific and clearly identifiable shift, 
occurring at a particular point in time and in a particular context. Furthermore, it is 
significant that the decision was made to teach fiqh from an ikhtilāf work authored by 
a Maliki scholar. It would have been equally possible for those behind the IUM to 
select an ikhtilāf work by a Hanbali scholar, such as al-Mughni by the Wahhabis’ long 
favoured legal authority Ibn Qudama. On further inspection, evidence emerges that 
 216 
such shifts were very much bound up with the IUM’s imbrication in cross-border 
circuits of scholars, as well as its functioning as an explicitly missionary organisation. 
On the first of these issues, it seems very likely that the Wahhabis’ longstanding – if 
somewhat ambiguous – criticism of the practice of taqlīd would have been encouraged 
by influences arriving at the IUM from beyond the Peninsula. The university operated 
with the involvement of representatives of the South Asian Ahl-i Hadith, a movement 
which had long been much firmer than the Wahhabis in its rejection of the practice of 
taqlīd.271 Ahl-i Hadith scholars urged that legal rulings should instead be derived from 
direct reference to the Qurʾan and the Sunna, along with limited use of the principles 
of qiyās (analogy) and ijmāʿ (consensus) (Metcalf 1982, 265, 270–72). Their views had 
become known in Wahhabi circles through Najdi students and scholars who travelled 
to India from the late nineteenth century, and major Wahhabi scholars of the modern 
period, including Ibn Baz, came to be influenced by their positions on this particular 
matter (Lacroix 2009, 61–62). Such influences would surely have been consolidated by 
Ahl-i Hadith figures who joined the IUM’s Advisory Council and teaching faculty. 
Another likely influence are Egyptian Salafis, including those linked to the Ansar al-
Sunna al-Muhammadiyya movement whose members also studied and taught at the 
IUM. The former president of Ansar al-Sunna ʿAbd al-Razzaq ʿAﬁﬁ sat on the IUM’s 
founding Advisory Council and was apparently involved in drawing up syllabuses. 
Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqi, who founded Ansar al-Sunna in Egypt in 1926, had been full 
of praise for the Wahhabis but had been simultaneously critical of what he saw as their 
inappropriate allegiance to the Hanbali madhhab (Gauvain 2010, 813). In 1949, 
following a visit to Saudi Arabia, the Ansar al-Sunna-linked Egyptian scholar Ahmad 
Muhammad Shakir (d. 1958) had written to King ʿAbd al-ʿAziz with recommendaƟons 
for how to organise the country’s judicial and education systems.272 In that report, he 
had specifically insisted on the importance of Bidayat al-Mujtahid and its treatment of 
the differences between the madhāhib. He noted that this crucial work had first been 
                                                        
271 The movements mentioned in this paragraph and their members’ roles at the IUM are 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
272 On Ahmad Muhammad Shakir, including his views on ijtihād, see Shaham 1999. On his links 
with Ansar al-Sunna, see Tahir 2006, 202–14. He is the same Ahmad Muhammad Shakir who 
edited one of the editions of Sharh al-Tahawiyya mentioned in an earlier footnote. 
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published in Egypt in the early 1920s in an edition edited by his own father, the scholar 
Muhammad Shakir (Shakir 2009). Individual scholars at the IUM may also have had a 
substantial impact on approaches to teaching fiqh. The Albanian-born Nasir al-Din al-
Albani, for example, a formidable figure who arrived at the university to teach very 
early on and was a member of its founding Advisory Council, held a profound 
commitment to the rejection of taqlīd which may well have contributed to pulling the 
university away from its early Hanbali leanings.273 
Quite apart from any such dialogical engagement with staff brought from beyond the 
kingdom, however, what is even clearer is that the shift in approaches to teaching fiqh 
was also tied to a certain dynamic of unequal reciprocity between the university and 
its students. In the earliest days of the university's existence, various voices coming 
both from within and from outside the IUM were explicitly critical of what was 
perceived to be the teaching of Hanbali fiqh there at that time and called instead for 
more serious engagement with all four madhāhib. These calls appealed to the ideal of 
rejecting taqlīd as a matter of principle. However, they also specifically emphasised the 
need for the university to adapt to the attitudes and expectations of its students. 
While the influence of the Hanbali madhhab was restricted mainly to the Arabian 
Peninsula in the mid-twentieth century, the IUM’s students were of course to include 
migrants from across the Islamic world. They would come from regions dominated by 
the Hanafi madhhab, like former Ottoman territories in the Middle East and the 
Balkans, along with “South Asia, Central Asia, and western China”; from regions where 
the Maliki madhhab prevails or is an important presence, like North Africa, West Africa, 
Bahrain and Kuwait; and from regions where the Shafiʿi madhhab is influential, 
including Iraq, Yemen, Southeast Asia, and “parts of East Africa, South Asia, and 
Central Asia” (Rabb 2009). It was necessary to make allowances for these migrant 
students’ diverse backgrounds, some suggested, in order to secure their consent to 
and their active participation in the IUM’s missionary project, and in order to facilitate 
their own missionary engagement with members of their home communities after 
graduation. 
                                                        
273 On al-Albani's approach to fiqh, see Lacroix 2009. 
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An example of this kind of argument is found in an article published in the newspaper 
al-Madina al-Munawwara in December 1961 by the Hijazi intellectual Ahmad ʿAbd 
Allah al-Fasi, who had been a vocal public advocate of the founding of an Islamic 
university in Medina in the years immediately prior to its establishment.274 Writing a 
few months after the passing of the university’s founding statutes which included the 
original Hanbali-oriented syllabuses, he urged that the university should teach all four 
madhāhib rather than just one. He argued that none of the law schools contradicts the 
Qurʾan and the Sunna. He also raised pracƟcal consideraƟons stemming from the need 
to appeal to a diversity of actors. He reminded his readers that, “the students who 
come to the university have studied from madhāhib other than that which is taught to 
them in the university – and that is what they aspire to.” Later in the article, he added 
In addition, the penetration of these madhāhib in the Islamic regions makes it difficult 
for graduates of this university to guide the public there. It is hard, as we know, for a 
person to be able to convince the public to change their madhhab. This is something 
that is admitted and it must not escape our consideration, especially given that our 
guiding principle is offering religious guidance to Muslims and providing them with that 
which illuminates for them the way and clears for them the path towards knowledge of 
their madhāhib, as well as their ability to explain to the people in their homes the issues 
of their religion (al-Fasi 1961)275 
Ibn Baz took this critique seriously enough to produce a lengthy response, which was 
published in the same newspaper the following month. In it, he insisted: 
All of us realise what profound benefit and great utility there is in teaching fiqh 
according to the four madhāhib, as long as they are taught according to a correct 
procedure and as long as the teacher possesses penetrating vision with regard to the 
horizons of the shariʿa and the ability to dive into its beloved depths (Ibn Baz 1962). 
It was in this context that he offered the description of fiqh instruction at the 
university quoted earlier in this chapter, in which he insisted that IUM staff did in 
practice include a comparative element in their teaching. 
                                                        
274 On al-Fasi and his public calls for the founding of an Islamic university in Medina, see 
Chapter 3. 
275 It is tempting to speculate that al-Fasi may be raising these objections as a Hijazi and that 
his talk of the difficulty of convincing people to change their madhhab may be a reference to 
the imposition of Wahhabi norms in parts of Saudi Arabia, like the Hijaz, where these had 
historically not been prevalent. 
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Ibn Baz gave assurances that the issue would be examined by the university council 
and that a decision would be made according to what would best serve the common 
interest (al-maṣlaḥa al-ʿāmma). Although the phrase is apparently being used here in a 
quite non-technical sense, it is worth noting that the word maṣlaḥa may refer to a 
principle of public interest which can serve as a basis of legislation in Islamic law.276 Ibn 
Baz concluded the article with a critique of what he saw as an unhelpful generalisation 
in al-Fasi’s remark that none of the madhāhib contradict the Qurʾan or the Sunna and 
that all of them proceed according to the guidance offered by these two sources. If al-
Fasi meant that the four imams all strove to base their work upon these sources, then 
of course that is true. However, if al-Fasi meant that all of the madhāhib are free from 
anything which contradicts Revelation, then that is obviously incorrect, “for in matters 
of disagreement there is one truth and that is what accords with the Book and the 
Sunna.” 
This lengthy, very public response from Ibn Baz did not put the matter to rest. As long 
as the texts on the syllabus remained Hanbali fiqh manuals, the dissenters do not 
appear to have been satisfied with his claim that teachers went beyond these core 
works to offer a wider perspective. In a memorandum presented to the first session of 
the IUM’s Advisory Council which began in late May 1962, council member Abul Hasan 
ʿAli Nadwi – the high-profile revivalist scholar associated with the Indian Nadwatul 
ʿUlama – again urged that all four madhāhib should be taught at the university. He 
asserted his own support as a matter of principle for a programme of study free of the 
practice of taqlīd. However, he also made the separate argument that 
if the student graduates from this university ignorant of his [own] madhhab, or of the 
madhhab of the society in which he will live and in which environment he will undertake 
his daʿwa, the performance of the burdens of daʿwa will not be fitting and there will not 
be a connection between him and his environment that will make it possible to exert 
influence within it and to win trust.277 
                                                        
276 Al-Atawneh (2010, 63–64, 80) has suggested that the concept of al-maṣlaḥa acquired 
unprecedented importance in Wahhabi legal practice in the twentieth century, as scholars 
sought ways of adapting their rulings to cope with rapidly changing realities. 
277 Cf. memorandum to the Advisory Council reproduced in Nadwi 1969b, 93–94. 
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An authorised history of the IUM includes a retrospective account of discussions which 
took place at that same session of the Advisory Council concerning the issue of how to 
teach fiqh, which merits quoting at length: 
The Council considered… that the reality of the university necessitates that it should 
proceed according to a precise method in the teaching of Islamic fiqh, because the sons 
of the university – by virtue of their affiliation to all Islamic countries and societies – 
belong to all of the madhāhib. In order to avoid that which might stir sensitivity and 
disagreement, the Council suggested… that teaching of the subject of fiqh at the 
university level should be in accordance with the four madhāhib, with proofs. [This is] in 
order to train the students in the derivation of legal rulings from the Book and the Sunna, 
and to accustom them to independence in examining the Book and the Sunna. This has 
been the method followed by the university from the time of its founding until now, due 
to that which it affords in terms of esteem and respect for the Imams and a connection 
for students to the two original sources [the Qurʾan and the sunna], from which the 
Imams drew legal matters. All of them [the Imams] emphasise adherence to evidence 
[from the Qurʾan and the sunna] [al-akhdh bi-l-dalīl] and do not overstep it. They advise 
their followers to set aside their view [the view held by any given Imam on any given 
matter] in favour of that of the Prophet of God (SAWS). In this way, the university 
limited the excessiveness of the chauvinism of some of the adherents to these 
madhāhib; because the method of these Imams [themselves] was to follow the evidence 
from the Book of God and the sunna of His Prophet (SAWS) (al-Ghamidi 1998, 150–51) 
The contemporary articles cited above offer fragmentary insights into the debates that 
surrounded the shift towards a more emphatically comparative approach to fiqh at the 
IUM in the very early days of the university’s existence. They reveal that at least one 
thread in these debates related to an explicit recognition on the part of actors who 
moved in the IUM’s orbit that being seen to adapt to the needs and attitudes of 
students and those to whom they were intended to preach was important if it was to 
be hoped that these people would invest themselves in the university’s religious 
mission. It was only in this way that those behind the university could hope to secure 
their consent, and the consent of those to whom they would preach, to its missionary 
project. The notion of consent was sometimes invoked in minimal terms as an absence 
of active resistance, as when al-Fasi emphasised the need to avoid the difficulties 
involved in seeking to convince people to “change their madhhab”. It also took on 
more positive connotations, suggesting articulation with existing worldviews and the 
channelling of existing energies; as when al-Fasi spoke of aligning teaching at the 
university with students’ existing aspirations, or when Nadwi raised the issue of 
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building connections and winning trust.278 Such considerations appear to have been 
one of a range of factors at play in the subtle but significant shift in the teaching of fiqh 
which occurred at the IUM soon after it opened its doors. In the retrospective account 
offered in the authorised history outlined above, these considerations were 
interwoven seamlessly with an affirmation of the longstanding commitment in 
principle within the Wahhabi tradition – and the broader Salafi tradition within which 
it is located – to treat direct, unmediated reference to the source texts as the ideal 
final arbiter in any matter of law. 
Conclusion 
The bodies of religious knowledge which represented one of the most important forms 
of spiritual capital distributed to and through students at the IUM from the early 1960s 
did not straightforwardly instantiate an entirely ossified, timeless set of Wahhabi texts 
and practices. Rather, I have argued in this chapter that they were a product of a 
particular historical conjuncture, the university’s location at the nexus of an array of 
cross-border connections, and also its functioning as a missionary institution. 
Certainly, there are very clear continuities between the bodies of knowledge explored 
here and the Wahhabi tradition which had existed for two centuries prior to the 
founding of the IUM. One sees processes of condemnatory othering which had always 
been an important part of Wahhabi identity-formation, here elaborated under new 
circumstances and with the insertion of new actors into the project from beyond the 
Peninsula. One also sees a related ongoing commitment to the same fundamental 
ideas about the meaning of tawḥīd, with only relatively limited signs of an opening up 
of the Wahhabi corpus on this issue. Even in the area of fiqh, where I have suggested 
that there were clearer transformations, these shifts were bound up with concerns and 
principles – regarding the legitimacy of taqlīd and modalities of ijtihād – which had 
long been very much present in Wahhabi discourse. What is clear, however, is the 
capacity of the Wahhabi tradition in this context to undergo transformations within 
the terms of a broader Salafi discursive framework; including in this case the 
                                                        
278 On the different forms that consent may take within hegemonic relations, from “active 
commitment to the established order” to far more grudging or ambivalent forms of 
compliance, see Lears 1985, 569–70. 
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incorporation of new texts and subtle shifts in discourse concerning the status of the 
madhāhib. I have argued that such transformations came about in part as a result of 
the IUM’s employment of representative of religious currents and social movements 
hailing from far beyond Saudi Arabia, as well as its project of catering for a similarly 
diverse student body. 
To the extent that the construction of the university’s daʿwa involved the evolution of 
a discursive tradition, this was not limited to the organic incorporation of new ideas 
and practices, or simply the reinterpretation of existing ideas and practices under new 
conditions. Equally, the transformations which the university underwent in the course 
of its interaction with staff and students from beyond the Peninsula did not occur as 
the result of open debate between participants on an equal footing. Rather, the 
discursive tradition within which the pedagogical practices described here were 
located was continually thrashed out in part through struggles for influence and 
authority between individuals, social movements and state actors occupying positions 
of varying strength within transnational religious economies. As explored in earlier 
chapters of this thesis, these struggles occurred within a framework of unequal 
relations defined by disciplinary social technologies, uneven distribution of material 
and symbolic capital, and bureaucratic structures mapping out control over the 
processes by which this capital was to be distributed. In this chapter, I have argued 
that – within the terms of these existing, uneven power relations – actors behind the 
IUM sought to consolidate a position of hegemonic authority as suppliers of religious 
resources within a shared moral and intellectual framework. Whilst operating within 
the terms of the heterogeneous, mutable Wahhabi and broader Salafi traditions, the 
university underwent carefully managed transformations through processes of 
unequal reciprocity with staff and students, which were in part about the perfecting of 
power. Through adjustments of the precise content of the university’s missionary 
project – the precise nature of the religious resources which it was to distribute – 
efforts were made to articulate this project with the worldviews and commitments of 
the diversity of actors who were its targets. These moves constituted an effort to 
secure their consent for and their active participation in its missionary endeavour 
through a power-laden process of hegemonic expansion. 
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Chapter 7 
The Islamic University and Its Students: Facilitating, 
Mediating and Contesting Wahhabi Religious Expansion 
This final chapter turns to the students who were expected to bear the Wahhabi-
influenced teachings of the Islamic University of Medina beyond Saudi Arabia’s borders, 
and whose mobility, networks and local knowledges were expected to give its 
missionary project both geographical reach and traction in diverse settings. I begin by 
unpacking the contention that – at the point of interface between the university and 
its students – the IUM’s missionary project can be understood in terms of a process 
whereby considerable new resources came to be injected into transnational religious 
economies. Material capital made available through the university’s scholarships 
programme has allowed students to direct their labour towards the acquisition of 
religious knowledge, skills and forms of certification grounded in the Wahhabi and 
broader Salafi traditions. These competencies and qualifications have significance as 
spiritual capital; positional goods which may be put to work in struggles for status and 
authority within the religious sphere in the contexts in which students find themselves 
after graduation. The expectation from the start was that this capital, and the 
influence which may derive from it, would be used to advance the university’s mission. 
In the decades following the IUM’s founding, the promise of access to such resources 
helped to bring many thousands of young men to Medina from all over the world. 
However, once in Medina and acquainted at first hand with the particular array of 
religious resources on offer, not all students would arrive at the same conclusions in 
regard either to their worth as positional goods or to their legitimacy as elements to be 
put to work in personal projects of pious self-betterment. As I explore in the second 
section of this chapter, migrant students themselves have entered into these 
transactions on campus already equipped with their own tastes and dispositions 
forged in divergent social and cultural contexts. They have engaged with the 
university’s teachings not only as aspiring Salafi duʿāt but also on the basis of many 
other overlapping identities and concerns; including as Nigerians and Westerners, Sufis 
and Shiʿa, and young men seeking adventure. As such, they have made their own 
evaluations of the religious learning available there, and have arrived at their own 
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conclusions about whether and how to engage with the various kinds of material and 
immaterial resources on offer. 
Finally, I consider the pathways that students have followed after leaving Medina, 
taking resources acquired there into transnational circulation. Graduates who have put 
these resources to work in securing and maintaining positions of religious authority 
have done so through processes of ongoing accumulation, investment and 
contestation which play out far from Saudi Arabia. They have used their newfound 
authority and influence to advance a diverse array of initiatives which, while often 
strongly informed and enabled by their IUM education, have taken on contrasting 
valences and have often operated with substantial autonomy with respect to the Saudi 
religious establishment and state actors. 
At each stage in this process, the IUM’s missionary project has been variously 
facilitated, mediated and contested by students themselves, as well as by an array of 
lay actors and established religious authorities in locations around the world. 
The IUM as a Site of Investment, Exchange and Accumulation 
From the start, the primary purpose of the IUM as an institution of Islamic education 
was of course to provide for the acquisition by students of particular bodies of 
religious knowledge, skills and qualifications. The learning of these religious 
competencies by individual students was valued in its own right, insofar as they were 
understood to afford access to higher truths, the bases for correct worship and tools 
for implementing a divinely ordained moral order in the context of personal belief, 
choices and action. However, it was also anticipated that they would serve a social 
function, bolstering students’ standing within the religious sphere after graduation, 
either in their communities of origin or in other locations in which they were to settle 
around the world. This was particularly important in light of the IUM’s missionary 
ambitions. Those behind the university anticipated that its students would emerge 
from their time in Medina not only as pious subjects but also with the competencies 
and qualifications necessary in order for them to secure recognition as duʿāt, jurists 
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(fuqahāʾ, sing. faqīh), teachers and judges (quḍāt, sing. qāḍin).279 These labels denote 
social roles, involving positions of authority and influence over others; the status 
necessary in order to issue authoritative guidance on their future choices or to pass 
authoritative judgement on their past actions. Insofar as they might serve students’ 
attainment of such religious status, competencies acquired at the IUM constituted not 
only elements in introspective processes of pious self-formation but also spiritual 
capital. 
Whilst students’ engagement with the IUM will be discussed further in the second 
section of this chapter, it is worth noting that several graduates interviewed for this 
research framed their motivations for studying in Medina in comparable terms. One 
British graduate recalled that he had gone with the aspiration of becoming “a scholar 
of knowledge”.280 Another said that his decision to join the IUM’s College of Shariʿa, 
rather than pursuing hadith studies as he had previously intended, had been partly 
informed by his views about which discipline would be of most benefit in daʿwa in a 
country like the United Kingdom.281 Yet another, who was still in the process of 
working towards his degree at the IUM when interviewed, said that he aspired to 
continue to develop his language skills such that he would be able to become a link 
between lay Muslims in the United Kingdom and “people of knowledge”; the 
implication being that those indicated by this phrase were Arabic-speaking scholars in 
the Middle East.282 In one way or another, all of these aspirations suggest recognition 
of the possibility that an IUM education might contribute to a certain repositioning in 
the social sphere, allowing the individual to attain status as a scholar, as an 
authoritative source of religious guidance, or as a trusted intermediary between 
laypersons and a clerical class. This does not mean conceiving of students as 
necessarily chasing resources in the name of social mobility or status for its own sake. 
Indeed, several of those interviewed for this project had given up prestigious 
                                                        
279 “Al-Nizam al-Asasi li-l-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya,” Article 1; “Nizam al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya bi-l-
Madina al-Munawwara” (Article 2), reproduced in al-Ghamidi 1998, 63–66; “Dalil al-Jamiʿa al-
Islamiyya” 1971, 63. 
280 Interview with IUM graduate G, London, 19 January 2011. 
281 Interview with IUM graduate C, London, 14 July 2011. His feeling was that hadith studies 
might be too technical to be of primary concern in this context. 
282 Interview with current IUM student H, Riyadh, 15 March 2012. 
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educational opportunities in their own countries of origin in order to go to the IUM, or 
had already completed degrees at distinguished secular universities which in 
themselves would have offered solid bases for social advancement. Rather, 
prospective students may also value resources available at the IUM insofar as those 
resources are understood to provide for a strengthened position within social struggles 
over the power to speak in the name of Islam; that is, to authoritatively advocate what 
are understood to be correct practices and to authoritatively undermine those 
understood to be incorrect. 
The notion of the translatability of different forms of material and immaterial capital 
can help to make sense of the role played by economic resources in the IUM’s mission. 
As Bradford Verter has noted, “spiritual capital, like other forms of immaterial capital, 
may only be acquired through the exchange of material forms of capital” (Verter 2003, 
167). In the case of full-time religious study of the kind undertaken at the IUM, 
students must largely withdraw from wage labour for several years, a possibility which 
in other circumstances commonly depends on the ability and willingness of family 
members to offer economic support.283 Such formal religious education also calls for 
other forms of material investment, including that required in order to pay for the 
labour of staff, and the construction and maintenance of the system of social 
technologies within which learning and socialisation are to occur. At the IUM, all of 
these costs were to be met not by students or their families but by the university itself. 
In this sense, material capital made available by the Saudi state would be translated 
into spiritual capital possessed by students. 
From the beginning, the university demanded no tuition fees to pay for the labour of 
staff and other expenses. Moreover, it offered a comprehensive scholarships 
programme to all students arriving from abroad, covering their living costs and 
transport between Medina and their countries of origin.284 Over time, scholarships 
would come to include accommodation, monthly stipends to cover everyday expenses, 
medical care, allowances for clothing and books, and trips to perform hajj and ʿumra. 
                                                        
283 Cf. Bourdieu’s (1986, 49–50) discussion of comparable dynamics in relation to secular 
education. 
284 “Al-Nizam al-Asasi li-l-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya,” Article 24. 
 227 
Although the real value of this support and the standard of living conditions on campus 
have varied over time, for much of the university’s history the amounts involved were 
generous. In the latter half of the 1970s (1397/1398 H.), the monthly stipend was 525 
Saudi riyals for most undergraduate students and 900 SR for those at the postgraduate 
level. The 525-riyal monthly stipend, which was to be used only as spending money by 
young students whose major expenses were all already covered, amounted to nearly 
150 US dollars at a time when the average monthly income in the United States was 
only around 480 US dollars.285 It was supplemented with an annual clothing allowance 
which alone amounted to 1,500 SR. In addition, students who passed their exams 
would be flown back to their countries of origin for the summer vacation and those 
who achieved top grades came to be eligible for a further award equivalent to more 
than a whole month’s stipend (al-ʿAbbud 2004, 390–401). 
With all material costs met by the university, the only thing that students were 
required to invest in the process of their accumulation of symbolic resources at the 
IUM was their own time and labour. For those prepared to apply themselves, the 
forms of spiritual capital that they could acquire there would include embodied 
competencies, such as: familiarity with the liturgical language of Arabic, which may be 
displayed through practices like quoting texts or even simply scattering one’s speech 
with individual items of Arabic vocabulary when speaking in one’s own first language; 
the ability to consult and cite complex works of classical scholarship; memorised 
knowledge of scripture and other religious texts; and skills such as the capacity to 
apply principles of fiqh derivation or hadith analysis. Students would also acquire 
spiritual capital in objectified forms, including collections of leather-bound religious 
texts, degree certificates, and in some cases letters of recommendation from individual 
members of staff.286 Furthermore, time in Medina would afford the opportunity to 
accumulate spiritual capital through processes which extended beyond the remit of 
university study programmes. Many students would spend a great deal of their spare 
time in the Masjid Nabawi and other mosques in the city; socialising, engaging in self-
                                                        
285 These very rough figures are calculated using http://fxtop.com/en/historical-exchange-
rates.php and http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/people/. 
286 Interview with IUM graduate I, London, 19 January 2012. 
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study and attending ḥalaqāt by often very prominent scholars. While the issuing of 
formal ijāza certificates attesting to a student’s progress in such study circles may be 
relatively rare in this context, students may informally list the names of the scholars 
under whom they have studied as a further means of affirming their religious 
credentials.287 
The prospect of fully-funded religious education in the Prophet’s city made the IUM an 
attractive destination for aspiring students from all over the world. Scholarships made 
study in Medina accessible to large numbers whose economic circumstances would 
not otherwise have permitted it. They also made Medina an appealing destination to 
many who, even if they might in principle have had access to the funds required for 
several years of full-time religious education, were attracted by the opportunity to 
embark on a programme of study which freed them from the necessity of making that 
investment and thereby left those resources available for other purposes. This includes 
students who are keen to pursue religious education but might not otherwise have 
considered the IUM as an ideal or an obvious place to study.288 
From the early 1960s onwards, the material and symbolic resources made available at 
the IUM drew many thousands from around the world into migratory circuits which 
grew up around its campus. From the start, the university was committed to giving the 
vast majority of its places – over 80 per cent – to non-Saudi citizens.289 In keeping with 
                                                        
287 For example, in the context of a rejoinder to his critics within the Salafi fold, the prominent 
Jamaica-born IUM graduate Bilal Philips reminds his readers that: “I studied in the University of 
Madeenah, and I used to sit in the circles of Shaykh al-Albaanee, Shaykh Bin Baaz, Sh Abdul 
Muhsin al Abbaad, Sh Ghunaymaan, Sh Muqbil, Sh Umar al Fulaataa and others, whose circles I 
attended during the six years that I studied there. I personally went to Shaykh Muqbil’s house 
and asked him to teach me takhreej (authentication of hadeeths), which he did, 
alhamdulillaah” (Philips n.d.). 
288 Two interviewees said that they had previously been considering undertaking religious 
studies at al-Azhar or elsewhere, and that the generous terms on offer at the IUM had been 
one factor in their eventual decision to apply to study in Medina. Telephone interview with US-
based IUM graduate D, 30 November 2010; and interview with IUM graduate J, London, 20 
January 2011. 
289 A newspaper article published in the year the IUM opened noted that 80 per cent of places 
were allocated to non-Saudi students (“al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya min al-Aʿmal al-Khalida li-Jalalat 
al-Malik Suʿud” 1961). University regulaƟons put in place in 1977 and still current in the early 
1990s included a formal stipulation that 85 per cent of students were to come from outside 
Saudi Arabia. “al-Laʾiha al-Tanfidhiyya li-l-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya bi-l-Madina al-Munawwara” 
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the emphasis on youth as agents of moral and social transformation, discussed in 
Chapter 5, it enforced an upper age limit on incoming students. This was originally set 
at 35 years old for those entering the undergraduate level and was later reduced to 25 
years old.290 
The administrative challenges involved in recruiting students from across the globe to 
this fledgling institution were met in a variety of ways. The diplomatic apparatus of the 
national state was put to work, with Saudi embassies called upon to facilitate flows of 
young men to Medina.291 The university also built up relationships with Islamic schools 
and organisations outside the kingdom which were in a position to send students. 
From the early days, as news of the opportunity for fully-funded religious instruction in 
the Prophet’s city spread, representatives of such organisations approached the IUM 
in the hope of securing allocation of places. A newspaper report published as early as 
1962, for example, told of a visit to the campus by representatives of an Islamic 
organisation in the Philippines referred to in Arabic as Jamʿiyyat Iqamat al-Islam, 
requesting places for graduates of their affiliated Islamic school in that country.292 
Over time, such institutional relations would be further strengthened by Saudi 
sponsorship of Islamic organisations abroad through bodies like the Muslim World 
League. Indonesian students, for example, commonly took up places at the IUM and 
other Saudi universities through the Saudi-backed Indonesian Daʿwa Council (Dewan 
Dakwah Islamiyyah Indonesia) and Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic in Jakarta 
(N. Hasan 2010, 682–83). As the IUM’s reputation grew, many would even pay their 
own way to Saudi Arabia, seeking the chance to apply in person and secure an 
interview on the spot. Several British Muslims interviewed for this project had won 
places at the IUM after applying during trips to Saudi Arabia to perform ʿumra. 
Ghanaian and other African students have often borrowed the funds necessary to 
undertake trips to Saudi Arabia on ʿumra or tourist visas in order to apply to Islamic 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(dated Rajab 1397 H.), Article 57, reproduced in “Nizam al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya bi-l-Madina al-
Munawwara wa-Lawaʾihiha al-Tanfidhiyya” 1990/91. 
290 “Al-Nizam al-Asasi li-l-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya,” Article 21; and al-ʿAbbud 2004, 381–82. 
291 “al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya min al-Aʿmal al-Khalida li-Jalalat al-Malik Suʿud” 1961. 
292 “Akhbar al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya bi-l-Madina” 1962. 
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studies programmes there, and similar journeys have been undertaken by aspiring 
students from Ethiopia (Iddrisu 2009, 169–70; Østebø 2012, 146–49). 
With university staff in the early days conscious of their lack of knowledge of the 
situation on the ground in many of the countries which they hoped to target, they also 
began sending delegations abroad which would come to serve a particularly important 
role in building the networks necessary for student recruitment. Some of the earliest 
examples of these delegations headed to sub-Saharan Africa and often included 
members of IUM staff whose own genealogies traced back to the African continent.293 
These tours could last several months at a time and took in large numbers of countries. 
The first, in 1964, was charged not only with gathering information and forging 
relationships with local Muslim leaders and Islamic organisations, but also distributing 
some 13,000 publications with the help of the Saudi embassy in Mogadishu and 
dispensing funds allocated by the IUM and the Muslim World League.294 Later, such 
tours would extend to locations around the world. 
The first group of students to graduate from the IUM in the mid-1960s hailed mostly 
from states with Muslim-majority populations, particularly in the Middle East and 
Arabic-speaking parts of Africa.295 Even by the end of that same decade, however, 
students graduating from the IUM came from a growing number of countries across 
the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and Africa.296 The geographical reach of 
recruitment – measured in terms of the numbers of countries from which students 
were drawn – continued to increase in the decades that followed and the university 
also eventually began to make inroads into minority Muslim communities in Europe, 
                                                        
293 They included the Algeria-born Abu Bakr al-Jazaʾiri; the Egypt-born ʿAƟyya Muhammad 
Salim; ʿUmar Fallata, of Nigerian descent; and an individual referred to as Muhammad Aman 
ibn ʿAli, who seems likely to have been the Ethiopia-born Muhammad Aman ibn ʿAli al-Jami. 
The biographies of all of these individuals are discussed in Chapter 4. 
294 “Dalil al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya” 1971, 157–60; al-ʿAbbud 2004, 364–70. 
295 The countries listed are Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Palestine, Yemen, Tunisia, Algeria, 
Sudan, Somalia, Mali, Indonesia, India and “Turkistan” (“Dalil al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya” 1971, 59). 
296 Ninety graduates in 1388/9 H. included individuals from nearly all of the same countries 
(except Tunisia and Turkistan) and also from Lebanon, Morocco, the Federation of South 
Arabia (al-Junūb al-ʿArabī), Qatar, Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia, Burma, Ethiopia, Nigeria, 
Mauritania, Eritrea, Cameroon, Mozambique and Zanzibar (“Dalil al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya” 1971, 
61). 
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North America and elsewhere. By around 1993 (1413/1414 H.), only seven British 
students and only thirteen from the United States had attained undergraduate 
qualifications (al-ʿAbbud 2004, 718–24). Nearly a decade later (1421/1422 H.), it was 
still the case that only twenty-one British students and only twenty from the United 
States had done so. Yet by around that time (1422/1423 H.), the university had offered 
251 scholarships to students from Britain and 285 to students from the United States 
(al-Maghamisi n.d.). Even allowing for the phenomena of declined places and high 
drop-out rates discussed later in this chapter, this suggests that recruitment from 
these countries was gathering pace. As will also be touched upon below, IUM 
graduates who had themselves been born elsewhere would also settle in Europe and 
North America. 
By around 2001 (1421/1422 H.) the number of students who had secured an 
undergraduate qualification had reached nearly 14,400, of whom nearly 11,600 – just 
over 80 per cent of the total – came from outside Saudi Arabia. The number of those 
leaving with undergraduate qualifications annually had grown from just forty-three in 
the mid-1960s (1384/1385 H.) to over 700 in the early 2000s (1421/1422 H.) (al-
Maghamisi n.d.). 
Student Responses: Assent, Rejection and Negotiation 
Such figures only tell part of the story, however. In practice, students have arrived at 
the IUM already equipped with their own religious dispositions and resources forged in 
diverse settings around the world. It is on those bases that they have engaged with its 
teachings, not necessarily as self-evidently valuable spiritual goods but as elements 
which might or might not be assimilated into pre-existing habituses, and which might 
or might not be judged to have personal or social value in the context of their own 
lives. 
It is certainly the case that a significant proportion of students have embraced the 
IUM’s teachings, seeing the knowledge and skills that could be acquired there as 
providing for the possibility of their own pious self-betterment and as bases for 
establishing the authority required in order to effectively call others to what they 
understand to be the true path. In some cases, this assent relates to the fact that they 
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have already been moving in Salafi circles in their countries of origin or elsewhere prior 
to travelling to Medina. This is partly a matter of self-selection; that is to say, students 
who self-identify as Salafi choosing to apply to the IUM on the basis of their prior 
knowledge of it as a Salafi institution. It has also been a matter of institutional ties, 
with the university conducting some of its student recruitment in cooperation with 
Salafi institutions, movements and personalities outside Saudi Arabia. IUM staff who 
come to the United Kingdom to recruit students, for example, have sometimes done so 
in cooperation with the London branch of the Saudi-sponsored Muslim World League, 
the Salafi organisation al-Muntada al-Islami in London, and the Green Lane Masjid in 
Birmingham, which is itself linked to the South Asian Ahl-i Hadith Salafi movement.297 
At the time of writing, both the Green Lane Masjid in Birmingham and the mosque run 
by al-Muntada al-Islami in London have imams who are themselves graduates of the 
IUM. In the case of students recruited through such networks, it is no doubt more 
likely that the university’s teachings will broadly cohere with their pre-existing religious 
preferences and that these teachings might be readily assimilated into the bodies of 
knowledge and pious practice that already structure their religious lives. 
However, it is by no means the case that all IUM students have been signed up through 
existing Salafi networks. Indeed, partly as a result of the vast geographical breadth of 
recruitment from the start, the student body quickly came to be very diverse indeed 
and staff soon came to recognise the challenges which presented themselves as a 
result. This is evidenced in a memorandum to the IUM’s Advisory Council by the Indian 
scholar Abul Hasan ʿAli Nadwi, which was published in the university journal in the 
mid-1970s. Invoking the case of the IUM, Nadwi noted the “disarray in thinking, action 
and goals” which had manifested itself in an Islamic university which brought together 
students from across the world, giving rise to a “medley of cultures, languages and 
backgrounds”. He lamented that 
It [the Islamic University] didn’t find sufficient time or strong, impressive personalities to 
unite these different elements, this mixture of youths, and to give them a single 
character. It was unable to fuse them in the melting pot of a single creed and a single 
goal. The matter increased in complexity and criticality when these enfeebling factors 
                                                        
297 Interview with IUM graduates A (London, 1 December 2011) and C (London, 14 July 2011). 
On earlier links between the IUM and the Ahl-i Hadith, see Chapters 4 and 6. 
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were joined by the factor of materialistic temptation; for the motivation for many of 
these youth was the generous scholarship which they grant in this university (Nadwi n.d.) 
Setting aside the question of material temptation as a motivation for studying at the 
IUM for the time being, it will be worth considering some of the diversity of ways in 
which students’ own social and cultural backgrounds have informed their responses to 
the university’s teachings. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum from those who embraced the IUM’s mission with 
enthusiasm, there have been those who have rejected it outright. Although the IUM 
had turned out nearly 11,600 non-Saudi graduates at undergraduate level by the early 
2000s, by around the same time (1422/1423 H.) it had in fact offered more than 
28,000 scholarships to prospective students from overseas (al-Maghamisi n.d.). Even 
allowing for those who had accepted these offers and were still undertaking their 
studies without having yet graduated at the time when these figures were drawn up, 
and even allowing for the possibility that this figure includes scholarships offered to 
students who would begin their studies in the IUM’s various pre-university level 
institutes, the disparity is striking. In fact, a problem of very high drop-out rates is 
confirmed anecdotally by former students, who cite a variety of reasons for their peers 
or themselves having left prior to graduation. These include workaday issues such as 
marriage, family circumstances, difficulty adapting to the academic regime and tough 
living conditions in Medina.298 However, others have left as a result of a sense of 
profound conflict between their pre-existing worldviews and the religious discourse 
that they encountered on campus. Despite having been drawn to the IUM by the 
promise of free Islamic education in the Prophet’s city, once there they found that 
“Islam” in this context denoted something quite different to the modes of religious 
belief and practice into which they had been socialised in their communities of origin. 
This issue arose as soon as the university opened its doors. In 1962, for example, the 
IUM offered scholarships to eighteen students from northern Nigeria. Of these, sixteen 
would walk out before graduating. Alex Thurston (forthcoming) notes that the 
dissatisfaction of members of this group related in part to practical matters, such as 
                                                        
298 Interviews with IUM graduates C, H and K, and with former IUM student L. 
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the perceived inadequacy of maintenance payments. However, other issues also arose, 
including negative attitudes in Medina towards the Sufi modes of faith which were 
such a central part of religious life in the context in which these students had been 
raised. Thurston quotes from a letter by some of these students to the Northern 
Regional Government in Nigeria, in which they pleaded to be transferred to an 
alternative institution where they might be able to study “without being separated 
from our creed, respecting our rulers and religious leaders, without our good 
traditional customs, which Islam does not forbid, being attacked”. 
Quotations such as this one point to the extent to which the capacity of students to 
critically assess the IUM’s teachings was facilitated by their ability to “objectify” them. 
Rather than taking those teachings as simply a natural and inevitable part of religious 
life, they could achieve a degree of critical distance and ask questions about their 
legitimacy and value by comparing them with alternative ways of knowing and living 
Islam; setting up a distinction between “our creed”, “our rulers and religious leaders” 
and “our good traditional customs”, on the one hand, and on the other hand, implicitly, 
“their” creed, leaders and customs (Eickelman and Piscatori 2004, 37–45). To the 
extent that the IUM sought to recruit from around the world and from outside the 
Salafi fold, as part of the missionary project which was its raison d’être, this ability on 
the part of its students to compare and contrast its teachings with alternative Islamic 
traditions was built into the system. Moreover, students’ evaluations of the forms of 
spiritual capital available to them at the IUM – evaluations made possible in the first 
place by this process of objectification – would in turn be coloured by outlooks 
informed by their own widely differing backgrounds. For students whose own religious 
tastes and dispositions had been forged through processes of learning and 
socialisation within the terms of divergent religious fields and traditions, the 
competencies and qualifications on offer in Medina could seem more or less legitimate 
and more or less valuable, either as resources to be put to work in personal projects of 
pious self-betterment, or as positional goods which might be used to secure religious 
authority in their communities of origin or elsewhere. 
Certainly, the large-scale walkout by this first group of northern Nigerian students was 
not an isolated episode. Intriguingly, a graduate who was at the IUM from the early 
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1960s recalled the arrival of its first cohort of some 25 Iranian students, of whom he 
suggested the vast majority were in fact Shiʿa. Again, all but one of them would quit. 
This graduate explained their departure as being due to disappointment at the small 
scale of the university at that stage and the absence of women on campus. However, 
the alternative interpretation that it may in fact have come down to a clash between 
their own pre-existing religious dispositions and the content of teaching that they 
experienced at the IUM – the teachings of which were profoundly inimical to Shiʿism, 
as discussed in Chapter 6 – would appear to be consistent with his recollection that 
only the one Sunni in the group had chosen to stay.299 
Responses of this kind to the IUM’s teachings have not been limited to those who 
arrived with no previous experience of the Salafi tradition, just as they also have not 
related solely to what might be most readily identified as specifically religious 
elements of students’ pre-existing habituses. More recently, the Guyana-born convert 
to Islam Qays Arthur has described a comparable experience of a jarring encounter 
with the IUM which occurred in spite of the fact that he had already been moving in 
Salafi circles in his country of origin prior to enrolling there in the second half of the 
1990s (Arthur 2009; Arthur 2013). Once in Medina, Arthur found himself faced with a 
feeling of disjuncture “between my identity as a Muslim and a westerner”. His 
narrative of his plight suggests that he was particularly uncomfortable with an 
emphasis in at least some quarters at the IUM on opposition to isbāl, the wearing of 
garments which hang below the ankle, a practice criticised by many Salafis as being 
contradictory to the sunna. His account illustrates the complexity of the many 
overlapping identities which students may inhabit prior to, during and after their 
studies in Medina. It suggests how tastes and dispositions which have much to do with 
social and cultural norms – in this case, the sympathy of a self-described “westerner” 
for those who “simply fancy trousers or jeans at normal length” – may inform 
students’ assessments of the legitimacy and value of the IUM’s teachings. In the end, 
Arthur left the IUM for the University of Jordan – which, “with its multitudes of Jeans 
and Tee shirts busy at work and play was more of what I was accustomed to” – and 
gravitated towards the Jordan-based American Sufi scholar Nuh Keller. 
                                                        
299 Interview with IUM graduate B, London, 27 June 2011. 
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While all of those described thus far abandoned the IUM, a final example illustrates 
that even decisions to stay until graduation do not necessarily signal assent to the 
university’s missionary project and do not necessarily result in a thoroughgoing 
transformation of the students in question. A South Africa-born Muslim of South Asian 
origin who arrived at the IUM in the 1980s, recalled that he had gone there as “a very 
religious young man” but one whose upbringing had left him inclined towards Sufi 
modes of belief and practice.300 He and a circle of friends at the IUM already had 
strong backgrounds in religious studies prior to arriving on campus, which contributed 
to a feeling that “how we viewed Islam and the message of Islam, we didn’t need to 
come to Saudi Arabia to undo everything we learned… we were secure, we didn’t feel 
any insecurity”. Yet he valued the opportunity to live in the proximity of Medina and 
Mecca. Despite his lack of sympathy for the IUM’s Wahhabi-influenced message, he 
also nonetheless viewed his training there – and particularly his acquisition of 
advanced Arabic language skills – as standing to advance his own personal spiritual 
development: 
I wanted to study and read a lot about Islam but I wanted to do that on my own. I 
wanted to open the old manuals and the old texts – the classical texts – by myself and 
make up my own opinions. But I knew I first had to, you know, get a better 
understanding of the language… I guess one of the reasons I also went there was to 
know Islam better… but I wanted to be able to do that by my own reading, through my 
own readings of Arabic texts. 
Over time, he even began to hope that the skills and qualifications that he could 
accumulate in Medina might offer a path towards a career as an Arabic-language 
specialist in secular academic institutions. The fact that he did in fact achieve that goal, 
going on to complete a PhD and secure academic jobs in Europe and the United States, 
illustrates how resources acquired in a religious setting like the IUM may also be put to 
work as cultural capital in other spheres of life. Finally, he spoke frankly about the 
attraction of the material capital made available through the university’s scholarships 
programme, which allowed him to buy “fancy watches” and gifts for family members. 
He recalled that he had been able to use free flights during the summer vacation – 
which were intended for visits home but at that time could also be claimed for trips 
                                                        
300 Telephone interview with US-based IUM graduate D, 30 November 2010. 
 237 
elsewhere – to see the world, including North America, East Asia and India. The 
knowledge that this would be possible had been one factor informing his decision to 
go to the IUM in the first place, rather than to al-Azhar. During his own time in Medina, 
he suggested, stipends were generous enough that students from developing 
countries could even become comparatively wealthy and save their maintenance 
payments towards the cost of building a home in their communities of origin. 
This graduate’s recollections illustrate the ways in which students may be drawn into 
the migratory circuits which built up around the IUM not only as aspiring Salafi duʿāt 
but on the basis of a host of other overlapping identities and considerations. Material 
resources made available through the scholarships programme have no doubt been an 
attraction for some students, as noted critically by Nadwi in the passage quoted earlier 
in this chapter. Yet, even for those who are sceptical of the IUM’s Wahhabi-influenced 
mission, this motivation for studying there may coexist and intertwine with the 
attraction of acquiring competencies and qualifications which may prove useful both in 
personal projects of pious self-betterment and also as positional goods in social life 
within and outside the religious sphere. 
I have argued for an understanding of the IUM’s missionary project in terms of the 
injection of new resources into transnational religious economies. Material capital 
made available by the Saudi state was to be translated into spiritual capital possessed 
by students, who were expected to take it into circulation around the world and to put 
it to work in the service of the Salafi daʿwa. Yet in practice, the processes by which 
these resources are exchanged and accumulated on campus have been subject to the 
agency and evaluative judgement of those same students. As with any educational 
institution, the IUM must contend with students’ pre-existing knowledges, tastes and 
dispositions, which in this case have been forged through learning and socialisation in 
a particularly diverse array of social, cultural and religious contexts. For all the 
disciplinary aspects of education at the IUM explored in Chapter 5 of this thesis, its 
system of instruction can by no means hope to simply “kill off the old man” and turn 
every student into a pious Salafi dāʿiya ex nihilo (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 44). The 
ways in which students’ educational, social, religious and cultural backgrounds have 
informed their responses to the IUM also indicate the limits of the hegemonic 
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dimensions of its missionary project, explored in Chapter 6. Far from becoming 
articulated into this project, at least some have rejected its message. They have either 
removed themselves from Medina altogether or have found ways of negotiating 
pathways through the IUM system and benefiting from the many different kinds of 
resources made available there whilst maintaining a certain detachment. As I argue in 
the next, final section of this chapter, the agency exercised by students – as well as 
that exercised by a far broader array of actors in locations far from Medina – has 
continued to play an important role in mediating the impact of the university’s 
missionary project well past the point of graduation. 
Leaving Medina 
While graduates may depart Medina in possession of newfound reserves of spiritual 
capital – including religious knowledge, competencies and qualifications – the value of 
this capital becomes subject to fierce contestation within and across the social spaces 
through which they later pass and in which they settle. For those who seek to use this 
capital as a basis for achieving status as an authoritative point of religious reference, 
achieving this goal becomes a matter of ongoing accumulation, careful investment, 
and struggle with an array of religious and lay actors. These processes give rise to 
forms of authority which, while built on the foundation of an IUM education, may 
subsequently be negotiated quite autonomously with respect to the kingdom and its 
scholars. This status may in turn be used to legitimate projects with divergent social 
and political ramifications, which by no means necessarily coincide with the concerns 
or interests of the Saudi state and religious establishment. 
A proportion of graduates of the IUM have engaged in exerting religious influence 
across the globe in ways which remain institutionally bound to the kingdom and its 
scholars. This includes employment by Saudi state or state-funded bodies to undertake 
preaching or other religious responsibilities overseas. By the early 1970s, IUM alumni 
had already been sent by the Saudi state agency Dar al-Iftaʾ to more than 20 African 
countries “extending from Rhodesia and South Africa in the south to Somalia in the 
north, and to Ghana and Niger in the West”. They remained in touch with the 
university, receiving supplies of publications for distribution amongst the populations 
of those countries, sending reports on their activities, and corresponding with staff to 
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seek clarification and solutions for “scholastic problems” which they faced in the 
course of their work.301 Some graduates have also been employed on a similar basis by 
Saudi-sponsored organisations like the Muslim World League.302 
However, most have travelled on from Medina independently and have forged their 
own paths after graduation. They may return to their countries of origin or settle in 
new locations, whether for daʿwa, further studies, or paid employment outside the 
religious sphere. IUM graduates in the United Kingdom at the time of this research, for 
example, included not only British Muslims but also individuals from the United States, 
Ghana, Liberia, India, Libya, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), and no doubt many other 
countries besides. Many graduates are neither prominent figures nor engaged in full-
time religious undertakings, either not viewing this as the future that they desire for 
themselves or else concluding that any such ambitions that they might have must 
inevitably give way to the need to provide materially for themselves and often for 
families. Those contacted for this research in the United Kingdom included people 
working not only within the religious sphere but also in computing, the secular 
education system, and in different forms of blue collar employment. 
Even those who either do not seek or do not achieve prominence as religious figures 
may nonetheless still exert authority on an informal, local basis in ways that are 
legitimised by their IUM background. A British Muslim from a South Asian background 
who returned to London after graduating from Medina in recent years explained that it 
was now common for acquaintances and friends of friends to telephone him seeking 
advice on religious matters.303 Two British converts to Islam who were still in the 
middle of their studies at the IUM suggested that this status as a perceived source of 
authoritative religious guidance can become noticeable long before one graduates, 
even when one is still only studying Arabic at the IUM in preparation for entering 
undergraduate studies.304 Those whose focus is on employment or further education 
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outside the religious sphere may also play roles in religious institutions on a part-time 
or occasional basis, including delivering Friday sermons, teaching classes in mosques or 
making appearances on Islamic media.305 
Competencies and qualifications accumulated at the IUM thus commonly form the 
bases for recognition as a source of religious guidance in informal, sporadic and 
localised ways. However, other graduates have been able to use this capital as a basis 
for securing far wider-reaching authority and influence. Over time, a great many IUM 
graduates have achieved prominence as high-profile figures both within and outside 
circles which are commonly labelled Salafi. As discussed elsewhere in this thesis, the 
university itself has during different periods – and often at any given time – hosted 
staff sympathetic to a broad range of viewpoints. It should thus come as no surprise 
that its alumni within Salafi currents around the world are situated across the 
spectrum on key issues of debate including the permissibility of political activism and 
the legitimacy of using violent means to achieve political change under current 
conditions. Saudi IUM graduates range from Safar al-Hawali, a key figurehead in Sahwi 
political activism, to Rabiʿ ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, who went on to teach at the IUM after 
graduation and whose name became synonymous with the staunchly quietist brand of 
Salafism which became a fierce rival of the Sahwa. Just a few examples of the diverse 
range of Salafi figures beyond the kingdom who are IUM alumni include Muqbil ibn 
Hadi al-Wadiʿi, the father ﬁgure of contemporary Salaﬁsm in Yemen who negoƟated an 
ambivalent path between pietist mission and strident positions on key political issues; 
Jaʿfar Mahmud Adam and Muhammad Sani ʿUmar, who became prominent in new 
forms of anti-Sufi activism in northern Nigeria after their return to their country of 
origin; and the Egypt-born ʿAbd al-Rahman ʿAbd al-Khaliq, who subsequently based 
himself in Kuwait where he was associated until the 1990s with Jamʿiyyat Ihyaʾ al-
Turath al-Islami (The Association for Reviving Islamic Heritage) and has been a key 
representative of efforts to promote a politically-engaged brand of Salafism.306 Others 
with looser links to the IUM include the Jordan-based Palestinian jihadi scholar ʾAbu 
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Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who never enrolled at the university but was informally 
granted use of its facilities as a young man (Wagemakers 2012a, 36); and Juhayman al-
ʿUtaybi, the leader of the 1979 Masjid Haram siege who, as mentioned previously, had 
taken classes at the IUM-affiliated Dar al-Hadith in Medina. 
The authority and influence exercised by many prominent graduates extends far 
beyond any single national sphere. After his own time in Saudi Arabia, where his 
studies in various locations culminated in a master’s degree from the IUM, the Yemeni 
scholar Muqbil al-Wadiʿi returned to his country of origin in 1979 with suﬃcient 
religious standing to found the Dar al-Hadith school in Dammaj in the early 1980s. 
With support from sources including Saudi ʿulamaʾ, “rich Saudi businessmen of Yemeni 
origin” and “charitable organisations linked to the Saudi government”, the Dammaj 
Dar al-Hadith became an important centre of Salafi instruction in the Yemeni context. 
By the late 1990s it boasted nearly 1,000 students (Bonnefoy 2011, 54–59). It and 
other schools which grew up around al-Wadiʿi in turn aƩracted migrants from far 
beyond Yemen’s borders. Al-Wadiʿi himself claimed that Dar al-Hadith came to serve 
students “from Egypt, Kuwait, from the Land of the Two Holy Places, the Najd, Aden, 
the Hadramawt, Libya, Somalia, Belgium and from other countries, Islamic and non-
Islamic” (quoted in Bonnefoy 2011, 58–59). After the Indonesian Salafi figurehead 
Jaʿfar Umar Thalib spent Ɵme in Yemen in the 1990s, “hundreds” of young Indonesians 
began travelling to study at schools linked to al-Wadiʿi there (N. Hasan 2010, 692–97). 
Such transnational influence has also been achieved by graduates through flows of 
publications and other media across borders. Noah Salomon has shown that works 
authored by ʿAbd al-Rahman ʿAbd al-Khaliq have played an important role in informing 
and legitimating political activism undertaken by the Sudanese Salafi movement Ansar 
al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya. The latter movement had itself earlier been influenced by 
the Egyptian organisation of the same name, whose links with the IUM were discussed 
in Chapters 4 and 6 of this thesis (Salomon 2009). As with many such figures, ʿAbd al-
Rahman ʿAbd al-Khaliq’s Arabic-language website makes his books, articles, fatwas, 
sermons and other materials available across the globe.307 A brief account of his 
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scholarly credentials on this site lists only the degree in shariʿa that he secured from 
the IUM in 1965, thus emphasising the centrality of spiritual capital made available by 
the IUM in legitimising his status as a source of transnational religious authority. 
Other IUM graduates have exerted considerable influence amongst English-speaking 
Muslims through entrepreneurial investment of symbolic capital acquired partly in 
Medina in novel organisational structures. One example is AlMaghrib Institute, a 
religious educational project founded by the Canadian IUM graduate Muhammad 
Alshareef in 2002. Its dean of academic affairs is the United States-born IUM graduate 
Yasir Qadhi, a prominent figure discussed further below. With chapters in the United 
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Ireland and the 
United Arab Emirates, AlMaghrib Institute claims to have taught over 33,000 students, 
who pay fees which help to make it sustainable.308 Another comparable project is 
AlKauthar Institute, headed by the IUM graduate Tawfique Chowdhury, which has 
websites in English and French, addresses in the UK, Canada, South Africa and Australia, 
and claims to offer instruction in nine countries.309 These institutional structures 
provide for transnational coordination of instructors, course content, seminars and 
qualifications across multiple national spaces. Graduates have also used new online 
learning technologies to achieve comparable reach through projects like the Islamic 
Online University. Founded in 2007 by the Jamaica-born IUM graduate Bilal Philips, 
who was by that time already a prominent figure through his publications, speaking 
tours and media appearances, this project has offices in Qatar and the Gambia. It 
offers no-cost diploma programmes and other more advanced fee-paying courses 
through virtual campuses operating entirely on the basis of online tuition. By 2012, it 
claimed to have 50,000 students from across the globe.310 In addition to their founders 
and heads, each of these organisations employs multiple IUM graduates as instructors, 
albeit alongside individuals from other educational backgrounds, and all of them cite 
IUM qualifications in online staff profiles as a way of attesting to their credentials. In 
this way, as with al-Wadiʿi’s Dar al-Hadith in Yemen, capital accumulated in part at the 
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IUM may be invested in new institutions, contributing to their capacity in turn to 
legitimate a particular set of religious goods and to certify qualifications for students 
across the globe. 
An IUM graduate may rarely secure or even seek recognition as a scholar in his own 
right, deserving of the label ʿālim, at least without considerable further training. 
However, graduates do more commonly secure other forms of religious standing 
reflected in honorific titles, including most commonly “shaykh”. They may come to be 
widely recognised as duʿāt or ṭalabat ʿilm (students of knowledge), denoting a capacity 
to offer religious guidance to the lay masses with reference to the rulings of those who 
are recognised as scholars. Such religious status as may be achieved by graduates 
neither derives automatically from IUM qualifications, nor is it in any way a matter of 
linear promotion through any kind of formally institutionalised hierarchy. Rather, in 
addition to careful investment of one’s existing reserves of spiritual capital, it involves 
ongoing accumulation and often intense contestation. 
Particularly for those whose own influence comes to extend transnationally, these 
struggles to secure and to constantly renegotiate positions of authority play out not 
only within but also across multiple local and national spaces, connected by migration 
and cross-border communications including YouTube, online discussion forums, 
websites and flows of publications. Together, these connections give rise to a 
transnational religious field of the kind defined in the introduction to this thesis, 
connecting actors in multiple local and national spaces. Struggles over the evaluation 
and ordering of spiritual capital within this field involve an array of actors, including 
scholars based at the IUM and elsewhere in Saudi Arabia but also other Medina 
graduates, established religious authorities across the world from both within and 
outside the Salafi fold, and lay audiences. 
As might be expected, non-Salafi religious figures – who view the university’s mission 
as a threat to their own ways of knowing and living Islam – have engaged in energetic 
efforts to devalue both the spiritual capital institutionalised in the IUM and also that 
embodied in its graduates. A particularly forceful illustration of this dynamic is found in 
a text penned by the Kuwaiti Sufi public figure Yusuf al-Sayyid Hashim al-Rifaʿi, Ɵtled 
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“Advice to Our Brothers the Scholars of Najd”. A sub-section of this text – titled “The 
Sham(e) of Madina University” – merits quoting in full, as an artefact of these broader 
transnational struggles. Addressing the Saudi scholarly establishment, al-Rifaʿi charges 
that 
You built a university in al-Madina al-Munawwara and named it the Islamic University, 
near the Master of Prophets, peace and greetings be upon him. People and scholars 
then flocked to it with their cherished children and sons, rejoicing at the chance of 
drinking form [sic] this spring, thinking it would increase them in love and followership 
of their Beloved, peace and greetings be upon him, his dear Family, his Companions, and 
the Successors. But there you were teaching them how to deprecate him and all of them! 
You also had the students spy on and surveil one another so as to report to you the 
names and activities of those you named grave-lovers (al-quburiy-yun)! Namely, those 
who made frequent visits and salutations upon the Master of Messengers and the 
Mercy of Allah to the worlds so that you might wage war against them, ostracize them 
and expel them! You would only keep whoever became your client and obeyed you – for 
those alone are truthful and trusted according to you. 
Whoever graduated successfully at your hands, having drunk in the gamut of your 
beliefs, you sent back to their countries as your representatives to sound out your 
warnings and announce your glad tidings that their misguided fathers and way ward 
nations must renew their Islam. Such graduates you pampered with lavish salaries, 
opening offices for them and every conceivable opportunity. As a result, dissensions and 
enmity flared up between them and the Ulema and pious Muslims of the generations of 
their fathers and past Shaykhs. Such graduates resemble the time bombs you 
manufactured and filled with all kinds of bad opinions of others and deep-seated 
contempt. This has transformed Muslim countries, especially Africa and Asia, into battle-
fields of perpetual dissensions among Muslims. This condition has even spread to the 
Muslim countries that gained their independence from Russia only recently, all the way 
to Muslim minorities and communities in Europe, America, Australia and elsewhere! To 
Allah is our complaint (al-Rifaʿi n.d.) 
Al-Rifaʿi’s alternaƟve narraƟve of the IUM project contrasts sharply with the 
university’s own self-presentation. In place of the themes of beneficence, 
enlightenment and universal truth, he offers an account of symbolic violence, 
divisiveness, religious deviation and patronage. More to the point, his narrative 
strongly contests the value of the spiritual capital accumulated by its students. Rather 
than duʿāt equipped with correct knowledge and skills grounded in scripture, the latter 
are presented as subservient clients and products of Saudi machinations (“your 
representatives” and “time bombs you manufactured”) endowed only with 
particularistic, misguided opinions (“your beliefs”, “your warnings” and “your glad 
tidings”). This text has been made available in both English and Arabic on the author’s 
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website, and has been reproduced and discussed on numerous other websites and 
online discussion forums by Muslims in locations around the world. 
Moreover, such contestation also rages within the Salafi fold, where the respective 
religious statuses of the IUM as an institution and of its graduates as individuals have 
been robustly disputed. At the militant end of the Salafi spectrum, for example, the 
IUM has been strongly criticised by Bakr ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Athari, a fellow 
countryman and student of the Jordanian militant Salafi ideologue Abu Muhammad al-
Maqdisi. Advising aspiring students against studying at the IUM, al-Athari makes 
accusations concerning not only poor teaching and consequently a poor calibre of 
graduates but also that most of its staff are in his view “from the Madakhila and the 
Jamiyya”, a reference to politically quietist Salafis aligned with the former IUM staff 
members Rabiʿ al-Madkhali and Muhammad Aman al-Jami. He also charges that its 
students are divided into factions like Sufis, groups inspired by the Syrian ex-Muslim 
Brother Muhammad Surur Zayn al-ʿAbidin, and followers of al-Madkhali; and that 
anyone who went to the IUM and revealed himself to be “from the people of the true 
programme”, presumably here a reference to a more militant brand of Salafism of the 
kind espoused by al-Athari himself, would quickly find himself pilloried, excluded or 
possibly even jailed. He makes these arguments despite his acknowledgement that 
IUM syllabuses may include some worthy content, including knowledge of correct 
creed on such issues as tawḥīd al-asmāʾ wa-l-ṣifāt (cf. Chapter 6).311 
Even al-Madkhali, himself a graduate and very influential former staff member of the 
IUM, has criticised other students and graduates of his own alma mater. Whilst 
praising the university and recommending that aspiring students should enrol there, 
he has warned about those “people of innovation” who have brought moral and 
religious corruption to its campus; giving the example of Indian Muslims who bring to 
the IUM their commitment to the Hanafi madhhab and to Maturidi creed, and who fail 
to see the error of their ways throughout their many years of study in Medina (al-
Madkhalee 2008). Al-Madkhali’s views ultimately come down to a defence of the IUM 
as an institution and only go so far as to suggest that an IUM qualification is not in 
                                                        
311 “Muntada al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad: Suʾal hawla al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya fi al-Madina” n.d. On al-
Athari and his relationship to al-Maqdisi, see Wagemakers 2012a, 175–76. 
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itself sufficient grounds for religious authority, since there are those who pass through 
its system without coming to accept the sacred truths imbued in its syllabuses. The 
Yemeni Salafi scholar Yahya al-Hajuri, a student of the IUM graduate al-Wadiʿi, has 
gone further, stridently attacking the university for what he suggests are ḥizbī 
influences amongst its faculty; the term ḥizbī in this context being used pejoratively to 
denote a tendency towards activist political engagement (al-Hajuri 2008).  
Like the statement by al-Rifaʿi quoted above, the views on the IUM expressed by al-
Athari, al-Madkhali and al-Hajuri have all been issued in statements posted online. In 
the case of the views expressed by al-Madkhali, this includes translation and 
distribution online in English by the United Kingdom-based Salafi Publications. In this 
way, they once again become part of a transnational debate over the religious 
standing both of the institution itself and also of its graduates. 
Just as the religious authority of the IUM and its graduates as a collective body are 
contested through such interventions, so do equivalent struggles play out concerning 
the standing of individual graduates. Scholars associated with the IUM and the Saudi 
religious establishment may become involved in this contestation. They may intervene 
directly, in instances where a particular Saudi scholar praises or criticises a particular 
graduate, with a view to legitimating or delegitimating them and the projects in which 
they are engaged. Alternatively, their involvement may be indirect, where Saudi 
scholars’ past works or statements are cited in order to critique or defend a particular 
graduate, or where graduates cite their previous studies under specific Saudi scholars, 
in order to affirm their own credentials. However, whilst the views of Saudi scholars 
carry weight in these struggles, particularly within the Salafi fold, they are by no means 
the only actors involved. Contestation over the religious authority of particular IUM 
graduates may also be engaged in by other IUM graduates and established religious 
authorities, who may release written tracts or other forms of online statements 
criticising particular graduates’ statements, actions or religious credentials. It can also 
involve laypersons with varying degrees of religious knowledge, far from Saudi Arabia, 
who are able to air and debate their views on platforms such as internet discussion 
forums. IUM graduates, like other religious figures, may be commended for their 
learning and perceived character traits such as erudition, sincerity or humility. At least 
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as often, individual graduates are strongly attacked, in ways which again tie in with 
broader struggles within and beyond contemporary Salafism. This frequently involves 
the use of value-laden labels. Discussion forums dominated by the pietist trend of 
Salafism associated with al-Madkhali – such as salafitalk.net – feature lengthy attacks 
on IUM graduates, amongst others, using derogatory terms such as “Qutbi”, “Ikhwani”, 
“hizbi” or mubtadiʿ. These terms denote sympathy towards the thinking of Syed Qutb, 
Muslim Brothers-style tendencies, factionalism and religious innovation, respectively. 
Similarly, individuals aligned with the pietist trend may be derided as “Madkhali” or 
“Jami”, denoting devotion to the pietist figureheads al-Madkhali and Muhammad 
Aman al-Jami, or as murjiʿ, suggesting a failure to take action on the basis of religious 
conviction. Graduates’ statements and actions may also be publicly attacked online by 
a range of religious and lay actors over their alleged inconsistency with scripture or 
with the views of classical or contemporary scholars. Indeed, to the extent that Saudi 
scholars become engaged in contestation over the religious status of individual IUM 
graduates, their involvement is often mediated by actors beyond the kingdom; their 
interventions occurring not infrequently at the behest of Salafis outside Saudi Arabia, 
who then record, translate and frame the scholar’s response for wider audiences. In all 
of the ways suggested here, spiritual capital represents not only a medium but also an 
object of conflict. 
In the context of this contestation, individual graduates may pursue a variety of 
strategies to negotiate their own credentials. While this includes citing their IUM 
qualifications as a way of attesting to their spiritual capital, these qualifications are 
rarely the sole bases of their authority. Facilitated by their knowledge of Arabic and 
capacity to engage with classical works, graduates engage in self study. They may also 
accumulate further formal qualifications which serve to bolster their spiritual capital, 
autonomously of the IUM. In keeping with contemporary modes of religiosity more 
generally, this ongoing accumulation occurs not within the terms of formal 
institutional structures but rather through more diffuse social networks (Guest 2007, 
190). These may be local but they may also have border-spanning reach, including in 
ways which tie in with the IUM’s own role in bringing together staff and students from 
across the globe. One British former student interviewed for this project, who had left 
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the IUM in the 1990s before graduating, noted that the Arabic language skills that he 
had acquired there had given him access to a whole new array of religious texts, 
facilitating his own subsequent independent studies. After returning to the United 
Kingdom, he moved in networks which connected in part to a circle of prominent 
Jordanian Salafi scholars, including Muhammad Musa Al Nasr, Salim ibn ʿId al-Hilali and 
ʿAli ibn Hasan al-Halabi. Since these men had studied under the former IUM staff 
member Nasir al-Din al-Albani in Jordan following his expulsion from Saudi Arabia, and 
since al-Albani’s thinking and works remained a palpable influence in Medina during 
this former student’s own time there, he suggested that this had been a quite natural 
transition.312 
It is worth noting that cultural capital may even be accumulated from outside the 
religious sphere in ways which serve to bolster graduates’ religious standing, 
underlining the porosity of different social fields. Many graduates, for example, go on 
to enrol on postgraduate and doctoral programmes in Islamic studies in secular 
universities, and they may display these achievements alongside their IUM 
qualifications in contexts like online profiles on the websites of religious projects. Here, 
in ways which parallel the earlier discussion of a South African graduate’s use of 
resources accumulated at the IUM as a foundation for a career in secular academia, it 
is clear that symbolic resources may transfer across different social fields and may 
have value in different spheres of life. 
Even to the extent that IUM graduates rely on spiritual capital accumulated at the IUM 
to bolster their religious authority, they may do so in a variety of ways. This includes 
not only displaying their IUM qualifications or legitimating their own views with 
reference to the positions of contemporary Saudi scholars but also drawing on 
embodied capacities like knowledge of scripture, classical works and the Arabic 
language, in order to back up their own stances and projects. Indeed, they may shift 
between registers, drawing on these various bases of authority when addressing 
different audiences or issues.313 They may also cite worldly experience as legitimating a 
                                                        
312 Interview with former IUM student L, 18 January 2011. 
313 Alex Thurston (forthcoming) has shown how northern Nigerian IUM graduates move 
between registers to legitimate their authority, tending to appeal to scripture and the 
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capacity to arrive at their own conclusions on the basis of their knowledge of scripture 
and classical works, even if these positions differ from those of contemporary Saudi 
scholars. ʿAbd al-Rahman ʿAbd al-Khaliq, for example, has emphasised his own 
knowledge of current affairs and claimed that those Salafi scholars who reject 
engagement in political activism – including major Saudi scholars – are hamstrung by 
their own ignorance of such matters (Wiktorowicz 2006, 224). Similarly, graduates may 
emphasise their experience of social life outside Saudi Arabia as a way of legitimising 
their capacity to interpret and apply religious principles in the particular environments 
in which they live. 
Through the processes described here, those IUM graduates who succeed in 
negotiating and maintaining positions of religious authority do so through dynamics of 
ongoing accumulation, investment and contestation which may play out locally but 
which also frequently span national borders. While actors linked directly with the IUM 
or the broader Saudi religious establishment exercise considerable weight in the 
context of these struggles, they are joined by laypersons and a diversity of religious 
authorities spread across countless local and national spaces. Through their 
engagement in these dynamics, IUM graduates – whilst utilising spiritual capital 
accumulated in Medina – may come to establish bases of authority with substantial 
autonomy with respect to the Saudi religious establishment. 
I conclude this section with a discussion of two artefacts which serve to illustrate the 
dynamics discussed here and which help to show how graduates may make use of 
religious authority deriving in part from an IUM education in ways which do not 
necessarily coincide with the ambitions of Saudi scholars or the Saudi state. 
The first of these artefacts is an article posted on the MuslimMatters.org website in 
2007 by Yasir Qadhi, the United States-born IUM graduate who is dean of academic 
affairs at AlMaghrib Institute, in which he announces that he has put his signature to a 
Pledge of Mutual Respect and Cooperation with dozens of Sunni figures both inside 
                                                                                                                                                                  
“classical Salafi canon” when addressing lay audiences, but invoking their knowledge of the 
positions held by modern scholars like al-Albani and Ibn Baz in the context of more involved 
debates about orthopraxy with audiences including “rival Salafis”. 
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and outside the United States (Qadhi 2007). The signatories include other IUM 
graduates like his AlMaghrib colleagues Muhammad AlShareef and Yaser Birjas, and 
Tawfique Chowdhury of AlKauthar Institute. They also include dozens of other figures 
from within and outside the Salafi fold, including some who are widely considered 
anathema in Salafi circles for their perceived creedal deviations. Qadhi’s assent to the 
pledge may be understood in the context of his broader self-declared project of 
promoting a form of religiosity amenable to life as part of a Muslim minority 
community in the United States and simultaneously grounded in core aspects of the 
Salafi creed taught in Medina.314 It is worth noting that he has in recent years 
repeatedly distanced himself from the label “Salafi”, noting in another context that 
while he is in agreement with Salafis on most matters of theology, “I have departed 
from that movement in many issues, most importantly in how it has traditionally 
viewed and dealt with opposing groups” (Qadhi 2011).315 
The lengthy comments thread which follows Qadhi’s announcement of his 
involvement in the Pledge of Mutual Respect and Cooperation on the 
MuslimMatters.org website includes remarks by an array of actors, including other 
regular contributors to the same site, lay Muslims and duʿāt. Many are strongly 
supportive of the pledge and of Qadhi’s involvement in it. Others, however, charge 
that it legitimises the beliefs and practices of Muslims who are not committed to Salafi 
creed and that it will represent an obstacle to open critique of their positions. Those 
leaving comments express their own views, sometimes citing texts from the Qurʾan or 
the Sunna, or the expressed views of contemporary scholars. Several critics of the 
pledge also question whether it has been approved by senior scholars, suggesting that 
mere duʿāt like Qadhi are not qualified to take such a step of their own accord. In the 
penultimate intervention before the thread is closed for fear of “creating more ill-will 
and going around in circles”, Yasir Qadhi once again defends his decision to sign. He 
advances several arguments in response to the points raised, including emphasising his 
belief that the document does not trivialise the differences between the various 
                                                        
314 Cf. Qadhi 2011. This article is a response to Elliott 2011, a profile of Qadhi published earlier 
in the New York Times. 
315 See also “Salafi Muslims: Following the Ancestors of Islam” 2013, a recent interview with 
Qadhi in which he discusses the label “Salafi”. 
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theological traditions, and that it will not stand in the way of measured discussion of 
those differences in appropriate, scholarly settings. He also argues that it is legitimate 
for duʿāt operating in contexts like the United States to make judgements and 
decisions on such matters based on their experience of life in these settings: 
five years ago, I was the senior-most American student at the Islamic University of 
Madinah, and the most active Western student as well... Yet, if I had been approached 
with this very document, in all likelihood I would have raised many of the same concerns 
that these brothers (most of whom are presently oversees) have raised, and I would 
have refused to sign it. Yet, here I am, five years later, signing such a document and 
seeing this as a good matter for the Muslims of N. America. Experience teaches one just 
as much as books do, and in these last years that I have been giving dawah, I have 
softened greatly in the harshness that I used to exhibit against the Asharis and moderate 
Sufis. Yes, they still have mistakes, some of them very serious, but seeing the entire 
context of our Western situation first-hand has made me realize that there is little to be 
gained by such harshness, especially in the times and place we live…. My theology hasn’t 
change one iota, but my attitudes towards specific groups has. And it is well known that 
muʿamalah316 with other groups is a context-based matter, and not one that has specific 
rulings in the Shareeʿah. 
Addressing the question of whether he ought to refer the matter to senior scholars, 
Qadhi emphasises that he has “conferred with the people of knowledge whom I look 
up to and who are more aware of our situation than overseas Mashayikh”.317 However, 
he asserts that this is not a matter in which it is necessary to defer to the judgement of 
the religious establishment either in Saudi Arabia or elsewhere: 
If I myself, having experienced first-hand the Western situation for the last few years, 
have changed my own views, and I am from the West, how would I then expect an 
alim318 who has lived his entire life in India or Saudi to understand our situation? 
Sometimes we place our ulamaa above the level they deserve, and that is a fact that 
needs to be said plainly and clearly. I say this with the utmost respect to them... But, in 
the end of the day, they are human beings, and a product of their own culture and 
civilization, just like I am a product of mine. 
Taken as a whole, the article and the exchange of comments which follow it illustrate 
the extent to which the authority exercised by IUM graduates – just like that exercised 
by other religious figures – is a product of constant negotiation and renegotiation with 
a diversity of actors. The decision to invest one’s spiritual capital in any given project, 
like the pledge of cooperation at stake here, is always attended by the risk that this 
                                                        
316 Muʿāmalāt, matters pertaining to relations between people, are contrasted in Islamic law 
with ʿibādāt, matters pertaining to conduct towards God. 
317 Mashāyikh is the plural of shaykh. 
318 ʿĀlim is the singular of ʿulamaʾ. 
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capital may be squandered if the initiative in question is not well received (Verter 2003, 
169). The outcome may depend in part on positions taken by senior religious figures 
like the Saudi scholarly establishment. At the same time, the outcome may also 
depend on the responses of a host of other less weighty religious and lay actors. Such 
people may voice their own views in an array of in public settings, including online 
discussion threads, and may justify those views in a diversity of ways, including with 
reference to scripture or relevant statements by established religious authorities. In 
the context of these struggles, IUM graduates may be able to combine capital 
accumulated in Medina with other claims to authority – such as practical experience of 
life as a member of a Muslim minority community in the United States – to establish a 
position of religious influence with some degree of autonomy with respect to the 
scholarly milieu in which they attained their own qualifications. 
In other instances, this dynamic of IUM graduates exercising authority autonomously 
of the Saudi religious establishment can take on even starker forms. As Nina Glick 
Schiller has observed, imperialist projects like that instantiated in the IUM – which 
seek to exert influence over life within the territories of other states without exercising 
direct sovereignty over them – are “fraught with contradictions from which people can 
learn”. Migrants who find themselves imbricated in such projects may find ways of 
prising open such fractures (Schiller 2005, 444, 454). Narratives of religious legitimacy 
and universal mission of the kind institutionalised by the Saudi state in projects like the 
IUM, whilst they serve political ends, simultaneously pave the way for criticism 
grounded in religious discourse. IUM graduates mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
including the Yemeni Muqbil al-Wadiʿi, have at points in their careers used the 
positions of religious authority that they negotiated partly on the basis of capital 
accumulated in Medina in order to advance strident critiques of the Saudi political or 
religious establishments.319 As high-profile figures, located beyond the reach of the 
Riyadh regime but exerting authority within transnational debates which also span the 
borders of the kingdom itself, such individuals may prove significant antagonists. The 
                                                        
319 On the fractious relationship between al-Wadiʿi and the Saudi establishment, see Bonnefoy 
2011. 
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second artefact put forward for discussion here illustrates how such dynamics may 
play out. 
This artefact is a video of a lecture given by another United States-born IUM graduate, 
Ahmad Musa Jibril, which was posted on YouTube in March 2013 and which by 
November 2013 had received around 11,100 viewings.320 Another version posted on 
YouTube ten days after the first one, this time with Arabic subtitles such that it might 
potentially be accessed by non-English speaking audiences inside Saudi Arabia, had by 
November 2013 received some 7,200 viewings.321 A website described as being set up 
by students of Ahmad Musa Jibril states that he “spent part of his childhood in the city 
of Madina… when his father, Sheikh Musa Jibril, was a student of the Islamic University 
of Madina”. Having returned to the United States and finished high school there in 
1989, Ahmad Musa Jibril apparently went on to himself secure a degree in shariʿa from 
the IUM before settling once again in the United States.322 In the video, speaking in 
English, he advises his students that they may put away their notes from the class that 
has just finished – on Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s al-Usul al-Thalatha – because 
the lecture will deal with a separate subject. He goes on to speak about recent protests 
undertaken by women in the Saudi town of Burayda, calling for the release of their 
relatives detained in Saudi jails, and addresses in particular the arrests and treatment 
of some of these female protestors in turn. He invokes earlier times in Muslim history 
when he claims that women were treated as untouchable and contrasts this with the 
actions of the Saudi state, alleging that women arrested in the Burayda protests have 
been ill-treated and beaten in jail. He criticises Saudi scholars who have failed to speak 
out on the matter and describes the Saudi royals as tawāghīt (tyrants) and “bums that 
rule by an iron fist”. Urging his audience to feel solidarity with the arrested protestors, 
he concludes by expressing the hope that God will paralyse, destroy and humiliate 
“any hands that touch them… or those mouths who order those to touch them”. 
Throughout this lecture, Ahmad Musa Jibril lends religious legitimacy to his arguments 
by drawing on his ability to cite hadiths and statements by the Prophet, to invoke 
                                                        
320 Free Our Sisters!! Shaykh Ahmad Musa Jibril 2013. 
321 al-Shaykh Ahmad Jibril Hafizahu Allah Nusra li-l-Haraʾir 2013. 
322 “About AhmadJibril.com” 2013. 
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specific episodes in Islamic history, and to appeal to works by past scholars like al-
Dhahabi, Ibn Kathir, al-Biruni, Yaʿqut al-Hamawi, al-Masʿudi and al-Baladhuri, along 
with the views of modern figures like al-Albani. The video is illustrative of ways in 
which knowledge and other kinds of embodied capacities accumulated at least in part 
at the IUM may be used to construct an authoritative political critique of the very state 
and religious establishment which funded and operated that project in the first place. 
Conclusion 
There is no doubt that material investment channelled into the IUM project has fed 
into far-reaching dynamics of cultural transformation. The significance of this 
investment is that it has provided for new cross-border flows of religious migrants 
bearing particular forms of spiritual capital, flows which have in turn contributed to the 
emergence and consolidation of Salafi currents in locations around the world. Whether 
or not they were already inclined towards Salafi modes of religiosity prior to travelling 
to Medina, time spent studying at the IUM has offered many of its graduates new 
bases of religious authority and influence grounded in bodies of knowledge and skills 
rooted in the Wahhabi and broader Salafi traditions. 
Yet far from proceeding mechanically, these dynamics have been refracted through 
the agency of an array of actors. While this chapter can by no means claim to present a 
comprehensive account of the trajectories of the many thousands of migrant students 
who have passed through these circuits, or to identify generalisable patterns in their 
behaviours, the insights that it offers are sufficient to establish a significant degree of 
diversity and fluidity within the overarching dynamic of Wahhabi religious expansion. 
Students themselves have evaluated the IUM’s teachings on the basis of tastes and 
dispositions forged prior to their arrival in the kingdom. While many have embraced 
the university’s missionary project, others have rejected it outright or have negotiated 
more subtle forms of engagement, finding ways of benefiting from the material and 
symbolic resources available on and around the IUM campus without necessarily 
assenting to its Wahhabi-influenced message. Moreover, in addition to functioning as 
resources in struggles to define Islamic orthodoxy, the forms of spiritual capital 
institutionalised in the IUM and embodied in its graduates have also in themselves 
become objects of struggle, as lay actors and established authorities around the world 
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have fiercely debated their value. Graduates who have succeeded in using these 
resources as bases for securing positions of authority in their communities of origin or 
transnationally have done so through processes of negotiation, contestation and 
ongoing accumulation which have played out far from Saudi Arabia. The forms of 
authority which emerge from these struggles may often be exercised with 
considerable autonomy with respect to the Saudi religious and political establishments. 
Investing in bringing religious migrants to Medina and providing them with a particular 
array of symbolic resources has allowed the Saudi state and its Wahhabi allies to exert 
considerable influence in far-flung locations. At the same time, migrant students 
themselves have found a certain amount of room for manoeuvre within the terms of 
these dynamics. Saudi elites have been faced with an inability to determine the precise 
ways in which resources made available in Medina are put to use, or to predict or 
control the ultimate social, cultural and political ramifications of their investment. 
 256 
Conclusion 
That Saudi “petrodollars” have played a role in the spread of Salafi currents in 
locations around the world since the 1970s has long been a commonplace assumption 
amongst scholars of the Middle East and media commentators alike. This thesis has 
explored just one aspect of the far broader array of ways in which these dynamics are 
said to have played out; that is, through developments which have occurred at the 
intersection between migration, education and state-backed religious mission. With a 
view to historicising these issues and moving past broad generalisations, I have 
developed a focused narrative of the role played by Saudi state-funded educational 
institutions in the extension of religious influence outwards from Najd and ultimately 
to locations across the globe from the 1920s onwards. Seeking a non-deterministic and 
non-reductionist account of how material investment by Saudi state actors has fed into 
dynamics of cultural transformation in far-flung locations, I have suggested 
understanding this history with reference to a conception of transnational religious 
economies consisting in flows – both within and across national borders – of material 
capital, spiritual capital, religious migrants and social technologies. Whilst taking into 
account the importance of material wealth, a historiography grounded in this 
approach can help to bring to light the complex tableau of actors, resources, power 
relations, historical contingencies, multivalent border crossings, and discursive shifts 
involved in the efforts of Saudi actors to exert religious influence far beyond the 
kingdom’s own territories. 
Education has served as a tool for promoting Wahhabism ever since the inception of 
Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s revivalist mission in eighteenth-century Najd. 
However, this project underwent a pivotal transformation in the occupied Hijaz of the 
1920s, with the assembling of a bureaucratised education system directly funded and 
administered by the Saudi state. As part of ongoing processes of state- and nation-
building from that time onwards, material investment in this apparatus was employed 
as a means for systematically advancing Wahhabi influence across and ultimately 
beyond the Peninsula. State-funded religious instruction offered to Saudi subjects and 
later to non-Saudis acquainted them with tenets rooted in the Wahhabi tradition. But 
this material investment also made possible the accumulation by students of spiritual 
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capital, including certificates of qualification and an array of embodied competencies. 
At least insofar as the forms of capital in question might come to be recognised as 
legitimate and valuable in any given social context, these resources offered potential 
bases of religious authority that could be used to assert an understanding of Islam in 
keeping with Wahhabi norms. In this sense, material wealth represented a source of 
power in the context of ever-unfolding social struggles to define Islamic orthodoxy. 
Social technologies of education appropriated firstly from the vestiges of the Ottoman 
and Sharifian Hijaz, and later from further afield, offered new means for facilitating, 
monitoring and managing these transactions in material and immaterial capital. 
At the same time, the question of legitimacy helped to ensure that these processes 
were always, inevitably about far more than material investment alone. In the context 
of the Saudi-occupied Hijaz, the legitimacy of the Wahhabi tradition and the value of 
spiritual capital accumulated within the terms of that tradition were profoundly 
contested. The same was true from the early 1960s, when domestic politicking and 
geopolitical considerations in the Cold War context led the monarchy to sponsor a 
concerted drive to extend religious influence beyond the Arabian Peninsula. Strategies 
which addressed the problem of legitimacy to some extent in the 1920s Hijaz 
reappeared in new forms in connection with later projects like the Islamic University of 
Medina. The institutions in question in each case co-opted religious migrants from 
across the Middle East and beyond, who not only performed the skilled labour of 
instruction and administration but also brought legitimating symbolic resources of 
their own; lent a veneer of Islamic universality to projects which were at root 
concerned with the promotion of a very particular set of beliefs and practices; could 
mediate in the conflicts which arose from this contentious endeavour; and, in the case 
of the IUM, helped to connect the university to the far-flung communities to which it 
was to preach. The use of education to promote Wahhabi concerns in the Hijaz and 
then later beyond the Peninsula also involved adjustments to religious discourse which 
could go some way towards securing legitimacy for those traditions with new 
audiences. The extension of Wahhabi influence was further complicated insofar as it 
was refracted through the agency of students themselves. 
 258 
While there is a growing body of serious research on religion and politics in Saudi 
Arabia, the empirical account offered in this thesis goes substantially beyond the 
existing secondary literature in unpacking the history of the particular set of 
institutions and dynamics at stake in these processes. To the extent that the 
missionary projects of institutions like the IUM have been treated in academic works 
and media coverage to date, these discussions have been at best quite fleeting. At 
worst, they have been characterised by broad generalisations, ill-founded assumptions 
and often elementary inaccuracies. 
The most basic way in which the present study contributes to the existing literature 
discussed in the introduction to this thesis is by offering considerable evidence to 
corroborate and add detail to earlier suggestions, invariably made more or less in 
passing, that cross-border religious educational circuits centred on institutions like the 
IUM must be taken into account as an important factor in any effort to understand the 
worldwide proliferation of Salafi modes of religiosity since the mid-twentieth century. 
This is not to suggest that the spread of Salafism in recent decades is nothing more 
than a product of Saudi machinations. Salafi currents around the world often have at 
least partially indigenous roots – tracing back to movements like the Ahl-i Hadith in 
South Asia and Ansar al-Sunna in Egypt, or to individuals like Muhammad al-Shawkani 
in Yemen – which may pre-date even the founding of the contemporary Saudi state. 
Salafis have flourished in situations where direct Saudi involvement is not an obvious 
factor. Moreover, Salafi currents are frequently shaped and reshaped in part by long-
distance connections which bypass Saudi Arabia altogether, as communication and 
transportation technologies increasingly facilitate the circulation of scholars, students 
and literature across borders. Nonetheless, this thesis has emphasised the scale of 
missionary projects like the IUM, which alone has absorbed many hundreds of millions 
of dollars’ worth of investment and has drawn in many thousands of students from the 
furthest reaches of the globe.323 It is not the case that all IUM graduates self-identify as 
Salafi or that all would be identified by others as such, and it would be unwise indeed 
                                                        
323 A rough calculation based on figures given in al-Ghamidi 1998, 281 suggests that the 
amount spent on the IUM between 1961 and 1998 alone had already reached a total that 
would be equivalent to well over 1,400 million US dollars at today’s exchange rates. 
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to pigeonhole all of those who have passed through these migratory circuits. 
Nonetheless, it is certainly true that, upon their return to their countries of origin or in 
the other locations in which they have settled, many graduates have put resources 
accumulated in Medina to work in bolstering existing Salafi movements and circles. 
Many have also succeeded in setting themselves up as authoritative points of 
reference in their own right, either as individuals or through newly established 
religious educational institutions. In this way, whether as recognised scholars or as 
lesser duʿāt or ṭalabat ʿilm, they have in turn often brought instruction grounded in 
Salafi theology to very large new audiences. Others still have engaged in similar 
processes in less eye-catching ways, at the level of individual communities and 
mosques. 
As much as these dynamics have involved flows of persons and resources outwards 
from Saudi Arabia, they have clearly also involved flows into the kingdom. With regard 
to the ongoing debate concerning the extent of the role played by foreign Muslim 
Brothers and other migrant actors in influencing the Islamist scene in Saudi Arabia, this 
study raises a number of relevant points. It would be overstating the case to suggest 
that migrant staff members represented nothing more than units of labour within the 
circuits which grew up around the IUM, merely delivering course content prepared for 
them by the Wahhabi establishment. Many migrants in fact claimed to have 
contributed to shaping instruction there, and these claims are corroborated by the fact 
that the university’s syllabuses came to include texts from well outside the Wahhabi 
tradition. Amongst them were works clearly associated with the Islamist social 
movements whose members took up roles in Medina.324 I have also highlighted at 
least circumstantial evidence to suggest that migrant staff members may have played a 
certain role in broader shifts in teaching, including the early move away from the 
Hanbali fiqh historically associated with the Wahhabi tradition towards a more 
explicitly comparative jurisprudential approach. Furthermore, foreign staff held 
important posts like overseeing the system of social supervision on campus and editing 
                                                        
324 Just a few examples include works by the Ahl-i Hadith forebear Siddiq Hasan Khan, Ansar al-
Sunna’s Muhammad Khalil Harras, the Egyptian Muslim Brother Sayyid Qutb and his brother 
Muhammad Qutb (al-Ghamidi 1998, 55; al-ʿAbbud 2004, 442, 543, 603, 638, 649). 
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the university journal, a publication which approvingly published articles by and about 
Islamist movements and thinkers from around the world. 
Nonetheless, this thesis has underlined the extent to which such contributions were 
made within a system which was funded and administered by, and which was 
ultimately answerable to, the Saudi religious and political establishments. To admit the 
importance of the involvement of migrant actors is not to shift responsibility for the 
anti-Semitism, sectarianism and xenophobia that so often marked university syllabuses 
and literature. The IUM from the start was not a product of cosmopolitan interactions 
between actors from diverse backgrounds on an equal footing; it was a project 
designed to serve the political interests of the Saudi regime upon which it relied for its 
very existence, and to promote core tenets in line with those of the Saudi religious 
establishment. Even if migrant actors participated as more than just units of skilled 
labour, their labour was indeed an important resource in the service of this Saudi 
project. These migrants also represented a resource for Saudi elites in a more complex 
sense, insofar as they brought symbolic resources including qualifications acquired in 
established centres of learning around the world. The fact that these resources were 
drawn from outside Saudi Arabia, and held cachet in the world beyond the kingdom, 
was important for legitimating a missionary project which aspired to be taken seriously 
by audiences far and wide. 
Even to the extent that the presence of foreign staff members and also foreign 
students from diverse backgrounds appears to have influenced the content of teaching 
at the IUM, this need not be understood as a dilution or weakening of the institution’s 
Wahhabi missionary drive. Rather, it may be understood in terms of a process whereby 
the absorption of resources, actors and discourses from beyond the kingdom in fact 
served to strengthen the capacity of a Wahhabi missionary project to exert influence 
over diverse audiences. Core tenets, like the tripartite Salafi conception of tawḥīd 
which has always been at the heart of the Wahhabi tradition, were not allowed to slip. 
To the extent that shifts in teaching are discernable, as in relation to fiqh, these 
occurred within the terms of the Wahhabi and broader Salafi discursive traditions. 
Importantly, there is clear evidence that these shifts were understood as contributing 
to the capacity of the university to position itself as a supplier of religious resources to 
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migrant students within a shared moral and intellectual framework. These adjustments 
to the content of teaching were seen as advantageous partly because it was 
understood that they might remove barriers to securing students’ assent to and active 
participation in the university’s missionary project, which ultimately rested on the core 
matter of creed rather than jurisprudence. 
Considerations such as these problematise the metaphor of the “export of 
Wahhabism”. This metaphor serves a purpose insofar as it draws attention to 
increasing religious influence exerted abroad by Saudi actors in recent decades. 
However, in suggesting the straightforward transposition of a pristine set of ideas and 
practices from one location to another, it distracts attention from the complex ways in 
which this influence has been achieved. It is certainly true that the missionary project 
institutionalised in the IUM may legitimately be described as Wahhabi, insofar as it 
was from the start managed by figures from the heart of the Wahhabi establishment 
and insofar as its syllabuses – particularly in relation to the key issue of tawḥīd – were 
rooted in principles in keeping with the Wahhabi framework of inquiry. However, the 
export metaphor fails to capture the fact that the IUM drew heavily on personnel from 
social and religious backgrounds which had little at all to do with Wahhabism, and that 
its syllabuses simultaneously came to feature texts, disciplines and ideas which had far 
more to do with the broader Salafi and Islamic traditions than with Wahhabism per se. 
If one is to reach for a metaphor to describe what is going on here, the idea of 
expansion is more appropriate than that of export. This metaphor makes room for the 
fact that what was occurring through these processes was a dynamic of hegemonic 
expansion of the Wahhabi mission. This involved transformations of the missionary 
project itself through the very process of its appropriation of persons, resources and 
discourses from outside the Wahhabi tradition and from outside the Saudi national 
sphere, and in the very course of efforts to articulate the core concerns of that project 
with the dispositions and aspirations of a diversity of actors from around the world. 
There are many senses in which all this has involved an extension of “soft power”, as 
earlier commentators have suggested. That said, it is necessary to be nuanced about 
who has wielded this power and what precisely this power has consisted in. By 
drawing thousands of migrants into its orbit, the IUM forged new networks of relations 
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both within and across borders, between the university’s state funders, the Wahhabi 
establishment which oversaw its functioning, the foreign staff who played a large role 
in implementing teaching, the foreign students who filled its classrooms, and the 
communities within which those students have made lives for themselves after 
graduation. Most fundamentally, the historiography employed in this thesis draws 
attention to the ways in which the terms of these relationships were defined by the 
uneven distribution of resources. Whether staff members were genuinely committed 
or not to the IUM’s teachings, as migrant workers seeking access to a share of the 
material resources which flowed downwards from state actors through the university 
apparatus their options for introducing radical changes were clearly limited. Similarly, 
migrant students arriving in Medina as recipients of scholarships were in no position to 
bring about major changes in how the system operated; meaning that those who 
objected strongly to the university’s teachings had little option but to remove 
themselves from the situation. On the other hand, those who stayed could accumulate 
resources in the form of spiritual capital which could then contribute to setting the 
terms of relations of power and authority between them and members of their 
communities of origin or other actors with whom they would come into contact after 
graduation. As I have suggested, the balance of relations as defined by the distribution 
of resources was in many cases further bolstered by other kinds of power, including 
discursive and bureaucratic forms. 
What emerges from this picture is not a realist image of a unitary state seamlessly 
extending its power outwards over an ever-increasing array of actors, according to 
some coherent grand design reflective of national interests. Rather, it is the 
proliferation of a far more complex network of power relations between an array of 
state and non-state actors, both within and across borders. Saudi state actors and the 
Wahhabi religious establishment have certainly exerted a great deal of sway within 
this network of relations by virtue of their privileged access to both material and 
immaterial resources, and their capacity to control the distribution of those resources. 
Yet non-state actors including IUM graduates have also had a certain amount of room 
for manoeuvre, in some instances even using resources acquired within these 
networks as foundations for attacks on the Saudi state itself. By injecting new reserves 
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of capital into transnational religious economies, Saudi state actors have been able to 
exert considerable influence within the territories of other states around the world; 
but that influence has not necessarily constituted control. 
The heuristic framework developed in this thesis offers tools for making sense of the 
ways in which economic conditions may impact on the capacity of actors to exercise 
power within always-unfolding struggles to define orthodoxy, and thereby to shape 
the evolution of religious traditions. This conceptual framework could be further 
developed with the introduction of the notion of social capital, which has not been a 
focus of analysis here. In its existing or developed form, this mode of analysis might be 
used as a basis for exploring other phenomena which have been identified as possible 
aspects of wider processes of Wahhabi religious expansion, including the funding of 
Islamic charities, movements and missionary organisations like the Muslim World 
League, or the sponsorship of certain kinds of religious publishing. It might also be 
used as a starting point for exploring the cross-border influence exerted by other 
religious educational institutions, Islamic or otherwise. If a broader conception of 
cultural capital were to be reintroduced in place of spiritual capital, a notion of 
transnational symbolic economies might even help to account for comparable 
dynamics relating to secular institutions. One might think of the Patrice Lumumba 
University, the founding of which by the Soviets at the height of the Cold War in 1960 
with a view to training students from developing countries bears direct comparison 
with the genesis of the IUM.325 
In relation to the topic at hand, it is clear that the present study represents only a point 
of departure. The IUM as an institution and the broader processes of religious 
expansion within which it is situated have undergone many changes over the past half 
a century and will certainly continue to do so into the future. To move past the often 
shrill discourse that surrounds the issues at stake in this thesis, to arrive at historical 
detail and nuance where previously there have been sweeping generalisations and 
innuendo, will inevitably require a great deal of further work. It is hoped that this 
                                                        
325 I am grateful to John Chalcraft for suggesting this parallel. 
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project may at least have laid some foundations and suggested some possible avenues 
for ongoing enquiry. 
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